Ethnic Voting in the Andes: How Ethnicity and Ethnic Attitudes Shape Voters' Presidential Vote Choice

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Declaration

I, Sam G W Kelly, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

Abstract

The rise of ethnic politics has been a prominent feature of Latin America's recent history, particularly in the Andes where much of the population claim some indigenous descent. Prominent politicians use ethnicity to frame important aspects of their political projects and identities, survey data show an emerging ethnic voting gap in several countries, and political protests, debates, and media coverage periodically expose strong ethnic undercurrents. Yet existing scholarship has not examined the precise nature or implications of ethnicity's role in electoral processes, and thus key questions about ethnic politics in Latin America remain unanswered. How and why do voters use ethnic information in their decision-making? What is the impact of ethnic voting on both the quality and terms of democratic representation? And how do wider contextual factors affect the occurrence and nature of ethnic voting? These questions have important implications for assessing how (and how well) elections fulfil their representational and accountability functions, how candidates can and do appeal to different sectors of the electorate, and the wider prospects for democratic stability in the region. This thesis addresses these questions through a comparative study of ethnic politics and electoral democracy in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, with a focus on presidential voting. The research design combines statistical analysis of nationally representative survey data, a computer-based 'mock election' experiment, and a range of materials from candidates' campaign publicity, mainstream and social media, and other sources. By examining the ways in which ethnicity shapes the preferences and electoral decision-making of individual voters, the thesis aims to provide new insight into the underlying processes that drive such political behaviour. Although the empirical focus is on three Latin American countries, the thesis has broader theoretical ambitions, and its analysis builds on, and seeks to contribute to, a wider comparative politics literature.

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List of Abbreviations

ADN	Acción Democrática Nacionalista (Nationalist Democratic Action)
AF	Alianza por el Futuro (Alliance for the Future)
AME	Average Marginal Effects (Statistical)
AP	Acción Popular (Popular Action)
APGC	Alianza por el Gran Cambio (Alliance for Great Change)
APR	Adjusted Probability at Representative Values (Statistical)
APRA	Partido Aprista Peruano (Peruvian Aprista Party)
ASP	Asamblea de la Soberanía de los Pueblos (Assembly for the Sovereignty of the Peoples)
CIDOB	Confederación Indígena del Oriente Boliviano (Indigenous Confederation of Eastern Bolivia)
CMS	Coordinadora de Movimientos Sociales (Coordinator of Social Movements)
CNE	Corte Nacional Electoral (National Electoral Court)
CONAIE	Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador)
CONFENAIE	Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon)
CSUTCB	Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (Unique Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia)
DINEIB	Dirección Nacional de Educación Intercultural (National Interculrural Education Directorate)
DPTE	Dynamic Process Tracing Environment
ECUARUNARI	Ecuador Runacunapac Riccharimui (Awakening of Ecuadorian People)
FC	Frente de Centro (Centre Front)
FEINE	Federación Ecuatoriana de Iglesias Evangélicas (Ecuadorian Federation of Evangelical Churches)
FENOCIN	Federación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas, Indígenas y Negras (National Federation of Peasant, Indigenous, and Black Organisations)
FTA	Free-Trade Agreement
F11	Fuerza11 (Force 11)
ID	Izquierda Democrática (Democratic Left)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISPS	Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos (Political Instrument for the Sovereingty of the Peoples)

LAPOP	Latin American Public Opinion Project
MAS	Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement towards Socialism)
MCNP	Movimiento Ciudadano Nuevo País (Citizen Movement New Country)
MNR	Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (Revolutionary Nationalist Movement)
MUPP	Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik (Pachakutik Plurinational Unity Movement)
NFR	Nueva Fuerza Republicana (New Republican Force)
NP	Nuevo País (New Country)
ONPE	Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (National Office of Electoral Processes)
PNP	Partido Nacionalista Peruano (Peruvian Nationalist Party)
PODEMOS	Poder Democrático y Social (Social and Democratic Power)
PP	Perú Posible (Peru Possible)
PPB-CN	Plan Progreso para Bolivia – Convergencía Nacional (Plan Progress for Bolivia – National Convergence)
PPC	Partido Popular Cristiano (Popular Christian Party)
PRIAN	Partido Renovador Institucional Acción Nacional (Institutional Renewal Party of National Action)
PSC	Partido Social Cristiano (Social Christian Party)
PS-FA	Partido Socialista – Frente Amplio (Socialist Party – Broad Front)
PSP	Partido Sociedad Partiótica, 21 de Enero (Patriotic Society Party, 21st of January)
RED	Red Ética y Democrática (Ethnics and Democracy Network)
TSE	Tribunal Supremo Electoral (Supreme Electoral Tribunal)
UN	Unidad Nacional (National Unity)
UPP	Unión por el Perú (Union for Peru)

Chapter One

Ethnicity, Elections, and Democracy in Latin America

The rise of ethnic politics has been a prominent feature of Latin America's recent history. Since the return to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s, powerful indigenous movements have emerged to challenge government policy and demand social, economic, and political reform, propelling indigenous actors and issues into the national political arena. Prominent politicians and parties have increasingly used ethnicity to frame important aspects of their political projects and identities; they have embraced indigenous demands, employed indigenous symbols in their campaigns, and emphasised the non-European heritage they share with much of the population. Additionally, survey data from several Latin American countries show the emergence of a pronounced ethnic voting gap in major national elections, with many voters showing a marked preference for candidates from the same, or a related, ethnic group (Madrid 2012, 1).[1] Beyond the direct political acts of organised protest, electoral campaigning, and voting, the politicisation of ethnicity has stirred ethnic tensions in the region more generally. The use of ethnic referents to frame social and political issues, as well as explicit racism, has recurrently featured in mass media, popular political debates, and public demonstrations and rallies around contentious issues (García and Lucero 2008; Espósito 2010; Ardito 2011; Lupien 2013).

Yet despite evidence that ethnic identities and issues may be important components of contemporary Latin American politics, the existing scholarship has not fully addressed the nature or implications of ethnicity's role in electoral processes. How and why do voters use ethnic information in their decision-making? What is the impact of ethnic voting on both the quality and terms of democratic representation? And how do wider contextual factors affect the occurrence and nature of ethnic voting? These questions have important implications for assessing how (and how well) elections fulfil their representational and accountability

[1] The concept of ethnic identity and group has been the subject of much scholarly debate, particularly in Latin America (e.g., Wade 1997, 2003; de la Cadena 2001; Stepan 1991). This thesis defines ethnicity in the broadest possible sense as social categories in which descent-based markers are important for membership (see discussion later in this chapter for a more detailed definition).

functions, how candidates can and do appeal to different sectors of the electorate, and the wider prospects for democratic stability in the region.

This thesis addresses these questions through a comparative study of ethnic politics and electoral democracy in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, with a focus on presidential voting. Each of these countries has large indigenous populations, and, unsurprisingly, the emergence of ethnic politics has been most pronounced in these countries. The research design combines a variety of quantitative and qualitative data, including nationally representative surveys from each country, results from a 'mock election' voting experiment in Peru, and a range of materials from candidates' campaign publicity, mainstream and social media, and other sources. The analysis is concerned not only with the identification of ethnic voting behaviour in the three countries under investigation, but also with the underlying constituent processes through which ethnicity shapes vote choice. Ultimately, each aspect of the analysis contributes towards a broader assessment of how ethnic voting shapes the electoral relationship between voters and candidates, as well as the more general social and political characteristics of the polities in question. Although the empirical focus is on three Latin American countries, the thesis has broader theoretical ambitions, and its analysis builds on, and seeks to contribute to, a wider comparative politics literature.

This introductory chapter is structured as follows. First, it frames ethnic voting in the wider context of elections and their democratic function as instruments of political representation and accountability, a basic framework that is developed more fully later in this introduction. After defining some key terminology, the next section outlines the principal line of argument in the thesis, and places the research in the context of existing scholarship. The two following sections offer an overview of Latin American ethnic politics, and general theories of ethnic voting, respectively. These sections link broader empirical and theoretical contexts to the specific aims of this research. The final two sections lay out the research design, which is elaborated more fully in Chapter Two, and preview the remaining chapters.

Elections, Representation, and Ethnic Voting

Competitive elections are the bare minimum requirement for democracies (Schumpeter 1950, 269). Elections provide the basic instrument for citizens to express their wishes to policymakers, to structure debate about public policy, and to ensure leaders are held accountable for their performance in government (Powell 2000, 4). In representative democracy, voters can express their preferences and be included in the political process by

choosing candidates who represent their interests. With periodic elections, voters can subsequently hold elected leaders accountable for their performance in office, rewarding those who perform well with re-election, and punishing those who perform poorly by removing them from government. Thus, in order for elections to perform their basic representational and accountability functions, voters must have enough information to identify the candidate who best represents their interests, and they must be sufficiently vigilant to judge the performance of elected leaders in office.

However, the interests and characteristics for which voters seek representation, and thus the criteria on which they judge leaders' performance, may vary considerably. On the one hand, voters may seek substantive representation for their policy-based interests, which may include broad values and ideology, as well as specific questions of public policy related to material concerns. On the other hand, voters may seek descriptive representation for certain salient demographic characteristics, electing leaders who reflect their gender, occupation, region, or ethnic background.[2] These candidate selection criteria have important implications for the quality of elections' representative and accountability mechanisms. If voters select candidates based on descriptive characteristics, they lose much of their control over the programmatic political agenda. Leaders enter office with no clear policy-based mandate, and even with the best intentions, they may struggle to represent effectively the interests of their constituents. This scenario may also weaken accountability because leaders will have little incentive to follow the preferences of citizens, or be concerned about their substantive performance, if voters remain loyal electorally on purely descriptive grounds.

However, descriptive representation may also have some positive effects on democratic stability and participation, which ultimately strengthen the electoral process. Some studies have shown descriptive representation to increase the perceived legitimacy and efficacy of the political system, strengthening trust in government and contributing to greater democratic stability (Swain 1993; Mansbridge 1999; Michelson, 2000; Gay, 2001; Tate, 2001; Banducci et al., 2004; Griffin and Keane, 2006; Jones 2011). This may be particularly important in cases where certain groups have previously been marginalised from the political process. Conversely, many of the same studies have found the lack of such descriptive

[2] The term 'descriptive representation' was coined by Griffiths and Wollheim (1960, 188) and adopted by Pitkin (1967). In much of the subsequent literature, descriptive representation is juxtaposed to 'substantive representation', what Griffiths and Wollheim refer to as 'representation of interests' (1960, 190). There is a large literature on the relative merits of descriptive and substantive representation, mostly in reference to minority groups including ethnic groups (e.g., Preston 1978; Grofman 1982; Swain 1993; Phillips 1995; Williams 1998; Mansbridge 1999; Banducci et al., 2004; Griffin and Keane, 2006; Jones 2011).

representation to increase feelings of distrust and antipathy towards a political system that is seen as unresponsive to citizens' needs, leading to greater instability and the possible breakdown of democratic government.

Ultimately, whether or not descriptive representation improves or diminishes the quality of elections as democratic instruments depends on the underlying motivation of voters. Of course, such motivations are also influenced by the behaviour of politicians and how they seek to mobilise voters with descriptive or substantive appeals. In general, descriptive representation as an expression of more or less unconditional group loyalty is likely to reduce the quality of electoral democracy, as outlined above. However, if descriptive representation leads to substantive representation because leaders tend to share and prioritise the interests of constituents from similar demographic backgrounds, then elections should still serve their basic democratic functions. Indeed, in this latter case, descriptive representation may actually improve substantive representation, with demographic characteristics providing a heuristic tool to help voters estimate the substantive profile of candidates. In short, the *nature* of descriptive representation, particularly its relationship to substantive representation, is crucial for assessing the quality of elections' democratic functions.[3]

Ethnic Voting

In multi-ethnic societies, voters may seek descriptive representation based on ethnic background, thus engaging in ethnic voting. Ethnic voting occurs when members of the same ethnic group show an affinity for a particular party or candidate that cannot be explained by other demographic or substantive factors (Wolfinger 1974, 41). Descriptive *ethnic* representation – the most common aim of ethnic voting – may be an especially prominent form of descriptive representation because ethnic identities tend to be particularly visible, and, partly as a result, they are often linked to long-standing sociopolitical inequalities. Furthermore, ethnic background is often a key determinant of an individual's social and cultural environment, which in turn shapes broad worldviews, values, and perceptions of interest as a result of socialisation (Kinder 1981; Kinder and Sears 1985, Graves and Lee 2000). This may be particularly the case in societies where ethnic inequalities are pronounced, such as in many Latin American countries. Thus, ethnic identities are not only an easily-available heuristic cue, but they may also reflect a demographic feature that has a

[3] This applies not only to ethnic descriptive representation, but also to descriptive representation based on other characteristics (class, gender, geographical provenance, and so forth).

profound impact on voters' political predispositions, as well as their every-day social experiences, interactions, and opportunities.

These features of ethnic identities – physical visibility, spatial concentration, and social salience – not only make ethnicity a particularly likely basis for descriptive representation, but also a form of constituent-politician linkage that is particularly susceptible to more unconditional loyalties.[4] Indeed, in ethnically divided societies, politicians may seek to consolidate in-group descriptive loyalties by stirring inter-ethnic distrust and resentment, shifting electoral competition away from substantive issues and promoting a political landscape based on unconditional group allegiances. Aside from the obvious reduction in terms of substantive representation and accountability, this scenario is likely to exacerbate ethnic tensions and threatens a downward spiral into ethnic violence (Horowitz 1985). Thus, determining the relationship between substantive and descriptive representation, and particularly the underlying nature of the latter, may be particularly important when ethnicity is a prominent descriptive characteristic in the polity.

Definitions

This thesis defines *ethnicity* and *ethnic group* as categories "in which descent-based attributes are necessary for membership" (Chandra and Wilkinson 2008, 517). Typically, these categories are organised around relatively intransient characteristics such as physical appearance, language or accent, and family names (Chandra 2006; Birnir 2007, 3-4; Madrid 2012, 5-6). However, a wide range of other demographic and achieved markers may also contribute to the ascription of ethnic identities, including territorial origins, occupation, educational level, and dress. These markers relate to ethnic identities, not only regional, cultural, or class identities, because the underlying human 'types' they are perceived to denote are often conceived in terms of intrinsic core characteristics that are fundamentally heritable (Wade 2003, 270-6). Indeed, this thesis endorses a constructivist approach to defining ethnic identities in general, assuming not only that ethnic identities are denoted by multiple markers, but also that individuals have multiple ethnic identities. These identities are fluid and both conditioned by other forms of social identification and subject to change over time and according to circumstances (Barth 1969; Chandra 2011, 2004; Laitin 1998; Posner 2005; Wilkinson 2006).

[4] Previous studies have shown that ethnic inequalities and competition are likely to increase ethnic political activity (e.g., Kandeh 1992).

Indigenous peoples and *indigenous population* are defined according to the working definition of the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. Thus, indigenous peoples are those which "having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, considered themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them" (United Nations 1986, paragraph 379).[5]

In most cases, this thesis uses *indigenous voter* or *indigenous constituent* to refer to citizens who explicitly self-identify themselves as indigenous in census and survey interviews. It uses *mestizo* to refer to individuals who self-identify with a more ambiguous mixed ethnic identity (usually, although not exclusively, some combination of indigenous and European ancestry). *White* refers to citizens who self-identify as white or with a particular European identity. However, the thesis also uses the term *indigenous-mestizo* and *white-mestizo* to differentiate within the numerically large and characteristically diverse mestizo group. *Indigenous-mestizo* refers to individuals who self-identify as mestizo, but have closer family or cultural ties to indigenous communities (de la Cadena 2001). This includes, but is not limited to, self-identified mestizos who speak an indigenous language or had parents who did so. *White-mestizo* is used to refer to individuals who self-identify as mestizo, but whose background is characterised primarily by European rather than indigenous heritage. White-mestizos would typically have no knowledge of an indigenous language, and would not identify strongly with any specific indigenous culture.

In the discussion of electoral strategies, this thesis makes regular reference to *ethnic appeals* and *programmatic* or *substantive appeals* made by candidates to voters. Ethnic appeals may be both symbolic and substantive: *symbolic ethnic appeals* include the use of ethnic symbols (dress, phrases, locations, cultural products) or campaign rhetoric that implicitly or explicitly alludes to ethnic identities, either positively or negatively; *substantive ethnic appeals* include concrete policy proposals targeted at specific ethnic groups, or that disproportionately benefit or disadvantage specific ethnic groups. *Programmatic* or *substantive* appeals refer to rhetoric and policy pledges that focus on broad ideological values and preferences (e.g., increasing state interventionism or reducing inequality), specific policy issues (e.g., the nationalisation of hydrocarbons), or that are directly linked to material interests (e.g., expanding social assistance programmes).

[5] This is the definition used in much of the ethnic politics literature (Van Cott 2005, 1; Madrid 2012, 6).

Traditional or *conventional populism*, *neoliberal populism*, and *ethnopopulism* refer to various forms of populist political actors, rhetoric, and substantive agendas. All three forms of populism include personalistic leadership, anti-establishment rhetoric, and a focus on non-elite social sectors. In addition to these common characteristics, *traditional* or *conventional populism* also includes advocacy of state interventionism; *neoliberal populism* includes advocacy free-market economics; and *ethnopopulism* includes the use of ethnic appeals (Madrid 2012, 6-8).

This thesis follows Wolfinger in defining *ethnic voting* in broad terms as "situations in which ethnic group membership is an important independent variable in voting behaviour" (1974, 41). More specifically, it uses the term *ethnic bias* to refer to an observable bias in voting outcomes among members of a particular ethnic group that is not explained by other factors (e.g., other sociodemographic or political preference variables). The origin of such ethnic bias is conceived as some combination of psychological ethnic attachments that predispose voters towards an ethnically-proximate candidate (the result of *expressive ethnic bias*), and the effect of candidate evaluations influenced by ethnic stereotypes (the result of *heuristic ethnic bias*). Heuristic ethnic bias in voting results from the use of *ethnic heuristics*, which refer to voters' use of a candidate's perceived ethnic identity (the product of personal appearance, biography, cultural traits, and so forth, as well as the candidate's use of ethnic appeals) as an information shortcut. Ethnic heuristics help voters make a range of assumptions about a candidate's personal, social, and political background and preferences, including his or her likely stance on specific policy issues.

Summary of the Argument

The existing scholarship on ethnic politics in Latin America has tended to focus on how and why ethnic movements and parties have formed since the return to democracy (Beck and Mijeski 2001, 2006; Durand Guevara 2006; Huber 2008; Laurent 2009; Madrid 2008; Marenghi and Alcántara Sáez 2007; Muñoz-Pogossian 2008; Rice 2006; Van Cott 2003, 2005; Yashar 2005). Among those studies that have dealt explicitly with ethnic parties, some have also examined electoral performance, ranging from more qualitative accounts of the socioethnic imagery and associations that may shape candidate perceptions (Assies and Salman 2005; García and Lucero 2008; Rice 2011; Raymond and Arce 2013), to more quantitative analysis of individual-level survey data and aggregate voting outcomes (Madrid 2005, 2011, 2012; Van Cott 2005; Birnir and Van Cott 2007; Moreno Morales 2015).

However, this scholarship has not fully explained the underlying processes that drive ethnic voting in the region, and thus key questions about the nature of ethnicity's influence on electoral processes remain unanswered. What do ethnic voting patterns signify in terms of voters' perceptions and calculations about their political circumstances and interests, and what are the primary motivations that shape electoral decision-making? What is the relationship between ethnic voting and other electoral considerations such as economic interests, ideological preferences, and views on specific public policy issues? And how do broader features of the electoral competition – the candidates who stand, the groups they purport to represent, the campaigns they run, and the social, economic, and political context in which the election takes place – influence the occurrence, and nature, of ethnic voting?

In order to address these questions, the thesis develops and examines evidence for three conceptual models of ethnic voting.[6] First, it proposes the *expressive model*. In societies marked by historical ethnic exclusions, contemporary ethnic inequalities, and pervasive discrimination, ethnic voting may function as an expressive act of identity affirmation. Achieving descriptive ethnic representation may afford psychological benefits to voters, a boost to community- and self-esteem achieved by elevating a co-ethnic to a position of power (Horowitz 1985; Laitin 1998, 155-8; Norris and Mattes 2003, 1; Fish 2008; Böhm et al. 2013). Theory suggests this type of ethnic voting may be particularly prevalent among groups with low social status, where ethnic identity provides an alternative way of 'measuring worth' (Horowitz 1985, 186). In Latin America, voters with indigenous backgrounds tend to have lower social status compared to mestizos ('mixed') and whites; they are often poorer, less educated, under-represented in private and public organisations, and victims of discrimination (see discussion in Chapters Three, Four, and Five). Thus, we might expect expressive ethnic voting in Latin America to be most evident among voters with indigenous backgrounds.

Second, although this type of psychological ethnic bias may be part of the story, this thesis argues that ethnic voting in Latin America is often more instrumental in nature. Thus, it proposes the *heuristic model*, according to which voters seek descriptive ethnic representation with the aim of achieving substantive representation. In other words, voters seek out candidates who they perceive as most likely to represent their material, ideological, and policy-based interests. However, voters have only limited information and resources from which to determine a candidate's actual substantive preferences, and so they rely on

[6] These three models develop from and adapt Ferree's (2006) conceptual framework, although they draw on a wide range of scholarship across several disciplines.

information shortcuts to make a series of calculated assumptions (Downs 1957; Popkin 1991; Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Lau and Redlawsk 1997, 2006). In more established democracies, party identification provides a reliable information shortcut for many voters, with party cues signalling a wide range of characteristics about the candidate's likely preferences. However, the inchoate party systems of the Andean democracies mean party cues are heuristically unreliable, and voters in these contexts must look for alternative decision-making tools. In multi-ethnic societies with unstable party identities, ethnicity may often serve such a heuristic purpose, helping voters to estimate a candidate's personal and political preferences based on stereotypes about their perceived ethnic group (McDermott 1998; Chandra 2004; Posner 2005; Ferree 2006; Birnir 2007). This thesis argues that ethnicity serves such a heuristic role in Andean electoral behaviour, and that ethnic voting in the region reflects, at least in part, the influence of a heuristic ethnic bias.

However, neither expressive nor heuristic ethnic voting operates entirely independently of other potential vote determinants. Ethnic bias, of whatever form, may predispose voters towards certain candidates, but consideration of record, personal competencies, economic interests, values and ideology, as well as specific issue stands, are still important. Thus, this thesis complements its analysis of ethnic voting with consideration of a *policy-as-usual* explanation for voting outcomes (Ferree 2006, 804). In this case, vote choice is determined by substantive preferences and performance assessments in which ethnic heuristics play no role. This thesis argues that, in many cases, a combination of ethnic bias (expressive and heuristic) and policy-as-usual assessments shape vote choice in Latin America. The relative salience of each is determined by the specific electoral environment (e.g., the candidates who run, the issues on which they campaign, and the strategies by which they mobilise supporters), as well as the wider sociopolitical context (e.g., the salience of ethnic issues, the strength of ethnic identification, and wider social and political events).

Examining how ethnic and non-ethnic criteria combine to shape electoral choices can shed light on the underlying nature of ethnic voting. For example, it can indicate the relative salience of both ethnicity and certain substantive preferences to voting behaviour across distinct ethnic groups, helping to determine the motivations behind support for particular candidates. It can also help demonstrate how particular combinations of ethnic and non-ethnic voter characteristics combine to shape vote choice, telling us something about the nature of a candidate's appeal to different groups. Indeed, this thesis argues that a candidate can win support among ethnically-proximate voters through inclusive ethnic appeals,

capitalising on expressive or heuristic biases, while appealing simultaneously to ethnically-distant voters on purely substantive grounds. However, it also suggests that candidates will generally need to provide some concrete indication of substantive representation even to win support in ethnically-proximate groups, and that the use of exclusionary ethnic rhetoric may preclude support among ethnically-distant groups irrespective of substantive appeals (Madrid 2012).

Finally, this thesis also considers an alternative explanation for ethnic voting, one which posits a less direct role for ethnicity in vote choice. The *indirect model* proposes that ethnic voting is simply a reflection of homogenous conditions and preferences within ethnic groups and that ethnic bias plays no direct role in vote decisions (Hechter 1975; Mattes 1995; Sigelman et al. 1995; Sniderman and Carmines 1997; Bratton and Mattes 2003). The theory runs that ethnicity, like other forms of social categorisation, places an individual in a particular social and cultural milieu that affects broad worldviews and perceptions of interests (Kinder 1983; Kinder and Sears 1985). These, in turn, influence voters' electoral choices (Graves and Lee 2000). However, this thesis argues that such an indirect role for ethnicity in voting is supplementary to, rather than encompassing of, the more direct effects of expressive and heuristic ethnic bias. Homogenous preferences within ethnic groups do not fully account for ethnic voting patterns in Latin America.

These three broad conceptual models of ethnic voting have distinct implications for assessing key aspects of electoral democracy in the region. Indeed, if voting is primarily an expressive act of group allegiance, then elections become mere ethnic headcounts. Voters lose control over the political agenda, while politicians can act at will, already assured of the unconditional support of co-ethnics. Furthermore, this scenario may contribute to ethnic polarisation because politicians have little incentive to be inclusive in their appeals, and they may seek to mobilise support by fomenting inter-ethnic resentment and prejudice. Alternatively, however, if voters use ethnicity as a shortcut to programmatic information, or common voting trends among co-ethnics simply reflect shared substantive interests, then these threats to democratic processes and stability are less severe. In both cases, substantive representation is the ultimate electoral goal, and ethnic voting is either a means for achieving such representation, or the result of ethnicity's wider impact on sociopolitical attitudes and interests. Either way, although politicians may still manipulate ethnic differences and stereotypes for electoral benefit, they cannot rely on unconditional support if they fail on performance and programmatic assessments.

This thesis argues that all three forms of ethnic voting may occur in the Andes. The processes implied are not mutually exclusive, and in many cases they speak to different aspects of electoral behaviour. For example, both the expressive and heuristic voting models refer explicitly to processes involved in the vote choice itself – the criteria on which voters select candidates and the characteristics for which they seek representation. In contrast, according to the indirect voting model, the causal effect of ethnicity on voting relates to its role in shaping substantive preferences prior to vote choice.[7] In this case, ethnic voting patterns are produced because voters then select candidates based on these (ethnically-influenced) substantive preferences. Thus, the indirect model implies a vote decision along the lines of either the policy-as-usual or heuristic model – that is, one in which the vote motivation is fundamentally instrumental. Nevertheless, although vote choice may be shaped by a range of motivations and decision-making processes, determining the predominance of one or another form of ethnic voting is important given the wider political implications of each hypothesised model.

Ethnic Politics in Latin America

Traditionally, ethnic mobilisation has been conspicuously absent in Latin America. A long history of ethnic mixing, or *mestizaje*, has worked to weaken ethnic identification and reduce ethnic polarisation across much of the region. Partly as a result, there have been few ethnic parties in Latin America, and most non-ethnic parties have tended to avoid ethnic themes in their political rhetoric and platforms. Voters in Latin America, meanwhile, have not selected candidates along ethnic lines, and indigenous and non-indigenous sectors of the electorate have often voted in ways that are indistinguishable from one another (Madrid 2012, 1; Madrid 2005; Van Cott 2005; Van Cott and Birnir 2007).[8]

Nevertheless, more recently ethnicity has become increasingly politicised in Latin America. The new indigenous movements that emerged through the 1980s and 1990s helped raise ethnic consciousness among indigenous Latin Americans, drawing on enduring ethnic

[7] In fact, political socialisation is often thought to occur in early life (Hyman 1959; Campbell et al. 1960, chapter 7).

[8] There have, of course, been some noteworthy historical cases of ethnic mobilisation and contemporary ethnic conflict in Latin America (see later discussion in this chapter). However, ethnicity has played a relatively less overt role Latin American politics, at least with regard to political mobilisation in the 'formal' political sphere (parties, social movements, and so forth), compared to many other regions of the world. Cases of ethnic conflict have also been comparatively rare in Latin America. By one estimate, there were just 35 cases of ethnic conflict across the entire Caribbean and Latin American region between 1946 and 2014 (almost all during Guatemala's civil war), compared to 73 and 154 cases in Europe and Africa, respectively, over a similar period. (Due to some missing data, these counts should be taken as indicative of broad trends rather than precise figures). Author's elaboration based on data from the Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (2015).

attachments and numerous grievances linked to ethnic inequalities that had persisted despite *mestizaje*. In several countries, these indigenous movements gave birth to indigenous political parties, which campaigned on an explicitly indigenous platform. More generally, a wide range of non-indigenous parties and candidates, particularly populists, have adopted indigenous demands, recruited indigenous leaders, and employed a variety of symbolic ethnic appeals in an effort to win support among indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters (Madrid 2012, 1). A combination of these factors means ethnicity has become an important factor in the contemporary electoral politics of several Latin American countries, particularly in the Andean democracies of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru.

Ethnic Identification in Latin America

Ethnic politics in Latin America has been shaped in important ways by the nature of ethnic identification and ethnic relations in the region. In particular, *mestizaje*, or ethnic mixing, has had a profound effect. *Mestizaje* refers to both biological mixing between European and indigenous (and sometimes African and Asian) individuals, and the cultural assimilation of indigenous peoples into a Eurocentric, mestizo national culture.

Biological, and to some extent cultural, *mestizaje* was widespread throughout the colonial period, to the extent that mestizos comprised more than a quarter of the population of Spanish American by independence (Mörner 1967, 98; cited in Madrid 2012, 20). In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the discourse of cultural *mestizaje* became a key driver of nation formation for the new Latin American states, although the precepts of such *mestizaje* were often antithetical. For example, one strand of the *mestizaje* discourse called for the celebration of indigenous ancestry as a dignified element of the new nations' human and cultural heritage. This discourse made room for the acceptance of indigenous communities as distinct ethnic groups, albeit ones which were ill-suited to full participation in the political mechanisms of the 'modern' state (de la Cadena 2000, 20-8; Tilley 2005, 57-64).

However, perhaps the more predominant version of the *mestizaje* discourse rejected 'Indians' (or denied their existence), admitting indigenous people into the nation only on the condition of their assimilation into a Eurocentric, mestizo national culture (Tilley 2005, 60-64).[9] This latter discourse of *mestizaje* provided the rationale for numerous state-led educational and other 'development' projects in indigenous areas through the early twentieth

[9] The most prominent advocate of this latter discourse of *mestizaje* was José Vasconcelos with his promotion of the 'cosmic race' (Vasconcelos [1925] 1997).

century, projects that aimed to promote Spanish literacy and discourage indigenous cultural practices. In several countries, states made explicit efforts to 'de-indianise' indigenous populations by recasting them as peasants, which, in the class-based language of the mid-twentieth century, replaced the ethnic label 'Indian' (de la Cadena 1998; Albro 2010; Yashar 2005). However, whether indigenous communities were conceived as 'ethnic relics' to be preserved as part of the national patrimony (and whose cultural products and symbols were appropriated for nationalist purposes), or whether indigenous populations were 'drags' on national progress that required further assimilation into the mestizo mainstream, the discourse of *mestizaje* worked to subordinate, exclude, or deny indigenous presence in modern Latin American societies.

In order to reflect the multiplicity and fluidity that underpins contemporary ethnic identities in Latin America – the combined result of both biological and cultural *mestizaje* – some scholars have argued that ethnic differences have come to resemble a continuum, rather than distinct ethnic categories (Wade 1993, 1997, Spitta 1996, 23; Howard 2005, 54, 192-8). Such a continuum is conceived as spanning indigenous at one end, through various mestizo identities in the middle, to a European (or at least Eurocentric) identity at the other. This sociocultural continuum is often perceptually conflated with a parallel pigmentocratic scale running from dark-skinned indigenous and Afro-descendent Latin Americans to fair-skinned European-descendants (Wade 1997). The continuum model is useful for highlighting the fluidity of ethnic identification in Latin America, the numerous intermediate categories, but also the underlying racial-ethnic hierarchy – from dark-skinned/indigenous to fair-skinned/European – that underpins social conceptualisations about such 'continuous' ethnic identities (Wade 2003). However, the continuum model does not always fit well with how ethnic identities are perceived in many Latin American communities. Indeed, the existence of intermediary ethnic categories does not necessarily mitigate more binary perceptions of ethnic differences, which often revolve around dichotomies such indigenous and non-indigenous, or white and non-white (Weismantel 2001, 39). In the context of *mestizaje*, however, even such binary identities may have ambiguous and conditional boundaries, allowing some flexibility in how individuals both self-identify and are identified by others.

The fluidity of ethnic identities in Latin America is further enhanced by the multiplicity of markers that may indicate social and ethnic groups. Although descent-based attributes such as phenotype and language remain the primary markers of ethnicity, *mestizaje* has meant their significance is often ambiguous. As a result, a wide range of social and

cultural characteristics are often important determinants of *ethnic* identities, as well as markers of other social categories. Thus, ethnic identities may be ascribed from markers or knowledge of territorial origins, educational level, occupation, dress, and social comportment, in addition to physical appearance, language, and family names. These identities are still *ethnic*, rather than (only) cultural, class, or territorial, because they invoke notions of more or less innate, heritable characteristics associated with certain social 'types' (de la Cadena 2001, 140-1; Wade 2003, 274).[10]

However, *mestizaje* and fluid notions of ethnic identities have not eliminated ethnic inequalities, psychological attachments to ethnic groups, or ethnic discrimination. First, ethnic background is still significantly linked to social and geographic location across much of the region. Chapters Three, Four, and Five present data showing that indigenous people in the Andes tend to be poorer, less educated, and have less access to health services than their non-indigenous counterparts. Moreover, the indigenous populations of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru are concentrated geographically in the highland and Amazon regions of their respective countries, and particularly in more rural areas. Second, despite the 'deindigenising' effect of *mestizaje*, many indigenous people maintain some traditional customs and languages and identify with their indigenous communities. A far greater number retain personal, family, and cultural ties to an indigenous heritage, even if they would not consider themselves indigenous per se. Indeed, census and survey data presented in Chapters Three to Five show the number of Andeans who report some identification with an indigenous *culture* (rather than self-identification *as* indigenous), or report growing up in a household where an indigenous language was spoken, greatly outnumber self-identified indigenous respondents. As indicated previously, this thesis employs the term indigenous-mestizo to describe these self-identified mestizos from more indigenous backgrounds. On the other hand, many self-identified mestizos may retain stronger psychological ties to non-indigenous family and cultural identities, often those of their European ancestors, with little if any attachment to an indigenous heritage. This thesis refers to these non-indigenous mestizos as white-mestizos.

Thus, at least in some respects, the intermediate ethnic categories implied by the continuum model are somewhat compatible with more binary perceptions about ethnic

[10] On the other hand, the multiplicity and flexibility of such socioethnic markers also means indicators of a particular ethnic heritage (e.g., regional provenance or various cultural products such as dress, festivals, art, and so forth) may be adopted to express various socioethnic identities, including those dislocated from the contemporary human subjects associated with the ethnic group in question. Thus, prejudice towards 'backward Indians' is not incompatible with a broader cultural, regional, or national identity in which indigenous heritage is proudly claimed (de la Cadena 2000, 232; Poole 2004).

identities. For example, many indigenous-mestizos may identify with a broadly non-white social and political identity, if not with an explicitly indigenous one. Similarly, many white-mestizos may identify themselves with a broad non-indigenous sociocultural group, but not necessarily with an ethnic label such as white. In terms of political behaviour, it seems likely that indigenous-mestizos may sympathise more with indigenous demands, and feel greater solidarity with an indigenous social or political identity, than would white-mestizo voters.

Finally, regardless of how individuals self-identify, both visible descent-based and 'achieved' social characteristics may signal particular ethnic identities to others. Moreover, in many cases they may do so in ways that reinforce dichotomous ethnic identities. For example, many mestizos may suffer the same discrimination as indigenous people, and, therefore, they may feel greater sympathy and solidarity with certain indigenous demands. In the survey data examined in Chapters Three to Five, respondents from an indigenous background were significantly more likely to report experience of discrimination, including discrimination based on physical appearance in particular. The same data demonstrate that a substantial minority of respondents hold prejudiced views against indigenous people, and these self-reported attitudes are likely to underestimate the extent of ethnic prejudice.[11]

In summary, a long history of *mestizaje* has blurred boundaries between ethnic groups and produced ethnic identities that are fluid, multiple, and conditional on a wide range of physical, biographical, and social markers. In this ethnic landscape, ethnic identification at the individual level may be relatively weak, and ethnic polarisation is likely to remain low. Nevertheless, the assimilationist project of *mestizaje* was never complete. Ethnic inequalities remain a prominent feature of contemporary Latin American societies, many individuals feel lingering ethnic attachments, and ethnic discrimination continues to shape every-day inter-personal relations and wider social and political opportunities.

The Historical Absence of Ethnic Mobilisation in Latin America

The nature of ethnic identification across much of Latin America may offer a partial explanation for the relative historical absence of ethnic political mobilisation in the region.[12]

[11] Several studies have shown how social desirability factors cause many people to suppress potentially unpopular attitudes – such as ethnic prejudices – when responding to survey interviewers (e.g., Fazio and Towles-Schwen 1999).

[12] Ethnic mobilisation has not been entirely absent from Latin America's political history, however. For example, there were several indigenous uprisings against Spanish imperial rule throughout the latter half of the eighteenth century (Crow 1992, 319-29; Bakewell 2004, 305-12). More generally, certain nineteenth-century political parties and *caudillo* political leaders drew on an 'ethnic' base of support (see, amongst others, Thomson 1991, on Mexico; and Walker 1999, on Peru), and some twentieth-century populist movements also

The type of fluid, conditional ethnic identification described above (where *mestizaje* has blurred the boundaries between ethnic groups and the precise ethnicity of individuals is often ambiguous) is likely to reduce ethnic polarisation significantly, and it is far less conducive to mobilisation around an ethnic cleavage. Individuals who have personal ties and social sympathies than transverse an ethnic cleavage (and who may also disagree on the nature and position of the cleavage in the first place) are less likely to respond favourably to mobilisation efforts aimed at stirring inter-ethnic distrust or resentment (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Chandra 2005; Dunning and Harrison 2010). In addition, because *mestizaje* has not eliminated ethnic discrimination, particularly against indigenous and Afro-descendent groups (in fact, the discourse of *mestizaje* is explicitly discriminatory against these non-mestizo groups), many Latin Americans with non-white backgrounds may choose to identify socially in terms of a more ambiguous mestizo ethnicity. The relative weakness of ethnic identification as an explicit form of social categorisation further reduces the potential for ethnic political mobilisation.

Aside from the peculiarities of ethnic identification and relations in Latin America, several political-institutional factors may also have contributed to the historical lack of ethnic mobilisation. First, the absence of such mobilisation may simply reflect the absence of opportunity. For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Latin American countries were ruled by authoritarian regimes, and there was little opportunity for indigenous or other groups to mobilise electorally. Even in the brief interludes of civilian rule, indigenous people were often excluded from national politics because of prohibitive residency, income, and literacy restrictions on political participation. Second, when the corporatist states of the mid-twentieth century co-opted indigenous communities into political structures, they did so as peasants, not as indigenous peoples. As a result, it was often more strategically useful for indigenous groups to organise as peasants, often through broad federations that included mestizo as well as indigenous organisations.[13] Third, even when suffrage restrictions were removed in the 1980s, various institutional and societal factors may have discouraged the rise of indigenous parties in particular. Party-registration requirements were often unfavourable to new parties, including indigenous parties, while electoral rules tended not to provide legislative representation to smaller parties (Birnir 2004; Marenghi and Alcántara Sáez 2007;

made efforts to mobilise indigenous support (see, for example, Lenton 2010, on Peronism in Argentina; and Stein 1980, on APRA in Peru).

[13] However, in many cases indigenous communities also appropriated and redeployed these institutional impositions to serve their needs as indigenous, not just peasant, groups (e.g., Dawson 2004; Yashar 2005, 54-69).

Rice 2006; Van Cott 2005). Pervasive anti-indigenous discrimination may also have limited indigenous access to mainstream political parties (Paredes 2007). It is not the intention of this thesis to adjudicate among the numerous explanations put forward to explain the relative lack of ethnic mobilisation historically in Latin America. However, a political environment that was generally restrictive, and unfavourable to indigenous mobilisation in particular, may well have been a contributing factor.

The Rise of Indigenous Movements and Parties

However, over the last two to three decades, ethnicity has become increasingly politicised in Latin America. The existing scholarship offers a range of explanations for the rise of ethnic politics in the region, focusing on both indigenous social movements and political parties engaged in local and national electoral competition. Concerning social movements, these explanations point to the introduction of neoliberal economic programmes, the wider impact of democratization in the 1980s, and the influence of an international indigenous rights movement; concerning political parties, explanations centre on institutional reforms in the 1990s, the collapse of traditional parties across much of the region, and the impact of newly-formed indigenous social movements.

Studies focused on indigenous social movements have tended to explain their emergence in terms of the new threats faced by indigenous communities following democratisation. In particular, the introduction of neoliberal economic reforms removed key agricultural subsidies and the protection of land rights for many indigenous communities, while the demise of corporatist state structures (particularly state-controlled peasant federations) reduced access to state resources and channels of political influence (Lucero 2008; Yashar 2005, 54-71). The ethnic dimension to these new protest movements arose from the potential loss of viability and autonomy for the local indigenous institutions these corporatist protections had allowed, particularly in terms of land and economic security (Yashar 2005, 68).[14] International factors may also have contributed to the ethnic frame adopted by these new movements, particularly the supranational resources provided by international non-governmental organisations. These organisations helped domestic indigenous actors build new strategies and political vocabularies for mobilising ethnic groups, capitalising on international treaties and conventions that specifically advanced the

[14] Some scholars have also argued that the incorporation of indigenous groups by multiclass populist parties, rather than Marxist parties, favoured the subsequent mobilisation of indigenous communities as indigenous, rather than as peasants (e.g. Rice 2012).

notion of indigenous rights (Lucero 2008, 21; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Brysk 2000).[15] In general, the politicisation of ethnicity by indigenous movements through the 1980s and 1990s helped weaken the predominant discourse of *mestizaje*, rejecting the discursive denial of ethnic inequality and discrimination that *mestizaje*'s assertion of a 'racial democracy' had permitted (Tilley 2005, 63-4).

The emergence of indigenous social movements had important effects on the subsequent development of indigenous parties, and the politicisation of ethnicity more generally. First, as the previous discussion has implied, indigenous social movements worked to raise ethnic consciousness in Latin America. Indigenous movements and their leaders encouraged Latin Americans from diverse backgrounds to embrace their indigenous heritage, however distant, by promoting indigenous pride and traditions, rejecting the assimilationist dimension to the discourse of *mestizaje*. This process of 'reindigenisation' helped subsequent indigenous and indigenous-mestizo politicians extend the scope of their ethnic appeals to a wider population, as increasing numbers of urban mestizos, as well as rural indigenous, were encouraged to identify with the broader values, symbols, and demands of the indigenous movement.

Second, indigenous movements also helped introduce an ethnic dimension to many wider political debates, patterns of association subsequently utilised and extended by various electoral candidates. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, indigenous movements played central roles in numerous multi-sector mobilisations, opposing the neoliberal reforms of a succession of national governments. The indigenous and mestizo leaders of the protests, as well as the many politicians who adopted their cause, emphasized the common values, interests, and demands of indigenous and many mestizo sectors: wealth redistribution; land protections; increased state control over natural resources; restrictions on imports; and an end to discrimination. They also highlighted their shared non-European heritage as a unifying factor linking the interests of diverse, non-elite social and ethnic groups.

In this way, the political leaders of such protests helped superimpose a dichotomous ethnic 'master frame' on several key social and political controversies, linking ethnic identities to particular political agendas (Rice 2012). Specifically, it associated a broad indigenous and indigenous-mestizo identity with nationalism, social justice, wealth

[15] Of particular significance were the International Labour Organisation's Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO 1989) and the United Nations' Declaration on the Rights on Indigenous Peoples (UN 2007).

redistribution, and opposition to neoliberalism.[16] This was set against a political agenda characterised by continued neoliberalism, the promotion of business interests, and the excessive interference of the United States in Latin American countries' domestic affairs. In the ethnic 'master frame', such a political agenda was associated with a white, Eurocentric identity embodied by the domestic elites and their 'imperial' backers in Europe, the United States, and the international financial institutions.[17] This thesis argues that the increased salience of this ethnic 'master frame' played an important role in the subsequent electoral success of indigenous parties and indigenous or indigenous-mestizo candidates.

Third, and more concretely, powerful indigenous movements, particularly in Bolivia and Ecuador, provided valuable human and material resources to support the development of indigenous parties (Andolina 1999; Van Cott 2005, 43-5). Indeed, an oft-cited explanation for the lack of a major indigenous party in Peru is the prior absence of a nationally relevant indigenous movement (Van Cott 2005; Paredes 2007). However, the wider politicisation of ethnicity in Peru may still have been influenced by indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador, particularly in terms of 'reindigenisation' and the promotion of an ethnic 'master frame'. Indeed, this thesis finds no evidence that ethnicity is any less significant in terms of shaping electoral behaviour in Peru than in either Bolivia or Ecuador.

Aside from these social movement factors, two further explanations for the rise of indigenous parties specifically are worthy of brief note. First, perhaps the most common approach attributes the rise of indigenous parties to institutional reforms carried out during the 1990s and early 2000s (Birnir 2004; Marenghi and Alcántara Sáez 2007; Muñoz-Pogossian 2008; Van Cott 2003c, 2005). These arguments focus on decentralisation, the relaxation of laws regulating party registration, and electoral reforms that granted legislative representation to smaller parties. These are all institutional changes that may favour the formation and electoral success of new parties, particularly those with a geographically concentrated base of support such as many ethnic parties (Grofman and Lijphart 1986; Horowitz 1991; Meguid 2014; Norris 2004; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Reilly 2001;

[16] Some Peruvian ethnopopulists, such as Alberto Fujimori and Alejandro Toledo, also endorsed neoliberal economic policies, and they cast themselves as emblematic of an emerging non-elite (and non-white) entrepreneurship (Lee 2010). Nevertheless, they still focused their campaigns on lower-class sectors, promised to reduce inequality and expand social programmes, and used popular nationalist rhetoric (see Chapter Five).

[17] Of course, the production of such an ethnic 'master frame' was not solely the doing of indigenous leaders and movements. In many cases, public figures associated with the white and white-mestizo elites implicitly or explicitly promoted a similar connection between ethnicity and sociopolitical ideology. Criticism of anti-neoliberal protesters often reproduced long-standing ethnic epithets about indigenous ignorance and backwardness in terms of 'modern' economic policy (see discussion in Chapters Three to Six).

Sartori 1976; Sisk 1996). Second, a number of studies point to the severe fragmentation of Latin American party systems in the 1980s and 1990s, which created space for the emergence of indigenous parties. In the absence of stable party identities and the resultant lack of voter alignment, these new indigenous parties successfully appealed to voters disaffected with the traditional political actors, capitalising on the decline of leftist parties in particular (Rice 2012, 4; Rice and Van Cott 2006; Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2011, 37).

Ethnic Politics in the Electoral Arena

The existing literature on ethnic politics in Latin America is quite helpful in explaining why indigenous movements and parties have formed. However, it is less useful in explaining the electoral performance of indigenous parties. Indeed, as Raúl Madrid points out, the explanations outlined above do not explain why, within the same country, some indigenous parties are successful while others are not, or why some have won the support of whites and mestizos as well as indigenous voters. Madrid (2012, 3) argues that, rather than institutional or social movement factors driving the success of indigenous parties, what matters most is their strategy of inclusive ethnopopulism. Madrid convincingly shows that indigenous parties have tended to succeed when they combined ethnic appeals with conventional populist appeals, recruited mestizo as well as indigenous candidates, and adopted an inclusive strategy that emphasized common interests, as well as common heritage, across non-elite indigenous and mestizo constituencies.[18]

In this way, ethnopopulists both capitalised on and reinforced the nature and terms of ethnic politicisation as promoted by the indigenous movement. Increased ethnic consciousness undoubtedly contributed to the wider resonance of ethnopopulists' ethnic appeals, while their prominence in national electoral campaigns helped raise the political salience of ethnicity further. However, perhaps more importantly, ethnopopulism both reinforced and further defined the substantive content of the ethnic 'master frame' initially introduced by the indigenous movement. Indeed, although ethnopopulists across the region have run on a wide range of substantive platforms, they have tended to promote nationalist, redistributive, and state-interventionist policies as prominent parts of their populist projects.[19]

[18] Ethnopopulists have not been the only political actors to employ ethnic appeals. Several smaller parties and individual politicians have adopted more exclusionary ethnic platforms, more along the lines of the conventional ethnic parties studied elsewhere (e.g., Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle 1978). However, these have tended to have much more limited electoral appeal (Madrid 2012).

[19] Some ethnopopulists also adopted neoliberal economic policies, as indicated previously. However, their campaigns still focused on the poor, criticised the political and economic elites, and offered various populist initiatives such as direct assistance programmes, credit schemes, agricultural subsidies, and so forth.

Crucially, ethnopopulists have looked to link explicitly their own non-white, non-European backgrounds, or their broad affinity with indigenous communities and cultures more generally, to the ideological beliefs that underpin their substantive political agenda. Just as the indigenous movement was able to build multisector coalitions by foregrounding the common values and interests of indigenous and other lower-class social sectors, ethnopopulism proved to be a successful electoral strategy because it tied inclusive, broadly defined ethnic identities to a wider substantive political programme that extended well beyond indigenous issues.

Madrid's notion of ethnopopulism constitutes a considerable advance in terms of understanding the nature and implications of Latin American ethnic politics in the electoral arena. However, Madrid's analysis, as with previous studies of ethnic voting in the region, provides little insight into the nature of ethnicity's effect on vote choice (only that ethnicity does indeed appear to have some effect). For example, it offers little indication whether the ethnic component to ethnopopulist appeals reflects expressive or heuristic voting motivations, each of which would have a distinct set of wider implications, as discussed previously. Moreover, Madrid's analysis does not examine in detail how voters' ethnic and non-ethnic (sociodemographic and attitudinal) characteristics combine to shape voting outcomes, an interaction implied by ethnopopulism's dual ethnic and populist appeal. This thesis seeks to expand the existing scholarship on ethnic politics in Latin America by addressing these types of questions about the underlying dynamics, and thus the wider political implications, of ethnic voting in the region.

Theories of Ethnic Voting in Latin America

In general, studies of electoral behaviour seek to explain why citizens choose to vote, and, for those who do, why they decide to support one party over another. In most cases, therefore, the base unit for analysis is the individual voter, with macro-level outcomes such as turnout and party vote share conceived as the product of multiple individual acts (Elster 1989).[20] However, although most studies agree on the primacy of individual-level actions, there is considerable disagreement over what the individual level might look like (Arzheimer and Evans 2000, xx). In terms of ethnic voting behaviour specifically, the comparative literature offers several distinct conceptual explanations, each of which draws on various

[20] Other macro-level factors, such as unemployment, crime, the party system, and so forth, are likely to influence these individual-level acts. However, it is hard to conceive of a relationship between macro-level factors (e.g. unemployment) and macro-level outcomes (such as vote shares) that bypasses what happens at the individual-level (Arzheimer and Evans 2000, xix).

theoretical paradigms from the more general electoral behaviour scholarship. Thus, conceptual innovations related to ethnic voting both reflect, and can contribute to, many of the theoretical controversies in the wider literature.

Theories of ethnic voting are primarily concerned with explaining why, at the individual level, voters from the same ethnic group vote en masse for a particular candidate or party. In addition to explanations focused on such positive ethnicity-vote correlations, some studies also examine the role of ethnic prejudice or resentment in voters' decision-making. As the previous discussion has outlined, this thesis proposes three conceptual models of ethnic voting: the expressive model, which conceives of voting as an expressive act of identity affirmation that affords psychological benefits to voters; the heuristic model, in which voters use ethnic stereotypes as an information shortcut in their decision-making; and the indirect model, in which ethnicity shapes the political preferences and interests that determine vote choice. Each of these broad models conceives of ethnic voting as being driven by quite different underlying voter motivations, and, as a result, they have quite different implications for assessing the nature and implications of electoral processes. However, each of these models may also produce observationally-similar results – a correlation between ethnicity and vote choice – and thus many existing studies forego attempts to distinguish among the three sets of associated processes. This thesis aims to make an initial contribution towards this end.

Expressive Ethnic Voting

Many studies of ethnic voting attribute such behaviour, at least in part, to psychological attachments to a particular ethnic group and/or prejudice towards members of other ethnic groups (Horowitz 1985; Lijphart 1999; Snyder 2000; Dickson and Scheve 2006). This model considers voting to be a largely unconditional declaration of group allegiance, and that vote choice is not primarily driven by concerns about substantive costs and benefits.

The theoretical underpinnings of this expressive explanation lie in social identity theory (e.g., Tajfel 1979; Tajfel and Turner 1986), which suggests that the groups to which people belong are a key source of pride and self-esteem.[21] Groups provide a sense of social identity, a sense of belonging to the social world. Thus, self-esteem is increased by enhancing the status of the group to which an individual belongs (the in-group), whether familiar,

[21] This builds on Tajfel's (1970, 1974) 'minimum group paradigm', which examined the minimum requirements for individuals to develop in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination.

ethnic, territorial, or based on other social categories. Self-esteem is also enhanced by devaluing the status of other groups (the out-groups), and thus social identity theory predicts out-group discrimination and prejudice is a fundamental feature of social relations. In terms of political behaviour, citizens seek to increase self-esteem through elevating in-group members to positions of power. In democracies, the primary means of achieving political power is through elections, and thus, in societies where ethnic groups are important social categories, ethnic voting is likely to occur.

According to this explanation, ethnic voting is not the product of a rational weighing-up of electoral alternatives, but an expression of allegiance to a group. Thus, voters are not guided by self-interest – in fact, they may vote explicitly against their substantive interests – but rather by unconditional loyalty to the party or candidate who represents their group identity.[22] Several studies of ethnic politics in Latin America suggest such expressive ethnic voting, although the precise causal processes hypothesised are not always tested empirically (Madrid 2011, 276; Moreno Morales 2015). Finally, in the Latin American popular press, ethnic voting patterns are often presented as evidence for a non-instrumental, expressive logic driving voting behaviour, particularly among indigenous people (e.g., Vargas Llosa 2006).

Certainly, there are plenty of reasons to think expressive ethnic voting may occur in Latin America. A long history of ethnic inequality and discrimination is conducive to the construction of strong ethnic group identities and the conceptualisation of social and political differences in ethnic terms. The perpetuation of historically constructed ethnic hierarchies and discriminatory practices, at both the institutional and individual level, is likely to strengthen group allegiances and may foster inter-ethnic distrust, resentment, and prejudice. Moreover, the recent politicisation of ethnicity in the region is likely to increase ethnic consciousness and exacerbate perceptions of ethnic difference, processes that may be similarly conducive to expressive ethnic voting. Nevertheless, *mestizaje* is likely to mitigate the social and political salience of ethnic differences and reduce ethnic polarisation. In general, voters are less likely to mobilise around an ethnic cleavage if they have personal, cultural, and/or interest-based attachments on both sides of the cleavage. Indeed, these types of multiple and conditional ethnic identities and fluid ethnic relations are not particularly

[22] This explanation underlies several studies of voting in the United States, which highlight prejudice as a principal factor in white opposition to black candidates (Kinder and Sears 1981; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Mendelberg 2001). It also emerges as an important factor in many comparative studies of ethnic voting (Horowitz 1985; Johnson and Schlemmer 1996; Chandra 2004; Friedman 2004, 2005).

conducive to the unconditional ethnic group attachments implied by the expressive voting model.[23]

In summary, Latin America's ethnic landscape does not suggest widespread expressive ethnic voting, although lingering feelings of ethnic solidarity or resentment may still exert some influence on voters' choices. However, the existing scholarship on Latin American ethnic politics has not fully assessed the extent of expressive ethnic voting, and it has not sought to distinguish such forms of electoral behaviour from competing conceptual explanations. This thesis seeks to address this limitation in the current literature.

Heuristic Ethnic Voting

In contrast to the expressive model, other scholars have argued for a more instrumental explanation for ethnic voting. Drawing on general theories of decision-making developed in cognitive psychology, these scholars suggest that voters use ethnicity as a political heuristic, a decision-making tool rather than a vote determiner in itself. Thus, voters use a candidate's perceived ethnic identity as an information shortcut to make a series of assumptions about likely personal, social, and political preferences and priorities (Chandra 2004; Posner 2005; Ferree 2006; Birnir 2009; Ichino and Nathan 2013). This approach assumes that voting is fundamentally rational and instrumental, but that 'pure' rational choice is unfeasible in a highly complex information environment such as an election campaign. In order to simplify such informational complexity, voters rely on various cues – easily acquired information that is perceived as a reliable indicator of other, unknown, characteristics – which help guide their evaluation of parties and candidates (Downs 1957; Popkin 1991; Lupia and McCubbins 1998).

The use of heuristics in voting has been well documented in the literature. Studies have demonstrated particularly significant effects for partisan cues (Campbell et al. 1960; Conover and Feldman 1989; Hurwitz 1984; Lau and Redlawsk 2006; Lodge and Hamill 1986; Rahn 1993), but also for various descriptive characteristics such as gender (Mansbridge 1999; Matland and King 2003; Jones 2011; Ditonto et al. 2013) and other aspects of physical appearance (Rosenberg and McCafferty 1987; Todorov et al. 2005; Lawson et al. 2010).

[23] However, to some extent fluid and multiple ethnic identities also mean more inclusive ethnic appeals have the potential to resonate much more widely. Ethnic appeal may speak not only to voters who strongly self-identify with the ethnic group in question, but also to those who consider the group to form part of their mixed ethnic heritage. Thus, certain indigenous ethnic appeals may not only resonate with self-identified indigenous voters, but also with many mestizos, who may feel some psychological and emotional attachments to a broad indigenous heritage, although they would not personally identify as indigenous.

Several studies have shown that ethnic identities and ethnic appeals (e.g., ethnic rhetoric, symbols, or endorsements from ethnic organisations) can also provide salient electoral cues, particularly in 'newer' democracies where party identities are often weak and unstable. However, although the role of ethnic heuristics in voting has been tested in various democratic regimes around the world – including in the United States (Dawson 1994; McDermott 1998; Philpot 2004; Barreto 2007), Eastern Europe (Birnir 2007), the Baltic republics (Hansen 2009), India (Chandra 2004), and several African countries (Brubaker et al. 2004; Posner 2005; Ferree 2006) – it has received little attention with regard to Latin America.

Several factors make heuristic ethnic voting highly probable in several Latin American countries, particularly the three Andean democracies examined here. First, the political landscape of these countries is marked by inchoate party systems, a lack of ideological differentiation and consistency, multiple candidate races, and the prevalence of newcomers. These factors contribute to a low information environment for electoral decision-making – that is, an environment in which the accessibility and intelligibility of political information is greatly reduced, but where the required scope of voters' information search is greatly expanded. These are precisely the features of 'new' democracies that scholars have linked to increased heuristic use, including the use of ethnic heuristics (Birnir 2007, 605-6).

Second, many parties and candidates in Latin America tend to be vague on programmatic issues. Most parties opt for broad catch-all appeals, presenting themselves as the representative of *all* citizens rather than specific social sectors or interests, and they tend to avoid taking strong stands on potentially divisive programmatic issues (Dix 1989; Cotler 1995). Catch-all appeals tend to foreground the personal characteristics of candidates and focus on valence issues. For example, in most Latin American campaigns the issues of unemployment, crime, and poverty feature prominently; all parties and candidates want less of each. These features of Latin American campaigns work to reduce further the substantive differentiation among candidates, making it increasingly difficult for voters to identify the candidate who best represents their preferences. Moreover, such campaign strategies will tend to shift voters' focus onto individual candidates and their personal values, priorities, networks, and capabilities. Programmatic ambiguity and candidate-centred campaigns are highly conducive to heuristic use, particularly to heuristics based on such personal candidate traits as ethnic identity.

Finally, a long history of ethnic inequality and discrimination has taught Latin Americans to connect ethnic identity with social behaviour and treatment, political interests, and individual prospects. Just as racial segregation in the United States (Dawson 1994), or apartheid in South Africa, introduced racial heuristics to voters in those countries (Ferree 2006; Mattes and Piombo 2001), so the social and political marginalisation of indigenous peoples has worked to socialise many Latin American electorates in the validity of ethnic heuristics. To some extent, the fluid and multiple ethnic identities that characterise Latin America's ethnic landscape suggest similarly fluid and conditional ethnic stereotypes, and thus some ambiguity about the precise characteristics implied by an ethnic heuristic. However, the tendency towards more binary views of ethnic identities, outlined previously, is likely to apply to stereotypic constructions as well (in fact, such a tendency is, almost by definition, a process of stereotyping). Thus, although the precise set of characteristics ascribed to an individual candidate through stereotyping may be somewhat flexible, the perceived predictive value of broader ethnic stereotypes – non-indigenous or indigenous, non-white or white – is likely to remain high. Indeed, Chapter Six finds strong evidence that two broad ethnic stereotypes – indigenous-Andean (indigenous or indigenous-mestizo) and white-European (white or white-mestizo) – may shape perceptions of presidential candidates in significant ways.

In short, despite fluid and conditional ethnic identities, social and geographic ethnic divisions and widespread discrimination mean a political ethnic heuristic 'makes sense' for many Latin American voters. Once again, the more recent politicisation of ethnicity in the region is likely to have increased the perceived salience of an ethnic 'master frame' for assessing social and political issues and actors, fomenting the wider use of ethnic heuristics in electoral decision-making. In particular, the way in which indigenous and ethnopopulist actors have strategically linked an inclusive indigenous identity (defined as non-white and non-European) to a nationalist, redistributive, and anti-neoliberal substantive agenda has helped reinforce and further define the contours of the prevalent political ethnic heuristic. Crucially, and unlike the expressive model, ethnic heuristic voting does not require strong ethnic identification at the individual level (although it does require some perception of ethnic differences more generally). As a result, the heuristic model is quite compatible with a Latin American ethnic landscape in which ethnic identification is relatively weak and ethnic polarisation is low.

Indirect Ethnic Voting

A final explanation for ethnic voting asserts that such behaviour can be explained by a conventional 'policy-as-usual' vote model, and that ethnicity plays no part in the vote decision directly. Rather than psychological attachments or prejudice, patterns of ethnic voting emerge because members of the same ethnic groups tend to have relatively homogenous preferences and interests. Thus, ethnicity may influence vote choice indirectly by helping to shape an individual's political socialisation, but it is not a direct vote determinant.

This indirect model draws on general sociological models of voting, which consider vote choice to be shaped by social environment (e.g., Berelson et al. 1954). In the general sociological voting models, the direct vote determinants are material interests, ideological preferences, and partisanship, but these are shaped by the individual's social context – family, friends, and other social-group affiliations. Similarly, in terms of ethnic voting, the theory runs that ethnicity – like other forms of social categorisation – places the individual in a particular social context that influences values, worldviews, and perception of interests (Kinder and Sears 1985). These social, cultural, and political predispositions manifest themselves as specific policy preferences and general ideology, which are the direct vote determinants (Graves and Lee 2000). Thus, vote choice is driven by interests, not identity, and the correlation between ethnicity and vote reflects similar interests within an ethnic group, and different interests across ethnic groups.

A number of studies in the comparative literature on ethnic politics adopt this basic perspective (Bates 1974; Bratton and Mattes 2003; Hechter 1975; Mattes 1995; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972). Similarly, a number of experimental and survey-based studies have found that ethnic voting preferences in the United States may be explained better in terms of policy and ideology than in terms of prejudice or psychological ties (Abrajano et. al. 2005; Sigelman et al. 1995; Sniderman and Carmines 1997). Ultimately, if the indirect model is correct, then there is no need for a special theory of ethnic voting, at least in terms of vote choice itself; the spatial voting model (Downs 1957), or the performance model (Ferejohn 1986) should apply (Ferree 2006, 805).[24]

[24] Spatial voting models focus on the ideological proximities between voters and parties, with the assumption that voters will seek to elect the most proximate candidate. Ferejohn's performance model argues that few voters can trust the promises of electoral challengers, and thus electoral choice is based solely on a retrospective performance assessment of the incumbent.

Several features of Latin America's social and political context are conducive to the conditions implied by the indirect model. Territorial, social, economic, and cultural divides are often closely aligned with ethnicity, meaning voters from similar ethnic backgrounds may well share both material interests and broader sociopolitical predispositions. Yet *mestizaje* has meant that ethnic identification at the individual level is often weak and fluid, while ethnic polarisation at the group level tends to be low. Thus, despite ethnic inequalities, many voters may not feel the strong, unconditional psychological attachments necessary for expressive voting, and may give greater relative importance to substantive preferences in their decision-making.

However, although previous studies of ethnic voting in Latin America have implied aspects of the indirect model, they have neither theorised explicitly nor tested empirically its specific mechanisms. For example, Madrid (2012, 26-30) refers to common interest among many indigenous and mestizo voters, which he suggests contribute to the broad appeal of ethnopopulism. Moreno Morales (2015, 127) finds that indigenous voters are more likely to vote for leftist candidates in several Latin American countries, implying an indirect role for ethnicity in shaping ideological preferences. However, neither study tests explicitly whether ethnic background has statistically significant indirect effects on vote choice, or through which particular non-ethnic voter characteristics such effects might be mediated. In contrast, the analysis in this thesis tests the influence of ethnicity on a range of substantive preferences, and the latter's effect on vote choice, in a single mediation model. This analysis offers a more complete assessment of the indirect model of ethnic voting and its applicability to Latin American voting behaviour.

Policy-as-usual

The 'policy-as-usual' model of voting is essentially the null hypothesis for the ethnic voting analysis. It proposes that voting behaviour can be explained in terms of voters' substantive interests and preferences and their perceptions about candidate's substantive performance. Ethnicity is not involved in the vote decision in any direct way: psychological attachments to ethnic group identities are not important electorally; and candidates' substantive profiles are determined directly from available information, not by employing ethnic heuristics. Thus, the 'policy-as-usual' explanation is directly comparable, and to some extent competitive with, both the expressive and heuristic models because all three refer to the vote decision itself.

In contrast, the 'policy-as-usual' explanation is one of two possible constituent components of the indirect model, along with the heuristic explanation. The indirect model proposes that ethnicity shapes substantive preferences, which, in turn, influence vote choice. Thus, in order for the indirect model to produce ethnic voting patterns, voters must select candidates in line with their (ethnically-influenced) substantive preferences. They may do so with or without the use of ethnic heuristics, but in the latter case, the indirect model implies the 'policy-as-usual' explanation to account for vote decision itself.

However, this thesis also argues that ethnic bias – whether produced by expressive ethnic attachments or the use of ethnic heuristics – may combine with substantive preferences to shape vote decisions. In other words, ethnic voting, of whatever form, does not preclude a role for 'policy-as-usual' voting behaviour. Indeed, strong psychological ethnic attachments do not preclude consideration of other information about substantive interests. Such voters may still be influenced by the programmatic promises of new candidates, or the performance of an incumbent in office.[25] Similarly, in considering a candidate's substantive profile, voters may well employ ethnic heuristics to fill information gaps. However, this need not imply they will entirely ignore explicit information about candidates accessed more directly.

In short, the identification of 'policy-as-usual' voting behaviour does not preclude a role for ethnicity in electoral behaviour, and voting preferences shaped by ethnic factors do not imply the absence of 'policy-as-usual' considerations. Rather, a variety of motivations and processes may influence voters' choices, and the conceptual framework put forward in this thesis explicitly allows for such casual heterogeneity.

Research Design

This thesis examines ethnic voting in presidential elections in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. These countries were chosen because the rise of ethnic politics has been particularly pronounced in the Andean region, and there is strong evidence that ethnic voting has occurred in all three cases.[26] The analysis focuses on presidential voting because presidential campaigns tend to be highly personalised, and thus candidate characteristics – including

[25] Other scholars have made similar claims with regard to ethnic voting elsewhere (e.g., Carlson 2015).
[26] This does not constitute selection on the dependent variable because the primary aim of this analysis is to understand the nature, not the occurrence, of ethnic voting. Thus, selecting the cases where ethnic voting is most likely to occur is appropriate.

ethnicity – are often more important than in subnational or legislative elections.[27] In the latter cases, capillary party organisation, specific local issues, clientelism, and interpersonal bonds tend to play a more prominent role (e.g., Blank 1974; Fornos et al. 2004, 930; Cancela and Geys 2016, 268), to the extent that they may override or mitigate the direct influence of ethnic bias in shaping electoral outcomes. Moreover, local demographic and political conditions may often make ethnic voting redundant or unobservable below the presidential level, as in cases where electorates and/or candidates are ethnically homogenous. Thus, presidential elections provide both an electoral context in which the effect of ethnicity on voting is potentially most salient, and where voter and candidate ethnicity varies sufficiently to distinguish ethnic voting from other forms of electoral behaviour.

This thesis's survey-based analysis covers the most recent presidential elections in each country for which detailed data are available. Thus, the analysis covers Bolivia in 2005 and 2009 (Chapter Three), Ecuador in 2002, 2006 and 2009 (Chapter Four), and Peru in 2006 and 2011 (Chapter Five). As well as their recency, these election cases have several further characteristics that make them appropriate choices for an examination of ethnic voting.

First, in each election at least one prominent candidate publicly identified as indigenous, or made explicit appeals to indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters. Similarly, at least one prominent candidate was widely perceived as the representative of the white, or at least non-indigenous, socioeconomic elite. In the context of ethnically-divided societies such as those in the Andes, these conditions are particularly conducive to ethnic voting. Second, these cases cover the first major electoral success of an indigenous party or ethnopopulist candidate in each country: Evo Morales in Bolivia 2005, Pachakutik in Ecuador 2002, and Ollanta Humala in Peru 2011.[28] They also include cases in which an incumbent ethnopopulist sought re-election (Bolivia and Ecuador in 2009), offering an opportunity to examine the impact of incumbency on ethnic voting. Indeed, although each election case shares certain key characteristics, they also exhibit variation on several electorally important contextual factors. In addition to incumbency, there is considerable variation in the salience of ethnicity in the campaign (the strength of ethnic identification among voters, the involvement of ethnic social organisations, the degree of ethnic polarisation, and so forth); the number of viable candidates and their respective campaign strategies; and the strength and nature of electoral

[27] Ethnic voting may also occur where parties are the primary electoral units, but only where a clearly defined ethnic party exists, which is arguably not the case in Latin America. See Ferree (2006) on party-based ethnic voting in South Africa.
[28] Humala also finished top of the first-round vote in Peru's 2006 election.

cross-pressures on voters. Thus, the election cases selected offer a common set of core characteristics that are broadly conducive to ethnic voting, they cover key moments in the recent history of ethnic politics in each country, and they provide potentially informative variation on important contextual factors.

Peru was chosen for the experimental study because its contemporary political landscape remains particularly inchoate (a condition conducive to heuristic use in general), and because it lacks a single, dominant, 'real-world' political personality. The aim of the experimental study was to examine the influence of a generalised ethnic heuristic on voting behaviour, for which the absence of a dominant 'real-world' figure such as Evo Morales (in Bolivia) or Rafael Correa (in Ecuador) was advantageous. The exceptional political dominance of such individual politicians will unavoidably influence perceptions about more general political 'types', and thus a context without such figures may produce results that are somewhat less contextually bound.

The analysis in this thesis is structured around three broad aims. First, it looks to establish the case for ethnic voting in each country under investigation, focusing primarily on statistical analysis of nationally-representative survey data. It also examines the relationship between ethnic voting and other, non-ethnic, vote determiners, with a view to understanding how diverse voter characteristics and preferences combine to shape vote choice. Second, the analysis looks to determine the underlying nature of ethnic voting behaviour in the region, assessing evidence for each of the three ethnic voting models and the one non-ethnic voting model, outlined previously. Thus, it examines support for the expressive model, the heuristic model, the indirect model, and the 'policy-as-usual' model, as well as how processes linked with each conceptual explanation may overlap and interact. Third, the thesis offers some initial thoughts on how wider contextual factors may influence ethnic voting in the region. This includes examination of various contextual variables (e.g., the prominence of ethnic identification and organisation; the composition of the electoral field; the presence of known political personalities; campaign strategies; and the prevalence of clientelistic practices) and their impact of ethnic voting at the micro level. This last aspect of the analysis is not fully elaborated here, but some preliminary trends are outlined with a view to future research.

Methods and Data

The thesis employs a range of methods and data in its analysis. These are discussed in detail in Chapter Two, but are outlined in broad terms here. First, it uses survey data from the

Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) to test the relationship between voter ethnicity and vote choice across the seven presidential elections examined in Chapters Three to Five. This analysis includes both group-level assessment of general ethnic voting patterns and more detailed statistical examination of voter characteristics and vote choice at the individual level. The group-level analysis provides descriptive statistics on the overall vote distributions within ethnic groups, and the ethnic composition of each candidate's vote share, for each election case study. These statistics provide an initial indication of ethnicity's relative salience in different groups, as well as the ethnic scope of a party's electoral appeal, and they provide a basic means of comparison across electoral cases. However, this group-level analysis provides only a weak basis for causal inference because it does not account for the potential confounding influence of other factors.

Thus, the analysis also includes a series of multinomial logistic regression models to test the effect of ethnicity on vote choice at the individual level. The statistical models incorporate both linguistic background and self-identification measures for ethnicity, and they include a wide range of potential confounders (e.g., other demographic indicators, economic perceptions, ideology, and policy preferences). The analysis also examines the interactions between voter ethnicity and substantive preferences, providing insight into how ethnic and non-ethnic vote determiners combine to shape electoral choices. Finally, the analysis tests how voters' attitudes towards ethnic groups and issues (e.g., support for ethnic policy issues, perceptions of different ethnic groups, and so forth) might influence vote choice, offering indications about possible voter motivations.

Second, the thesis uses data from a 'mock election' experiment in Peru to examine electoral decision-making at the micro level. The experiment took the form of an interactive mock election campaign simulated on a computer, in which subjects gathered and evaluated information about hypothetical candidates whose profiles were experimentally manipulated. The experimental data offer unique insights into how voters use ethnic information in making their electoral choices, and thus contribute to a deeper understanding of the motivations driving ethnic voting behaviour.

Finally, the thesis makes use of various qualitative data to illustrate or contextualise findings from the survey and experimental analysis. These include campaign publicity items, local media content, reports from government agencies and non-governmental organisations, and other similar materials.

In summary, the research design developed in this thesis provides data on ethnic voting from various perspectives and at various analytical levels. Each component of the empirical analysis aims to contribute towards one or several of the principal research aims, yet the nature of the data available, and the type of research questions addressed, mean that different empirical tests at times address different conceptual propositions. In general, both survey and experimental data and analysis offer important insights into ethnic voting in the region, while the qualitative analysis can help illustrate, and link empirically, the principal findings. Thus, in their own way, each of these three broad strands of analysis addresses various aspects of the overarching aim of the thesis: to examine the occurrence and nature of ethnic voting in Latin America, and to assess the implications for the quality and stability of electoral democracy in the region.

Organisation of the Thesis

Following this introduction, Chapter Two lays out the research design of the thesis in detail. It includes further discussion of the principal research aims, focusing on the specific contributions made by the survey, experimental, and qualitative analyses. It also includes in-depth discussion of the research methods employed – the statistical analyses carried out, and the experimental procedures followed – as well as key characteristics of the data examined.

Chapters Three, Four, and Five are the election case studies covering Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, respectively. These chapters offer in-depth quantitative analysis of voting behaviour in the elections under investigation, as well as discussion of the wider sociopolitical context in which the elections took place. Chapter Six shifts the analytic focus to the decision-making of individual voters, drawing on data from the Peruvian experiment.

The final chapter draws some broad conclusions regarding the principal findings of the thesis, and how these may contribute to our current understanding of ethnic politics and electoral behaviour in the Andes and beyond. It discusses the degree of generalisability of the findings, and it suggests a number of areas for further research.

Chapter Two

Research Design

This chapter lays out the specific aims, data, and methods on which the analysis in the following chapters is based. Each component of the analysis aims to contribute to one or several of the principal research objectives of the thesis. However, the nature of the data available, and the type of research questions addressed, mean that different empirical tests at times address different conceptual propositions. Thus, the analysis of nationally representative survey data in Chapters Three, Four, and Five establishes the case for ethnic voting in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, respectively, focusing on presidential voting. This analysis also examines the relationship between ethnic voting and other potential vote determinants. However, the survey data do not permit detailed examination of the underlying processes that drive ethnic voting, and this analysis cannot easily distinguish between expressive and heuristic ethnic voting. As a result, most of the analysis in these three chapters focuses on the effects of a broadly defined ethnic bias on presidential vote choice, and the electoral consequences of the interplay between ethnic bias and substantive preferences. In this case, ethnic bias is considered to result from either psychological ethnic attachments and prejudice, or the instrumental use of ethnicity as an information shortcut, or both.

In contrast, the Peruvian experiment discussed in Chapter Six was designed specifically to address questions about the precise role of ethnicity in electoral decision-making. The experiment provides a wealth of data on the micro-level processes through which individual voters arrive at their vote decisions, and how differences in candidate profiles affect those processes and outcomes. The experiment data can clearly distinguish between expressive and heuristic ethnic voting – the impact of expressive or heuristic ethnic bias – and identify and trace the constituent processes involved in different forms of voting. However, the experimental sample is relatively small (N = 217), it is not nationally representative, and it was drawn from just a single country (Peru). As a result, findings from the experiment are far less generalisable to national or supranational populations than results from the survey-based analysis.

In general, both types of data and analysis offer important insights into ethnic voting in the region, and although the findings from each cannot always be tested directly against one another, it is possible to establish their consistency with broad conceptual propositions. Similarly, qualitative analysis can help substantiate, and link empirically, the findings from the survey and experimental data. For example, key features of the macro context are discussed in relation to the survey-based findings in Chapters Three through Five, and data from open-ended post-experiment interviews help interpret data from the election simulations. Overall, the research design developed in this thesis provides data on ethnic voting from various perspectives and at various analytical levels. Although such diverse data do not always allow direct head-to-head tests for specific propositions, they do shed light on components of the same causal story and thus provide a more complete and nuanced assessment of ethnic voting and its implications for democratic politics in the Andes.

OVERVIEW AND AIMS

The first half of this chapter provides an overview of the general research design, focused on the specific aims, concepts, limitations, and contributions of each component of the analysis. It outlines the seven case studies of presidential elections in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, and it discusses the various components of the statistical analyses applied. These analyses can contribute to several research aims of the thesis, but they also have certain intrinsic limitations. Next, the discussion turns to the key features of the Peruvian voting experiment and how these findings complement the survey-based analysis. In both cases, more detailed discussion of the specific research methods employed, and the key characteristics of the data examined, comes in the second half of this chapter.

Case Studies of Presidential Elections in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru

Chapters Three, Four, and Five are case studies of national presidential elections in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, respectively. Each chapter includes a detailed examination of two to three consecutive elections occurring between 2002 and 2011. The analyses are primarily based on surveys conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), which provides data on political attitudes and vote choice since the early 2000s. However, a range of other data is used to construct the wider sociopolitical context in which the election cases take place and to offer qualitative substantiation for the findings of the survey-based analysis.

The case studies in these chapters have three principal aims. First, they assess general voting patterns in each election, focusing on two broad measures of ethnic voting: group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation. Second, they aim to determine whether ethnicity has a direct causal relationship with vote choice and to explore the nature of that relationship. Finally, they seek to identify and measure potential indirect effects of ethnicity on voting outcomes, where the effect of voter ethnicity is mediated through substantive preferences and interests.

Group- and Candidate-Centred Ethnicisation

Group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores provide a broad overview of ethnic voting in the election in question. Group-centred ethnicisation refers to the relative importance of ethnicity to voters, and it is measured by the level of consistency in vote choice among members of the same ethnic group. Thus high levels of group-centred ethnicisation would be a case in which the vast majority of voters within an ethnic group vote for the same candidate; low levels of group-centred ethnicisation would be a case in which members of the same ethnic group vote for different candidates. Candidate-centred ethnicisation refers to the composition of a candidate's support base, and it is measured by the constitutive proportion of voters from each ethnic group in the candidate's overall vote share. Thus, high levels of candidate-centred ethnicisation would be a case in which the vast majority of a candidate's support came from just one ethnic group; low levels of candidate-centred ethnicisation would be a case in which the candidate wins votes across ethnic groups.[29] The analysis of group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation is based on data from LAPOP surveys in each country.

Together, these two broad measures can contribute to a general assessment of ethnic voting in the election in question, providing insight into the voting behaviour of particular ethnic groups and the appeal of particular candidates across ethnic groups. Group-centred ethnicisation can offer an indication of the likely salience of ethnicity to individual voters, and thus it can tell us something about voters' electoral motivations. It seems reasonable to assume that when members of a group spread their votes across several candidates, the salience of ethnicity to vote choice is relatively low; ethnicity does not significantly shape individual voting behaviour. In contrast, when members of the same group support, en masse, the same candidate, we may assume that ethnicity plays a more prominent role in electoral choice.

[29] The broad framework for assessing ethnic voting based on measures of group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation is developed by Huber (2012), although the calculation methods used here are a simplification of Huber's.

Candidate-centred ethnicisation can tell us something about the appeal and electoral support base of candidates and parties across ethnic groups. Thus, candidate-centred ethnicisation can contribute to assessments about the likely behaviour of candidates and, ultimately, the prospects for ethnic polarisation. For example, high levels of candidate-centred ethnicisation suggest the candidate wins little support outside their 'base' ethnic group. In this case, the candidate may have little incentive to adopt an inclusive political platform, and they may resort to electoral strategies aimed at priming ethnic cleavages and exacerbating ethnic tensions. This is likely to increase ethnic polarisation (Huber 2012, 988).

Of course, group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation are linked. Voters respond to candidates' political speech and behaviour, and candidates design their campaigns based on what they believe will appeal to target constituencies. Thus, a white candidate faced with high levels of group-centred ethnicisation may opt to focus his or her campaign on white and white-mestizo voters, believing indigenous and indigenous-mestizos to be out of reach. Such a campaign strategy may, in turn, lead to higher levels of candidate-centred ethnicisation, doing little to convince indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters that their interests will be represented. Thus, although group-centred ethnicisation does not necessarily imply risks to democratic stability, group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation may be mutually reinforcing, and latter is more conducive to ethnic polarisation and conflict.

In some respects, then, group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation are two sides of the same ethnic politics coin. Yet despite their overlap, they are conceptually distinct, and each directs us towards different sets of questions and is indicative of characteristics linked to different aspects of ethnic voting. However, both group- and candidate-centred measures relate to ethnic voting at the group-level, and thus they do not take into account individual-level voter characteristics beyond ethnic background. As a result, they provide only a weak basis for inferring a causal relationship between voter ethnicity and vote choice, making it impossible to rule out potentially confounding factors (i.e., various non-ethnic voter characteristics) that may account for group-level outcomes.

Ethnicity's Direct Effect on Vote Choice

Thus, the second aim of the analysis in Chapters Three, Four, and Five is to strengthen the empirical case for a causal relationship between voter ethnicity and vote choice and to explore the nature of that relationship. First, the analysis tests the significance of ethnicity as a vote predictor in each election while controlling for a wide range of potential

confounders, using both linguistic and self-identification measures of ethnicity. It also examines interactions between ethnicity and certain substantive preferences and interests in order to understand better the relationship between ethnic and non-ethnic vote determiners. A final component of the analysis tests the effect of variables measuring voter attitudes towards ethnic groups and issues (e.g., negative views of a particular group, or support for affirmative-action policies), which can help gain insight into voter motivations.

First, in order to examine what types of ethnic identification are most important electorally, the analysis includes a linguistic and self-identification measure of ethnicity. The linguistic measure is based on the childhood language of the respondent or the respondent's parents (Spanish or an indigenous language), while the self-identification measure is the respondent's self-reported identification with predetermined ethnic categories (in most cases white, mestizo, or indigenous).[30] Comparison between the effects of these two ethnicity measures may provide some initial insight into the nature of ethnicity's role in voting. For example, the linguistic measure reflects a broader sociocultural background and may include individuals who self-identify with diverse ethnic categories. Indeed, in the three countries examined here, voters with an indigenous-language background include many self-identified mestizos – the overwhelming majority of respondents in all three countries – as well as indigenous voters. Thus, one useful feature of the linguistic measure is to distinguish between mestizos with a more proximate indigenous background (indigenous-mestizos), and those with more distant connections to indigenous heritage.

In contrast, the self-identification measure may be more indicative of an individual's explicit self-association with a particular ethnic group. As indicated previously, the majority of Andeans tend to self-identify as mestizo when this category is offered, but sizeable minorities also identify as white, indigenous, or black. For the purposes of the current study, the self-identification measure may help distinguish those voters with an indigenous-language background who feel a more immediate, and perhaps more socially and politically salient, attachment to indigenous identity. Such voters may be more likely to self-identify explicitly as indigenous, rather than as more ethnically ambiguous mestizos. Similarly, it can help distinguish voters who consider themselves entirely separate from indigenous culture from those who feel some (possibly distant) attachment to indigenous heritage. Many of the former

[30] Other response categories, such as 'black', 'oriental', or 'other' are included in the broad mestizo category. These groups typically constitute a small minority of respondents in the Andean surveys, and they tend to resemble mestizo voters in terms of electoral behaviour (the analysis tested vote models including both multiple and reduced (i.e., only white, mestizo, indigenous) ethnic categories and found little variation in results).

may choose to self-identify as white (or perhaps black), while many of the latter may signal their indigenous ties through a mestizo self-identification.[31]

Second, in order to explore the relationship between ethnic and non-ethnic factors in shaping vote choice in each election, the analysis includes interactions between ethnicity, on the one hand, and several key substantive preferences and interests, on the other. The inclusion of interactions, and their decomposition into marginal effects (the effect of *X* on *Y* according to *Z*) and adjusted predictions (the predicted probability of *Y* given specific values of *X* and *Z*), allows us to compare behaviour across ethnic groups and examine how ethnicity and other factors combine to produce voting outcomes. These features of the analysis can contribute to our understanding of the underlying nature of ethnic voting. For example, marginal effects can tell us the relative importance of particular substantive issues and interests to different ethnic groups, which can help determine the motivations behind support for a certain candidate within those groups. Similarly, adjusted predictions based on particular combinations of ethnic and non-ethnic voter characteristics can help demonstrate how both sets of vote determiners shape electoral choices, telling us something about the nature of candidates' appeal to different groups. Where these interactions are significant, their omission from the analysis may also bias estimates of main effects, as well as any predicted vote probabilities based on such models, leading to misplaced causal inferences.

Finally, for all those elections where the data are available, the analysis includes several measures of voters' attitudes towards specific ethnic groups and related policy issues. These include a number of variables that can be taken as proxies for ethnic prejudice, as well as support for ethnic policy issues and experience of discrimination. An examination of the relationship between these attitudinal measures and vote choice can contribute to an understanding of the underlying character of voters' motivations, particularly in terms of building a case (or not) in favour of more expressive ethnic voting.

Ethnicity's Indirect Effects on Vote Choice

The third aim of the analysis in Chapters Three through Five is to explore possible mediated effects of ethnicity on voting. Ethnicity might have mediated, or indirect, effects on vote choice because ethnic identity often helps shape certain sociopolitical attitudes and can

[31] In the Bolivian case, the analysis also includes an additional cultural identification measure. These data offer further insight into the types of ethnic identification that affect voting behaviour, and they allow comparison of voting trends across distinct cultural groups within a broadly-defined indigenous bloc. The significance of these cultural identification measures is discussed in Chapter Three.

determine material circumstances. These factors, in turn, may influence voting preferences. Mediated effects may occur in addition to, or even in the absence of, more direct effects of ethnicity on voting, such as those driven by psychological group allegiance or shaped by ethnic heuristics. The analysis in this thesis examines mediation effects of ethnicity via a wide range of sociopolitical attitudes, and it includes estimates of both total indirect effects and the specific pathways through which mediation may occur.

The analysis of indirect ethnic effects can help us understand the formative relationship between ethnicity and key sociopolitical attitudes, introducing a possible ethnic component to the latter's influence on vote choice. This is normally ignored by studies of ethnic voting, yet it is key to understanding the causes and consequences of ethnic voting patterns. This examination of indirect ethnic effects extends the thesis's voting analysis beyond the immediate dynamics of the vote decision itself, taking into consideration the construction of electorally significant substantive preferences and the possible role of ethnicity in such processes.

The Peruvian Voting Experiment

Chapter Six discusses the results of the Peruvian voting experiment. The experiment took the form of an interactive mock election campaign simulated on a computer, in which subjects gathered and evaluated information about two hypothetical candidates running for president. Mini-questionnaires throughout the campaign recorded 'live' data on voters' impressions and preferences, which were then compared across experimental groups exposed to distinct candidate profiles. A major advantage of the experiment was that voters could be observed up close *while* they were making their vote decisions, under conditions that could be experimentally controlled and manipulated. This provides unique insight into the underlying motivations that may drive ethnic voting (Lau and Redlawsk 2006, 17). The experiments were conducted in Peru in September and October of 2013, with participants from across the country taking part through the project's website. Details of the experimental sample and software platform used to run the studies are included later in this chapter. The specific experimental design and procedures are outlined in Chapter Six.

The voting experiment was specifically designed to examine the decision-making processes of voters at the micro level. In particular, it aimed to distinguish between processes indicative of expressive and heuristic ethnic voting. With regard to the latter, it tests two related mechanisms through which the use of ethnic heuristics might influence voting

behaviour, both informed by existing theory on decision-making from cognitive psychology (e.g., Fiske and Taylor 1991). The first mechanism involves the use of ethnic stereotypes as information shortcuts; the second refers to the resistance of stereotypes to change (Zaller 1992; Rahn 1993). Thus, the analysis proposes that voters will not only make stereotype-based assumptions about unknown candidates that go well beyond the actual information available, but that they will also tend to play down the significance of actual information that contradicts those stereotype-based expectations.[32]

The analysis in Chapter Six tests voters' assumptions about three aspects of candidate profile: programmatic positions, social-group associations, and personal characteristics. Programmatic profile refers not only to a candidate's stand on specific policy issues (e.g. nationalisations or public spending), but also to his or her broader political ideology. Social-group associations refer to voters' general impressions about the social groups and interests that the candidate will favour and which will benefit most from the candidate's election. These may well be linked to programmatic profile, but they exceed simple calculations about the utility of policy *A* or *B* for a certain group. They include assumptions about possible clientelistic benefits and a candidate's wider sympathies, loyalties, networks, and personal as well as political priorities. The third aspect of candidate profile, personal characteristics, refers to the perceived personal traits of the candidate, including competency, trustworthiness, sophistication, responsibility, and so forth. Once again, programmatic profile is probably important for such candidate-trait ascriptions, although more deep-seated beliefs about 'intrinsic' ethnic types may exert more influence in this last case.

By examining how voters use ethnic information in reaching their vote decision, the analysis in Chapter Six can provide insight into the 'black box' of voter decision-making that other methods of analysis cannot easily reach. Understanding voter decision-making at the micro level is crucial for understanding the motivations that drive voting behaviour, and thus the wider consequences of ethnic voting for the terms and quality of democratic representation and democratic stability. Empirically, the voting experiment provides the only direct test for distinguishing between expressive and heuristic ethnic voting, as well as the only means by which to trace the constituent processes involved in the latter.

[32] Such effects have been identified elsewhere in relation to party stereotypes. For example, Rahn (1993) found that voters consistently neglected information that was inconsistent with party labels when reaching candidate evaluations.

DATA AND METHODS

The remainder of this chapter outlines the specific data and methods used in the subsequent chapters' analysis. It discusses the key features of the seven election case studies and the most important characteristics of the LAPOP survey data. It then presents further details of the various types of statistical analyses applied to the LAPOP data. These include descriptive statistics of group-level voting patterns, a series of multinomial logistic regression models to examine individual-level vote characteristics, and mediation analysis to test the indirect ethnic voting model. The discussion then turns to the Peruvian voting experiment, laying out the basic experimental design and the methods used to analyse its data. Finally, this chapter concludes by briefly summarising some of the sources for more qualitative data used in the analysis.

Election Case Studies

The analysis in Chapters Three, Four, and Five covers a total of seven presidential elections, two in Bolivia, three in Ecuador, and two in Peru. In order to maintain a degree of comparability, the elections selected for analysis include the two (or three, in the case of Ecuador) most recent electoral cycles prior to 2013, and thus they cover Bolivia in 2005 and 2009, Ecuador in 2002, 2006 and 2009, and Peru in 2006 and 2011.[33] Aside from contemporaneity, these seven elections have a number of further points in common, including: (i) the presence of a prominent ethnopopulist candidate; (ii) the presence of a relatively prominent white or white-mestizo candidate; (iii) a programmatic debate that tended to focus on similar broad issues (such as wealth redistribution and nationalisations); and (iv) the electoral prominence of regional, economic, and ethnic divides. Variation in the exact data available for each election and country, as well as the lack of a common dependent variable (i.e. different candidates running across countries and electoral cycles), leads this chapter to forego explicit cross-country comparison in statistical terms. However, the common characteristics across these seven elections allow for some more qualitative comparative analysis.

Indeed, despite broad similarities, these seven elections also exhibit variation on several important contextual factors. Where such variation is prominent, the discussion offers some tentative interpretations about the wider impact of country-level factors on voting

[33] The additional Ecuadorian case study, on the 2002 election, is included because it represents the most prominent electoral success of an indigenous party in Ecuador (Pachakutik, whose joint candidate won the presidency). Thus, it may constitute the clearest example of ethnic voting in the Ecuadorian case.

behaviour, although the focus remains primarily on individual-level variables. Among the contextual factors that vary across the seven election cases are: (i) the presence of an ethnopopulist newcomer (Bolivia 2005, Ecuador 2002 and 2006, Peru 2006); (ii) the presence of an incumbent seeking re-election (Bolivia 2009 and Ecuador 2009); (iii) the level of social and political unrest preceding the election (ranging from very high in Bolivia 2005 and 2009, to progressively lower in Ecuador and Peru); (iv) the role of social movements (highly involved in Bolivia, particularly in 2005, to some extent in Ecuador 2002 and 2006, but less so elsewhere); and (v) substantial variation in the political alignment of regional, economic, organisational, and ethnic blocs and, in some cases, associated clientelistic relations. The possible effects of such contextual factors are discussed as they arise in relation to the specific election case studies and in more general terms in the concluding chapter.

Survey Data

Most of the data for the election case studies come from LAPOP surveys conducted between 2004 and 2012. These surveys are nationally representative of voting-age adults, with a total sample size between 1,500 and over 3,000 respondents. Country samples are developed using a multi-stage probabilistic design, and they are stratified by major subnational region and by urban and rural areas within municipalities.[34] These design features, as well as weighting schemes in both the Bolivian and Ecuadorian cases, are incorporated into the statistical models presented in the following chapters.

The data come mostly from the 2006 and 2010 rounds of surveys, which cover the elections in 2005 and 2006, and 2009, respectively. In addition, the analysis uses the 2004 survey for Ecuador 2002, the 2008 survey for Ecuador 2006 (the 2006 survey was conducted prior to the election), and the 2012 survey for Peru 2011. For the principal vote models, then, data come from post-election surveys conducted within twelve months of the election, with the exception of Ecuador 2002 and 2006. Like most post-election surveys, the LAPOP data tend to overstate support for the eventual winner of the election in question, although they generally reflect the overall trend of the official results.

Although the LAPOP surveys included a core set of questions across electoral cycles and countries, several measures of interest to the current analysis are absent in individual surveys. Where possible, alternative, related measures are substituted for missing variables,

[34] LAPOP has conducted comparable biennial public opinion surveys in most countries in North, Central, and South America since 2004. See LAPOP (2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2008, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2012) for full technical information on each survey design, and Appendix E for specific question wording.

although even where such alternatives exist, the lack of direct comparability makes quantitative cross-country and over-time analysis problematic. Details of the specific substitute measures used in each election case study are outlined in the relevant chapters. In general, however, all surveys except Ecuador 2002 and 2008 include comparable measures of voters' linguistic background (Spanish or an indigenous language), and all seven relevant surveys include a 'generic' self-identification measure (in most cases, white, mestizo, or indigenous). In addition, the Bolivian cases include a measure of cultural identification (asking whether respondents identify with specific indigenous cultures – Aymara, Quechua, Camba, Guaraní, and so forth – or with no indigenous culture). All surveys also include measures of household income, region, urban/rural residence, age, gender, trust in political parties, perceptions of national and personal economic circumstances, and, of course, first-round presidential vote choice.[35]

Data Analysis and Statistical Models

Most election case studies include four main empirical sections, although in some cases one or more sections is dropped or reduced due to data limitations. First, each case study presents an overview of group- and candidate-perspective ethnicisation in the election – that is, the proportion of each ethnic group that votes for each candidate, and the proportion of each candidate's vote share that comes from each ethnic group. The second section presents the results from a multinomial logistic regression model that tests the basic relationship between voter ethnicity, sociodemographic factors, economic perceptions, and political attitudes affecting vote choice. In most cases, it also reports the results of a similar model that includes various interactions between ethnicity and other factors, presenting marginal effects and adjusted predictions. The next section adds ethnic attitudes to the model (where such data are available), and, once again, examines both main and marginal effects. Lastly, the final section in each case study presents the results of mediation analysis, where the effect of ethnicity on vote choice as mediated through political attitudes is estimated for the two major candidate pairs.

Group- and Candidate-Centred Ethnicisation

Group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores are calculated for each ethnic group and each major candidate for the seven elections studied. Both types of score are simple

[35] All three countries have electoral systems that require the president to win a clear majority in first-round voting to avoid a second-round runoff (in most cases, this means over fifty percent of valid vote). Where no candidate wins such a majority, the top two candidates proceed to a runoff election.

standard deviations (SD), with group-centred scores based on the distribution of votes to candidates within an ethnic group, and candidate-centred scores based on the ethnic composition of the candidate's vote.

There are two group-centred ethnicisation scores, SD1 and SD2, which are calculated based on different mean proportions. The first, SD1, is the standard deviation of vote proportions within each ethnic group from the overall vote proportions in the full survey sample, whereas SD2 is simply the standard deviation from an equal-vote-share mean (simply 100 percent divided by the number of voting outcomes). Thus, SD1 takes into account the overall performance of the candidates, helping to identify disproportionate preferences in particular groups. However, majority groups will always have lower SD1 scores, even if their vote is highly concentrated, because their vote proportions will (by definition) be closer to the mean as set by the overall sample proportions. For its part, SD2 does not take into account one or another candidate's stronger overall performance, but it does allow more concentrated vote patterns in majority groups to be identified (unlike SD1).

Candidate-centred ethnicisation scores are the standard deviations of each candidate's ethnic vote proportions from the ethnic group proportions in the full sample. Candidate-centred ethnicisation scores thus take into account the ethnic composition of the overall LAPOP sample when calculating candidate scores.

Group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores give a broad overview of national voting patterns in the election under investigation, indicating both trends in the electoral behaviour of each ethnic group and the breadth of each candidate's ethnic appeal. The ethnicisation scores also provide useful summary statistics that can aid some (qualified) cross-election comparisons.

Multinomial Logistic Regression: Overview

Much of the following chapters' analysis is based on a series of multinomial logistic regression (mlogit) models with vote choice as the dependent variable. First, the analysis reports the results of a 'base' mlogit model for each election, which includes the following sets of explanatory variables: (i) ethnicity, including at least linguistic and self-identification measures; (ii) sociodemographic indicators (income, age, gender, etc.); (iii) several measures of broad political and economic perceptions (perceived performance of the national economy, trust in political parties, etc.); and (iv) a range of political attitudes and preferences (ideology and support for specific programmatic proposals). To ease interpretation, the log-odds

produced by these models are converted to effects on overall predicted vote probabilities, with the original output reported in appendices.

However, main effects of the type produced by the base mlogit models assume that voters' sociodemographic background and political attitudes influence vote choice uniformly across ethnic groups. They also assume that the effect of ethnicity on vote choice is the same for voters with different sociodemographic backgrounds and who have quite different social and political attitudes. Although analysis of main effects can provide valuable insight, in many cases it seems likely that these two assumptions will not hold. Therefore, after presenting main effects for each election, this thesis proceeds to decompose these effects into average marginal effects (AMEs) by ethnic group: the effect of *X* on *Y* according to *Z*. Furthermore, in order to assess the substantive impact of such effects on vote choice, the thesis also calculates and compares predictions based on various possible voter profiles: the predicted value of *Y* given set values of *X* and *Z* (or, indeed, set values of X_i, X_{ii}, X_n and *Z*). These average marginal effects and adjusted predictions are calculated based on two-way interactions between ethnicity and political attitudes, and between ethnicity and income, added to the base mlogit model.[36] Together, an examination of main effects, marginal effects, and substantive predictions provides a far more nuanced – and far more accurate – picture of the interplay among ethnicity, sociodemographic indicators, political attitudes, and vote choice in the Andes.

Finally, where appropriate measures are available, ethnic attitude variables are added to the base mlogit model. The particular measures tested vary considerably across survey round and country, so detailed discussion of this aspect of the analysis is deferred to the individual chapters. In general, however, these measures include attitudes towards ethnic mixing, inter-ethnic marriage, the root of ethnic inequalities, the treatment of certain groups, and personal experience of discrimination. As well as main effects, the analysis also reports decomposed effects and predictions for two-way interactions between ethnicity and these ethnic attitude measures.

Multinomial Logistic Regression: Marginal Effects and Predictions

The analysis of decomposed effects in the following chapters consists of two principal components: Average Marginal Effects (AMEs) and Adjusted Predictions at Representative

[36] Separate models are run for interactions with each ethnicity measure, with the other ethnicity measure included as a control.

Values (APRs). Average Marginal Effects represent the average effect of *X* on *Y* by *Z*, taking into account the values of any other variables under consideration across the full sample. For example, an AME can indicate the effect of political ideology (*X*) on vote choice (*Y*) in each ethnic group (*Z*), while controlling for sociodemographic and other factors. Adjusted Predictions at Representative Values are simply the predictions on the dependent variable associated with AMEs. Thus, APRs are the predicted outcome on *Y* according to *X* and *Z* at various set values of *Xi*, *Xii*, *Xn*, while controlling for other factors. For example, APRs could provide the predicted probability of voting for Candidate A for a voter who is white, low income, and supports the nationalisation of key industries.

The analysis of these decomposed effects and predictions is generally restricted to ethnicity's interactions with four key vote determiners: income, political ideology, support for state-led wealth redistribution, and support for nationalisations. These four non-ethnic explanatory variables are selected because they appear to play important roles in many of the elections examined in this thesis, and they represent four relatively broad, and consistently central, themes in political competition in the region.

Mediation Analysis

Mediation analysis can be used to determine whether the effect of *X* on *Y* is mediated through *M* and, if so, to what extent (so: $X \rightarrow M \rightarrow Y$). For the purposes of this study, mediation analysis is used to test the effect of voter ethnicity on vote choice, including mediation of ethnicity's effect through political attitudes. Conceptually, the argument runs that ethnicity may influence a voter's political attitudes (through determining both physical surroundings/material conditions and political socialization), and that these ethnically-influenced political attitudes then help shape voting behaviour. Such effects are routinely hypothesised, but rarely explicitly tested.

Mediation analysis has been the subject of considerable debate in the statistical literature (e.g. Baron and Kenny 1986; MacKinnon 2008; Imai et al. 2010; Linden and Karlson 2013; Kenny 2014), yet there is little consensus regarding the preferred method of calculation. This is particularly the case where the outcome and mediator variables include categorical as well as continuous measures, an unavoidable aspect of this thesis's analysis (categorical ethnicity measures; categorical and continuous political attitude measures; categorical vote-choice outcomes). In such cases, the conventional methods for estimating mediation – the 'product of coefficients' approach (multiplying the coefficient of $X \rightarrow M$ by

the coefficient for $M \rightarrow Y$), or the 'difference in coefficients' approach (subtracting the effect of $X \rightarrow Y$ controlling for M from the direct effect of $X \rightarrow Y$) – are not easily applied. The problem arises from the need to combine coefficients and error terms from both linear and nonlinear models.

Several approaches have been proposed to resolve this issue (see Imai et al. 2010 or Linden and Karlson 2013). The analysis presented in the following chapters opts for an adjusted version of the 'product of coefficients' approach, which uses *Y*-standardisation to combine coefficients from the linear and logit parts of the mediation model.[37] This method, proposed by MacKinnon and Dwyer (1993) and implemented in the user-written Stata command 'binary_mediation' (Ender, nd), uses *Y*-standardisation to rescale coefficients to be measured in standard deviations of the latent outcome variable that is assumed to underlie the binary outcome variable. The results are coefficients that can be interpreted in a similar way to standardised coefficients in linear models (e.g. Winship and Mare 1983).

Although some studies have found this method to produce slightly biased results (Linden and Karlson 2013: 101), it has the major advantage of being able to estimate multiple specific mediation pathways (e.g. $X \rightarrow M_i \rightarrow Y$; $X \rightarrow M_{ii} \rightarrow Y$; $X \rightarrow M_{iii} \rightarrow Y$; etc.) while controlling for other mediators and direct predictors.[38] Most alternative methods only provide an estimate of the overall mediation, or are limited to one mediator variable (Buis 2010; Karlson et al. 2012; Hicks and Tingley 2011).[39] The decomposition of mediation effects into specific pathways has considerable conceptual utility for this thesis's analysis, allowing us to identify the particular political attitudes through which ethnicity's indirect effects might operate. The overall mediation effects are checked against estimates from two alternative methods (Karlson et al. 2012; Buis 2010), which are both based on the comparison between effects in 'full' and 'reduced' models (that is, between the model with mediators, and the model without mediators), rather than the 'product of coefficients' approach. These two alternative methods are referred to as KHB (Karlson) and LDE (Buis) in the following case studies. In general, the vote analyses in the following chapters show the three methods to

[37] More specifically, the method standardises the coefficients linking $X \rightarrow M$ and $M \rightarrow Y$ (a and b), and then applies the 'product of coefficients' method to these coefficients (ab). In cases where M is continuous, the $X \rightarrow M$ relationship constitutes the standardised coefficient of a linear model, while in cases where M is categorical, the coefficient is the standardised coefficient of a logit model (Linden and Karlson 2013: 89-90).

[38] In fact, this method is shown to produce relatively accurate point estimates for direct, indirect, and total effects. However, it tends to overestimate the overall proportion of the effects mediated (Linden and Karlson 2013: 92-102).

[39] The method proposed by Buis (2010) is a generalisation of Erikson et al. (2005) and is implemented in the Stata command 'ldecomp'. The methods proposed by Karlson et al. (2012) and Hicks and Tingley (2011) are implemented in the Stata commands 'khb' and 'medeff', respectively.

produce broadly comparable estimates for the proportion of the total effect that is mediated (typically, within ten percent of one another).[40] At least for the purposes of the current analysis, these differences tend not to alter fundamentally interpretations about ethnicity's indirect role in voting.

Methodological limitations have also determined two other features of the following chapters' mediation analysis. First, the requirement for a binary dependent variable has meant that the analysis focuses only on the top two candidates in each election, although some additional candidate pairs are included in separate models where the comparison has potential explanatory value. This has an obvious impact on sample size, as only voters for the candidate pair tested are included. Second, the requirement for binary or continuous independent variables means the ethnic self-identification measure is converted into head-to-head comparisons, tested in separate models. Thus, one model tests the effect of self-identification as white compared with mestizo (excluding all non-white and non-mestizo observations), while a second model tests the effect of self-identification as indigenous compared with mestizos (excluding all non-indigenous and non-mestizo observations). In some cases, a combination of these two methodologically imposed adjustments produces subpopulations that are too small for meaningful analysis, while the partially recoded variables (resulting in further sample reduction), as well as the process of standardisation required to produce the estimates, make direct comparisons with the 'base' mlogit models problematic.

However, despite the methodological complications, the mediation analysis presented in the following chapters can offer some important insights into ethnicity's direct and indirect role in voting. It can estimate the extent to which ethnicity exerts indirect influence on vote choice by prior conditioning of political and ethnic attitudes, it can identify which political attitudes might act as mediators, and it can suggest what the constituent parts of the mediated effect might look like. Statistical inaccuracies notwithstanding, these findings can contribute to our broad understanding of how ethnicity might shape vote choice *indirectly*, as well as directly, in contemporary Andean elections.

Design and Data Analysis for the Voting Experiment

For ease of reference, discussion of the specific procedures for the Peruvian voting experiment is deferred to Chapter Six. The following paragraphs include a more general

[40] Data limitations restrict the analysis in the Ecuadorian case (see discussion in Chapter Four).

discussion of participant recruitment, the basic operating platform for the experiment, and the principal methods of data analysis.

Participants

The experiment included a final sample of 217 participants ('voters') who were recruited from across Peru by 36 paid local research assistants. The author recruited these assistants via various universities, nongovernmental organisations, and online advertisements, and each assistant was asked to recruit up to 10 experiment participants from his or her extended family and social and professional networks. Although the resulting sample is not nationally representative, it does include substantial variation on key demographic variables (age, gender, income, occupation, ethnicity, and region of residence).[41] Full descriptive statistics for the experiment sample are included in Table D1.

Most participants took part online, via the project's website, during September and October 2013. Although this online mode of participation implies some loss of control over the experimental environment compared to a laboratory setting, it significantly increases recruitment reach by removing prohibitive travel demands on participants. For participants without private access to internet, several research assistants were able to convene experiment sessions in their homes, in local internet *cabinas* (small internet cafes), or at their place of study. This helped expand sociodemographic variation among participants.

The Basic Experimental Design

The experiment was developed and run on the Dynamic Process Tracing Environment (DPTE) platform hosted at the University of Iowa. The DPTE platform provides a highly customisable software base for designing dynamic, interactive social experiments, and it is particularly suitable for studying voting behaviour (e.g., Lau and Redlawsk 2006).

On accessing the experiment platform, participants were randomly selected into one of three experimental groups, which determined the candidate profiles to which they would be exposed.[42] After completing an initial questionnaire on demographic characteristics and political preferences, participants entered the first of three 'active' phases of the simulated campaign. During these 'active' phases, participants were tasked with searching and

[41] Research assistants were asked explicitly to include as much variation on demographic variables as possible among their recruits.

[42] The DPTE software randomly assigns participants to groups according to set probability weights (in this case, 33.3 percent, to achieve comparable group sizes). See discussion in Chapter Six on the composition of candidate profiles in each group.

evaluating information about the hypothetical candidates running for president, and mini-questionnaires between phases recorded 'live' data on participants' changing impressions and preferences. Each 'active' phase lasted five minutes, and participants were exposed to different types of information in each phase (see discussion in Chapter Six).

Participants accessed information via a 'dynamic information board', which presented a range of 'information titles' on the computer screen concerning various aspects of the campaign. When clicked on, these 'titles' revealed more detailed information about the indicated topic. For example, clicking on a title such as 'Olarte's Economic Policy' might reveal a short text setting out the economic programme of the candidate Olarte.[43] The DPTE platform allows for a variety of different information inputs, and the Peruvian experiment used text, images, and audio. When the participant finishes reading a particular text (or viewing an image or listening to an audio recording), he or she closes the information window and returns to the list of 'titles'. In general, information items were presented in a variety of forms, including simple factual items ('Olarte's Economic Policy' or 'Olarte: Family Background'); simulated news reports ('Olarte denies plans to increase taxes'); third-party endorsements ('CONFIEP declares support for Romero'); direct candidate policy statements ('Olarte: I will protect our natural resources'); and attack advertisements and rebuttals ('Romero: Olarte's plan for economic ruin'). The DPTE platform records what information participants look at, in what order they look at it, and for how long.

In order to better simulate a real election campaign, there was a set time limit to each 'active' phase of the campaign, and a clock at the top of the screen counted down to the end of the phase. When the phase ended, the information screen automatically closed and the participant was taken to the next post-phase task (usually a mini-questionnaire). Importantly, the information titles were not static; they constantly 'scrolled' down the screen so that every six seconds a new title appeared at the top of the screen, the last title disappeared from the bottom of the screen, and the remaining titles moved down one place. Participants were informed in advance that this 'scrolling' of titles would continue in the background while they were accessing specific information. Thus, participants missed new information titles while they were researching a specific topic.

This feature simulated better the time and resource constraints of a real-world election campaign, forcing participants to be more selective and efficient in choosing what

[43] The hypothetical candidates in the simulated campaign were Guillermo Olarte, Luís Romero, Juán Sánchez, and Luís Rodríguez. See Chapter Six.

information to examine. This was a particularly crucial feature in terms of assessing heuristic use because it is precisely to simplify complex and overwhelming information environments that heuristics are employed in the first place. If participants were allowed the opportunity to access *all* the information available and to do so without time pressure, then heuristic use would be likely to be reduced considerably. However, in order to ensure that all participants received a common set of core information items (e.g., information on a candidate's ethnic background), several items were introduced as 'fixed' features; the 'active' campaign phases paused and the screen was taken over by an 'announcement', 'newsflash', or 'candidate spot' containing the required information.

Instructions to participants and the various within-experiment questionnaires were all conducted via the DPTE platform, which guides participants through the various stages. In addition to the experiment data, the DPTE platform records the IP addresses from which the experiment platform is accessed, helping to prevent repeat participation.

Analysing the Experimental Data

For the most part, the experimental data are examined statistically, employing a range of different analyses. First, simple tests of association (T-tests and proportions tests) are used to examine the ascription of specific characteristics to candidates. For example, proportions tests are used to examine the ascription of different personal characteristics to each candidate, as well as the variation of such associations across experimental phases and groups.

Second, various regression analyses are employed to examine a wide range of relationships among voter characteristics, experimental conditions, and voter behaviour. The precise type of model employed depends on the nature of variables under consideration (e.g., whether the dependent variable is categorical or continuous) and the specific aims of the analysis. For example, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used to test the relationship between voter ethnicity and ratings on candidate 'feeling thermometers', while logistic regression is employed to examine vote choice.

Third, much of the analysis requires examination of interactions between various predictor variables of interest and the experimental group. These are decomposed into marginal effects and adjusted predictions. This is essential for the purpose of analysing the experimental data because a primary aim is to determine the influence of distinct group conditions on voting behaviour. Thus, in most cases, the relationships of interest relate to the

effects of different predictor variables across experimental groups (marginal effects) and the outcome of such relationships in each group (adjusted predictions).

Fourth, a key feature of the experiment design was the separation of the mock campaign into three distinct phases in which voters were exposed to different types of information. Thus, an important task for the data analysis is to examine how the perceptions and preferences of individual voters change across experimental phases. For this type of analysis, the experiment dataset is converted to longitudinal panel data and mixed-effects models are applied to examine within-subject changes over time (i.e., over the three experimental phases).

Finally, the experiment produced a vast amount of data (over 285,000 data points). In order to gain a broad overview of certain key trends, several composite measures are computed. In particular, two measures of voter-candidate proximity (how closely a voter's profile resembles that of each candidate) are key components of the final vote-choice analysis. The calculation methods for these and other composite measures are outlined in the relevant discussion in Chapter Six. Chapter Six also includes some further elaboration of the specific statistical analyses employed in the wider discussion of results.

Chapter Three

Bolivia

This chapter examines ethnic voting in Bolivia's 2005 and 2009 presidential elections. Indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters supported Evo Morales and the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) in overwhelming numbers in both elections, while non-indigenous mestizos and whites tended to support opponents of the MAS disproportionately. Substantive preferences and other demographic indicators do not fully account for these voting patterns, and the analysis in this chapter strongly suggests ethnic preferences influenced vote choice in many cases. However, voting in the Bolivian 2005 and 2009 presidential elections was some way off the 'ethnic census' pattern associated with unconditional ethnic group allegiances. Indeed, all major candidates won support across ethnic lines, albeit to different extents, and substantive preferences and interests often appeared to influence such voting behaviour. Overall, the analysis in this chapter indicates that voting outcomes were shaped by a combination of bias towards an ethnically-proximate candidate and more instrumental concerns about substantive preferences and interests. Successful candidates and parties in Bolivia can, and do, appeal to voters on both ethnic and substantive grounds, although the wider context of the election may influence the relative salience of these two sets of criteria.

For the purposes of this chapter's analysis, the direct influence of ethnicity on voting in Bolivia is attributed to a broadly-defined ethnic bias. Such ethnic bias is conceived as some combination of psychological attachments to an ethnic group, and more instrumental assumptions about candidates' personal and political characteristics based on ethnic stereotypes. In terms of the three models outlined in Chapter One, therefore, this ethnic bias includes processes associated with both expressive and heuristic ethnic voting.[44] Although the analysis at times suggests the predominance of one form of ethnic voting over the other – for example, significant effects for certain attitudinal measures may indicate ethnic prejudice or resentment – the survey data provide no direct test to distinguish expressive from heuristic

[44] The three voting models in question are the expressive model, where voting constitutes an act of unconditional (psychological) ethnic group allegiance; the heuristic model, where voters' rely on ethnic stereotypes to make candidate assessments; and the indirect model, where ethnicity shapes vote choice indirectly by its prior influence on political preferences and social circumstances.

motivations. Thus, for the most part, this chapter's analysis (and that of Chapters Four and Five) refers only to this combined form of ethnic bias. Chapter Six deals explicitly with the underlying nature of such ethnic bias in relation to the Peruvian voting experiment.

Ethnicity and Ethnic Voting in Bolivia

Several features of Bolivia's ethnic landscape and recent political history may explain the emergence and electoral significance of ethnic bias. In many cases, these relate to the general social, cultural, and political characteristics of Andean countries outlined in Chapter One. Indeed, many of the broad contextual factors outlined below are variously relevant to the Ecuadorian and Peruvian cases examined in subsequent chapters. However, the Bolivian case is also distinct from its regional neighbours in several respects, and ethnic voting has been notably more pronounced in recent Bolivian elections than elsewhere in the Andes.

First, as in most Latin American countries, ethnic relations in Bolivia have been profoundly shaped by *mestizaje*. *Mestizaje* refers to both biological mixing and a sociocultural discourse promoting the assimilation of indigenous peoples into a Eurocentric, national mestizo culture. This 'deindigenising' dimension to *mestizaje* had been a prominent feature of Bolivian social and cultural history since the colonial period, but it accelerated in the latter half of the twentieth century both as a result of public policy and mass urban migration (Albro 2010; Halperin Donghi 1997; Sanjinés 2002, 2005). For example, in the wake of the 1952 revolution the ruling Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR) moved to integrate indigenous Bolivians into the post-revolutionary state for the first time. Yet they did so through incorporating indigenous communities into mestizo peasant unions, and they explicitly discouraged organising along ethnic lines (Van Cott 2005, 158-9; Albro 2010, 150-1 2010; Webber 2011, 67). Mass migration from the mid-twentieth century also hastened *mestizaje*. Increased inter-ethnic contact, including more frequent exposure to discrimination, led many indigenous migrants to the city to gradually abandon their indigenous cultural characteristics (language, dress, customs, and so forth), assimilating into an urban mestizo cultural class (Albó 2008, 32-3; Toranzo Roca 2008, 38-9; Klein 2011, 285-6).

In part because of *mestizaje* (both biological and cultural), ethnic identities in contemporary Bolivia are marked by exceptional fluidity and multiplicity. When asked by census and survey interviewers, many Bolivians opt for an ethnically ambiguous mestizo self-identification ('7 de cada 10 bolivianos se ven mestizos' 2009; cited in Madrid 2012, 38). Overall, this ethnic landscape is not particularly conducive to the type of inflexible, binary,

and antagonistic ethnic-group identification typically associated with expressive ethnic voting.

Nevertheless, the assimilationist effect of *mestizaje* on ethnic identification has been notably less pronounced in Bolivia than in either Ecuador or Peru. Indeed, according to LAPOP's 2010 survey, 19.0 percent of Bolivians consider themselves indigenous, compared to 72.7 percent mestizo and 7.2 percent white.[45] In contrast, just 2.0 percent of Ecuadorians and 3.3 percent of Peruvians self-identified as indigenous in the same round of LAPOP surveys. Moreover, when Bolivian respondents were asked about their cultural identification (as opposed to self-identification per se) a total of 73.1 percent reported identification with an indigenous culture, while 23.9 percent reported speaking an indigenous language as a child (compared to 1.6 percent of Ecuadorians, and 14.3 percent of Peruvians).[46] These data suggest many Bolivians still identify to some extent with an indigenous identity and heritage (and in greater numbers than voters in Ecuador and Peru), and we might expect such psychological ethnic attachments to play some role in voting behaviour.

Furthermore, ethnic inequalities and discrimination are pervasive in contemporary Bolivian society. Bolivians from an indigenous background tend to be poorer, less educated, and have less access to health facilities compared with non-indigenous Bolivians (Jiménez Pozo et al. 2006, 48-9; cited in Madrid 2012, 38). People with an indigenous background are also far more likely to have experienced discrimination. Indeed, according to the 2010 LAPOP survey, 63.8 percent of indigenous Bolivians reported experiencing some form of discrimination in the previous year, compared to just 44.7 percent of mestizos and 33.2 percent of whites. Moreover, 24.6 percent of indigenous respondents reported several instances of discrimination explicitly on the grounds of physical appearance in the last year, compared to 11.4 percent of mestizos and 4.6 percent of whites.[47] In this context, it seems likely that psychological ethnic ties and prejudice may influence voters' evaluation of their electoral alternatives in ways that are separate from calculations based on purely substantive preferences and interests.

Finally, in this context of ethnic inequality and discrimination, ethnic differences become a prominent part of everyday social experiences. As a result, ethnic identities are likely to have some perceived explanatory value as a means of predicting social and political

[45] Unless stated otherwise, all figures from LAPOP data are the author's elaboration.
[46] The Ecuador and Peru surveys did not include a question on cultural identification.
[47] Based on respondents who reported discrimination as a result of physical appearance "many times" or "several times" in the last 12 months.

background, preferences, and behaviour, even if the precise boundaries between ethnic groups are blurred. Indeed, this chapter argues that voters may use the perceived ethnic identity of electoral candidates as cues from which to make assumptions about personal background, social networks, and wider sociopolitical preferences. This use of an ethnic heuristic may well contribute to an observable ethnic bias in voting outcomes.

Both these potential causes of ethnic bias – lingering ethnic attachments and ethnic heuristic use – are likely to increase when ethnicity becomes politicised. As noted in Chapter One, the politicisation of ethnicity has been a noteworthy feature of recent Andean political history, but it has been particularly pronounced in Bolivia. In fact, unlike in Ecuador and Peru, Bolivia's indigenous population has been electorally significant as early as the mid-twentieth century, when the MNR's removal of literacy restrictions on suffrage effectively enfranchised the largely illiterate indigenous population. Through the late 1950s and 1960s, the MNR achieved strong support among the newly expanded indigenous electorate. The MNR government incorporated indigenous communities into peasant federations that it controlled, enacted land reform, and expanded education and health services in rural indigenous communities (Madrid 2012, 40).[48]

In the 1970s, a new wave of indigenous parties emerged from the Aymara-based Katarista movement.[49] Although they varied somewhat in terms of leadership and ideology, the Katarista parties all sought to increase ethnic consciousness among Aymara communities and to promote the political and economic advancement of Aymara Bolivians (Madrid 2012, 40-1). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s various populist parties also used ethnic appeals to win support among indigenous voters, running indigenous candidates, adopting some indigenous demands, and using indigenous symbols in their campaigns (San Martín Arzabe 1991; Alenda Mary 2002; Romero 2003). Finally, in addition to these political parties, a wide range of indigenous organisations and leaders were actively involved in prominent national peasant federations such as the Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB). The CSUTCB and similar organisations became increasingly influential through the late 1980s, spearheading opposition to the neoliberal reforms of successive governments. Moreover, they helped propel indigenous actors and issues into the centre of national politics.

[48] The MNR also relied on fraud and clientelistic incentives to win votes (Ticono Alejo et. al 1995).

[49] The Katarista movement is named after Tupak Katari, who led an indigenous uprising in the eighteenth century in the area that is modern-day Bolivia. See Rivera Cusicanqui (1986), Ticona Alejo et al. (1995), Van Cott (2005), and Yashar (2006) on the Kataristas.

In the mid-1990s, the CSUTCB and its social movement allies began to explore the possibility of creating a political branch through which the social movements could participate in elections. In 1995, a joint-congress of the CSUTCB and several other indigenous organisations approved the formation of the Asamblea de la Soberanía de los Pueblos (ASP) to compete in upcoming local and national elections. Initially, Morales served as deputy leader of the ASP, but, following a leadership dispute, he split from the movement in 1998 and formed an independent political party, the Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos (ISPS). In order to participate in the 1999 elections, Morales and ISPS adopted the official registration of the MAS, a small leftist party, a title the party subsequently opted to retain. The MAS reached out to indigenous, peasant, and urban working-class organisations across the country, and it adopted an inclusive ethnopopulist electoral strategy. The MAS and its leaders also played a prominent role in the anti-government protests that marked the late 1990s and early 2000s, events that provided the party with a national platform to establish its credentials as a broadly-based protest movement. In supporting the protests, the MAS and its leaders sought to link the demands, interests, and sociocultural values of the indigenous movement to a broader political agenda that emphasised economic and political reform, nationalism, anti-imperialism, and an end to ethnic and social 'apartheid' (García Linera 2005, 456-7; Harten 2011, 126; Madrid 2012, 58-68; Vales 2005).

Thus, throughout the late twentieth century, a succession of indigenous social movements and political parties worked to strengthen ethnic consciousness and politicise ethnic differences in Bolivia. In doing so, they not only increased the salience of ethnic identification at the individual level, but they also helped to introduce an ethnic frame to many controversial political issues. Indigenous organisations and politicians were often at the forefront of multisector political protests, and their rhetoric sought to connect broadly defined indigenous values and demands to the wider interests of non-elite sectors across Bolivian society. A central argument in this chapter, and elsewhere in this thesis, is that this context of ethnic politicisation helped link an inclusive indigenous ethnic identity to a much more general anti-establishment, anti-neoliberal political agenda. This, in turn, contributed to the formation of an ethnic heuristic that associated indigenous and non-indigenous politicians with a particular substantive platform.

In summary, this chapter argues that ethnic bias in Bolivian voting arises as a result of both psychological attachments to ethnic groups and the heuristic use of ethnic stereotypes. The relative influence of each constituent aspect of such ethnic bias is likely to vary

according to the characteristics of the individual voter and certain macro-level contextual factors (e.g., the types of ethnic appeals employed by politicians, or specific events that polarise or unify ethnic groups in the lead-up to an election). Nevertheless, although Bolivian voting patterns strongly suggest ethnic bias, this chapter also argues that most voters are concerned with more than simple ethnic descriptive representation. Indeed, in many cases the statistical analysis estimates vote probabilities that vary considerably within ethnic groups, and this variation tends to reflect voters' ideological and policy-based preferences. Similarly, in the 2009 election, voters' perceptions of both national and personal economic trends were important vote predictors, suggesting that the record of the MAS government in office featured significantly in voters' calculations. In short, ethnic voting patterns in Bolivia's 2005 and 2009 election suggest that substantive interests and ethnic bias combined to shape electoral outcomes.

Finally, this chapter argues that ethnicity's influence on material conditions and political socialisation can also contribute to an explanation of ethnic voting patterns. The societal conditions outlined above – distinct ethnic communities, ethnic inequality, and widespread discrimination – are likely to result in members of the same ethnic group sharing certain substantive interests and preferences. Ethnic inequalities mean many co-ethnics will often share material interests because of similar social positions (e.g., indigenous Bolivians are disproportionately poor, they comprise a majority of agricultural workers, and so forth). In addition, the persistence of social and cultural differences across ethnic groups means individual voters may be socialised in diverse environments, leading to broader ideological preferences and values that are similar within – and distinct across – ethnic groups.

As a result, it is conceivable that ethnic voting patterns may simply reflect the substantive preferences and interests of Bolivians whose social circumstances and experiences have been shaped by ethnic background. Ethnicity may not *directly* enter voters' electoral considerations at all. However, the analysis presented in this chapter finds only partial evidence for this indirect model of ethnic voting. Ethnicity appears to have some influence on substantive preferences, but the effect of ethnicity on vote choice is not captured fully by voters' non-ethnic characteristics.

Overview of the 2005 and 2009 Presidential Elections

Several features of the 2005 and 2009 presidential elections were conducive to ethnic voting along the lines described above. In both cases, voters faced an electoral environment

that presented distinct ethnic, as well as substantive, alternatives. In 2005, the only two viable candidates for the presidency, at least by the latter stages of the campaign, were Morales and Jorge Quiroga. Morales was an Aymara indigenous leader who had been a vocal critic of the neoliberal policies of the political establishment, and both he and the MAS had been prominently involved in anti-government protests through the 1990s and early 2000s. The MAS was highly critical of neoliberalism, promised to defend coca production, and decried the interference of the United States and international financial institutions in Bolivia's affairs. It also pledged to rewrite the national constitution to reflect Bolivia's multicultural character and to enshrine indigenous values, beliefs, and specific rights in the country's political and legal framework (MAS 2005, 64-70). The MAS was also closely allied with numerous indigenous organisations, and its supporters were particularly active in the mostly indigenous western provinces.

Quiroga, in contrast, came from a privileged, white family background. He was educated in the United States, had an American wife, and had worked for IBM, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund before returning to Bolivia to join the right-leaning Acción Democrática Nacional (ADN) party. He served as vice president to Hugo Banzer (1997-2001), and as president (2001-2002) following Banzer's resignation. In 2005, Quiroga ran as the candidate of the centre-right coalition Poder Democrático y Social (PODEMOS), which included the ADN and several other rightist parties. Quiroga and PODEMOS offered neoliberal continuity, including the expansion of free-trade agreements and a 'zero coca' policy of eradicating coca production in Bolivia. Quiroga drew his principal support from the upper and middle classes in the wealthier, less indigenous eastern provinces.

This basic pattern was repeated in 2009, although both the specific electoral environment and the wider sociopolitical context were even more polarised. Following his success in 2005, Morales ran for re-election in 2009 as the incumbent, promising to continue and expand the MAS's 2004-2009 programme. This is included further nationalisations in the hydrocarbons sector, the extension of social programmes, and continued defiance of the United States, particularly on the coca issue (MAS 2009, 55, 115, 120-1).[50] His principal opponent this time around was Manfred Reyes Villa, who represented the coalition Plan Progreso para Bolivia-Convergencia Nacional (PPB-CN), a loose alliance of moderate and more extreme right-wing parties and citizen organisations (Aguilar 2013). In the two years

[50] Morales had expelled both the United States' ambassador and the US Drug Enforcement Agency from Bolivia in 2008, accusing both of conspiring with the MAS's political opponents (Paredes 2013).

prior to the 2009 election, Bolivia had been gripped by widespread protest and violent conflict driven by demands from the resource-rich eastern provinces for greater autonomy. The pro-autonomy movement included both many prominent local and national politicians and civil society organisations, many of which became important actors in the PPB-CN. The confrontation between the MAS government and the pro-autonomy movement took on a distinct ethnic, as well as regional, dimension. Pro-autonomy leaders attacked Morales and his supporters with racial epithets, and factions of the pro-autonomy movement engaged in quasi-paramilitary activities, including bomb attacks on government installations and racially-motivated physical attacks on indigenous MAS supporters (Dangl 2007; Harten 2011, 182-3; Postero, 2010, 63-4; Sivak 2010, 221-22; Webber 2011, 133-40).

Thus, in both 2005 and 2009 Bolivian voters faced an electoral and a wider political environment that was highly polarised. A combination of the candidates who ran and the broader context and events surrounding the election worked to dichotomise the electoral alternatives along ethnic, regional, ideological, and partisan lines.[51] Moreover, at least in 2005, the two major contenders reflected a clear divide between the political establishment and a populist outsider promising the re-foundation of the Bolivian nation.

Ethnic and Substantive Appeals

In advancing their ethnopopulist appeals, Morales and the MAS were able to take advantage of both these specific electoral contexts and the longer-term sociopolitical trends outlined previously. Morales and the MAS won indigenous support in part because they appealed to voters on ethnic terms. But the MAS also campaigned on a range of substantive issues, and their electoral success cannot be attributed to ethnic appeals alone (Madrid 2012, 38-40). Similarly, ethnic bias and prejudice may well have contributed to the disproportionate support for opponents of the MAS among sectors of the non-indigenous population. Yet here, too, substantive preferences played a role, and both indigenous and non-indigenous voters who chose not to support the MAS appear to have done so in part as a result of disagreement on substantive issues.

A range of ethnic appeals helped the MAS win support among indigenous voters. The party established close ties to indigenous organisations, ran indigenous candidates, adopted key indigenous demands, and made a broadly-conceived indigenous identity a key frame for

[51] Partisan is used loosely here to refer to various political organisational loyalties (e.g., to civic movements and other social organisations, many of which were tied to political parties or candidates).

their political project. Indigenous organisations not only provided the MAS with valuable material and human resources, but they also contributed voters by publicly endorsing the MAS's candidates and issuing electoral instruction to members (Madrid 2012, 54-5). Indigenous candidates occupied numerous key positions on the MAS's electoral lists, from its presidential candidate to the many candidates it put forward for the national Congress and various subnational authorities. It its campaign, the MAS regularly employed various symbolic ethnic appeals. Its candidates used indigenous dress, spoke in indigenous languages, took part in indigenous ceremonies, and extolled the virtues of Bolivia's indigenous cultures and peoples. Finally, the MAS made concrete indigenous demands central to its platform. These included the defence of the coca leaf (an issue that was important both economically and symbolically), the promotion of indigenous land and water rights, and bilingual education (MAS 2005, 20-23, 48, 53; MAS 2009, 26-7, 35, 115).

However, the MAS also campaigned on the basis of several broader substantive pledges. In both 2005 and 2009, Morales promised to reduce inequality, increase spending on social programmes, combat discrimination, and nationalise leading sectors of the economy (MAS 2005, 12, 14-19, 40; MAS 2009, 37-8, 55, 142). Such proposals appealed particularly to indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters who were likely to benefit disproportionately from such policies, but they were popular well beyond indigenous constituencies. The analysis presented in this chapter suggests that the MAS won support in both elections based in part on these specific substantive pledges.

In short, through its political rhetoric the MAS sought to position itself as the electoral embodiment of Bolivia's non-European heritage and people, an inclusive sociocultural identity that explicitly included mestizos. In its use of ethnic appeals, the party sought to construct a broadly-defined, inclusive indigenous frame for its political project, one that worked to link indigenous identity with a redistributive, nationalist, and anti-imperialist political agenda open to all. Such a substantive programme, the MAS rhetoric implied, was the political expression of the wider values, traditions, and worldviews of Bolivia's indigenous peoples. Moreover, it was deliberately juxtaposed to the social injustice and exploitation inherent in the hegemonic Western ideology that, the MAS argued, had provided the framework for colonialism and neo-colonial dependence (MAS 2009, 146).

In both 2005 and 2009, the principal political opposition fit easily into this perceptual frame. Quiroga was a white, wealthy former president who preached neoliberal continuity

and was intimately linked, both personally and politically, with the United States; Reyes Villa emerged as the leader of a right-wing coalition that included radical – and often racist – pro-autonomy activists from the wealthier, and largely non-indigenous, eastern provinces. This opposition had far less success in winning support across ethnic lines based on substantive appeals, and its support was limited to non-indigenous constituencies, mostly in these eastern provinces.

This context is conducive to both expressive and heuristic ethnic voting. On the one hand, the polarisation of Bolivia's political landscape along ethnic lines, particularly in 2009 but also throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, worked to raise ethnic consciousness and increase ethnic group attachments and prejudice. On the other hand, longer-term ethnic inequalities and discrimination helped construct an experientially validated ethnic heuristic. The more recent politicisation of ethnicity helped to reinforce such a heuristic, specifically associating a broad indigenous identity with a redistributive, anti-neoliberal, nationalist (i.e., anti-imperialist) agenda. Finally, in both 2005 and 2009, the major electoral alternatives offered quite distinct programmatic platforms, in addition to their diverse descriptive profiles. Thus, quite aside from any possible influence of ethnic bias, we might expect group-level ethnic voting patterns to emerge as a result of non-ethnic vote determiners.

The 2005 Election

The 2005 Bolivian election followed a period of exceptional political turmoil. The coalition government of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (2002-2003) had collapsed after just a year in power, amid a series of violent protests. These protests marked the apex of long-running opposition to the neoliberal reforms implemented by successive regimes throughout the 1990s. Protests continued during the subsequent tenure of Carlos Mesa (2003-2005), particularly around the issue of privatisation and exports in the natural gas industry. Mesa himself resigned in early 2005 following renewed protests, and his successor, Eduardo Rodríguez (2005), called an early general election for December 2005. The principal candidates in the 2005 race included Morales and the MAS, Quiroga and PODEMOS, businessman Samuel Doria and his Unidad Nacional party (UN), and the MNR's Michiaki Nagatani. However, from early in the campaign, Morales and Quiroga emerged as the only two candidates with a realistic chance of winning the presidency.

The 2005 campaign reflected many of the ruptures underlying the social and political conflict of the previous years. Morales and the MAS campaigned as the party of protest in 2005, positioning themselves as the only electoral alternative to continued neoliberalism. In the context of widespread disenchantment with the economic and political status quo, the MAS's ethnopopulist appeals resonated widely. They won support among indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters on both ethnic descriptive and more substantive grounds, while they also appealed to many whites and mestizos based on their wider substantive and populist appeals. The presence of Quiroga and PODEMOS enhanced the MAS's outsider image. Personally and politically, Quiroga embodied the political establishment and the continuity of neoliberalism, an economic model that was widely perceived as serving the interests of domestic and international elites. Quiroga also based his campaign in the resource-rich eastern departments, whose population was on average wealthier and less indigenous than the western highland departments were the MAS were strongest. Thus, as indicated previously, the profiles and platforms of the two principal candidates in 2005 reflected, to a large extent, the contours of converging ethnic, regional, socioeconomic, and ideological cleavage lines across the Bolivian electorate.

Official Results and LAPOP Data

According to the Corte Nacional Electoral, Morales won 53.7 percent of the valid first-round vote in 2005, giving him an outright majority and avoiding the need for a second-round runoff (see Table 3.1).[52] Quiroga came in a distant second with 26.6 percent, and Doria and Nagatani followed with 7.8 percent and 6.5 percent, respectively. Although LAPOP's 2006 survey was conducted several months after the December 2005 election, the vote estimates are relatively accurate, with limited variation from the official results. The following discussion focuses mostly on the vote for Morales and Quiroga – who together won over 75 percent of the LAPOP vote – with only occasional reference to Doria and Nagatani.

Unlike later survey rounds, the 2006 survey did not include questions on voters' support for state-led wealth redistribution or nationalisations – key preferences in several of the vote models examined elsewhere in this thesis. However, the 2006 Bolivia survey did include a question on nationalisation in the natural gas industry specifically, and this measure serves as a partial substitute for the more general measure. Similarly, the 2006 Bolivia survey

[52] In Bolivian presidential elections, a candidate must win 50 percent of the valid vote plus one, or 40 percent and 10 percent more than the second-placed candidate, to be elected. If no candidate meets these criteria, then a second round vote is held between the first- and second-placed candidates from the first round.

did not collect data on the language(s) spoken by respondents' parents, the linguistic measure used in the Ecuadorian and Peruvian studies, so the Bolivia 2005 models are run with a measure of respondents' own maternal language(s). The Bolivian analysis also makes use of two self-identification measures. In addition to the generic self-identification measure (white, mestizo, indigenous) used for Ecuador and Peru, the Bolivian study includes a wider measure of respondents' cultural identification with a specific indigenous heritage (none, Quechua, Aymara, Other Indigenous).

Group- and Candidate-Centred Ethnicisation

Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the ethnic breakdown of reported vote choice in Bolivia's 2005 election. Sub-table *A* shows the overall distribution of votes in the LAPOP sample and official results (last column); sub-table *B* shows the proportions of each candidate's supporters within each ethnic group; sub-table *C* shows the proportion of each candidate's vote derived from each ethnic group; and sub-table *D* shows the group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores (the standard deviations of the proportions in sub-tables *B* and *C* from the relevant overall proportions in the full LAPOP sample).[53] Table 3.1 includes voters' linguistic background (Spanish or indigenous language) and the generic self-identification measure, while Table 3.2 includes the more specific measure of indigenous cultural identification (none, Quechua, Aymara, Other indigenous).

Overall, the pattern of vote choice in 2005 shows a clear preference for Morales among indigenous voters (according to self-identification and linguistic measures). It also shows a disproportionate preference among self-identified white voters for Morales's principal opponent, Quiroga. Thus, the general pattern of voting in 2005 suggests a role for ethnicity in determining vote choice. These group-level patterns are elaborated briefly below.

Group-Centred Ethnicisation

The group-centred ethnicisation scores in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 indicate considerable variation in the vote concentrations of different ethnic groups. On the linguistic measure, higher scores in the indigenous-language group (.104) indicate a higher vote

[53] There are two group-centred scores, SD1 and SD2. SD1 is the standard deviation of vote shares within each group compared to the overall candidate shares, while SD2 is the standard deviation from an equal-share mean (in this case, 20 percent; 100 percent divided by five voting outcome categories). See Chapter Two for more details.

TABLE 3.1: Ethnicity and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005 (with generic self-identification)

		LINGUISTIC GROUP		SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP			Total LAPOP	Total Official
		Spanish	Indigenous	White	Mestizo	Indigenous		
A: Overview	Evo Morales	30.9	22.3	3.7	33.8	15.6	53.1	53.7
	Jorge Quiroga	22.9	2.0	4.8	17.6	2.4	24.9	28.6
	Samuel Doria	6.2	1.0	1.2	5.1	0.9	7.2	7.8
	Michiaki Nagatani	4.8	1.0	1.3	3.1	1.4	5.8	6.5
	Other/Null	7.1	2.0	0.8	6.7	1.5	9.0	3.4
	Proportion of full sample	71.8	28.2	11.8	66.4	21.8	100.0	100.0
B: By Group	Evo Morales	43.0	79.1	31.5	50.9	71.8	53.1	
	Jorge Quiroga	31.9	7.0	40.8	26.6	10.9	24.9	
	Samuel Doria	8.6	3.6	10.3	7.7	6.3	7.2	
	Michiaki Nagatani	6.7	3.5	10.7	4.7	4.0	5.8	
	Other/Null	9.9	6.9	6.7	10.1	7.0	9.0	
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
C: By Candidate	Evo Morales	58.1	41.9	7.0	63.5	29.4	53.1	
	Jorge Quiroga	92.1	7.9	19.4	71.0	9.6	24.9	
	Samuel Doria	86.0	14.0	17.0	71.0	23.8	7.2	
	Michiaki Nagatani	83.1	16.9	21.9	54.3	12.1	5.8	
	Other/Null	78.4	21.6	8.7	74.4	16.8	9.0	
	Proportion of full sample	71.8	28.2	11.8	66.4	21.8	100.0	
D: Ethnicisation Scores	**Group-Centred**							
	SD1	.041	.104	.096	.013	.077		
	SD2	.147	.296	.136	.172	.260		
	Candidate-Centred	**LINGUISTIC GROUP**		**SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP**				
	Evo Morales	.137		.051				
	Jorge Quiroga	.203		.081				
	Samuel Doria	.142		.065				
	Michiaki Nagatani	.113		.080				
	Other/Null	.066		.054				

N = 1771

Notes: Sub-table A shows the first-round vote proportions by ethnic group (linguistic and self-identified, which should be read separately) in LAPOP's 2006 survey sample, as well as official election results (all percent). Sub-table B shows the proportion of each ethnic group that voted for each candidate in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-table C shows the proportion of each candidate's vote share received from each ethnic group in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-table D shows group-centred ethnicisation scores (SD1 and SD2) and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores based on the LAPOP sample. SD1 is the standard deviation (SD) of each candidate's share within the ethnic group from the candidate's full sample proportions. SD2 is the SD from an 'equal-share' mean of .20 (100 percent divided by five vote outcome categories). Candidate-centred ethnicisation scores are the SD of candidate vote proportions by ethnic group (linguistic and self-identified, which should be read separately) from the proportions of each group in the full sample.

Source: Author's elaboration of data from LAPOP 2006 and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (http://www.ifes.org/).

TABLE 3.2: Ethnicity and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005 (with cultural identification)

		LINGUISTIC GROUP		INDIGENOUS CULTURAL IDENTIFICATION				Total
		Spanish	Indigenous	None	Quechua	Aymara	Other Ind.	LAPOP
A: Overview	Evo Morales	30.8	22.1	8.3	24.1	19.1	2.5	53.9
	Jorge Quiroga	22.1	2.0	11.2	6.3	2.4	4.3	24.1
	Samuel Doria	6.1	1.0	3.0	2.1	1.3	0.8	7.1
	Michiaki Nagatani	4.7	1.0	2.9	0.7	0.5	1.6	5.7
	Other/Null	7.3	2.0	2.7	2.8	2.2	1.5	9.2
	Proportion of full sample	70.9	29.1	28.0	36.1	25.4	10.6	100.0
B: By Group	Evo Morales	43.4	79.5	29.6	66.8	75.1	23.2	53.9
	Jorge Quiroga	31.1	6.9	39.8	17.5	9.3	40.4	24.1
	Samuel Doria	8.6	3.5	10.6	5.9	5.0	7.1	7.1
	Michiaki Nagatani	6.7	3.4	10.4	1.9	1.9	15.3	5.7
	Other/Null	10.2	6.7	9.7	7.8	8.7	14.0	9.2
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
C: By Candidate	Evo Morales	57.1	42.9	15.4	44.7	35.3	4.5	53.9
	Jorge Quiroga	91.7	8.3	46.3	26.2	9.8	17.7	24.1
	Samuel Doria	85.8	14.2	41.5	30.0	18.0	10.5	7.1
	Michiaki Nagatani	82.9	17.1	51.2	12.1	8.3	28.5	5.7
	Other/Null	78.7	21.3	29.5	30.5	24.0	16.0	9.2
	Proportion of full sample	70.9	29.1	28.0	36.1	25.4	10.6	100.0
D: Ethnicisation Scores	**Group-Centred**							
	SD1	.042	.103	.097	.052	.085	.123	
	SD2	.147	.298	.124	.240	.277	.114	
	Candidate-Centred	**LINGUISTIC GROUP**		**SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP**				
	Evo Morales	.138		.093				
	Jorge Quiroga	.207		.264				
	Samuel Doria	.149		.168				
	Michiaki Nagatani	.120		.379				
	Other/Null	.078		.045				

N = 1778

Notes: Sub-table A shows the first-round vote proportions by ethnic group (linguistic and cultural identification, which should be read separately) in LAPOP's 2006 survey sample, as well as official election results (all percent). Sub-table B shows the proportion of each ethnic group that voted for each candidate in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-table C shows the proportion of each candidate's vote share received from each ethnic group in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-table D shows group-centred ethnicisation scores (SD1 and SD2) and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores based on the LAPOP sample. SD1 is the standard deviation (SD) of each candidate's share within the ethnic group from the candidate's full sample proportions. SD2 is the SD from an 'equal-share' mean of .20 (100 percent divided by five vote outcome categories). Candidate-centred ethnicisation scores are the SD of candidate vote proportions by ethnic group (linguistic and cultural identification, which should be read separately) from the proportions of each group in the full sample.

Source: Author's elaboration of data from LAPOP 2006 and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (http://www.ifes.org/).

concentration compared with non-indigenous language speakers (.041).[54] These scores reflect the relatively high proportion of indigenous-language speakers who voted for Morales (79.1 percent, compared to Morales's overall LAPOP vote share of 53.1 percent), and the disproportionately low number of indigenous-language speakers who voted for Morales's opponents as a result (e.g., just 7.0 percent voted for Quiroga, well below his 24.9 percent of the total LAPOP vote). Similarly, Morales won a disproportionate share of the self-identified indigenous group as well (71.8 percent), contributing to similarly high ethnicisation scores in that group (.077).

As by far the largest group, the mestizo group approximates the vote proportions in the full sample, resulting in a low SD1 score (.013). However, an overall preference for Morales among mestizos (50.9 percent voted for the MAS) produces an SD2 score (.172) that is notably higher than the white group (.136). Finally, the white group showed a disproportionate preference for opponents of Morales, particularly Quiroga (who won 40.8 percent, well above his overall share of 24.9 percent), although the MAS still won a sizeable minority (31.9 percent). This pattern of vote distribution confirms the MAS's capacity to win votes beyond its indigenous and mestizo base, and, for the white group, it results in a combination of high SD1 scores (reflecting disproportionate opposition to Morales) and low SD2 scores (reflecting a fragmented vote).

Table 3.2 shows the distributions of votes according to the more specific cultural identification measure. In many respects, these confirm the general tendencies identified in Table 3.1. However, there are some additional indications worthy of note. First, Table 3.2b shows disproportionate support for Morales from both Quechua and Aymara voters, the two largest highland indigenous groups (66.8 percent of Quechuas and 75.1 percent of Aymaras voted for Morales, compared to his overall share of 53.9 percent).[55] However, voters from the Other Indigenous category, which includes mostly lowland indigenous groups, show disproportionate support for the MAS's principal rivals, both Quiroga and the MNR's Nagatani (40.4 percent support Quiroga and 15.3 percent Nagatani, compared to their respective overall vote shares of 24.1 percent and 5.7 percent).[56] Similarly, voters who

[54] Unless stated otherwise, group-centred scores refer to SD1.

[55] Variation in the total vote shares between Tables 3.1 and 3.2 result from slightly different samples according to missing data patterns on the two self-identification measures.

[56] Respondents who reported identification with a lowland indigenous group were a mix of self-identified mestizos (the majority) and self-identified indigenous. It is worth noting that (a) most of the latter sub-group were Morales supporters; and (b) the majority of the former sub-group were Spanish-only speakers. This suggests that a proportion of the lowland indigenous group that supported Quiroga and Nagatani were reporting

explicitly reported *no* identification with any indigenous culture – a group comprised of self-identified whites and mestizos – also showed disproportionate support for opponents of Morales, particularly Quiroga (Morales won just 29.6 percent of this group, while Quiroga won 39.8 percent). These vote distributions produce relatively high ethnicisation scores for the Quechua (.052) and Aymara (.085) groups, but even higher scores for the non-indigenous (.097) and lowland indigenous (.123) groups.

These scores not only underline the considerable polarisation of the 2005 vote along ethnic lines, they also highlight two key trends within the indigenous and mestizo vote: first, the strong highland indigenous base behind Morales and the MAS, particularly in Aymara constituencies; and second, the marked divide between highland indigenous groups (Quechua and Aymara) that supported Morales, and the lowland indigenous groups that tended to prefer other candidates. However, although the *proportional* distribution of both non-indigenous and lowland indigenous groups was skewed against Morales, the relatively low SD2 scores for both groups reflect the broad spread of their vote overall, including substantial minorities that continued to back the MAS (see Table 3.2b).

Overall, the analysis of group-level patterns in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 suggests ethnicity is relatively salient to vote choice for voters with an indigenous background. Both the self-identified and linguistic indigenous groups supported Morales in proportions well in excessive of the candidate's overall LAPOP vote share, as did voters who identified with an Aymara or, to a lesser extent, a Quechuan cultural background. Ethnicity also appears somewhat salient to vote choice for non-indigenous voters, particularly those who self-identified as white or explicitly stated their *non*-indigenous cultural background. Both these groups tended to support Quiroga disproportionately. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that Morales also won substantial support among non-indigenous voters, and even Quiroga won a limited number of votes from indigenous respondents, particularly from lowland indigenous groups. Thus, despite a clear tendency for voters to support more ethnically-proximate candidates in 2005, many voters still crossed ethnic lines, and voting outcomes were some way off an 'ethnic census' pattern. Ethnicity, it seems, was not the only criterion for vote choice.

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more 'distant' identification with a family-ancestral or regional background, rather than a strongly-felt contemporary sociocultural identity. Nevertheless, distrust of the MAS among certain lowland indigenous groups is well-documented, even as early as 2005 (e.g., López 2010).

Candidate-Centred Ethnicisation

The candidate-centred ethnicisation scores in Table 3.1d and Table 3.2d highlight both the broad appeal of Morales (producing relatively low scores) and the more ethnically-concentrated vote received by Quiroga (reflected in higher scores). Examination of the MAS vote reveals considerable support across all ethnic groups, while the PODEMOS vote was concentrated among non-indigenous language speakers and self-identified whites (Table 3.1c). Indeed, only 7.9 percent of Quiroga's vote came from indigenous-language speakers and just 9.6 percent from self-identified indigenous (compared to full-sample proportions of 28.2 percent and 21.8 percent, respectively). Meanwhile, 19.4 percent came from self-identified whites, well above the 11.8 percent proportion of whites in the full survey sample. Like Quiroga, both Doria and Nagatani tended to rely disproportionately on non-indigenous language speakers and self-identified whites, although self-identified indigenous voters were proportionally represented in the MNR vote (23.8 percent, compared to a sample proportion of 21.8 percent).[57]

However, despite its comparable heterogeneity, the MAS vote remained disproportionately reliant on indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters. A total of 29.4 percent were self-identified indigenous and 41.9 percent were indigenous-language speakers (compared with sample proportions of 21.8 and 28.2 percent, respectively). Self-identified whites, in contrast, were under-represented proportionally, accounting for just 7.0 percent of the MAS vote, although whites made up 11.8 percent of the total LAPOP sample.

When the candidates' vote shares are decomposed by the cultural identification measure, Morales's support among highland indigenous groups is once again apparent, with both Quechua and Aymara voters over-represented in the MAS's share (accounting for 44.7 and 35.3 percent, respectively), while lowland indigenous voters comprised a disproportionate share of Quiroga's and Nagatani's supporters (17.7 and 28.5 percent, respectively). Finally, those voters who did not identify with any indigenous group, a sector of the electorate that included many self-identified white voters, made up a disproportionate share of Quiroga's (46.3 percent), Doria's (41.5 percent), and Nagatani's (51.2 percent) vote. However, they were under-represented among MAS voters (just 15.4 percent).

[57] In the light of the statistics reported in Table 3.2c, it would appear most of these voters identified with lowland indigenous groups (the Other Indigenous category).

Overall, all four major candidates in Bolivia's 2005 election received support across several ethnic groups, suggesting they were able to win votes based on a variety of appeals (partisan, regional, substantive, charismatic, and so forth, in addition to ethnic). In particular, it is worth re-emphasising the considerable breadth of support for the MAS, reflected in the comparatively low candidate-centred ethnicisation scores for Morales compared to those of his principal rival, Quiroga.[58] The MAS's concerted efforts to present its political project as both of the indigenous movement and broadly inclusive appears to have paid off in 2005, both consolidating its support among highland indigenous Bolivians and attracting significant minorities of non-indigenous mestizos and whites. Many of the latter, we might assume, were attracted by the MAS's wider populist and substantive appeals. For Quiroga, his personal ethnic and family background, the regional concentration of his campaign, and the substantive content of his political programme, all appear to have put off many indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters, concentrating support for PODEMOS among non-indigenous mestizos and whites.

However, although none of these candidates appears to have relied on, or directed their campaigns solely towards, a single ethnic electoral base, the candidate-centred ethnicisation scores remain relatively high. Indeed, the average candidate-centred score for Bolivia's 2005 election (.69) is exceeded only by Bolivia's 2009 election across all seven case studies examined in this thesis.[59] These overall patterns suggest some potential for further ethnic polarisation if candidates and parties choose to forego inclusive appeals, opting to consolidate their ethnic base rather than reach out to groups in which they have little support.[60] Indeed, in the 2009 election, which took place in the context of heightened political and ethnic tensions, Reyes Villa received an even smaller proportion of indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters than Quiroga in 2005. However, the presence of highly controversial (and some extremist) figures in the PPB-CN worked to alienate many whites and mestizos as well as indigenous voters, thus reducing the potential ethnic dimension to political polarisation.

[58] Morales's scores are .137, .051, and .093, on the linguistic, self-identification, and cultural identification measures, respectively, compared to .203, .081, and .264 for Quiroga.

[59] Based on candidate-centred ethnicisation scores according to self-identified groups. However, such cross-country comparisons should be taken only as a rough guide. The ethnicisation scores are relatively unsophisticated and quite sensitive to underlying ethnic-group distributions in the survey samples.

[60] For example, Quiroga and PODEMOS might interpret the statistics in c, showing just 7.9 percent of their vote coming from indigenous-language speakers, as a reason to focus their campaign on shoring up support among non-indigenous constituencies.

Direct Predictors of Vote Choice: Main Effects

Table 3.3 shows results from a multinomial logistic regression (mlogit) model that tests the characteristics of voters for each of the major candidates in 2005. All three ethnicity measures are tested (linguistic, generic self-identification, and cultural identification), although the two latter variables are included in separate models.[61] The parameter estimates represent the marginal effect of each variable on the overall predicted probability of voting for the candidate in question, elaborated from the two base mlogit models (see Appendix A).

The analysis generates a number of noteworthy findings. It finds statistically significant effects for both linguistic and self-identification measures while controlling for potential confounders. This strengthens inferences of a causal relationship between voter ethnicity and vote choice as implied by the group-level patterns reported in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. However, it also finds significant effects for several key substantive preferences and non-ethnic demographic characteristics, thus confirming that vote choice in the 2005 election cannot be explained solely in terms of ethnic vote determinants.

Ethnicity Variables

First, the analysis predicts that indigenous-language speakers, self-identified indigenous voters, and those who self-identified with a highland indigenous culture (Quechua or Aymara) were significantly more likely than their non-indigenous counterparts to vote for Morales. The overall predicted probability of voting for Morales increased by 18.6 percentage points for indigenous-language speakers compared to Spanish-only speakers and by 17.4 percentage points for self-identified indigenous voters compared to whites. Self-identification as Quechua or Aymara produced an increase of 10.2 and 17.1 percentage points, respectively, compared with those who identified with no indigenous culture. Morales's predicted vote probability also increased by 13.6 percentage points among self-identified mestizos compared to whites and by 20.4 percentage points when Aymara voters are compared with lowland indigenous groups. The differences between self-identified indigenous and mestizo voters, and between those who identified with no indigenous culture and with a lowland indigenous culture, are not statistically significant. As we might expect, the effects on Quiroga's vote probability are almost exact inverse copies of the Morales

[61] The parameter estimates for all other variables are those from the generic self-identification model. However, estimates do not change appreciably between models.

TABLE 3.3: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005

	MORALES		QUIROGA		DORIA		NAGATANI	
Voter Characteristic	Coeff.	SE	Coeff.	SE	Coeff.	SE	Coeff.	SE
Speaks an indigenous language	**.186****	.047	**-.165****	.038	**-.038^**	.022	**.029**	.033
White (Mestizo)	**-.136***	.058	**.141***	.058	**-.012**	.029	**.036^**	.022
Indigenous (Mestizo)	**.037**	.045	**-.066**	.049	**-.007**	.030	**.015**	.024
Indigenous (White)	**.174****	.065	**-.207****	.070	**.005**	.041	**-.021**	.033
Quechua (None)	**.102***	.045	**-.066**	.045	**.027**	.023	**-.076****	.022
Aymara (None)	**.171****	.056	**-.164****	.054	**.045**	.044	**-.088****	.023
Other Indigenous (None)	**-.033**	.073	**-.010**	.071	**-.011**	.024	**.021**	.037
Quechua (Aymara)	**-.069**	.046	**.098***	.048	**-.018**	.041	**.012**	.009
Other Indigenous (Aymara)	**-.204****	.078	**.153***	.078	**-.055**	.048	**.108****	.037
Income	**-.028***	.013	**.018**	.012	**.003**	.007	**-.003**	.006
Female	**.000**	.028	**-.023**	.032	**-.002**	.018	**-.004**	.013
Age	**.001**	.001	**-.001**	.001	**-.001**	.001	**.002****	.000
Trust in parties	**.009**	.012	**.004**	.010	**-.003**	.006	**.001**	.005
Participation in protests	**.055^**	.032	**.002**	.031	**-.023**	.026	**-.014**	.016
National economy improved	**.046**	.033	**-.066^**	.034	**.009**	.024	**.006**	.016
Personal finances improved	**-.035**	.037	**.059**	.039	**.006**	.021	**-.026**	.017
Resides in *media luna*	**-.241****	.027	**.084****	.030	**.056***	.022	**.067****	.017
Resides in rural area	**-.004**	.016	**.008**	.014	**-.012**	.011	**-.003**	.006
Rightist ideology	**-.047****	.007	**.041****	.007	**-.002**	.003	**.011****	.003
Support for gas nationalisation	**.026****	.006	**-.012***	.006	**-.004**	.005	**-.004**	.003
'Strongman' populist leader	**-.030**	.026	**.012**	.024	**.008**	.012	**.007**	.009
Direct democracy	**.054**	.047	**.016**	.045	**-.051^**	.032	**-.040**	.027
Minorities to follow majority	**.029**	.041	**.035**	.043	**.015**	.025	**-.045^**	.024

N= 1079. ^ = $p < .10$; * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$.

Notes: Coefficients are the effects on overall vote probability based on the multinomial logistic regression model reported in Appendix A. The effects for ethnic self-identification and cultural identification are compared to the base category in parentheses. Generic self-identification and cultural identification variables were included in separate models; parameter estimates for all other variables are those from the generic identification model. Source: Author's calculations based on LAPOP 2006.

effects. An indigenous-language background also decreased the predicted probability of voting for Doria (by 3.8 percentage points) and self-identification as white significantly increased Nagatani's vote probability by 3.6 percentage points compared to mestizos.

Thus, the results of regression analysis provide a strongly suggest a causal role for ethnicity in the 2005 election, as suggested by the vote distributions presented previously. The disproportionate support for Morales among indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters, the concentration of Quiroga's support among non-indigenous mestizos and whites, and the marked divide between highland and lowland indigenous groups, is not explained fully by sociodemographic factors, economic perceptions, or a series of ideological and policy preferences.

Moreover, the analysis finds that both linguistic and self-identification measures of ethnicity had statistically significant effects. Significant effects for the linguistic measure, even once self-identification has been taken into account, may indicate that wider sociocultural background influenced vote choice, including among voters who self-identified with a more ambiguous mestizo identity. A combination of lingering ethnic attachments, common social experiences, and, perhaps, the use of an ethnic heuristic – which connects ethnic background with a broad range of likely preferences, priorities, and characteristics beyond those tested explicitly in the model – may help shape voting preferences across a wide demographic. The significance of the linguistic measure suggests a role for ethnic bias, but a role that is not entirely derived from strong psychological group attachments. The latter, we might presume, will be captured in part by the self-identification measures.

However, significant effects for the self-identification measures, even when controlling for linguistic background, suggest that explicit identification with an ethnic group also affected voting behaviour. For example, choosing to self-identify as white, or declaring no identification with any indigenous culture, may have indicated a particular subgroup among non-indigenous language speakers whose members considered themselves especially detached from indigenous culture, values, and interests. This analysis cannot easily determine the underlying nature of this particular ethnic bias – that is, whether it derived from allegiance to an ethnic group or the use of an ethnic heuristic. However, the facts that self-identification differentiates behaviour among voters who shared similar ethnic backgrounds (at least in terms of linguistic group), and that the analysis includes controls for a wide range

of demographic indicators and political preferences, suggest some role for more psychological ethnic attachments and/or prejudice.

Non-Ethnic Variables

In addition to ethnicity variables, the mlogit reported in Table 3.3 also reports statistically significant effects for several non-ethnic voter characteristics, including income, political ideology, and support for the nationalisation of Bolivia's gas industry. Participation in protests, perceptions of the national economy, and region of residence are also significant predictors of vote choice in 2005.

First, a one-unit increase in income, measured on a 10-point scale from low to high ('Income'), is associated with a 2.8 percentage point decrease in the overall probability of voting for Morales.[62] The coefficient is positive, but not statistically significant, for Quiroga. This suggests the MAS appealed particularly to poorer voters, even when ethnicity and other factors are taken into account. Second, political ideology seems to have played an important role in voters' electoral considerations. A one-unit move from left to right on the 10-point ideology scale ('Rightist ideology') is associated with a 4.7 percentage point decrease in the predicted probability of voting for Morales, a 4.1 percentage point increase in the probability of voting for Quiroga, and a 1.1 percentage point increase for Nagatani. Support for all three candidates, it seems, was influenced by ideological preferences, with leftist voters across ethnic groups showing a preference for Morales, while rightists were more inclined towards Quiroga. Finally, a one-unit increase in support for gas nationalisation ('Nationalise the gas industry', measured on a 1-7 scale) is associated with a 2.6 percentage point increase in the probability of voting for Morales and a 1.2 percentage point decrease for Quiroga. Unsurprisingly, Morales's promise to nationalise the gas industry, and Quiroga's pledge to encourage further private investment in the sector, appears to have influenced voters' electoral choices. The remaining political attitude measures, all relating to various non-programmatic aspects of populism, are not significant.

In addition to ethnicity and these various substantive preferences, a number of other variables are worthy of note. Participation in protests is positively associated with a Morales vote, confirming the MAS's position as the party of protest in 2005. Region is also highly significant, with a clear split between residents of the highland western departments, the base

[62] Where the discussion refers explicitly to a variable in the statistical model, the variable name is capitalised and placed between single quotation marks.

of MAS support, and inhabitants of the lowland *media luna*. The latter were 24.1 percentage points *less* likely to vote for the MAS, all else being equal. However, the *media luna* vote appears to have been split among the three remaining candidates, with no significant probability increase according to region for any of the three. Perhaps surprisingly, perceptions of economic performance and rural residence seem to have had little noteworthy effect in 2005, with any influence on vote choice presumably captured by other variables.[63] In the latter case, the lack of a significant effect for rural residence may also reflect the support won by the MAS in urban, as well as rural, areas.

In sum, ethnicity seems to have played quite a prominent role in the 2005 elections, with Morales winning an overwhelming majority of indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters. However, this initial analysis suggests that non-ethnic factors, including region, income, political ideology, and views on gas nationalisation – a key issue of the day – are also important parts of the causal story. Overall, these results largely confirm previous findings (Madrid 2012, 69; Moreno Morales 2015). However, the following paragraphs, which examine the decomposition of ethnicity's interaction with several other factors, provide a more detailed and nuanced picture of the interplay among ethnic and non-ethnic vote determinants.

Direct Predictors of Vote Choice: Decomposed Effects

In addition to the main-effects analysis in Table 3.3, the 2005 vote also examined the interaction of different ethnicity variables with several non-ethnic voter characteristics. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the predicted probability of voting for Morales or Quiroga by ethnic group (linguistic and generic self-identification, respectively) and at representative values of several non-ethnic voter characteristics (APRs). They also show the average marginal effects (AMEs) of the non-ethnic voter characteristics on overall vote probabilities, by ethnic group. These decompositions help us compare behaviour across ethnic groups and examine how ethnicity and other factors combine to produce voting outcomes. Both these aspects of the analysis can contribute to a better understanding of voters' electoral motivations. The full results of the decomposition analysis are included in Appendix A, but some of the most noteworthy findings are summarised here.

[63] The interpretation of economic perceptions measures is somewhat dubious in any case, given that these questions explicitly referred to "the last 12 months". This period would have covered both the previous Mesa/Rodríguez interim government and the initial months of the MAS government.

FIGURE 3.1: Predicted Probability of Vote Choice, by Linguistic Group, Bolivia 2005



N = 1079; ^ = $p < .10$; * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$.
Plots show adjusted predicted vote probabilities, with 95% confidence intervals, for the candidate indicated according to ethnic group and each non-ethnic voter characteristic (APRs). Coefficients in the legend are average marginal effects (AMEs) by ethnic group for the relevant non-ethnic characteristic. Results are based on a multinomial logistic regression model with two-way interactions between voter ethnicity and each non-ethnic characteristic (see Appendix A for full output).

FIGURE 3.2: Predicted Probability of Vote Choice, by Ethnic Self-Identification, Bolivia 2005



N = 1079; ^ = *p* < .10; * = *p* < .05; ** = *p* < .01.
Plots show adjusted predicted vote probabilities, with 95 percent confidence intervals, for the candidate indicated according to ethnic group and each non-ethnic voter characteristic (APRs). Coefficients in the legend are average marginal effects (AMEs) by ethnic group for the relevant non-ethnic characteristic. Results are based on a multinomial logistic regression model with two-way interactions between voter ethnicity and each non-ethnic characteristic (see Appendix A for full output).

Income

According to Table 3.3, higher income was associated with a decrease in the predicted probability of voting for Morales and an increase for Quiroga. The decomposition of ethnicity's interaction with voter income largely confirms these general findings. However, Figure 3.2 suggests this trend may have been reversed among self-identified whites. In fact, poorer whites showed a clear preference for Quiroga over Morales (APRs of sixty percent compared to twenty percent).[64] Thus, although the MAS's substantive appeals to lower-income interests appear to have won Morales broad support, poorer white voters were clearly unconvinced. This suggests an effect for ethnic bias among white voters, either based on prejudice towards Morales and other indigenous leaders of the MAS (expressive bias) or based on fears that a Morales government would prioritise indigenous interests to their material detriment (heuristic bias).

More generally, the decomposition analysis shows that APRs of voting for both Morales and Quiroga varied significantly within, as well as across, ethnic groups according to income. For example, Figure 3.1 suggests a poor voter from an indigenous-language background had an eighty percent probability of voting for Morales and just a ten percent probability of voting for Quiroga. This compared to sixty percent (for Morales) and more than twenty-five percent (for Quiroga) for a poor non-indigenous voter. Meanwhile, a wealthy voter from an indigenous background was equally likely to vote for Morales and Quiroga, as was a wealthy non-indigenous voter (around forty percent for all four combinations). This pattern of interaction is indicative of a conditional relationship between ethnicity and income in which both sets of criteria combine to shape vote choice.

Political Ideology

The decomposed effects and predictions of ethnicity's interaction with political ideology provide little further insight to complement the main-effects analysis in Table 3.3. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 indicate more leftist ideology was associated with increased support for Morales, while more rightist ideology tended to increase the probability of a Quiroga vote, across ethnic groups. Nevertheless, the extent of each candidate's ideological appeals was also significantly affected by ethnic bias. For example, Figure 3.1 indicates that although

[64] Predicted probabilities are rounded to the nearest five percent. Confidence intervals are relatively large in some cases (particularly at levels of the covariate with fewer observations, often towards the extremes), and more precise estimates are therefore less appropriate. In general, the decomposition analysis aims to demonstrate broad trends rather than provide exact point estimates.

Quiroga clearly appealed more to right-of-centre voters across ethnic groups, a centre-right voter from an indigenous-language background has a comparable APR to a centre-left voter from a non-indigenous background (both around twenty percent). Similarly, Figure 3.2 shows how a white voter who identified with an extreme left-wing ideology was more likely to vote for the MAS than a right-wing white voter (fifty percent compared to twenty percent), but also that the APR for the left-wing white voter is comparable to a centre-right mestizo or indigenous voter (also around fifty percent). Finally, Figure 3.2 also suggests the APRs of voting for Quiroga were quite high among self-identified white voters irrespective of ideological position (around forty percent). Thus, although political ideology clearly affected vote choice in significant ways (the AMEs are statistically significant in most ethnic groups), ethnic bias that inclined indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters towards Morales, and non-indigenous and white voters towards Quiroga, continued to influence substantive voting outcomes.

Gas nationalisation

The main effects in Table 3.3 indicate support for gas nationalisation was broadly associated with increased electoral support for Morales and lower support for Quiroga, which is the trend we might expect given each candidate's stand on the issue. Once again, the decomposed analysis does little to alter this general interpretation.

The MAS's promise to strengthen state control over the gas industry increased its APRs among non-indigenous voters from around twenty to thirty percent for opponents of nationalisation to above forty percent – and as high as sixty percent – for the policy's supporters (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2). In contrast, Quiroga's opposition to excessive state interventionism won him support among opponents of nationalisation (APRs around forty percent for most non-indigenous voters, and as high as seventy percent among whites). The indigenous groups – both linguistic and self-identified – are somewhat distinct, with non-significant AMEs in both cases. However, it would be misleading to infer indigenous voters were unconcerned about gas nationalisation. Rather, the absence of statistically significant AMEs probably has more to do with the minimal variation of reported issue-positions for voters in these groups; most indigenous voters strongly supported gas nationalisation. Thus, agreement with the MAS on this substantive issue may well have contributed to indigenous and indigenous-mestizo support for Morales, even if the lack of response variation precludes statistically significant marginal effects.

In short, the issue of gas nationalisation appears to have played a role in voters' preferences in 2005, particularly among non-indigenous groups where there was greater diversity of opinion. However, comparison of APRs across self-identified ethnic groups suggests some influence for ethnic bias, particularly with regard to white voters. Indeed, Figure 3.2 indicates that a white voter who strongly supported nationalisations has a near-identical APR of voting for Morales (around forty percent) and a higher APR of voting for Quiroga (around forty-five percent), compared with a mestizo voter who strongly *opposed* nationalisation (forty percent for Morales, and thirty-five percent for Quiroga). Once again, these patterns of vote probabilities suggest the combination of ethnic bias and substantive preferences in shaping vote choice.

Attitudes towards Ethnic Groups and Issues

Tables 3.4 and 3.5 show the effects of voters' attitudes towards ethnic groups and issues on vote choice in 2005. The tables show the main effect of each ethnic attitude measure on the overall predicted probability of voting for Morales or Quiroga, as well as the marginal effects by ethnic group. Results are based on analyses that added all seven ethnic attitude variables to the base mlogit model reported in Table 3.3 (main effects), and a further model that also included two-way interactions between ethnicity and each ethnic attitude measure (average marginal effects, AMEs).[65] Table 3.4 reports the main and marginal effects of a preference for descriptive ethnic representation ('Prefer leader of…'), a belief that the country should have a single national culture ('One national culture'), and the frequency of discrimination experienced by respondents ('Experience of discrimination'). Table 3.5 reports the main and marginal effects of negative views about certain ethnic groups ('Negative views of…').[66]

[65] In general, the estimates for other variables (voter ethnicity, other demographic indicators, and ideology/policy preferences) are largely comparable between the original mlogit model reported in Table 3.3 and the ethnic attitude models (see Appendix A). Notable exceptions are the measures of identification with Aymara or Quechua culture, which become non-significant when the specific ethnic attitude variables are included. This is unsurprising, given the high degree of correlation between self-identification with Aymara or Quechua culture and positive/negative views of these groups.

[66] The principal ethnic groups mentioned are white, mestizo (not included here), Aymara, Quechua, and Camba. Camba is a somewhat ambiguous socioethnic label. It was originally a generic (and derogatory) term for 'lowland indigenous', but through the twentieth century it was appropriate by middle- and upper-class residents of the *media luna* (mostly white and white-mestizo) as both a self-appellation and a shorthand for a special kind of *mestizaje*. This unique mixing ostensibly explains the perceived lowland exceptionalism within Andean-indigenous Bolivia, and Camba is often juxtaposed with the *Collas* (a pejorative term for highland indigenous Bolivians) of the western highland departments (Lowrey 2006, 66; Webber 2011, 90-92). In both Bolivian LAPOP samples (2006 and 2010), this latter non-indigenous understanding of the term appears to have been more prevalent: many self-identified Cambas also identify as white, and very few identify as indigenous or have any indigenous-language background.

TABLE 3.4: General Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005

	MORALES		QUIROGA		DORIA		NAGATANI	
Voter Attitude/Experience	**Coeff.**	**SE**	**Coeff.**	**SE**	**Coeff.**	**SE**	**Coeff.**	**SE**
Prefers same ethnicity leader	**-.004**	.045	**-.036**	.044	**.043**	.039	**-.011**	.017
Spanish language	**-.051**	.052	**-.025**	.053	**.058**	.043	**.008**	.019
Indigenous language	**.217****	.070	**-.099^**	.053	**-.002**	.002	**-.166****	.017
White	**-.042**	.096	**-.050**	.100	**.164***	.066	**-.010**	.042
Mestizo	**-.078**	.053	**-.016**	.053	**.077**	.057	**.000**	.021
Indigenous	**.282****	.086	**-.021**	.064	**-.105****	.033	**-.138****	.045
None (no indigenous culture)	**-.129**	.083	**-.037**	.074	**.046**	.056	**.077^**	.042
Quechua	**-.064**	.090	**-.086**	.084	**.091^**	.053	**-.028****	.008
Aymara	**.047**	.072	**.013**	.082	**-.035**	.056	**-.019**	.015
Other Indigenous	**-.005**	.135	**.019**	.129	**.007**	.050	**-.022**	.059
Prefers one national culture	**.038**	.052	**.054**	.048	**-.061***	.024	**.003**	.022
Spanish language	**.030**	.062	**.061**	.055	**-.068***	.028	**.005**	.023
Indigenous language	**.134****	.051	**-.093***	.046	**.000**	.000	**.031****	.008
White	**-.054**	.126	**.246***	.107	**-.146****	.047	**.048**	.040
Mestizo	**.087**	.062	**-.012**	.056	**-.058^**	.033	**-.004**	.025
Indigenous	**-.105**	.081	**.150^**	.089	**.032**	.040	**.056**	.054
None (no indigenous culture)	**.061**	.079	**.026**	.072	**-.086****	.022	**.038**	.052
Quechua	**.245***	.112	**.087**	.100	**-.132****	.030	**-.037****	.010
Aymara	**-.070**	.077	**.036**	.081	**.000**	.053	**.014**	.028
Other Indigenous	**.037**	.093	**.023**	.103	**-.038**	.024	**.106**	.088
Experience of discrimination	**.018**	.013	**-.002**	.012	**-.008**	.009	**-.021***	.008
Spanish language	**.012**	.016	**-.006**	.015	**-.006**	.010	**-.011^**	.007
Indigenous language	**.040**	.058	**.015**	.028	**-.001**	.002	**-.072**	.077
White	**.024**	.026	**-.014**	.035	**.048***	.024	**-.068^**	.035
Mestizo	**.012**	.016	**-.001**	.014	**-.011**	.011	**-.014^**	.007
Indigenous	**.019**	.019	**-.012**	.021	**-.014**	.010	**.005**	.016
None (no indigenous culture)	**.018**	.028	**-.021**	.022	**.008**	.014	**-.026^**	.016
Quechua	**.014**	.027	**-.003**	.024	**-.024**	.023	**-.017**	.011
Aymara	**.020**	.022	**.012**	.024	**-.026**	.020	**-.024**	.016
Other Indigenous	**.111****	.036	**.054**	.054	**.004**	.016	**.006**	.025

N = 787. ^ = $p < .10$; * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .001$

Notes: Coefficients are main effects (first line of each sub-section) and average marginal effects by linguistic, generic self-identified, or self-identified cultural group of the indicated ethnic attitude variable on the overall predicted probability of voting for each candidate. Results are based on a series of multinomial logistic regression models (one for each ethnicity measure), first with no interactions (main effects) and then with two-way interactions between each ethnicity and ethnic-attitude variable (marginal effects). Full output is included in Appendix A.

Source: Author's calculations based on data from LAPOP 2006.

TABLE 3.5: Attitudes Towards Specific Ethnic Groups and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005

	MORALES		QUIROGA		DORIA		NAGATANI	
Voter Attitude	**Coeff.**	**SE**	**Coeff.**	**SE**	**Coeff.**	**SE**	**Coeff.**	**SE**
Negative view of Quechua	**-.036**	.045	**-.013**	.047	**.036**	.034	**.012**	.018
Spanish language	**-.040**	.054	**.012**	.056	**.041**	.044	**-.003**	.018
Indigenous language	**-.009**	.062	**-.131****	.048	**.004**	.004	**.095****	.014
White	**.088**	.105	**.080**	.102	**-.114***	.044	**.072^**	.041
Mestizo	**-.066**	.054	**.023**	.056	**.061**	.055	**.009**	.020
Indigenous	**.008**	.084	**-.076**	.098	**-.057^**	.032	**-.023**	.074
None (no ind. culture)	**.077**	.104	**-.027**	.083	**-.057**	.049	**.004**	.033
Quechua	**-.281****	.081	**.077**	.084	**.037**	.052	**-.011**	.008
Aymara	**-.101**	.076	**-.129**	.079	**.215****	.052	**.017**	.021
Other Indigenous	**.344****	.086	**-.323****	.088	**-.023**	.023	**.041**	.088
Negative view of Aymara	**-.141****	.042	**.127****	.047	**-.005**	.027	**.012**	.018
Spanish language	**-.143***	.053	**.124***	.057	**-.008**	.034	**.021**	.021
Indigenous language	**-.113**	.079	**.143***	.065	**.006***	.003	**-.075****	.014
White	**-.129**	.110	**.029**	.101	**.038**	.083	**-.026**	.035
Mestizo	**-.106***	.053	**.104^**	.062	**-.022**	.050	**.008**	.024
Indigenous	**-.383****	.068	**.187^**	.102	**.117**	.073	**.116**	.089
None (no ind. culture)	**-.273***	.111	**.199***	.086	**.110***	.051	**.009**	.039
Quechua	**-.033**	.074	**.041**	.063	**-.077****	.027	**.000**	.003
Aymara	**-.077**	.073	**.104**	.089	**-.082**	.065	**-.013**	.015
Other Indigenous	**-.382****	.098	**.349****	.089	**.025**	.040	**-.008**	.082
Negative view of Camba	**.031**	.039	**-.053**	.038	**-.008**	.023	**.002**	.017
Spanish language	**.048**	.053	**-.062**	.045	**-.007**	.027	**-.004**	.018
Indigenous language	**-.079**	.060	**.102***	.051	**-.004**	.003	**-.062****	.011
White	**.173***	.071	**-.326****	.077	**.019**	.048	**.025**	.033
Mestizo	**-.011**	.053	**-.029**	.048	**.012**	.028	**.008**	.018
Indigenous	**.040**	.101	**.057**	.072	**.009**	.028	**-.062**	.056
None (no ind. culture)	**.080**	.058	**-.101^**	.052	**-.007**	.029	**-.018**	.041
Quechua	**-.045**	.083	**-.050**	.082	**.011**	.060	**.006**	.005
Aymara	**.097**	.091	**.001**	.083	**-.070**	.069	**.022**	.039
Other Indigenous	**-.018**	.092	**.028**	.114	**-.082***	.036	**.013**	.053
Negative view of Whites	**.076***	.039	**-.066^**	.039	**.006**	.026	**-.019**	.016
Spanish language	**.073^**	.046	**-.075^**	.045	**.005**	.029	**-.005**	.017
Indigenous language	**.226****	.064	**-.012**	.058	**.000**	.002	**-.253****	.018
White	**-.017**	.084	**-.129**	.085	**.051**	.054	**.019**	.042
Mestizo	**.088***	.044	**-.052**	.045	**-.017**	.028	**-.022**	.020
Indigenous	**.207***	.093	**-.138**	.092	**-.022**	.026	**-.150***	.058
None (no ind. culture)	**-.094**	.069	**.043**	.063	**.004**	.034	**-.006**	.029
Quechua	**.223****	.076	**-.076**	.069	**.002**	.042	**-.025****	.009
Aymara	**.077**	.080	**-.056**	.078	**.017**	.065	**-.038**	.056
Other Indigenous	**.135**	.098	**-.058**	.112	**.030**	.032	**-.083^**	.048

N = 787. ^ = $p < .10$; * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .001$

Notes: Coefficients are main effects (first line of each sub-section) and average marginal effects by linguistic, generic self-identified, or self-identified cultural group of the indicated ethnic attitude variable on the overall predicted probability of voting for each candidate. Results are based on a series of multinomial logistic regression models (one for each ethnicity measure), first with no interactions (main effects) and then with two-way interactions between each ethnicity and ethnic-attitude variable (marginal effects). Full output is included in Appendix A.

Source: Author's calculations based on data from LAPOP 2006.

The analysis produces some noteworthy results. First, Table 3.4 reports non-significant main effects for the binary-response variable measuring a preference for a co-ethnic leader. However, when the effects are decomposed by ethnic group, the AMEs indicate a statistically significant positive relationship between such preferences and a vote for Morales among indigenous voters (an increase of 21.7 and 28.2 percentage points for indigenous-language speakers and self-identified indigenous voters, respectively). Second, support for a single national culture ('One national culture') is similarly non-significant in terms of main effects, but is associated with statistically significant AMEs among indigenous-language speakers (an increase in Morales's vote probability of 13.4 percentage points) and voters who identity with Quechua culture (an increase in favour of Morales of 24.5 percentage points). This may reflect a sector of the MAS's indigenous base that aspired to a single (presumably indigenous-based) national culture, although this measure may also capture a broader nationalist sentiment among many MAS supporters. For Quiroga, the effects of both these variables tend to be comparable inverse copies, at least for the indigenous-language group. Finally, the variable measuring experiences of racial or ethnic discrimination does not seem to have significant effects on vote probabilities, even when effects are decomposed by ethnic group. Although the coefficients are positive in all groups with regard to Morales's vote probability, and negative in most groups regarding Quiroga, only among lowland indigenous groups does the AME reach statistical significance.

The analysis of inter-ethnic perceptions reported in Table 3.5 is also informative. Negative views of the Aymara group are associated with quite substantial decreases in the predicted probability of voting for Morales – an Aymara himself – and corresponding positive effects on Quiroga's vote probabilities. The main effect indicates an overall decrease in the probability of voting for Morales of 14.1 percentage points, but the AMEs reveal considerably larger effects among voters who explicitly stated their non-indigenous background (27.3 percentage points) or identified with a lowland indigenous culture (38.2 percentage points). These are in addition to somewhat lesser effects in the self-identified mestizo group (10.6 percentage points) and non-significant effects for highland indigenous groups and whites. Similarly, the main effect indicates an increase in the probability of voting for Quiroga of 12.7 percentage points, but the effects are 19.9 percentage points for those

who identified with no indigenous culture and as high as 34.9 percentage points among lowland indigenous groups.[67]

Negative views of whites also have significant main effects for both Morales and Quiroga, an increase of 7.6 percentage points in the former case and a decrease of 6.6 percentage points in the latter. However, once again the AMEs reveal considerably larger effects in certain groups, with negative views of whites producing an increase of over twenty percentage points in Morales's vote probability among indigenous-language speakers, self-identified indigenous, and Quechuas. The AMEs are more or less in line with the main effect in Quiroga's case, although they only reach statistical significance in the non-indigenous language group. The marginal effects related to views about Quechua or Camba groups are mostly non-significant, and the few significant effects are typically based on relatively few observations.

In summary, the analysis reported in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 suggests that ethnic attitudes may have important effects on voters' electoral decisions. A preference for descriptive ethnic representation may have contributed to support for Morales among indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters and reduced support for Quiroga, although the analysis cannot determine the motivations behind such preferences (i.e., expressive or heuristic). Negative views of whites may also have increased support for Morales and the MAS, particularly among voters with some indigenous background. Meanwhile, negative views of Aymaras reduced support for Morales among lowland indigenous and non-indigenous voters and increased support for Quiroga. Although this analysis cannot easily determine whether such effects reflect psychological attachments and prejudice, or heuristic assumptions about group-related interests, it is clear that several direct measures of ethnic bias – whether expressive, heuristic, or both – had significant effects on vote choice in Bolivia's 2005 election.

Finally, this analysis does not detect any noteworthy effects of ethnic discrimination on vote choice. This is perhaps surprising given that experience of discrimination is often cited as a contributing factor to ethnic voting among subaltern groups. However, self-reported measures of discrimination such as those employed by the LAPOP surveys are likely to underestimate the frequency of such experiences (Fazio and Towles-Schwen 1999).[68]

[67] The AMEs for both Morales and Quiroga in the self-identified indigenous group are probably heavily influenced by this effect in the lowland indigenous group.

[68] Indeed, more general questions about ethnic discrimination in Bolivian society (rather than personal experience) had produced considerably higher affirmative response rates in previous LAPOP surveys.

Indirect Effects of Ethnicity

Table 3.6 reports a summary of ethnicity's indirect effects on the log-odds of voting for Morales over Quiroga in 2005, with full results provided in Appendix A. The mediation analysis shows total indirect effects that are significant for the indigenous-language measure and for self-identification with both Quechua and Aymara cultures. In each case, the effects indicate a positive association with a vote for Morales over Quiroga. Depending on the calculation methods used, these indirect effects comprise between 19.4 and 44.4 percent of the total effect in the case of the linguistic measure, and between 43.6 and 58.2 percent, and between 41.4 and 52.5 percent, in the Aymara and Quechua cases respectively. In line with the results reported in Table 3.3, in both the latter cases the direct effect is non-significant, and it is only with the addition of quite substantial indirect effects that the total effect reaches statistical significance. Moreover, the analysis also uncovers several specific mediation paths that produce significant indirect effects, even when the total indirect effects are not significant (see final column of Table 3.6). This applies to the case of indigenous self-identification, white self-identification, and identification with a lowland indigenous culture. These indirect effects are positively associated with a Morales vote in the first case, but are negative in the two other cases.

Decomposition of the total indirect effects reveals that a substantial proportion of the mediation occurs through political ideology and voters' attitudes towards specific ethnic groups or identities. In the case of linguistic group, an indigenous-language background is significantly associated with more leftist ideology, which in turn is associated with a vote for Morales over Quiroga. Self-identification as indigenous (compared to white) and identification with Quechua culture both have comparable indirect effects in favour of Morales that operate through very similar mediation pathways.

In addition to political ideology, voters' views about certain ethnic groups appear to have played important mediator roles in several cases. Indigenous-language speakers were more likely to have negative views of the Camba ethno-regional group, attitudes which were associated with a vote for Morales over Quiroga. Attitudes towards the Camba group also mediated the effects of identifying with a lowland indigenous group, although in this case lowland indigenous identity decreased negative perceptions of Cambas and produced an indirect effect in favour of Quiroga. Self-identification as white and identification with the Aymara culture both showed indirect effects mediated through perceptions of the Aymara

TABLE 3.6: Summary of Mediation Analysis, Bolivia 2005

	Coeff.	SE	Significant Mediation Pathways	Total *N*
Speaks an indigenous language				624
Total indirect effects	.086^*	.029	Rightist ideology (.034; -.692** / -.272**)	
Direct effects	.222^*	.068	Negative view of Camba (.020; .619* / .644*)	
Total effect	.309^*	.063		
Proportion of total effect mediated	.280			
KHB	.194			
LDE	.441			
White (mestizo)				
Total indirect effects	-.068	.029	Negative view of Aymara (-.019; .513^ / -.186**)	513
Direct effects	-.146	.062		
Total effect	-.214	.059		
Proportion of total effect mediated	.316			
KHB	.097			
LDE	.421			
Indigenous (mestizo)				557
Total indirect effects	.049	.033	Negative view of whites (.015; .556* / .534^)	
Direct effects	.047	.062		
Total effect	.096	.068		
Proportion of total effect mediated	.599			
KHB	.424			
LDE	.956			
Indigenous (white)				
Total indirect effects	.138	.095	Rightist ideology (.038; -.846^ / -.253*)	178
Direct effects	.297^*	.097		
Total effect	.435^*	.100		
Proportion of total effect mediated	.318			
KHB	.091			
LDE	.478			
Aymara (no indigenous culture)				310
Total indirect effects	.184^*	.070	Negative view of Aymara (.047; -.887* / -.924*)	
Direct effects	.132	.114		
Total effect	.316^*	.110		
Proportion of total effect mediated	.582			
KHB	.436			
LDE	.537			
Quechua (no indigenous culture)				426
Total indirect effects	.111^*	.043	Rightist ideology (.037; -.521* / -.297**)	
Direct effects	.111	.076		
Total effect	.222^*	.072		
Proportion of total effect mediated	.500			
KHB	.415			
LDE	.525			
Other Ind. (no indigenous culture)				261
Total indirect effects	-.008	.058	Negative view of Camba (-.034; -.724* / .849*)	
Direct effects	.093	.086		
Total effect	.085	.085		
Proportion of total effect mediated	-.099			
KHB	.380			
LDE	.290			

Notes: Table presents a summary of the mediation analysis. Full constituent tables of output can be found in Appendix A. Coefficients are standardised indirect, direct, and total effects of the ethnicity measure indicated on a vote for Morales over Quiroga. ^ and * indicated indicate coefficients are significant at the .05 level according to confidence intervals calculated through the percentile and bias-correction methods, respectively. 'Proportion of total effect mediated' is based on the product of coefficients/*Y*-standardisation method. KHB and LDE show estimates for the same proportions based on two alternative calculation methods (see Chapter Two for further discussion on methods). Coefficients for significant mediation pathways are: overall indirect effect via the mediator (standardised); effect of ethnicity measure on mediator (unstandardised); and effect of mediator on vote choice (unstandardised). Coefficients may be linear regression coefficients or log-odds from logistic regression, depending on the mediator.
Source: Author's calculations based on LAPOP 2006.

group. Whites were more likely than mestizos to hold negative views of Aymaras, which contributed to an indirect effect in favour of Quiroga; Aymaras were more likely to have positive views of their own group (compared to non-indigenous), which produced an overall indirect effect in favour of Morales. Finally, indigenous voters tended to perceive white Bolivians less favourably than mestizos, an attitude which was associated with a positive effect on the likelihood of voting for Morales.[69]

In summary, mediation analysis for the effects of ethnicity on vote choice in Bolivia's 2005 election reveals a number of significant indirect effects. In some cases, these combine to produce significant total indirect effects, although the lack of such overall statistical significance should not alter the interpretation of individual mediation pathways. The indirect effects identified would not be detected through direct-effects models, and thus mediation analysis reveals a crucial aspect of ethnicity's broader impact on vote choice. For example, the direct effects might suggest that the distinction between Aymara or Quechua identification, on the one hand, and non-indigenous identification, on the other, is not electorally important once other factors – particularly ethnic attitudes – are taken into account. The mediation analysis indicates differently, however, suggesting that distinct ethnic backgrounds may, in this case, have helped shape political ideology as well as perceptions of other ethnic groups (Aymaras in particular) in ways that inclined many Aymara and Quechua voters to favour Morales over Quiroga.

Still, even in these cases, the proportion of the total effect that is mediated remains well below one hundred percent, which would indicate full mediation. Non-complete mediation, combined with the persistence of significant direct effects (at least in the case of the linguistic measure), suggests that ethnicity's effect on voting cannot be explained fully in terms of the indirect model of ethnic voting. Rather, persisting direct effects suggest that ethnic bias, whether expressive or heuristic, was still an important factor in determining voting outcomes in Bolivia's 2005 election.

BOLIVIA 2009

The 2009 general elections in Bolivia took place in a highly polarised political environment. Following his electoral victory in 2005, Morales had pushed ahead with a

[69] These specific mediation pathways do not account for the full overall indirect effect, which constitutes the sum of all such pathways (not just those that are individually significant).

pledge to rewrite the country's constitution, convening a constitutional assembly within his first year in office. Controversy surrounding constitutional reform exacerbated, and became a focus for, wider political conflicts rooted in long-standing regional, ethnic, and class divides. In particular, opposition towards the MAS in the wealthier, less indigenous *media luna* region found voice in a reinvigorated autonomy movement, which demanded near or complete independence from the MAS-controlled central government. Pro-autonomy advocates included a number of high-profile politicians from the political right, including the prefects of Santa Cruz, Pando, Tarija, and Beni. Defeat in a 2006 referendum that explicitly addressed the autonomy issue did little to subdue pro-autonomy activism. Indeed, violent confrontations between pro-autonomy protesters and supports of the central government became increasingly frequent through 2007 and 2008.

In September 2007, violent clashes on the streets of Cochabamba left several dead and hundreds injured when supporters of the MAS government, mostly indigenous, were attacked by a group of rival protesters, mostly youths from the city's wealthier, white neighbourhoods (Espósito 2011, 8). The events in Cochabamba highlighted the ethnic underside of the autonomy issue, a dimension to the political confrontation that was repeatedly in evidence in the series of protests and counter-protests that had engulfed the *media luna* by early 2008. The explicitly racist rhetoric that marked much of the political debate was often mirrored by openly racist, physical attacks on (perceived) supporters of rival political groups, particularly targeting indigenous supporters of the MAS. Sections of the pro-autonomy movement engaged not only in strikes, blockades, and civil disobedience, but also in quasi-paramilitary activities, including armed attacks on indigenous communities and even bombings of state companies, indigenous NGOs, and human rights organisations (Dangl 2007; Kolzloff, 2008; Chávez 2009; Webber 2009, 93-6; Postero, 2010, 63-4; Sivak 2010, 221-22; Harten 2011, 182-3; Webber 2011, 133-40; Farthing and Kohl 2014, 47-9). The violence reached its apex in September 2008, when an ambush of a group of MAS activists on its way to Cobija, the provincial capital of Pando department, left 19 dead. The Prefect of Pando, Leopoldo Fernández, was subsequently arrested and charged with ordering the killings (Chávez, 2008), although to date there has been no verdict in his trial.

A degree of stability was achieved by early 2009 when the MAS government agreed to a series of amendments to the new constitution proposed by the parliamentary opposition, although the central government stopped well short of acceding to the full demands of the

pro-autonomy activists. The new constitution was subsequently ratified by popular referendum in January 2009, triggering a general election the following December.

Unsurprisingly, the electoral landscape in the 2009 campaign reflected the polarised divisions of the contemporary political environment. Morales lined up against Manfred Reyes Villa, who headed the right-wing PPB-CN coalition. The PPB-CN included Reyes Villa's Nueva Fuerza Republicana (NFR), a number of centre-right parties including the MNR, and several prominent pro-autonomy party-movements and politicians (the imprisoned Leopoldo Fernández, for example, was Reyes Villa's running mate). The only other candidate of note was Samuel Doria, who ran again on his Unidad Nacional (UN) ticket, positioning himself as the moderate option in a polarised field. Doria's support was restricted to certain middle-class, urban areas, and his polling figures never reached double digits (Bustillos 2013).

Overall, this electoral environment and the wider political context were conducive to both heuristic and expressive ethnic voting, but perhaps particularly the latter. Not only did several key substantive controversies fall along ethnic lines, but both politicians and their popular supporters evoked ethnicity explicitly in their political rhetoric. Moreover, attacks on political opponents were often couched in ethnocentrist or openly racist sentiments. Combined with ethnically-motivated physical violence against supporters of rival political forces, such conditions were likely to raise significantly the political salience of ethnicity, strengthen feelings of ethnic solidarity, and stir ethnic prejudice.

Official Results and LAPOP Data

The results of the election gave Morales and the MAS a resounding victory, with the former winning 64.2 percent of the valid presidential vote. Reyes Villa came a distant second 26.5 percent, and Doria third with 5.7 percent. The 2009 election, then, firmly cemented the MAS's position as the dominant party in Bolivian politics, albeit in a context of severe political polarisation particularly characterised by sharp regional and ethnic divides.

LAPOP's 2010 survey, conducted some months after the election, only slightly overestimated Morales's vote, giving the MAS candidate a 66.7 percent share. However, it severely underestimated Reyes Villa's support, with only 17.3 percent of LAPOP respondents reporting a vote for the PPB-CN's candidate. One possible explanation for this bias in the LAPOP data is that opposition supporters were uneasy about revealing their electoral preferences in a political environment that was still highly polarised. Indeed, a total 1,047 of respondents in LAPOP's 2010 survey declined to report their vote choice, and it

seems likely some of these were Reyes Villa supporters. However, despite this bias in reported vote choice, the LAPOP data do at least reflect the general trend in official results, and sample still includes a sufficient number of Reyes Villa supporters to conduct meaningful analysis (N = 375).

With regard to specific measures, the 2009 analysis continues to use personal language knowledge as the linguistic measure of ethnicity for comparability with 2005 (although the 2010 survey also included the parental linguistic measure used in Ecuador and Peru). As in 2005, the 2009 analysis also employs both generic ethnic self-identification (white, mestizo, indigenous) and cultural identification measures. Further details of the additional variables used are included in the relevant subsections, below.

Group- and Candidate-Centred Ethnicisation

Tables 3.7 and 3.8 show the ethnic breakdown of reported vote choice in Bolivia's 2009 election, as well as group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores (sub-tables *D*). Table 3.7 reports results based on the generic ethnic self-identification measure, while Table 3.8 reports results from the cultural identification measure.

Group-Centred Ethnicisation

The group-centred ethnicisation scores in Tables 3.7d and 3.8d show similar relative patterns to 2005, but with a marked increase across all groups. In the case of SD2 scores, this partly reflects the overall higher vote share won by Morales in 2009 (66.7 percent compared to 53.4 percent in 2005). However, the fact that SD1 scores are also higher in 2009 indicates that vote concentrations within ethnic groups, *even relative to overall vote proportions*, were also notably higher. This reflects the increased polarisation of Bolivian politics in 2009, and particularly the ethnic dimension to such polarisation. Indeed, SD1 scores are higher in Bolivia 2009 than in any other election studied in this thesis.

The principal aim of the group-centred analysis is to provide an indication of the likely salience of ethnicity to vote choice across ethnic groups. As in 2005, the SD2 scores from 2009 shows the highest overall vote concentrations in the indigenous-language and self-identified indigenous groups (.376 in both cases), as well as the two highland indigenous groups, Quechua (.290) and Aymara (.375). These indigenous groups voted overwhelmingly for the MAS in 2009, with Morales winning 74.8 percent of the Quechua vote and 90.0 percent in the other three groups (Tables 3.7b and 3.8b). However, the SD1 scores show that

TABLE 3.7: Ethnicity and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009 (with generic self-identification)

		LINGUISTIC GROUP			SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP		Total	Total
		Spanish	Indigenous	White	Mestizo	Indigenous	LAPOP	Official
A: Overview	Evo Morales	41.6	25.1	2.3	44.4	20.1	66.7	64.2
	Manfred Reyes Villa	16.2	1.2	2.2	14.5	0.6	17.3	26.5
	Samuel Doria	3.9	0.2	0.4	3.5	0.1	4.0	5.7
	Other/Null	10.5	1.5	0.8	9.6	1.5	12.0	3.6
	Proportion of full sample	72.1	27.9	5.7	72.0	22.3	100.0	100.0
B: By Group	Evo Morales	57.7	90.0	40.0	61.6	90.0	66.7	
	Manfred Reyes Villa	22.4	4.1	38.7	20.1	2.7	17.3	
	Samuel Doria	5.3	0.6	7.0	4.9	0.4	4.0	
	Other/Null	14.5	5.3	14.3	13.3	6.9	12.0	
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
C: By Candidate	Evo Morales	62.4	37.6	3.4	66.5	30.1	66.7	
	Manfred Reyes Villa	93.4	6.6	12.8	83.7	3.5	17.3	
	Samuel Doria	96.0	4.0	10.0	87.8	2.2	4.0	
	Other/Null	87.7	12.3	6.9	80.4	12.8	12.0	
	Proportion of full sample	72.1	27.9	5.7	72.0	22.3	100.0	
D: Ethnicisation Scores	**Group-Centred**							
	SD1	.045	.117	.134	.025	.117		
	SD2	.198	.376	.146	.218	.376		
	Candidate-Centred	**LINGUISTIC GROUP**			**SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP**			
	Evo Morales	.097			.052			
	Manfred Reyes Villa	.212			.125			
	Samuel Doria	.239			.134			
	Other/Null	.156			.063			

N = 1918.

Notes: Sub-table A shows the first-round vote proportions by ethnic group (linguistic and self-identified, which should be read separately) in LAPOP's 2010 survey sample, as well as official election results (all percent). Sub-table B shows the proportion of each ethnic group that voted for each candidate in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-table C shows the proportion of each candidate's vote share received from each ethnic group in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-table D shows group-centred ethnicisation scores (SD1 and SD2) and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores based on the LAPOP sample. SD1 is the standard deviation (SD) of each candidate's share within the ethnic group from the candidate's full sample proportions. SD2 is the SD from an 'equal-share' mean of .25 (100 percent divided by four vote outcome categories). Candidate-centred ethnicisation scores are the SD of candidate vote proportions by ethnic group (linguistic and self-identified, which should be read separately) from the proportions of each group in the full sample.

Source: Author's elaboration of data from LAPOP 2010 and Tribunal Supremo Electoral (http://www.oep.org.bo/).

TABLE 3.8: Ethnicity and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009 (with cultural identification)

		LINGUISTIC GROUP		SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP				Total
		Spanish	Indigenous	None	Quechua	Aymara	Other Indig.	Official
A: Overview	Evo Morales	41.8	25.7	9.3	26.8	26.5	4.9	67.5
	Manfred Reyes Villa	15.4	1.1	6.9	3.6	0.4	5.7	16.5
	Samuel Doria	3.8	0.2	1.6	0.8	0.7	0.9	4.0
	Other/Null	10.5	1.5	3.2	4.6	2.0	2.2	12.0
	Proportion of full sample	71.5	28.5	21.0	35.9	29.5	13.6	100.0
B: By Group	Evo Morales	58.5	90.2	44.2	74.8	89.9	36.0	67.5
	Manfred Reyes Villa	21.5	4.0	32.9	10.0	1.2	41.7	16.5
	Samuel Doria	5.3	0.6	7.6	2.3	2.2	6.3	4.0
	Other/Null	14.7	5.2	15.3	12.9	6.6	15.9	12.0
	Total							100.0
C: By Candidate	Evo Morales	61.9	38.1	13.7	39.7	39.3	7.3	67.5
	Manfred Reyes Villa	93.1	6.9	41.8	21.6	2.2	34.4	16.5
	Samuel Doria	96.0	4.0	40.4	21.2	16.4	22.0	4.0
	Other/Null	87.6	12.4	26.8	38.7	16.4	18.1	12.0
	Proportion of full sample							100.0
D: Ethnicisation Scores	**Group-Centred**							
	SD1	.045	.114	.117	.041	.112	.158	
	SD2	.202	.377	.144	.290	.375	.144	
	Candidate-Centred	**LINGUISTIC GROUP**			**SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP**			
	Evo Morales	.096			.068			
	Manfred Reyes Villa	.216			.364			
	Samuel Doria	.244			.284			
	Other/Null	.161			.109			

N = 1915.

Notes: Sub-table A shows the first-round vote proportions by ethnic group (linguistic and cultural identification, which should be read separately) in LAPOP's 2010 survey sample, as well as official election results (all percent). Sub-table B shows the proportion of each ethnic group that voted for each candidate in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-table C shows the proportion of each candidate's vote share received from each ethnic group in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-table D shows group-centred ethnicisation scores (SD1 and SD2) and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores based on the LAPOP sample. SD1 is the standard deviation (SD) of each candidate's share within the ethnic group from the candidate's full sample proportions. SD2 is the SD from an 'equal-share' mean of .25 (100 percent divided by four vote outcome categories). Candidate-centred ethnicisation scores are the SD of candidate vote proportions by ethnic group (linguistic and cultural identification, which should be read separately) from the proportions of each group in the full sample.

Source: Author's elaboration of data from LAPOP 2010 and Tribunal Supremo Electoral (http://www.oep.org.bo/).

the white group (.134), self-identified non-indigenous group (.117), and the lowland indigenous group (.158) had vote distributions that were equally – or more – disproportionate in their distribution relative to overall vote shares (Tables 3.7d and 3.8d). This pattern of low SD2 and high SD1 scores indicates ethnic groups in which the vote is more fragmented (and thus closer to the equal-share mean proportion of 25 percent), but where group-level voting trends diverge from the rest of the electorate (thus larger standard deviations from the overall sample proportions).

Indeed, the breakdown of the vote in these non-indigenous groups – and in the lowland indigenous group – serves to highlight both the MAS's broad appeal beyond its highland indigenous and mestizo base and the concentration of opposition support in non-indigenous constituencies. Although Morales won 40.0 percent of white and 44.2 percent of self-identified non-indigenous voters (figures that reflect more or less the same set of individual voters), as well as 36.0 percent of lowland indigenous voters, these proportions were well below the levels of support enjoyed by the MAS in other groups. These were, accordingly, the groups that offered most support to Reyes Villa, although only in the lowland indigenous group did the PPB-CN receive a greater vote share than the MAS (41.7 percent compared to 36 percent).[70]

Overall, analysis of group-centred voting patterns from 2009 suggests that ethnicity was highly salient to vote choice across most groups, with the partial exception of the heterogeneous self-identified mestizo and Spanish-language groups. Substantively, the group-centred analysis indicates the MAS made gains across all ethnic groups between 2005 and 2009, reconfirming the breadth of the party's appeal. However, it also highlights the increased polarisation of Bolivian politics in 2009, with group-centred ethnicisation scores consistently higher for all groups (compare Tables 3.1d and 3.2d with 3.7d and 3.8d). Moreover, the breakdown of each ethnic group's vote distributions identifies the nature of this ethnic polarisation. Continuing but amplifying the electoral trends of 2005, Morales and the MAS won overwhelming majorities among highland indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters in 2009, while support for the opposition was restricted to whites and non-indigenous mestizos, as well as voters who identified with lowland indigenous groups.

[70] It should be re-emphasised that these proportions are based on the LAPOP respondents who reported their vote choice, a subsample that underestimated support for Reyes Villa.

Candidate-Centred Ethnicisation

Like the group-centred statistics, the candidate-centred ethnicisation scores tend to increase for opponents of the MAS from 2005 to 2009 (compare Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.7, and 3.8). For example, Reyes Villa's candidate-centred ethnicisation scores are .212 for the linguistic measure (compared to .203 for Quiroga in 2005) and .125 and .364 for the two self-identification measures (compared to .081 and .264 for Quiroga four years earlier). Doria's scores are also substantially higher on all three measures in 2009 compared to 2005. In fact, the average candidate-centred ethnicisation score is .122 in Bolivia 2009, the highest score across all seven election case studies.

However, in contrast to Reyes Villa and Doria, the candidate-centred scores for Morales are comparable between 2005 and 2009 or even decrease in value. Thus, while the principal opponents of the MAS saw their vote become more ethnically concentrated in 2009, Morales maintained and even expanded the MAS's support across ethnic groups. Overall, these candidate-centred ethnicisation scores confirm the general trend implied by the group-centred scores: the consolidation of the MAS's base in indigenous constituencies, while maintaining broad support across other ethnic groups; and the concentration of support for the principal opposition in non-indigenous and lowland indigenous constituencies.

Nevertheless, Morales's support was still concentrated among indigenous and indigenous-mestizo sectors in 2009, with 37.6 percent coming from indigenous-language speakers (compared to a sample proportion of 27.9 percent) and 30.1 percent coming from self-identified indigenous voters (compared to a sample proportion of just 22.3 percent). Just 3.4 percent of Morales's vote came from self-identified whites, although the overall proportion of whites in the sample was also lower in 2009 than in 2005 (just 5.7 percent, compared with 11.8 percent).[71] In terms of the wider cultural identification measure, a total of 80.0 percent of Morales's vote came from voters who identified with either Quechua or Aymara culture, with just 13.7 percent coming from non-indigenous voters (although the latter comprised 21.0 percent of the sample). Just 7.3 percent of Morales's vote came from voters who reported identification with lowland indigenous cultures (about half the 13.6 percent sample proportion).

[71] This reduction in the size of the self-identified white group cannot be explained by white unease about reporting opposition vote choice. The full sample, including non-responses to the vote question, included just 6.8 percent whites, much lower than the 12.0 percent in 2005 and not substantially higher than the 5.7 percent of whites who did report vote choice in 2009.

The concentration of support for Reyes Villa among non-indigenous voters is highlighted by the 93.4 percent of the PPB-CN vote that came from non-indigenous language speakers (compared to a sample proportion of 72.1 percent), the 12.8 percent from whites (twice the sample proportion), and just 3.5 percent from indigenous (well below the 22.0 percent sample proportion). Among those indigenous voters were some of the 34.4 percent of lowland indigenous respondents who reported voting for Reyes Villa (well above the 13.6 percent in the sample), while the remainder of the PPB-CN vote was comprised of non-indigenous voters (41.8 percent, comprising whites and non-indigenous mestizos), 21.6 percent Quechua, and just 2.2 percent Aymara (compared to sample proportions of 21.0, 35.9, and 29.5 percent, respectively).[72]

Overall, the ethnic composition of candidates' vote shares reflected the polarised political environment in 2009. Support for Reyes Villa was considerably more ethnically-concentrated than Quiroga's vote in 2005, with minimal support among highland indigenous or indigenous-mestizo voters. This reflected PPB-CN's choice of political personnel, its campaign rhetoric, and its programmatic platform, which all worked to associate the coalition with the interests of wealthier, less indigenous residents of the *media luna*, including the interests and views of more radical factions of the pro-autonomy movement (Chávez 2009). The candidate-centred analysis suggests that these characteristics of the PPB-CN electoral platform severely restricted the scope of its descriptive and substantive appeals, even alienating many whites and mestizos. In contrast, and despite the severe political confrontations in the years preceding the 2009 election, the MAS actually increased its vote share across all groups, although it still drew disproportionate support from indigenous voters, at least in the highlands. In part, the MAS's consolidation of its highland indigenous base may have reflected heightened expressions of ethnic solidarity within these constituencies in the context of a more polarised ethnic environment and, particularly, the more aggressive anti-indigenous posturing of sections within the main political opposition.

Direct Predictors of Vote Choice: Main Effects

Table 3.9 shows the effects of voter characteristics on the overall predicted probability of voting for Morales and Reyes Villa in 2009. The analysis does not include discussion of Doria's vote, given the relatively few LAPOP respondents who reported voting

[72] Doria's vote composition followed a comparable pattern to Reyes Villa's, although it indicated somewhat less polarisation

TABLE 3.9: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009

	MORALES		REYES VILLA		DORIA	
Voter Characteristic	**Coeff.**	**SE**	**Coeff.**	**SE**	**Coeff.**	**SE**
Speaks an indigenous language	**.147****	.041	**-.054**	.045	**-.015**	.019
White (Mestizo)	**-.243****	.046	**.157****	.057	**.040**	.038
Indigenous (Mestizo)	**.047**	.051	**-.095***	.041	**-.028***	.013
Indigenous (White)	**.290****	.071	**-.252****	.076	**-.068^**	.038
Quechua (None)	**.011**	.038	**-.059^**	.037	**.001**	.016
Aymara (None)	**.134****	.043	**-.181****	.038	**.020**	.026
Other Indigenous (None)	**-.037**	.055	**.029**	.046	**.021**	.019
Quechua (Aymara)	**-.123****	.035	**.122****	.026	**-.019**	.022
Other Indigenous (Aymara)	**-.170***	.069	**.210****	.048	**.000**	.032
Income	**-.011**	.007	**.016^**	.010	**.005**	.005
Female	**.004**	.022	**-.015**	.023	**.020**	.014
Age	**.002***	.001	**.000**	.001	**-.001**	.001
Trust in parties	**.013^**	.007	**-.002**	.006	**-.002**	.005
Participation in protests	**-.099****	.035	**.082***	.038	**.035**	.027
National economy has improved	**.140****	.030	**-.071***	.029	**-.008**	.018
Personal finances have improved	**.021**	.028	**-.058***	.029	**.018**	.018
Resides in *media luna*	**-.213****	.039	**.148****	.031	**.005**	.014
Resides in rural area	**.006**	.013	**-.003**	.018	**-.001**	.006
Rightist ideology	**-.043****	.008	**.029****	.007	**.002**	.003
Wealth redistribution	**.016^**	.010	**.004**	.011	**.004**	.006
Social Security	**.009**	.012	**-.005**	.012	**-.008**	.007
Nationalisations	**.016***	.007	**-.017***	.007	**-.010****	.003
Free trade	**-.001**	.010	**.012**	.009	**.000**	.006
Limit opposition voice	**.038****	.009	**-.019***	.009	**-.004**	.004
Direct democracy	**.021****	.008	**-.014***	.007	**-.002**	.004
Minorities are a threat	**.001**	.008	**.006**	.010	**-.002**	.005

N= 1151. ^ = $p < .10$; * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$.

Notes: Coefficients are the effects on overall vote probability based on the multinomial logistic regression model reported in Appendix A. The effects for ethnic self-identification and cultural identification are compared to base category in parentheses. Generic self-identification and cultural identification variables were included in separate models; parameter estimates for all other variables are those from the generic identification model.

Source: Author's calculations based on LAPOP 2010.

for the UN. The full results of the base mlogit model, reported in Appendix A, include parameter estimates for Doria.

Ethnicity Variables

First, the model predicts that voters from a non-indigenous language background were 14.7 percentage points more likely to support Morales than non-indigenous language speakers. Similarly, both self-identified mestizos and indigenous voters were significantly more likely to vote for Morales than whites (by 24.3 and 29.0 percentage points, respectively). Voters who identified with an Aymara cultural background were also more likely to support Morales than those who reported no indigenous cultural identification (by 13.4 percentage points), or those who identified with Quechua or a lowland indigenous culture (by 12.3 and 17.0 percentage points, respectively).

For the most part, these patterns are inversely mirrored in terms of Reyes Villa's vote probabilities, indicating increased support among whites and non-indigenous voters, and near-total rejection by Aymara voters, in particular. In addition, the results indicate that Quechua cultural identification (compared to non-indigenous) was also associated with a 5.9 percentage point decrease in the probability of voting for Reyes Villa. However, linguistic background did not appear to influence Reyes Villa's vote, at least once both self-identification measures were taken into account.

Overall, the results outlined above strongly suggest a causal relationship between voter ethnicity and vote choice in Bolivia's 2009 election. However, a comparison of effects linked to the linguistic and self-identification measures may also provide more specific insight into the nature of ethnicity's role in voting behaviour. As discussed previously, the linguistic measures can be taken as indicative of a broader sociocultural background, compared to the more conscious, expressive character of the self-identification measures. Results from the 2009 vote analysis show that voters from an indigenous-language background were more likely to vote for Morales than Spanish-only speakers, indicative of the MAS's broad appeal among indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters. This point is reinforced by the absence of a significant difference between self-identified indigenous and mestizo voters, who, as Tables 3.7 and 3.8 made clear, supported Morales in overwhelming numbers. However, in Reyes Villa's case, the linguistic measure is non-significant, while self-identification with explicitly *non*-indigenous identities (white or non-indigenous culture) is significant and positive. Taken together, these effects might indicate that more expressive

(i.e., conscious or politicised) ethnic identifications – particularly with groups and cultural identities that are explicitly distinguished from highland indigenous Bolivia – may have played an important role in support for Reyes Villa.[73]

In summary, the results of regression analysis appear to confirm a causal role for ethnicity in the 2009 election, as suggested by the vote distributions presented previously. The disproportionate support for Morales among indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters (and particularly among Aymara voters), and the concentration of Reyes Villa's support among whites and non-indigenous mestizos (as well as, and including, voters who identified with a lowland indigenous culture), is not explained fully by sociodemographic factors, economic perceptions, or political attitudes. Once again, these findings suggest an important effect of ethnic bias on Bolivian voting outcomes. Moreover, the relative significance of linguistic and self-identification measures may indicate a more expressive form of bias among supporters of Reyes Villa in particular, although in the wider context of ethnic and political polarisation it seems likely that ethnic solidarity and prejudice may have played an increased role across all groups.

Non-Ethnic Variables

However, even when ethnic variables are taken into account, substantive issue preferences and ideology, economic assessments, and several other demographic variables all contributed to vote choice. First, as in 2005, political ideology ('Rightist ideology') had highly significant effects on the predicted vote probabilities for both major candidates in 2009. A one-unit move from left to right on the ideology scale was associated with a 4.3 percentage point increase in the probability of voting for the MAS, and a 2.9 percentage point decrease in the probability of voting for Reyes Villa. These effects reconfirm the ideological, as well as the ethnic and regional, divisions in contemporary Bolivian politics.

The 2010 surveys also introduced several more specific measures of programmatic preferences linked to political ideology: support for state-led wealth redistribution ('Wealth redistribution'); support for greater social security ('Social security'); and support for some nationalisations ('Nationalisations'). Although most voters supported an increase in social security, meaning it has little predictive value in voting analysis, both the wealth redistribution and nationalisation preferences had significant effects. A one-unit increase in

[73] It is worth re-emphasising, however, that the ethnic effects identified are all relative (i.e., they reflect support within one ethnic group relative to another), and that Morales's performance in terms of actual vote share was rarely inferior to Reyes Villa.

support for both programmatic measures is associated with a 1.6 percentage point rise in the predicted probability of voting for Morales, and, in the case of the nationalisation measure, a comparable drop in the probability of voting for Reyes Villa. Thus, the MAS's substantive agenda, which made wealth redistribution and nationalisations key components of its political project, seems to have appealed to many voters along ideological and programmatic lines even when ethnic bias is taken into account.

However, unlike in 2005, voter income appears to have had little effect on voting in 2009. This might indicate some increase in support for the MAS among wealthier voters during Morales's first term, although in fact there was little change in the mean income of MAS voters between 2005 and 2009, and the latter remained considerably poorer on average than supporters of other candidates.[74] Thus, the lack of statistical significance for voter income may have more to do with the increased salience of other factors, which partially confounded the effect of income.

One such factor may have been the perceived performance of the national economy ('National economy has improved'), generally a reliable predictor of incumbent support. Indeed, Table 3.9 indicates that voters who considered the national economy to have improved in the previous twelve months were 14.0 percentage points more likely to vote for the MAS than voters who perceived no change or a decrease in economic performance. Voters who reported an improvement in their personal finances ('Personal finances have improved') were also 5.8 percentage points less likely to vote for Reyes Villa compared with voters who reported no improvement. It seems reasonable to conclude that some of the effect of income may have been reflected in these sociotropic and 'pocket-book' economic evaluations – in addition to the effects of substantive preferences and demographic factors – with the perceived trend in economic performance (rather than the specific income level) the most salient variable in voters' economic voting behaviour.

Finally, in addition to the effects of ethnicity, political attitudes, and economic assessments, a number of other effects are worthy of note. In contrast to 2005, participation in protests ('Participation in protests') was positively associated with a vote for Reyes Villa, possibly a reflection of support for the PPB-CN among voters involved in the anti-government, pro-autonomy protests of 2008-2009. Divisions over the autonomy issue are

[74] For example, the mean income band of MAS supporters in 2009 was 4.1 (out of bands ranging from zero to 10), compared to 5.0 for supporters of Reyes Villa and Doria. The equivalent means from 2005 were 3.9 and 4.4 for supporters of Morales and Quiroga, respectively.

also reflected in the significant effect for region on vote probabilities, with residents of the *media luna* departments 21.3 percentage points less likely to vote for Morales compared with voters outside the region. However, the effect of region was not particularly different from 2005, suggesting that the 2008 unrest did not noticeably increase the already-substantial electoral significance of region. As with 2005, rural residence was not a significant vote predictor, again indicating the MAS's broad appeal across the urban-rural divide. Any residual effects for rural residence were presumably captured by ethnicity, region, income, or programmatic preferences. The remaining measures of political attitudes indicate increased support for Morales among voters who approved of limiting the voice of the opposition 'in order for the country to progress' ('Limit voice of opposition') and among those who preferred a direct, rather than representative, form of democracy ('Direct democracy').[75] Attitudes towards free trade ('Free trade') and whether minorities pose a threat to the majority ('Minorities are a threat') were both non-significant.

In sum, ethnicity appears to have played a particularly prominent role in the polarised election of 2009. In particular, Morales appears to have consolidated his base among indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters, a pattern of support that is not fully explained by political attitudes, region, or any other sociodemographic indicators. Similarly, such factors do not explain the extent of support for Reyes Villa among whites and voters who explicitly identified as *non*-indigenous, or the near-total rejection of the PPB-CN by highland indigenous voters. However, despite the substantial influence of ethnicity on voting, this initial analysis also suggests that non-ethnic factors played an important role. In particular, voters' perception of the national economy, their region of residence, their ideological attitudes, and their support for state-interventionist social and economic policies are all significant factors in explaining vote choice. The following paragraphs, which examine the decomposition of ethnicity's interaction with several of these factors, can offer further insight into the interaction of ethnic and non-ethnic vote determinants.

Direct Predictors of Vote Choice: Decomposed Effects

As in 2005, the 2009 vote analysis also examined the interaction of different ethnicity variables with several non-ethnic voter characteristics, including voter income, political

[75] Despite its generalised wording, it is hard to see how the question about the president's capacity to limit the voice of the political opposition would not be viewed by many survey respondents in reference to the contemporary Bolivian case. Thus, it seems likely that support for such presidential powers specifically reflected support for the Morales government to limit the voice of PBB-CN opposition and associated groups. It should not, then, be taken as a measure of general political predispositions.

ideology, support for wealth redistribution, and support for nationalisations. The analysis generated predicted probabilities (APRs) and average marginal effects (AMEs) for set combinations of voter characteristics. These are reported in Figures 3.4 and 3.5.[76] Analysis of these decomposed effects can help identify variation in the effects of ethnic and non-ethnic vote determiners across ethnic groups, as well as the ways in which such factors combine to shape voting outcomes. Once again, following paragraphs do not attempt an extensive review of the full results from the decomposition analysis, but rather focus on some illustrative trends and examples.

Income

According to the main effects, income had a limited impact on vote probabilities in 2009, and the decomposed effects do little to alter this interpretation. However, the analysis does generate some significant marginal effects for income in certain groups, effects that are not picked up in the main-effects model. For example, an increase in income is associated with a 2.3 percentage point rise in the probability of voting for Reyes Villa among mestizo voters, by far the largest group numerically. The 2009 analysis also replicates the findings of the 2005 model, which indicates opposition to the MAS is strongest among poorer white voters. Indeed, according to the model, a poor white vote has over fifty percent probability of voting for Reyes Villa and less than twenty percent probability of voting for Morales, while poorer mestizo and indigenous voters are far more likely to vote for Morales (APRs over sixty percent).[77]

Thus, income appears to have had some effect on vote probabilities in 2009 – the MAS seems to have performed somewhat better among poorer non-white voters, while poorer whites were a key constituency of the PPB-CN opposition. However, the evidence for ethnic bias is much stronger. Indeed, the decomposed analysis suggests the divide between mestizos and indigenous voters on the one hand, and whites on the other, was electorally significant across most income bands.

Political Ideology

Figures 3.4 and 3.5 suggest that ideology had comparable effects on vote probabilities across most ethnic groups in 2009, with leftist ideology associated with support for Morales

[76] See Appendix A for full results.
[77] The drop in support for Reyes Villa among wealthier whites is exacerbated by Doria's stronger performance in this constituency, with APRs over twenty percent for the UN candidate among wealthy whites (not reported here). See Bustillo (2013), amongst others, on Doria's appeal among wealthier middle-class voters.

FIGURE 3.4: Predicted Probability of Vote Choice, by Linguistic Group, Bolivia 2009



N = 1151; ^ = $p < .10$; * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$. Plots show adjusted predicted vote probabilities, with 95 percent confidence intervals, for the candidate indicated according to ethnic group and each non-ethnic voter characteristic (APRs). Coefficients in the legend are average marginal effects (AMEs) by ethnic group for the relevant non-ethnic characteristic. Results are based on a multinomial logistic regression model with two-way interactions between voter ethnicity and each non-ethnic characteristic (see Appendix A for full output).

FIGURE 3.5: Predicted Probability of Vote Choice, by Self-Identified Group, Bolivia 2009



N = 1151; ^ = $p < .10$; * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$. Plots show adjusted predicted vote probabilities, with 95 percent confidence intervals, for the candidate indicated according to ethnic group and each non-ethnic voter characteristic (APRs). Coefficients in the legend are average marginal effects (AMEs) by ethnic group for the relevant non-ethnic characteristic. Results are based on a multinomial logistic regression model with two-way interactions between voter ethnicity and each non-ethnic characteristic (see Appendix A for full output).

and rightist ideology associated with support for Reyes Villa. This is broadly in line with the main effects reported in Table 3.9. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the AMEs are non-significant for the indigenous-language group, the self-identified indigenous group, and the Aymara group (not reported here), the principal bases of MAS support. Indeed, the APRs of voting for Morales in all three groups remain relatively constant (between seventy and eighty percent) across ideology levels. This is in marked contrast to the pattern of predicted probabilities in the non-indigenous groups (as well as the Quechua and lowland indigenous groups), where the APRs drop from a similar high of seventy to eighty percent among leftists, to around forty percent for rightist mestizos and non-indigenous language speakers, to below ten percent for rightist whites. The trend in the APRs for Reyes Villa is the near-identical inverse copy of Morales's case.

Significant marginal effects in the non-indigenous groups, combined with consistently high APRs in the indigenous groups, underline a key feature of the MAS's electoral success. Not only did Morales win overwhelming support among indigenous and non-indigenous voters, who appeared willing to put aside ideological differences to back the MAS (evidence of ethnic bias), but Morales also won substantial proportions of non-indigenous mestizos and whites, apparently on the basis of ideological appeals. Perhaps more than any other case, then, the interaction between ethnicity and political ideology in Bolivia's 2009 election clearly demonstrates the substantive electoral contours of a two-track appeal for inclusive ethnopopulism, as proposed by Madrid (2008, 2012): strong support, apparently on ethnic grounds, among ethnically-proximate voters, combined with support from ethnically more distant voters on substantive (ideological) grounds.

Wealth Redistribution

The main effects suggested a positive relationship between support for state-led efforts at inequality reduction and the probability of voting for Morales. The decomposed analysis confirms this general trend, finding positive effects for Morales and negative effect for Reyes Villa in most groups, although only the non-indigenous language group has a statistically significant AME (and only with regard to Morales's vote). The pattern of the linguistic interaction thus resembles the case of political ideology – that is, largely consistent support for the MAS among indigenous-language voters across the programmatic covariate (seventy to eighty percent), and a positive trend in the non-indigenous group (from around fifty percent among those opposed to the policy, to a comparable seventy percent among

supporters). Once again, this pattern of interaction suggests ethnic bias among indigenous-language speakers in favour of Morales and programmatic support for the MAS among many non-indigenous voters.[78]

It is perhaps surprising that 'Wealth redistribution' does not produce more significant electoral effects; after all, a promise to reduce inequality has been a key feature of the MAS's political platform (Levitsky and Roberts 2011, 4-5). However, in terms of a general sociopolitical goal, inequality reduction appears to be supported by most Bolivians (mean positions are > 5, on a 1-7 scale, in all groups), and the LAPOP question did not refer to specific *means* of achieving such a goal (beyond a vague reference to legislation), which might provoke more disagreement.[79] There may also be considerable confounding effects by the political ideology and income variables, and indeed the *p*-values for wealth redistribution decrease notably when these variables are dropped from the model.[80]

Nationalisations

As in 2005, the main effects indicated an association between support for nationalisations and a vote for MAS, a trend that is broadly borne out by the decomposed effects. Indeed, the pattern once again resembles that of the ideology and wealth redistribution interactions. Programmatic preferences seem to have had relatively limited impact on Morales's vote probability for both indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters and for whites, but a significant effect among non-indigenous mestizos. Support for Morales remained high among indigenous-language speakers (seventy to eighty percent) across the policy covariate, while the APRs increased in the non-indigenous language group from around fifty-five percent among opponents to seventy percent among supporters. Although the APRs are comparable for self-identified indigenous and mestizo voters, the AME is only significant in the latter case, indicating that the position on the nationalisation may have had little influence on self-identified indigenous voters.

Morales, then, won strong support among voters with some indigenous background, even among those who may have disagreed with the MAS on the specific policy issue, a

[78] There is relatively little variation in Reyes Villa's APRs, either between linguistic groups or across policy levels.
[79] The lack of variation in voter positions on this programmatic measure also accounts for the relative lack of variation of APRs. With the majority of voters reporting similar positions, the APRs come to reflect the overall vote distributions in the full sample.
[80] For example, the AME in the mestizo group increases to .024 (from .014), with $p < .005$ (from $p < .10$), with regard to Morales's vote probability.

possible indication of ethnic bias.[81] However, the MAS also won support from non-indigenous voters on substantive grounds, performing significantly better among voters who supported the party's policy position than those who opposed it. The exception was the white group, for whom the nationalisation issue had no statistically significant effects. In fact, whites were significantly more likely to support Reyes Villa across almost all policy levels compared to mestizos, further evidence for an ethnic bias.

Direct Predictors of Vote Choice: Attitudes towards Ethnic Groups and Issues

Table 3.10 shows a summary of the main and marginal effects of ethnic attitudes on the overall predicted probability of voting for Morales and Reyes Villa, including the generic self-identification and cultural identification measures, respectively. As with the 2005 analysis, the parameter estimates come from two mlogit models that introduce ethnic attitude variables (and two-interactions between ethnicity and ethnic attitude variables) to the base mlogit model reported in Table 3.9.

The analysis suggests certain ethnic attitudes may have played some role in shaping voters' electoral preferences, although the effects varied substantially across groups. First, voters who approved of a hypothetical marriage between their son/daughter and an indigenous person ('Approves of inter-racial marriage') were significantly more likely to vote for the MAS, and less likely to vote for Reyes Villa, than those who disapproved. A one-unit change on the 1-7 approval scale resulted in a 1.8 percentage point increase in the predicted probability of a Morales vote, and a 2.2 percentage point decrease in Reyes Villa's vote probability. Decomposition of these main effects suggests this attitudinal measure had most impact among mestizos and non-indigenous language speakers, including voters who explicitly reported no identification with an indigenous culture.[82]

Second, voters who considered indigenous poverty to result from innate biological or cultural deficiencies ('Indigenous poverty: innate/cultural') were significantly less likely to support the MAS, and more likely to vote for Reyes Villa, than those who attributed indigenous poverty to unfair treatment. The former attitude produced a main effect equivalent

[81] Again, strong overall support for nationalisations among indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters may contribute to the lack of variation in APRs in this group. However, there were still considerable minorities in each group who opposed nationalisations (e.g., over twenty percent of self-identified indigenous voters reported some degree of opposition, with response < 4 on the 1-7 scale), preference variations that are not reflected in a significant decrease in support for Morales.

[82] The AMEs in the self-identified indigenous group can be ignored; unsurprisingly, very few self-identified indigenous voters reported disapproval of a son/daughter marrying an indigenous person.

TABLE 3.10: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009

	MORALES		REYES VILLA	
Voter Attitude	**Coeff.**	**SE**	**Coeff.**	**SE**
Mix of races 'good'	**.004**	.009	**.003**	.009
Spanish language	**.007**	.010	**.003**	.009
Indigenous language	**-.022**	.021	**.012**	.016
White	**.064^**	.033	**-.048^**	.029
Mestizo	**.008**	.009	**.000**	.010
Indigenous	**-.003**	.038	**-.004**	.008
None (no indigenous culture)	**.003**	.017	**.006**	.015
Quechua	**-.007**	.018	**.005**	.016
Aymara	**-.008**	.020	**-.029****	.008
Other Indigenous	**.045****	.019	**-.020**	.018
Approves of inter-racial marriage	**.018***	.007	**-.022^**	.012
Spanish language	**.020***	.008	**-.025^**	.013
Indigenous language	**.010**	.020	**.001**	.019
White	**-.025**	.024	**.022**	.022
Mestizo	**.021***	.008	**-.026***	.012
Indigenous	**.103^**	.057	**.135***	.054
None (no indigenous culture)	**.028^**	.015	**-.033^**	.019
Quechua	**.009**	.012	**-.016**	.013
Aymara	**.060****	.018	**.016***	.007
Other Indigenous	**.008**	.014	**-.044***	.022
Indigenous poverty: innate/cultural cause	**-.065***	.031	**.091****	.028
Spanish language	**-.071^**	.037	**.094****	.030
Indigenous language	**-.168***	.073	**.174***	.074
White	**-.259***	.101	**.108**	.118
Mestizo	**-.031**	.034	**.075****	.027
Indigenous	**-.213***	.101	**.066****	.023
None (no indigenous culture)	**-.072**	.075	**.125***	.061
Quechua	**-.129***	.052	**.113***	.055
Aymara	**-.080**	.073	**.115****	.034
Other Indigenous	**.082**	.111	**.041**	.083
Indigenous treated worse	**.013**	.029	**-.000**	.028
No significant marginal effects in any group				
Indigenous political influence	**.043**	.031	**-.029**	.021
Spanish language	**.055**	.038	**-.034**	.023
Indigenous language	**-.028**	.050	**.005**	.054
White	**.382****	.098	**-.125**	.091
Mestizo	**.028**	.037	**-.031**	.023
Indigenous	**.025**	.069	**.030****	.010
None (no indigenous culture)	**.024**	.054	**-.003**	.043
Quechua	**.036**	.057	**-.027**	.044
Aymara	**-.019**	.057	**-.061***	.030
Other Indigenous	**.078**	.136	**-.042**	.078
Experience of discrimination	**-.005**	.016	**-.007**	.015
Spanish language	**-.013**	.019	**.007**	.016
Indigenous language	**.056**	.037	**-.068^**	.044
White	**.521****	.138	**.072**	.103
Mestizo	**-.012**	.016	**.006**	.015
Indigenous	**.142^**	.090	**-.097***	.045
None (no indigenous culture)	**-.048**	.035	**.031**	.030
Quechua	**-.021**	.034	**-.002**	.030
Aymara	**.048^**	.030	**-.107***	.037
Other Indigenous	**.251****	.071	**.203****	.084

N = 2018.

Notes: Notes: Coefficients are main effects (first line of each sub-section) and average marginal effects by linguistic, generic self-identified, or self-identified cultural group of the indicated ethnic attitude variable on the overall predicted probability of voting for each candidate. Results are based on a series of multinomial logistic regression models (one for each ethnicity measure), first with no interactions (main effects) and then with two-way interactions between each ethnicity and ethnic-attitude variable (marginal effects). Full output is included in Appendix A.

Source: Author's calculations based on data from LAPOP 2010.

to a 6.5 percentage point decrease in the probability of voting for Morales and a 9.1percentage point increase in Reyes Villa's vote probability. Decomposition shows significant negative AMEs across most groups in Morales's case and comparable positive AMEs in the case of Reyes Villa. The effect was particularly pronounced in the white group, where this attitudinal position was associated with a 25.9 percentage point decrease in support for Morales.

Both these measures can be seen as proxies for broad anti-indigenous prejudice, and their significant relationship to vote choice, both in terms of main and marginal effects, indicates an important role for such prejudice in voting behaviour. Similarly, more positive views of ethnic mixing ('Mix of races 'good'') among whites was linked to an increase in Morales's vote probability, an effect that also implies the reverse – that whites opposed to inter-ethnic mixing were more likely to vote against Morales. This effect, although only significant at the .10 level, may provide some further evidence for ethnic prejudice in voting, particularly in terms of white opposition to Morales.

Third, the two measures that might reflect more interest-based resentment towards either whites or indigenous groups both produce mostly non-significant main and marginal effects. Agreement with the statement that indigenous Bolivians are treated worse than whites ('Indigenous treated worse'), or the impression that indigenous groups have influenced recent legislation ('Indigenous political influence'), does not appear to have affected voting preferences significantly.[83]

Finally, the variable measuring experience of discrimination ('Experience of discrimination') has a non-significant main effect, although the analysis generates significant AMEs in both the indigenous-language and self-identified indigenous groups.[84] At least for indigenous voters, then, experience of discrimination may have increased support for the MAS, which offered both explicit legislative initiatives to combat discrimination and descriptive representation for the most discriminated-against groups. It seems likely that the experience of discrimination may also have contributed to resentment among indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters towards the white/white-mestizo leadership of the PPB-CN. Such

[83] In fact, the only significant AME is in the white group and indicates that whites who believed that indigenous groups had influenced recent legislation were *more* likely to vote for Morales. Clearly, this does not suggest white resentment at the perceived undue influence of indigenous groups on government. Rather, it may reflect positive assessments of the MAS government's record among white supporters of the MAS.

[84] The effect in the white group is not particularly informative, given that only 5 out of 61 white voters reported experience of discrimination. Affirmative responses to the discrimination question were also very low in the Other Indigenous group.

resentment may have been especially pronounced in the context of the polarised 2009 campaign, in which factions of the PPB-CN and allied civil society organisations promoted openly racist anti-indigenous views.

In summary, the analysis reported in Table 3.10 suggests ethnic attitudes may have some influence on vote choice. The significance of two variables that are proxies for anti-indigenous racism – rather than, for example, semi-rationalised resentment based on perceived inequalities in social and political treatment – suggests that more expressive ethnic bias, driven by ethnocentrism and prejudice, may best characterise such effects. Unlike in the case of the 2005 election, this analysis of Bolivia 2009 also finds significant effects for ethnic discrimination on vote choice, particularly among voters with an indigenous background. Experience of racism, then, may have contributed to voters' preference for descriptive representation, as well as increasing their resentment towards the groups associated with such discriminatory experiences and the political candidates perceived to represent them.

Indirect Effects of Ethnicity

Table 3.11 reports a summary of ethnicity's indirect effects on the log-odds of voting for Morales over Reyes Villa in 2009. Full statistical output from the mediation analysis is included in Appendix A.

Despite a more polarised political environment in 2009, which may have been more conducive to direct effects of ethnicity on vote choice (expressive or heuristic ethnic voting), voters were also faced with distinct programmatic alternatives. Indeed, the preceding analysis has indicated significant effects for a series of substantive preference variables, and thus there are grounds to believe that indirect ethnic voting may also have played a role in 2009. In fact, the mediation analysis shows significant total indirect effects for most ethnicity measures; only linguistic group, and the head-to-head comparison of Quechua and lowland indigenous identification, do not produce significant indirect effects. In general, self-identification as indigenous or with any specific indigenous culture (Aymara, Quechua, or lowland indigenous cultures) had a positive indirect effect in favour of Morales and the MAS, while self-identification as white (compared with mestizo or indigenous) had a positive indirect effect in favour of Reyes Villa. In many (but not all) cases, these indirect effects are in addition to, not instead of, ethnicity's direct effect on vote choice. However, the proportion of the total effect mediated, as well as the ratio between direct and indirect effects, varies considerably by ethnicity measure. The analysis also uncovers a number of mediation pathways through

TABLE 3.11: Summary of Mediation Analysis, Bolivia 2009

	Coeff.	SE	Significant Mediation Pathways	Total *N*
Speaks an indigenous language				847
Total indirect effects	.014	.037	Limit opp. voice (.020; .343* / .348**)	
Direct effects	.185^*	.074		
Total effect	.209^*	.076		
Proportion of total effect mediated	.066			
KHB	.198			
LDE	.570			
White (mestizo)				704
Total indirect effects	-.098^*	.030	Rightist ideology (-.045; .845** / -.550**)	
Direct effects	-.121^*	.042	Nationalisatiions (-.10; -.679** / .161*)	
Total effect	-.219^*	.042	Income (-.004; .292 / -.146^)	
Proportion of total effect mediated	.448		Direct democracy (-.006; -.415^ / .151^)	
KHB	.378		Indigenous poverty: cult (-.008; .619* / -.533*)	
LDE	.460		Approves inter-racial marr. (-.018; -.931**/ .203*)	
Indigenous (mestizo)				799
Total indirect effects	.104^*	.029	Income (.007; -.338*/-.154^)	
Direct effects	.196^*	.089	Nationalisations (.007; .294^/.165*)	
Total effect	.300^*	.084	Lim opp. voice (.031; .637**/.343**)	
Proportion of total effect mediated	.346		Direct democracy (.021; .657**/.224*)	
KHB	.448		Approves inter-racial marriage (.009; .308*/.193*)	
LDE	.640			
Indigenous (white)				191
Total indirect effects	.357^*	.123	Rightist ideology (.090; -1.311**/-3.575)	
Direct effects	.281^*	.144	Wealth redist. (-.018; .114/-8.114)	
Total effect	.638^*	.102	Minorities threaten maj. (.045; .919**/2.567)	
Proportion of total effect mediated	.560			
KHB	------			
LDE	.543			
Aymara (no indigenous culture)				409
Total indirect effects	.295^*	.076	Income (.047; -1.126**/-.327*)	
Direct effects	.161	.131	Rightist ideology (.084; -.765**/-.849**)	
Total effect	.456^*	.088	Nationalisations (.053; -.765**/-.849**)	
Proportion of total effect mediated	.647		Limit opp. voice (.024; .616**/.296^)	
KHB	.549		Indigenous poverty: cult (.014; -.532^/-.796^)	
LDE	.678			
Quechua (no indigenous culture)				557
Total indirect effects	.127^*	.056	Limit opp. voice (.024; .529**/.249*)	
Direct effects	.060	.077	Approve inter-racial marriage (.025; .753**/.181^)	
Total effect	.187^*	.069		
Proportion of total effect mediated	.680			
KHB	.678			
LDE	.699			
Other Indigenous (no indigenous)				325
Total indirect effects	.091^	.050	Limit opp. voice (.038; .502*/.474**)	
Direct effects	-.141	.083	Approve inter-racial marriage (.024; .511*/.296*)	
Total effect	-.050	.080		
Proportion of total effect mediated	-1.830			
KHB	6.599			
LDE	6.689			
Aymara (Other indigenous)				292
Total indirect effects	.181^*	.059	Rightist ideology (.122; -1.601**/-.668**)	
Direct effects	.346^*	.107	Indigenous influence (.028; .794; 1.452^)	
Total effect	.545^*	.104	Wealth redist. (.015; .381/.368)	
Proportion of total effect mediated	.332			
KHB	.245			
LDE	.267			

Notes: The table presents a summary of the mediation analysis. Full constituent tables of the output can be found in Appendix A. Coefficients are standardised indirect, direct, and total effects of the ethnicity measure indicated on a vote for Morales over Reyes Villa. ^ and * indicated indicate coefficients are significant at the .05 level according to the percentile and bias-correction methods, respectively. 'Proportion of total effect mediated' is based on the product of coefficients/*Y*-standardisation method. KHB and LDE show estimates for the same proportions (see Chapter Two for further discussion on methods). Coefficients for significant mediation pathways are: overall indirect effect via the mediator (standardised); effect of ethnicity measure on mediator (unstandardised); and effect of mediator on vote choice (unstandardised). Coefficients may be linear or non-linear, depending on the mediator.
Source: Author's calculations based on LAPOP 2006.

ethnicity may exert electoral influence, with political ideology, support for nationalisations, approval of limits on the political opposition, and attitudes toward indigenous Bolivians being the most prominent.[85]

First, linguistic group did not have significant indirect effects on vote choice in 2009. However, the mediation analysis confirms a significant direct effect, with an indigenous-language background linked to an increase in the likelihood of voting for Morales. The lack of an indirect effect is surprising, although it is noteworthy that both the alternative methods for calculation overall mediation, the KHB and LDE methods, estimate considerably larger mediation (19.8 and 57.0 percent respectively). We might expect linguistic background, compared to self-identification, to be a better measure of a voter's formative social and cultural environment in which political socialisation takes place, and, therefore, that linguistic group would be significantly linked to vote-determining political attitudes. However, linguistic background may also be a sufficiently broad measure to include voters with diverse characteristics on both sides of the linguistic divide, and thus the indirect effects of linguistic background on vote choice are ambiguous.

Second, unlike the linguistic measure, most measures of self-identified ethnic and/or cultural group produce significant total indirect effects, with the exception of the Quechua/lowland indigenous comparison (not reported in Table 3.11). Self-identification with the generic indigenous group or with any of the more specific indigenous cultures (Aymara, Quechua, and lowland indigenous) was associated with indirect effects in favour of Morales, although the proportion of the total effect mediated varies considerably. In most cases, the mediation occurred variously through political ideology, views on nationalisations, support for wealth redistribution, anti-indigenous racism, a preference for more 'direct' democracy, and income, as well as the 'Limit opposition voice' variable (see penultimate column in Table 3.11). For example, compared with whites, both self-identified indigenous and mestizo voters reported more leftist ideological positions, as did Aymara compared to non-indigenous voters and both Aymara and Quechua compared to lowland indigenous voters. More leftist ideological positions were, in turn, significantly associated with a vote for Morales over Reyes Villa. Similarly, support for nationalisations and state-led wealth

[85] As noted previously in the discussion of the main effects model, it seems likely that voters' reported support for the President limiting the voice of the political opposition captured general backing for Morales (and distrust or concerns about the specific political opposition of 2009), rather than more normative views about populist, 'strongman' leaders. For this reason, its effects are unlikely to reflect socialised political predispositions, and thus the discussion in this section makes only limited reference to this particular measure.

redistribution was positively associated with a vote for the MAS, and the same groups tended to be more in favour of these two political agendas.

In contrast, anti-indigenous racism, measured through the proxy of attitudes towards marriage to an indigenous person, was associated with a vote for Reyes Villa over Morales.[86] Both white and mestizo voters, as well as voters who identified with a non-indigenous cultural background (mostly whites and mestizos), were significantly more likely to hold such anti-indigenous attitudes than all self-identified indigenous groups. This resulted in a significant indirect effect on voting preferences. Voters who identified with a non-indigenous cultural background were also more likely to attribute indigenous poverty to innate or cultural deficiencies (compared with Aymara), an attitude that was similarly linked with a vote for Reyes Villa over Morales.

Aymara voters also appeared more supportive of direct forms of democracy, and they were generally poorer than non-indigenous groups, both of which were factors associated with a MAS vote. In specific comparison with lowland indigenous voters, Aymara also considered indigenous groups to have had greater influence on legislation during Morales's first term, a perception that was similarly associated with an indirect effect in favour of the MAS. This divide may be indicative of a perception among lowland indigenous groups that the MAS government prioritised highland indigenous demands over their own interests.

In summary, the mediation analysis indicates a series of significant indirect effects for ethnicity on vote choice in 2009. These findings suggest many non-ethnic vote determinants were shaped in important ways by ethnic background, particularly in the cases of political ideology, support for greater state intervention in the economy, and negative views of indigenous Bolivians. Many of these non-ethnic mediators were also identified as key variables in the 2005 analysis. However, the persistence of significant direct effects for ethnicity indicates that many voters were also influenced by ethnic bias, either heuristic or expressive. Indeed, we might expect both forms of ethnic bias to have been particularly prominent in the polarised environment of the 2009 campaign, in which ethnic identities and issues were particularly salient. The significant mediating role of variables measuring anti-indigenous racism (combined with the direct effects of these variables reported in Table 3.9) suggests that more expressive ethnic bias was an important part of this causal story.

[86] The variable is coded so that higher values indicate approval of inter-racial marriage, so the coefficients are positive for Morales.

Thus, as in the 2005 case, the mediation analysis in 2009 provides only partial support for the indirect model of ethnic voting. Although voters' ethnic background clearly played a role in shaping electorally significant political preferences and attitudes, ethnicity also had more direct effects on voters' decision-making.

Chapter Four

Ecuador

This chapter examines ethnic voting in Ecuador, focusing on the 2002, 2006, and 2009 presidential elections. In several respects, these three election cases include a number of comparable characteristics to the Bolivian elections examined in Chapter Three. Aside from broad contextual similarities, both sets of elections cover key events in the recent political history of each country: they cover the first major success of an indigenous party backed by powerful indigenous movements (the Movimiento al Socialismo, MAS, in Bolivia 2005, and Pachakutik in Ecuador 2002); the election of a prominent ethnopopulist newcomer (Evo Morales in Bolivia 2005, Rafael Correa in Ecuador 2006) at the expense of the traditional parties and/or candidates associated with the white, socioeconomic elites; and the subsequent re-election of a president who enjoyed widespread support among indigenous voters (Morales and Correa again, both in 2009).[87] However, despite some similarities, Ecuador also diverges from the Bolivian case in important ways. Indeed, this chapter argues that several contextual differences have significant implications for both the occurrence and nature of ethnic voting in Ecuador. The chapter begins by exploring some of these country-level similarities and differences, which are then subsequently developed to interpret the more specific vote analyses from 2002, 2006, and 2009.

At first glance, the politicisation of ethnicity in Ecuador has followed a somewhat similar trajectory to the Bolivian case. Like Bolivia, Ecuador witnessed the emergence of a powerful national indigenous movement in the 1980s, which came to play an important role in mobilising multisector opposition to government-led neoliberal reforms of the 1990s. In fact, the Ecuadorian indigenous movement was arguably more influential politically than its Bolivian counterpart, particularly during the early 1990s. Under the leadership of the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE), the indigenous movement won a number of highly significant policy concessions from a succession of

[87] In both 2006 and 2009 Correa's appeal was primarily populist (personalistic, anti-establishment, and focused on the lower classes). However, he also included some ethnic appeals in both campaigns, and thus Correa's candidacy fits within a broad definition of ethnopopulism (see discussion later in this chapter).

governments, demonstrating an impressive capacity to coordinate nationwide mobilisations in pursuit of its political goals. As an indication of the movement's political influence, CONAIE was instrumental in orchestrating the overthrow of President Jamil Mahuad in 2000, and its leader served in the brief three-man junta that comprised the post-coup government.

Moreover, as in Bolivia, the indigenous movement in Ecuador also produced a political party. The Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik (MUPP, or Pachakutik) competed successfully in both local and national elections throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s. The candidate it supported, former army colonel Lucio Gutiérrez, even won the presidency in 2002. Although ethnic appeals were an important part of Pachakutik's electoral strategy, the party also recruited many non-indigenous candidates, allied itself with non-indigenous organisations, and offered a broad substantive platform that went well beyond indigenous issues. In particular, Pachakutik was a vocal critic of neoliberalism, foreign intervention in Ecuador's affairs, and the traditional political classes. Thus, Pachakutik, like the MAS in Bolivia, fits easily into Raúl Madrid's (2008, 2012) definition of ethnopopulism.[88]

However, unlike the MAS, Pachakutik never became a dominant party. In part, this was because Pachakutik faced increasing electoral competition from other populists and ethnopopulists after 2002. For example, Gutiérrez's Partido Sociedad Patriótica (PSP) and particularly Correa's Alianza País (AP) movement won large shares of the indigenous vote in both 2006 and 2009, as well as the support of many lower-class non-indigenous voters who had previously backed Pachakutik. Although Gutiérrez and Correa were primarily populists (and neither candidate claimed an indigenous background), both of them made some symbolic and substantive ethnic appeals to indigenous constituencies. Thus, at least to some extent, both Correa and Gutiérrez can be seen as employing ethnopopulist electoral strategies, in direct competition with Pachakutik.

In each of the three presidential campaigns examined in this chapter, at least two of Pachakutik, Correa, and the PSP are among the principal contestants. Given the profile and electoral strategies of these parties and candidates, we might consider the 2002, 2006, and 2009 elections to constitute likely cases for ethnic voting in Ecuador. Yet this chapter's vote analyses find only limited evidence that ethnicity influenced electoral outcomes across these

[88] According to Madrid, ethnopopulism constitutes the combination of conventional populist appeals with ethnic appeals (see general discussion in Chapter One, as well as Three and Five on ethnopopulism in Bolivia and Peru).

electoral cycles. In 2002, self-identified indigenous voters were somewhat more likely to vote for Gutiérrez, although the majority of the PSP-Pachakutik's votes still came from non-indigenous sectors. However, in 2006 and 2009, the effect of ethnicity on vote choice appears to have been almost negligible.

This chapter argues that a combination of factors may account for the apparent low salience of ethnicity in recent Ecuadorian elections. First, at least two major candidates (and in some cases, more) actively appealed to indigenous voters in each election, which had the effect of splitting the indigenous vote. Second, the Ecuadorian political-electoral landscape has subjected voters to particularly acute and contradictory cross-pressures, which has resulted in highly unpredictable voting patterns. Such cross-pressure have arisen not only because of the candidate profiles outlined above, but also as a result of prominent organisational, regional, religious, and clientelistic attachments that cut across, rather than align with, ethnic differences.[89] Finally, this chapter's analysis and most of the available data suggest that ethnic identification is relatively weak across Ecuadorian society. Few Ecuadorians self-identify as indigenous or retain knowledge of an indigenous language, and thus it is perhaps unsurprising that ethnicity has little observable influence on voting preferences.

This last feature regarding Ecuador's ethnic demographics presents some significant methodological issues for this chapter's analysis. Most surveys find very little response variation on conventional measures of ethnicity such as linguistic background and self-identification. Indeed, in the surveys conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), which form the basis on this chapter's analysis, most Ecuadorians report both a Spanish-language background and self-identification as mestizo.[90] Moreover, LAPOP's Ecuador surveys tend not to include many questions on respondents' attitudes towards ethnic groups or issues, and where such measures are included, responses once again show very limited variation. As a result of these data limitations, the vote analyses presented in this chapter are considerably less developed than their equivalents in Chapter Three (on Bolivia) and Chapter Five (on Peru). Decomposed effects and the analysis of voters' ethnic attitudes are not included in any of the Ecuadorian election case studies, and the mediation analyses are discussed only briefly.

[89] See Coppedge (1998), Van Cott (2000), and Beck and Mijeski (2006), amongst others, on these aspects of Ecuador's national politics.

[90] The Ecuador surveys, unlike those conducted in Bolivia, have not asked respondents about their identification with particular indigenous cultures or the strength of ethnic identification.

However, data limitations notwithstanding, the analysis in this chapter provides some important insight into ethnicity's role in recent Ecuadorian presidential elections. It finds some evidence for ethnic bias in voting outcomes when the specific electoral context is conducive to such behaviour, such as the 2002 election.[91] Moreover, this chapter's wider discussion of the relationship between electoral context and ethnic voting can add to the our understanding of electoral behaviour in Bolivia and Peru, as well as offering a possible explanation for the relative lack of ethnic voting in Ecuador. This comparative dimension of the analysis can contribute in important ways to our broader understanding of ethnicity's role in voting, and how both specific electoral conditions and wider sociopolitical factors may shape the occurrence and nature of such political behaviour.

Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in Ecuador

As elsewhere in Latin America, a long history of *mestizaje* has fundamentally shaped ethnic relations in Ecuador. *Mestizaje* refers not only to biological ethnic mixing, but also to a process of cultural assimilation in which indigenous people gradually abandon their traditional customs and ethnic identities and become mestizos. Although both biological mixing and cultural assimilation have occurred since the early colonial period, rapid urbanisation through the latter half of the twentieth century accelerated these processes. Many indigenous migrants to urban areas chose to assimilate into mestizo culture in part to avoid the pervasive anti-indigenous discrimination to which they were subjected. Several scholars have argued that fundamental beliefs in indigenous inferiority contributed to public policies that explicitly aimed to hasten *mestizaje*, especially through rural education programmes. Many of these programmes promoted Spanish literacy, delegitimised traditional knowledge and customs, and sought to instil belief in a single mestizo national culture. In doing so, these policies sought to drive forward *mestizaje* as a process of 'deindigenisation'.[92]

By most measures, the 'deindigenising' effect of *mestizaje* was considerably more pronounced in Ecuador than in Bolivia. Indeed, as early as 1950, the national census estimated that just 14 percent of Ecuador's population spoke an indigenous language (Sánchez-Parga 1996; cited in Madrid 2012, 78), substantially less than the 63.5 percent of

[91] As in Chapter Three, the survey-based vote analysis presented in this chapter aims only to identify the presence of ethnic bias in voting behaviour, which is conceived as some combination of expressive and heuristic ethnic voting motivations. The data available do not allow the analysis to distinguish definitively between expressive and heuristic bias. This is a primary aim of Chapter Six's analysis.

[92] Guillermo Rodríguez Lara, the army general who ruled Ecuador from 1972-1976, reportedly summed up this rationale for state policy towards the indigenous population by declaring, "There is no indigenous problem. We all become white men when we accept the goals of the national culture" (cited in Yashar 2005, 95).

Bolivians who reported speaking an indigenous language in the same year (Dirección General de Estadística y Censos 1950; cited in Madrid 2012, 39). By 2001, the proportion of Ecuadorians who spoke an indigenous language had dropped to just 4.6 percent according to official census data, while the same census showed just 6.1 percent of Ecuadorians self-identified as indigenous. This compared to 77.7 percent who identified as mestizo, 10.8 percent as white, and 5.0 percent as black (León Guzmán 2003, 118).[93] Estimates from the LAPOP surveys indicate an even smaller indigenous population. According to the 2004 survey, less than one percent of Ecuadorians spoke an indigenous language and just 3.3 percent self-identified as indigenous.[94] Similarly, the 2010 survey estimated that 1.6 percent of Ecuadorians spoke an indigenous language and 2.0 percent self-identified as indigenous. By comparison, in the equivalent Bolivian surveys, 27.5 and 23.9 percent reported speaking an indigenous language in 2004 and 2010, respectively, while 9.3 and 19.0 percent self-identified as indigenous. In short, a wide range of data indicates that indigenous ethnic identification is considerably weaker in Ecuador than Bolivia.[95]

Nevertheless, *mestizaje* has not entirely eliminated ethnic differences in Ecuador. Many mestizos still have roots in indigenous communities and identify with both a family and cultural indigenous heritage. Indeed, according to LAPOP's 2006 survey, 28.5 percent of Ecuadorians identify with an indigenous *cultural* identity, although only 2.6 percent of respondents in the same survey self-identified as indigenous.[96] These proportions are still considerably lower than comparable estimates for Bolivia (see Chapter Three), but they do suggest some degree of indigenous identification across a sizeable minority of the Ecuadorian population.

Irrespective of ethnic self-identification, however, there is little doubt that ethnic inequalities and anti-indigenous discrimination are prominent features of contemporary Ecuadorian social relations. First, indigenous Ecuadorians tend to be considerably poorer than their non-indigenous counterparts. According to the Ecuadorian national census bureau's

[93] Prior to 2001, the census did not include questions on self-identification. Other survey data from the same period show similar patterns (see León Guzmán 2003, 118-20).
[94] Unless stated otherwise, all calculations based on LAPOP data are the author's.
[95] The indigenous movement and some scholars have estimated that indigenous people represent more than forty percent of Ecuador's population (Pacari 2002). The data do not support this claim, however. To some extent, the low estimates from census and survey data may reflect a preference among respondents to report mestizo identification to avoid the stigma still associated with indigeneity (León and Rappaport 1995, 32). Yet it seems unlikely that such an explanation can fully account for the discrepancy in estimations.
[96] The question asked respondents the extent to which they identified with the Quichua culture, the largest indigenous group in Ecuador, on a scale of one to seven (not at all – very strongly). The 28.5 percent proportion refers to respondents who reported identification at level four or above.

2006 Survey of Living Conditions, more than seventy percent of indigenous people lived below the poverty line, compared to 35 percent of mestizos and 33 percent of whites (Sistema Integrado de Indicadores Sociales del Ecuador 2007, 8). Second, indigenous people are far more likely to experience discrimination. In the 2010 LAPOP survey, more than half (53.8 percent) of self-identified indigenous respondents had experienced some form of discrimination in the previous year, compared to 30.9 percent of mestizos and just 19.8 percent of whites. Moreover, 35.4 percent of indigenous respondents reported discrimination based on skin colour or other aspects of physical appearance, compared to 16.0 percent for mestizos and 6.0 percent for whites. More generally, a total of 21.5 percent of respondents to LAPOP's 2006 survey reported being concerned that the country's next president could be an indigenous person, and several indigenous leaders have questioned whether the country is ready for an indigenous president (interviews cited in Madrid 2012, 80).

Finally, Ecuador's indigenous population is also geographically divided from the non-indigenous population. Most indigenous people live either in rural areas in the highlands and in the Amazon or on the outskirts of major cities. In contrast, whites and non-indigenous mestizos make up the majority of the population in coastal provinces and in the major city centres.

In summary, Ecuador's socioethnic landscape suggests some possible role for ethnicity in voting behaviour, although its influence is likely to be more limited than in Bolivia. Ethnic identities still retain some personal and social salience for many Ecuadorians, ethnic background remains an important predictor of social and geographic location, and ethnic hierarchies and discrimination continue to shape aspects of every-day social relations. Such conditions suggest ethnic differences may influence wider social attitudes and interests that are electorally significant. Nevertheless, ethnic identification is noticeably weaker in Ecuador compared with Bolivia, and the low levels of indigenous language knowledge suggest the assimilationist dimension of *mestizaje* may have been particularly far-reaching. These ethnic demographics are considerably less conducive to ethnic voting compared to Bolivia's.

The Indigenous Movement and Ethnopopulism in Ecuador

The relatively low levels of ethnic identification in Ecuador are somewhat surprising given the prominence of the country's indigenous movement. Indeed, the Ecuadorian indigenous movement has traditionally been the strongest in the region (Pallares 2002;

Zibechi, 2004). Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, both the Roman Catholic Church and leftist parties helped create several important indigenous organisations, although a unified national movement did not emerge until the 1980s. CONAIE was formed in 1986, when the main highland indigenous federation, Ecuador Runacunapac Riccharimui (ECUARUNARI), came together with the principal federation from the Amazon region, the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana (CONFENAIE). By some estimates, CONAIE represented more than eighty percent of the indigenous population in the 1980s and 1990s (Madrid 2012, 85), although several important indigenous organisations remained outside CONAIE. These included most of the evangelical indigenous organisations affiliated with the Federación Ecuatoriana de Iglesias Evangélicas (FEINE), and the Federación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas, Indígenas y Negras (FENOCIN), a leftist organisation based in the coastal provinces (Yashar 2005; Van Cott 2005).

CONAIE had an immediate impact on Ecuador's national political scene. As early as 1988, CONAIE successfully lobbied the government to create the Dirección Nacional de Educación Intercultural (DINEIB) to manage the state-funded bilingual education programme (Van Cott 2005, 110; Conejo Arellano 2008, 68). CONAIE was also granted the power to appoint directors of DINEIB, and the government at the time officially recognised CONAIE as the mouthpiece of the indigenous movement (Selverston 1994, 146). The DINEIB not only constituted a breakthrough policy achievement for CONAIE, but it also became an important organising tool, an institutional structure through which CONAIE coordinated many of its affiliate organisations (León 2001, 5). In 1990, CONAIE orchestrated its first major national mobilisation against the government of Rodrigo Borja (1988-1992), coordinating protests, blockades, occupations, strikes, and sit-ins across the country in alliance with numerous non-indigenous organisations. The weeks-long mobilisation forced Borja to negotiate with CONAIE on a long list of grievances, during which the CONAIE delegation won major policy concessions (Zamosc 1994; Selverston 2002, chapter 2). Further protests occurred throughout the following years, including a 1994 mobilisation that successfully blocked an agrarian development law proposed by President Sixto Durán Ballén, which CONAIE considered unfavourable to small-scale indigenous farmers. Later the same year, CONAIE mobilised multisector opposition to defeat the government in a national referendum on a set of further neoliberal reforms (Andolina 1994, 19-20; Van Cott 2005, 112; Madrid 2012, 85).

The nationwide mobilisations of the early 1990s gained the indigenous movement numerous allies among non-indigenous popular movements and centre-left political parties.

CONAIE's leadership of these protests not only significantly raised its national profile, but it also helped the indigenous movement position itself as a key political vehicle for popular opposition to neoliberalism (Andolina 1999, 215). Within CONAIE, the movement's success also helped shift opinion towards electoral participation. Before the mid-1990s, the indigenous movement had tended to remain independent from political parties, declining to run candidates in elections or endorse candidates from other parties. However, CONAIE's growing influence in the early 1990s convinced some indigenous leaders that the time was right to enter electoral politics. Despite misgivings from several highland organisations within CONAIE, the executive committee voted to create an independent electoral movement, Pachakutik, to compete in the 1996 general elections.

The Traditional Political Parties, Pachakutik, and Ethnopopulism

Pachakutik was notably distinct from the traditional political parties that preceded it. The party recruited numerous indigenous candidates, remained closely allied to the indigenous movement, and ran on a substantive platform that included several key indigenous demands (Madrid 2012, 86-88). Unsurprisingly, Pachakutik won large shares of the indigenous vote in its first three national elections (in 1996, 1998, and 2002), and it elected numerous candidates to municipal and other subnational positions throughout the country.

Before Pachakutik, indigenous people had traditionally played little role in Ecuador's electoral politics. It was not until 1978 that a new constitution lifted literacy restrictions on suffrage, restrictions that had disproportionally affected indigenous people.[97] Even with an expanded indigenous electorate, however, most traditional political parties eschewed ethnic appeals in the 1980s and early 1990s. Although these parties often expressed their opposition to ethnic discrimination and decried the social and economic conditions in which many indigenous people lived, they offered few policies to address these concerns. In fact, several parties explicitly rejected ethnic policies such as quotas, bilingual education, and territorial autonomy for indigenous communities, arguing that state policies should not encourage ethnic divisions.[98] Moreover, very few traditional parties recruited indigenous candidates or forged alliances with indigenous organisations. For example, just one indigenous

[97] As in other countries in the region, illiteracy rates were considerably higher among rural indigenous Ecuadorians than among non-indigenous citizens (Quintero López 1978, 281; Collins 2001, 6).

[98] For example, the declaration of principles of the centre-right Partido Social Cristiano (PSC) stated that policies towards indigenous people should not 'foment ethnic differences'; instead, they should provide 'equality of possibilities' (Tribunal Supremo Electoral 1981, 156-7; cited in Madrid 2012, 82).

congressman, Manuel Naula, served in the national legislature during the 1980s (Madrid 2012, 81).

Some leftist parties sought to build somewhat closer electoral ties with indigenous voters in the 1980s. Many smaller leftist parties had a long history of organising in indigenous areas, and they adopted many of the demands of the indigenous movement (Andolina 1999, 195-97; Van Cott 2005; Becker 2008, 104-5; Madrid 2012, 82-83).[99] Larger leftist parties, such as Izquierda Democrática (ID), also reached out to indigenous voters to some extent. For example, during his presidency ID leader Rodrigo Borja implemented several long-standing demands of the indigenous movement, including land reform and bilingual education. However, although leftist parties generally won substantial shares of the indigenous vote through the 1980s, they failed to build lasting ties with indigenous voters. The indigenous movement frequently expressed its frustration with the traditional parties, complaining that the latter used indigenous organisations to win elections but offered little in the way of substantive or descriptive representation (Becker 2008, 182-4). Indeed, the leadership of these traditional parties was dominated by whites and mestizos, and the interests of these sectors, rather than the concerns of indigenous voters, drove the parties' substantive agendas. The widespread disenchantment with traditional parties, together with CONAIE's growing political presence in the 1990s, combined to convince indigenous leaders to launch Pachakutik in 1996 (Madrid 2012, 83).

From the outset, Pachakutik was heavily reliant on the indigenous movement from which it emerged. Many of Pachakutik's most important leaders came from CONAIE, and almost half the party's executive committee was comprised of CONAIE members (Freidenberg and Alcántara 2001). Pachakutik also relied on CONAIE's extensive networks of grassroots organisations to mobilise voters in its campaigns, and the party performed particularly well in those indigenous areas where CONAIE was influential (Beck and Mijeski 2001; Van Cott 2005, 110; Madrid 2012, 85-6). Thus, CONAIE played a central role in the formation of Pachakutik, and it helped the party win strong support in indigenous areas. However, Pachakutik's electoral success also relied on the party winning support beyond indigenous constituencies, and from its inception the party actively sought to win support from both whites and mestizos. It avoided exclusionary rhetoric, recruited many white and

[99] Some populist parties, such as the Concentración de Fuerzas Populares (CFP), also made symbolic ethnic appeals to indigenous voters. Jaime Roldós, the CFP's leader and president from 1979 to 1984, advocated improving support for indigenous communities (e.g., with adult education programmes), and he spoke in Quichua to indigenous voters (Grefa 1996, 55; cited in Madrid 2012, 82).

mestizo candidates, sought alliances with non-indigenous organisations, and offered a broad substantive programme centred on non-elite interests and opposition to neoliberalism.

This inclusive electoral strategy paid off. In 1996, Pachakutik allied with the Movimiento Ciudadano Nuevo País (MCNP) led by Freddy Elhers, a white television personality who was the coalition's presidential candidate. With the support of Pachakutik and the endorsement of a wide range of social movements and leftist parties, Elhers won an average of 34 percent of the presidential vote in majority indigenous districts and 21 percent in minority indigenous districts.[100] Although Elhers and Pachakutik performed better proportionally in indigenous areas, the much larger population in non-indigenous areas meant that approximately three-quarters of Elhers's vote came from non-indigenous constituencies (Madrid 2012, 87). In 2002, Pachakutik allied with another non-indigenous party, the PSP, and supported the PSP's Lucio Gutiérrez for president. Gutiérrez finished at the top of the first-round voting with 20.6 percent, and he won the subsequent runoff with a comfortable 54.8 percent of the valid vote (Madrid 2012, 100). Several Pachakutik leaders initially served in the Gutiérrez government, taking up a number of prominent ministerial and other positions (Beck and Mijeski 2006, 12). However, after his election, Gutiérrez largely abandoned the anti-neoliberal platform on which he had run, and the Gutiérrez-Pachakutik coalition lasted only a few months (Zamosc 1994; Beck and Mijeski 2006).

One consequence of Pachakutik's alliance with Gutiérrez was its decision to run its own candidate in 2006. Initially, Pachakutik considered an alliance with Correa, who had actively sought the support of Pachakutik and CONAIE ('Pachakutik rechaza propuesta de Rafael Correa' 2006). However, disagreement over who should be the presidential candidate ultimately prevented any alliance, and Pachakutik nominated Luis Macas as its candidate instead ('Pachakutik va con Macas y deja fuera a Rafael Correa' 2006). Despite failing to win the backing of Pachakutik and CONAIE, Correa still sought to appeal to indigenous voters by adopting a broad ethnopopulist electoral strategy. Not only did Correa employ symbolic ethnic appeals in his campaign (speaking Quichua at rallies, describing himself as an *indigenista*, and so forth), but he also secured the support of both several important social organisations that had previously supported Pachakutik and a number of defectors from Pachakutik's previous congressional lists (Zeas 2006, 225; Becker 2008, 177). Moreover,

[100] The MUPP-NP coalition managed to gain the support of a wide range of non-indigenous organisations, including multisector trade union federations such as the Coordinadora de Movimientos Sociales (CMS). Several leftist parties, including ID, also backed Elhers for president, while running their own congressional candidates (Madrid 2012, 91-2).

Correa adopted many of the substantive positions of the indigenous movement championed by Pachakutik, including the nationalisation of natural resources, opposition to free-trade agreements, and a promise to rewrite the national constitution (Conaghan 2011, 266; Madrid 2012, 104-5).

In addition to Correa and Macas, the PSP also competed for the indigenous and lower-class indigenous-mestizo vote in 2006. Gilmar Gutiérrez, brother of Lucio Gutiérrez, was the PSP's presidential candidate, and he looked to capitalise on the party's strong ties to numerous indigenous leaders and organisations established during Lucio's presidency. Indeed, despite his rightward turn, Lucio Gutiérrez had also invested significantly in social programmes and public infrastructure projects in some poorer areas, and, following the collapse of his coalition with Pachakutik, he had established a new indigenous organisation to compete with CONAIE (Beck and Mijeski 2006). Gutiérrez's efforts to develop his own ties with indigenous organisations outside CONAIE had exacerbated existing divisions within the indigenous movement, particularly along regional and religious lines; most highland indigenous organisations opposed Gutiérrez and supported Pachakutik, while many Amazonian and evangelical organisations remained loyal to Gutiérrez (Zamosc 2004, 149-50; Beck and Mijeski 2006, 178-9). Gilmar Gutiérrez drew on lingering loyalties to his brother among many indigenous and poor indigenous-mestizo voters affiliated with the latter organisations, many of which mobilised to support the PSP's campaign in 2006. Gutiérrez ultimately finished third, just six percentage points behind Correa, who defeated Álvaro Noboa in the second round.

In 2009, the electoral landscape bore some resemblance to 2006, with the important distinctions that Correa now ran as the incumbent and Lucio Gutiérrez returned as the PSP's candidate. The 2009 campaign was generally low-key, mostly because a Correa victory was largely seen as inevitable. Pachakutik chose not to nominate a presidential candidate, and it won just four seats in the legislature (Madrid 2012, 107), confirming the party's sharp decline since its high point at the start of the decade.

Finally, in both 2006 and 2009, the principal candidate for the right was Álvaro Noboa, who headed his own electoral vehicle, the Partido Renovador Institucional Acción Nacional (PRIAN).[101] Noboa was a white, wealthy businessman from the coast whose electoral platform combined a strong defence of neoliberalism with a range of direct populist

[101] Other important candidates included León Roldós, who was the early front-runner in 2006 but finished fourth in the first-round vote, and his niece Martha Roldós, who also finished fourth in 2009.

appeals. Noboa pursued an aggressive clientelistic campaign, offering credit, computers, and construction materials to poor communities and using his own charitable foundation, the Cruzada Nueva Humanidad, to distribute goods and medical treatments to potential voters (Freidenberg 2014, 117-9). These direct populist appeals won him some support among poorer voters, including some indigenous and indigenous-mestizo sectors, although his principal base of support was in the urban middle class.

Ethnic Voting in Ecuador

Ecuador's overall ethnic landscape and the ways in which ethnicity has been politicised have several implications for ethnic voting. Ecuador's various similarities with Bolivia – a large and marginalised indigenous population, the emergence of a prominent national indigenous movement, and the rise of ethnopopulism – mean we might expect some common trends in electoral behaviour across the two countries. However, this chapter argues that Ecuador's divergence from the Bolivian case – comparatively weak ethnic identification, greater competition for the indigenous vote, and more contradictory electoral cross-pressures in general – is equally important for explaining the occurrence and nature of ethnic voting in Ecuador.

First, the data presented above suggest that many Ecuadorians, like their Bolivian counterparts, identify to some extent with an indigenous culture and heritage, despite centuries of biological and cultural *mestizaje*. The same data indicate socioeconomic inequalities and geographic divides that continue to run along ethnic lines, and they suggest ethnic prejudice and discrimination remain important parts of contemporary Ecuadorian social relations. These features of Ecuador's ethnic demographics are generally conducive to ethnic voting. Ethnic identification implies some degree of psychological attachment to ethnic group identities, which may contribute to electoral decisions driven by in-group solidarity and/or out-group resentment or prejudice (i.e., expressive ethnic voting). Moreover, even if voters do not strongly self-identify in ethnic terms, ethnic inequalities and discrimination are likely to increase the social and political salience of ethnicity. In addition to strengthening in-group loyalties and out-group resentment, these conditions are likely to increase the perceived explanatory value of ethnic heuristics. Social experience teaches many voters to treat ethnic background as an indicator of likely social and political characteristics, which may contribute to voters' evaluation of electoral candidates (i.e., heuristic ethnic voting). Meanwhile, the spatial and social proximity of ethnically similar communities may

lead to political preferences that tend to align with ethnic divisions, the combined result of shared material circumstances and political socialisation within a particular socioethnic environment. If voters subsequently elect candidates based on such political preference, they engage in indirect ethnic voting.

Second, both Bolivia and Ecuador saw the emergence of a powerful indigenous movement in the 1980s and the subsequent rise of ethnopopulism as a prevalent electoral strategy.[102] The indigenous movement in Ecuador, like its counterpart in Bolivia, helped raise ethnic consciousness among indigenous and indigenous-mestizo citizens, and it encouraged Ecuadorians to take pride in their indigenous heritage. The ethnic appeals of ethnopopulist political actors looked to take advantage of, and further contributed to, both these processes. Increased ethnic consciousness and pride in ethnic group identities are likely to strengthen ethnic group allegiances, and they are thus conducive to expressive ethnic voting.

Moreover, the political rhetoric and activities of Ecuador's indigenous movement and ethnopopulist candidates helped introduce an ethnic 'master frame' to wider political controversies (Rice 2012). Both the indigenous movement and ethnopopulist politicians forged alliances with non-indigenous social movements and leftist parties to oppose the perceived imperialism of the United States, the international financial institutions, and the neoliberal economic policies they both promoted. In doing so, they helped link a broadly defined indigenous ethnic identity to a substantive political agenda characterised by popular nationalism and state-interventionism. In many cases, the appeal of ethnopopulists was aided by the profile of their domestic political opponents, who tended to be members of the political establishment (e.g., Borja or Roldós) or neoliberal outsiders (e.g., Noboa or Guayaquil's controversial mayor and former presidential candidate Jaime Nebot). These latter candidates were not only white (as was Correa), but they also belonged to the national political and/or economic elites. As such, they were often perceived as representatives of associated elite interests and linked with the political and economic status quo that many Ecuadorians, particularly indigenous voters, had become increasingly disillusioned with. In these respects, then, the way in which ethnicity was politicised in Ecuador is likely to have resulted not only in heightened ethnic consciousness among Ecuadorian voters, but also the reinforcement and further definition of a political ethnic heuristic.

[102] This chapter includes populists such as Correa and the Gutiérrez brothers within the ethnopopulist category. Although neither Correa nor Gutiérrez could, strictly speaking, offer ethnic descriptive representation to indigenous constituents, their use of both symbolic and substantive ethnic appeals signalled some recognition of – and even an affinity with – indigenous and indigenous-mestizo social sectors.

In these respects, Ecuador's ethnic, social, and political landscape bears some resemblance to the Bolivian case, and, like in Bolivia, it is broadly conducive to expressive, heuristic, and indirect ethnic voting. However, this chapter argues that Ecuador's points of divergence (not only convergence) with the Bolivian case are important for understanding contemporary electoral behaviour.

First, even if ethnic background retains some psychological and social relevance for many Ecuadorians, most of the data presented previously suggest ethnic identification is considerably weaker in Ecuador than in Bolivia. If voters' place less importance on ethnic group identities, then we might expect expressive ethnic voting to be relatively less prevalent.[103]

Second, there has tended to be considerably greater competition for the indigenous vote in Ecuador compared with Bolivia. Whereas only a few very small parties challenged the MAS for the indigenous vote in Bolivia, several prominent parties and candidates have actively wooed indigenous voters in Ecuador. Since the early 1990s, Pachakutik, the Gutiérrez brothers, Correa, and several leftist parties (e.g., Borja and the ID) have all campaigned in these constituencies. Many of these candidates have pursued alliances with indigenous and social organisations, employed direct ethnic appeals to indigenous voters, and adopted conventional populist and clientelistic electoral strategies. In this context, we might expect ethnic voting in general to be more limited, with multiple candidates offering indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters some combination of descriptive, substantive, and clientelistic incentives.

Third, Ecuadorian voters are often subjected to considerably more contradictory electoral cross-pressures than their Bolivian counterparts. Such cross-pressures – the presence of diverse interests and loyalties that direct voters to different electoral alternatives – are certainly not unique to the Ecuadorian case; they affect most voters in most democracies (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Berelson et al. 1954, 188-27; Scheufele et al. 2006). However, the electoral 'pushes' and 'pulls' of partisan or organisational loyalties, associated clientelistic benefits, regional identities, religious affiliations, and programmatic preferences may be particularly contradictory in Ecuador. Moreover, these pressures often cross-cut ethnic divides, in contrast to the Bolivian case where such pressures have to a greater extent tended

[103] Moreover, from a methodological perspective, the lack of response variation on ethnicity measures means this chapter's vote models may not easily identify a statistically significant relationship between voter ethnicity and vote choice. In fact, this data-imposed limitation affects analysis of all three voting models in this chapter.

to align with ethnic cleavages. The presence of such cross-pressures, then, is likely to reduce further the observable relationship between voter ethnicity and vote choice in Ecuador.

One frequent source of electoral cross-pressures is personal and organisational affiliations or loyalties, and these may have particular influence in Ecuadorian electoral behaviour. Voters often look to prominent social or political personalities or organisations for electoral cues, either because they have some formal affiliation (e.g., members of an indigenous organisation or trade union) or because an endorsement signals something about the likely characteristics of the candidate (e.g., voters may infer that a candidate endorsed by CONAIE is favourable to indigenous interests). In both cases, voters may follow such electoral cues out of 'partisan' or personal loyalty or more instrumental motivations based on perceived group interests (Berelson et al. 1954; Lupia and McCubbins 1998). Furthermore, in many cases formal organisational affiliations may be directly linked to patronage networks and clientelistic privileges, adding a clear material incentive to organisational loyalties (Becker 2008, 172-3, 178).[104] However, when a voter has some form of affinity with organisational or individual actors who offer contradictory electoral cues, the resulting cross-pressures may lead to unpredictable vote choices.

We might reasonably assume this has been the case for many voters in recent Ecuadorian presidential elections, and perhaps particularly among indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters. For example, although CONAIE has been the dominant indigenous federation since the late 1980s, several smaller organisations (e.g., FEINE and FENOCIN) have also established important grassroots networks and spheres of influence. Even within CONAIE, different factions have often pursued quite distinct political agendas, including issuing public endorsements in favour of opposing presidential candidates. For example, in 2002 several smaller Amazonian organisations supported former CONAIE president Antonio Vargas, while the CONAIE leadership and highland organisations backed Gutiérrez. Outside the indigenous movement, non-indigenous social organisations (including various unions, professional associations, and religious organisations), some political parties, and individual political personalities, all exert some influence in indigenous areas. In this context, when various Pachakutik politicians, non-indigenous social movements, and smaller

[104] For example, strong ties between Lucio Gutiérrez's and factions within the Amazonian and Evangelical indigenous movement often revolved around personal and institutional channels for distributing goods and favours to affiliated organisations. These networks were influential in mobilising votes for the PSP in both 2006 and 2009 (Madrid 2012, 105).

leftist parties defected from Pachakutik/CONAIE to Correa in 2006, they may well have persuaded many indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters to do the same.

Finally, as the preceding discussion has implied, both geographical region and religious affiliations are important dimensions of the organisational networks and loyalties outlined above. The two principal federations within CONAIE, ECUARUNARI and CONFENAIE, reflect a distinct regional divide between the highlands and the Amazon. At several key political junctures, these two regional factions have disagreed over the political candidates and alliances that CONAIE should pursue, and have directed their grassroots organisations to back different candidates. Once again, the split between pro- and anti-Gutiérrez factions in the Amazon and highlands, respectively, is a notable case in point.[105] Religious affiliations have also added to the mix, with the PSP in particular building strong ties with evangelical indigenous organisations. These organisations saw their membership increase significantly in the 1990s and 2000s, and they have provided an important base of grassroots activism and electoral support for the PSP (Becker 2008, 178).

In summary, this chapter argues that lingering ethnic attachments, long-standing ethnic inequalities, and pervasive discrimination all indicate a likely role for ethnicity in electoral behaviour. Moreover, the way in which ethnicity has been politicised (first by the indigenous movement and then by a series of ethnopopulist parties and candidates), is likely to have strengthened ethnic consciousness and reinforced an ethnic heuristic among Ecuadorian voters. Thus, we might reasonably expect ethnic bias, both expressive and heuristic, to have some influence in Ecuadorian voting behaviour.[106] The sociogeographic concentration of individuals from similar ethnic backgrounds is also conducive to indirect ethnic voting.

However, this chapter also argues that a combination of weak ethnic identification and especially acute and contradictory cross-pressures (linked to organisational loyalties, clientelistic politics, region, and religion) may have significantly reduced the prevalence of ethnic voting in recent Ecuadorian elections. In the case of 2009, the presence of a single dominant incumbent is likely to have further reduced the electoral salience of ethnicity, with vote choice focused on assessments of Correa's first term. Overall, a combination of these

[105] Descriptive regional preferences may also have played a role in support for Gutiérrez in his native Amazon region. However, the LAPOP data provide no measure of regional identification.

[106] As discussed in the Bolivian case, the survey-based analysis cannot determine definitively whether an observable ethnic bias in voting results from expressive or heuristic voting. This distinction is the subject of Chapter Six's analysis.

contextual factors is likely to weaken the observable relationship between voter ethnicity and vote choice, although ethnicity is still expected to play some role in voting behaviour.

ECUADOR 2002

In the years immediately preceding the 2002 election, Ecuadorian politics had been marked by exceptional instability. Following the short-lived presidency of Abdalá Bucaram (1996-1997), five different presidents governed Ecuador in just five years, with several being forced from office by mass street protests and the intervention of the armed forces. Of particular significance was the removal of President Jamil Mahuad, who was forced from office in 2000 in a coup d'état orchestrated by CONAIE and junior military officers. The coup had broad popular support, and it followed weeks of nationwide protests coordinated by CONAIE and its non-indigenous social movement allies. Among the junior army officers who stood aside to allow the coup to develop was Lucio Gutiérrez, who, after being discharged from the army for his role in the uprising, ran for president in the subsequent elections.

In the 2002 campaign, Gutiérrez ran as the joint candidate of his newly formed PSP and Pachakutik, and he received the official backing of CONAIE. Although Gutiérrez himself was primarily a populist, his alliance with Pachakutik and his close ties to the indigenous movement (dating from the 2000 uprising) place his 2002 candidacy in the broad category of ethnopopulism. Indeed, aside from his indigenous coalitional partners, Gutiérrez's electoral platform included many key demands of the indigenous movement, including constitutional reform, the reversal of neoliberal policies, the recognition of Ecuador as a plurinational state, and opposition to the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). However, many of these policies appealed well beyond indigenous constituencies, and Gutiérrez sought to win votes from whites and mestizos (as well as indigenous voters) based on his strong anti-establishment credentials and anti-neoliberal programmatic agenda.

Gutiérrez's principal rivals in the 2002 election included the neopopulist Álvaro Noboa and three well-known personalities from traditional political parties: León Roldós, Rodrigo Borja, and Jacobo Bucaram. Thus, the 2002 election was somewhat distinct from those in 2006 and 2009 in that a single candidate, Gutiérrez, emerged as the principal representative for indigenous and indigenous-mestizo sectors. Certainly Roldós, Borja, and

Bucaram could expect to gain some limited support from indigenous voters thanks to established party, movement, and kinship networks that all fed into long-running clientelistic relations. Yet the coalescence behind Gutiérrez of Pachakutik, CONAIE, and many smaller leftist parties and social organisations with influence in indigenous areas made him the clear favourite to win the majority of indigenous votes in 2002.

In the first round of voting, Gutiérrez finished first with 20.6 percent of the valid vote, and proceeded to a second round runoff against Noboa, the second-placed candidate. Roldós, Borja, Bucaram, and the PSC's Antioni Neira all won more than ten percent of the first-round vote, underlining the severe fragmentation of Ecuadorian politics in the early 2000s. Ultimately, Gutiérrez won the presidency in the second round, defeating Noboa by winning 54.8 percent of the valid vote.

LAPOP Data

Data for the 2002 vote analysis come from LAPOP's 2004 survey. The LAPOP data considerably overestimate the vote share of the top two candidates in the first round, Gutiérrez and Noboa, suggesting that some respondents may have reported their second-round choice to interviewers (see Table 4.1a). However, the LAPOP data broadly reflect the trend, if not the actual proportions, in the official voting results: Gutiérrez won 28.6 percent in the LAPOP sample (compared to 20.6 percent in the official count), Noboa 21.7 percent (compared to 17.4 percent), Roldós 5.9 percent (compared to 15.4 percent), and Borja 6.1 percent (compared to 14.0 percent).[107]

LAPOP's 2004 survey did not include any measure of respondents' linguistic background, so the 2002 vote analysis employs only a measure of self-identification. Similarly, the 2004 survey did not include any specific measures of voters' support for state-led wealth redistribution or nationalisations, two variables that are important vote predictors in several of the other election case studies examined in this thesis. Finally, the 2004 data did not include measures of voter attitudes towards ethnic groups and issues, and so this aspect of the 2002 analysis is not developed. In general, it is worth re-emphasising the low overall response variation on the ethnicity measures in all the Ecuadorian surveys. In 2004, just 112 respondents reported self-identification as indigenous, 174 as black, 322 as white, and 2,319 as mestizo. These low overall counts for non-mestizo categories (which are reduced further

[107] A total of 37.6 percent of the LAPOP sample reported voting for a candidate outside the top four, or submitting a blank or void ballot. This compares to 32.6 percent who fell within the equivalent category in the official results (Table 4.1a).

by the exclusion of cases with missing data for the regression analysis) should be borne in mind when interpreting the following results.

Group- and Candidate-Centred Ethnicisation

Table 4.1 shows the breakdown of the 2002 vote according to ethnic group and candidates' ethnic vote shares. In addition to basic vote-share proportions, Table 4.1d reports group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores. These are calculated as the standard deviation of the proportions within each ethnic group that vote for each candidate (group-centred) and the standard deviation of the proportion of each candidate's vote share received from each ethnic group (candidate-centred).[108]

The group-centred ethnicisation statistics show low SD1 scores but relatively high SD2 scores. Higher SD2 scores reflect the larger standard deviation from the equal-share mean (20 percent) in most groups, which is mostly the result of the low reported vote for the third- and fourth -place candidates, and the large number of voters who selected candidates outside the top four. The SD1 scores are generally low, however, indicating that voters from all ethnic groups supported a range of candidates. For comparison, the average SD1 in Bolivia's 2005 election was .062, while Ecuador's 2002 average was just .043, suggesting that members of the same ethnic groups spread their vote considerably more widely in the Ecuadorian case. Nevertheless, the SD1 score for the indigenous group is noticeably higher than other groups in Ecuador 2002, reflecting the disproportionate support for Gutiérrez among indigenous voters (48.6 percent voted for Gutiérrez, well above his overall LAPOP vote share of 28.6 percent; see Table 4.1b).[109]

An examination of each candidate's ethnic vote share (Table 4.1c) confirms disproportionate indigenous support for Gutiérrez. In total, 5.6 percent of the PSP-Pachakutik's vote came from indigenous voters even though they constituted just 3.3 percent of the LAPOP sample. However, as these proportions make clear, Gutiérrez appealed well beyond an indigenous constituency, winning the majority of his vote among mestizos and whites (78.7 and 11.1 percent, respectively). The ethnic breakdown of other candidates' vote shares reveals relatively proportional distributions, although Noboa's vote contained just half the sample proportion of indigenous voters (1.7 percent compared to 3.3 percent).

[108] See Chapter Two on group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores.
[109] The higher score in the black group results from disproportionate rejection of Gutiérrez and disproportionate support for Noboa (30.4 percent, compared to Noboa's overall 21.7 percent) and other candidates outside the top four.

TABLE 4.1: Ethnicity and Vote Choice, Ecuador 2002

		SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP					
	Candidate	**White**	**Mestizo**	**Indigenous**	**Black**	**Total LAPOP**	**Total Official**
A: Overview	Lucio Gutiérrez	3.2	22.6	1.6	1.3	28.6	20.6
	Álvaro Noboa	2.7	16.4	0.4	2.3	21.7	17.4
	León Roldós	0.8	4.6	0.2	0.4	5.9	15.4
	Rodrigo Borja	0.5	5.4	0.0	0.0	6.1	14.0
	Other/Null	4.6	28.5	0.1	3.5	37.6	32.6
	Proportion of full sample	11.7	77.5	3.3	7.5	100.0	100.0
B: By Group	Lucio Gutiérrez	27.2	29.1	48.6	17.4	28.6	
	Álvaro Noboa	22.9	21.2	11.0	30.4	21.7	
	León Roldós	6.5	5.9	6.4	5.2	5.9	
	Rodrigo Borja	4.6	7.0	2.8	0.0	6.1	
	Other/Null	38.8	36.8	31.2	47.0	37.6	
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
C: By Candidate	Lucio Gutiérrez	11.1	78.7	5.6	4.6	28.6	
	Álvaro Noboa	12.3	75.5	1.7	10.5	21.7	
	León Roldós	12.8	77.1	3.5	6.6	5.9	
	Rodrigo Borja	8.9	89.6	1.5	0.0	6.1	
	Other/Null	12.1	75.8	2.7	9.4	37.6	
	Proportion of full sample	11.7	77.5	3.3	7.5	100.0	
D: Ethnicisation Scores	**Group-Centred**						
	SD1	.012	.006	.082	.072		
	SD2	.129	.121	.174	.171		
	Candidate-Centred				**SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP**		
	Lucio Gutiérrez	.				.018	
	Álvaro Noboa					.022	
	León Roldós					.014	
	Rodrigo Borja					.082	
	Other/Null					.014	

N = 2927.

Notes: Sub-table A shows the first-round vote proportions by ethnic group in LAPOP's 2004 survey sample, as well as official election results (all percent). Sub-table B shows the proportion of each ethnic group that voted for each candidate in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-table C shows the proportion of each candidate's vote share received from each ethnic group in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-table D shows group-centred ethnicisation scores (SD1 and SD2) and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores based on the LAPOP sample. SD1 is the standard deviation (SD) of each candidate's share within the ethnic group from the candidate's full sample proportions. SD2 is the SD from an 'equal-share' mean of .20 (100 percent divided by five vote outcome categories). Candidate-centred ethnicisation scores are the SD of candidate vote proportions by ethnic group from the proportions of each group in the full sample.

Source: Author's elaboration of data from LAPOP 2004 and the Consejo Nacional Electoral (http://cne.gob.ec/es/).

Overall, the low candidate-centred ethnicisation scores in Table 4.1d confirm the relatively proportional ethnic composition of most candidates' vote.[110]

In short, an examination of overall ethnic vote distributions in 2002 confirms that Gutiérrez and his PSP-Pachakutik coalition received disproportionate support from indigenous voters. However, it also underlines Gutiérrez's wider appeal among both whites and mestizos, a prerequisite for electoral success given Ecuador's ethnic demographics. In general, this pattern of vote distributions does not indicate voting preferences that are significantly determined by ethnicity (at least not based on the limited measures in the LAPOP survey), and voters across ethnic groups clearly supported a range of candidates in the 2002 election.

Direct Predictors of Vote Choice: Main Effects

Table 4.2 reports the effects of voter characteristics on the overall probability of voting for each major candidate in Ecuador's 2002 election. The results are based on a multinomial logit (mlogit) model applied to data from LAPOP's 2004 survey. Full results can be found in Appendix B.

The analysis generates statistically significant positive effects for self-identification as indigenous on the predicted probability of voting for Gutiérrez in the 2002 first-round vote. According to the model, indigenous voters were 12.9 percentage points more likely to vote for Gutiérrez compared to mestizos (and 17.3 percentage points more likely than whites) even when other factors were controlled for. However, ethnicity did not have statistically significant effects on the vote probabilities of any other candidate. These results strongly suggest that Gutiérrez and his Pachakutik allies befitted from a positive ethnic bias among indigenous voters in 2002, as the overall vote distributions in Table 4.1indicated.

Aside from ethnicity, the model identifies significant effects of several other voter characteristics on first-round vote choice. Voter income ('Income') is negatively associated with Gutiérrez's vote (a 1.0 percentage point decrease in probability for a one-unit increase in income band), confirming the PSP-Pachakutik's broad appeal to poorer voters.[111] Despite his personal wealth, Noboa's populist platform and clientelistic politics appear to have won him some support across socioeconomic classes, while support for both of the 'establishment'

[110] The high score for Borja results from the very low number of both white and indigenous votes for the ID candidate (Table 4.1c).
[111] Variable names are capitalised and enclosed in single quotations marks.

TABLE 4.2: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Ecuador 2002

	GUTIÉRREZ		NOBOA		ROLDÓS		BORJA	
Voter Characteristic	**Coeff.**	**SE**	**Coeff.**	**SE**	**Coeff.**	**SE**	**Coeff.**	**SE**
White (Mestizo)	**-.044**	.042	**.046**	.038	**.007**	.023	**-.016**	.022
Indigenous (Mestizo)	**.129^**	.079	**-.070**	.072	**-.002**	.037	**-.025**	.036
Black (Mestizo)	**-.053**	.057	**.021**	.045	**-.005**	.028	**n/a**	n/a
Indigenous (White)	**.173***	.088	**-.116**	.079	**-.009**	.023	**-.009**	.040
Income	**-.010^**	.006	**-.006**	.005	**.009****	.003	**.013****	.004
Female	**.008**	.027	**-.027**	.023	**.009**	.014	**.005**	.015
Age	**.003****	.001	**-.001**	.001	**.000**	.000	**.000**	.000
Trust in parties	**-.002**	.009	**-.012**	.008	**-.001**	.004	**.010***	.004
National economy improved	**.054**	.044	**.006**	.041	**-.011**	.027	**.002**	.025
Personal finances improved	**-.017**	.037	**-.001**	.034	**-.013**	.021	**.010**	.021
Resides in highlands (coast)	**.083****	.031	**-.187****	.026	**-.004**	.015	**.090****	.014
Resides in Amazon (coast)	**.234****	.041	**-.170**	.032	**-.023**	.018	**.017**	.016
Resides in rural area	**.100****	.030	**-.039**	.029	**-.036^**	.021	**.005**	.020
Rightist ideology	**-.006**	.006	**.013***	.005	**-.005**	.003	**-.012****	.004
'Strongman' populist leader	**-.026**	.029	**-.019**	.026	**-.006**	.015	**.023**	.017
President can bypass Congress	**-.006**	.027	**-.002**	.023	**-.016**	.014	**.013**	.015

N= 1079. ^ = $p < .10$; * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$.

Notes: Coefficients are average marginal effects on overall vote probability based on the multinomial logistic regression model reported in Appendix B. The effects for ethnic self-identification and region are compared to base category in parentheses.

Source: Author's calculations based on LAPOP 2004.

candidates (Roldós and Borja) increased with voter income (by 0.9 and 1.3 percentage points, respectively).

Region was also a highly significant vote predictor in 2002 ('Resides in highlands'; 'Resides in Amazon'). Voters in the highlands and particularly voters residing in Gutiérrez's native Amazon were much more likely to vote for PSP-Pachakutik than were those living on the coast (by 8.3 and 23.4 percentage points, respectively). Borja also appears to have performed better in the highlands than on the coast, indicating that the ID's historical strength in the highlands was partially preserved in 2002. Noboa, for his part, drew greater support from voters in the coastal provinces, particularly compared to highland residents (*ceteris paribus*, the former were 18.7 percentage points more likely to support PRIAN). Finally, Gutiérrez also won greater support among rural voters, who were on average 10.0 percentage points more likely to vote for his PSP-Pachakutik ticket than their urban compatriots.

Political ideology ('Rightist ideology') does not appear to have affected Gutiérrez's support significantly, underlining the broadly non-ideological character of his populist appeals despite the presence of leftist parties in his coalition. In contrast, leftist ideology had a statistically significant effect on support for Borja and ID, one of Ecuador's traditional centre-left parties (a one-unit move from left-right on the 10-point ideology scale produced a 1.2 percentage point increase in Borja's predicted vote probability). Noboa's strong defence of neoliberalism and his conservative social views appear to have won him greater support among self-declared rightists (equivalent to a 1.3 percentage point increase for a one-unit rightward move). The final two measures in Table 4.2, both concerned with characteristic aspects of populism (the perceived need for a 'Strong populist leader' and agreement that a 'President can bypass Congress' to speed up policy implementation), did not have statistically significant effects in 2002. This is perhaps unsurprising given the personalistic nature of electoral competition in contemporary Ecuador.

In summary, the 2002 vote analysis suggests indigenous ethnic bias may have played some role in bolstering support for Gutiérrez, although ethnicity did not appear to affect voting preferences for any other candidates. Indeed, in general the analysis indicates that other, non-ethnic factors – especially income, region, and perhaps political ideology – were more important in shaping voters' electoral choices in 2002. Although the LAPOP data did not provide any direct measures for organisational affiliations and associated clientelistic relations, such factors were almost certainly important in Ecuador's factionalised political

environment. This chapter would argue that both region and urban/rural residence are likely to correlate with organisational affiliations and personal networks that directly link to such clientelistic relations. Thus, it seems plausible that the large effects for region and urban/rural residence identified in Table 4.2 may reflect some latent association between clientelistic networks and vote choice. Moreover, this chapter hypothesises that some regional and rural/urban measures may pick up dimensions of Gutiérrez's support based on wider ethnic preferences. Most indigenous-mestizo voters – who may have reported mestizo self-identification to LAPOP interviewers – reside in the smaller towns and rural areas of the highlands and Amazon, a regional background that is significantly linked statistically to a Gutiérrez vote. However, in both these cases, LAPOP data provide no direct measures to test such hypotheses, and thus any inferences remain conjectural.

Indirect Effects of Ethnicity

As part of the 2002 vote analysis, this chapter also tested ethnicity's indirect effect on vote choice.[112] Ethnic background may influence material circumstances and political attitudes, which in turn may affect vote choice. However, the mediation analysis for the 2002 vote finds no evidence for such indirect ethnic voting (that is, ethnicity → political attitudes → vote choice), although it does confirm a statistically significant *direct* effect for indigenous self-identification on Gutiérrez's vote. Thus, at least based on the data available, this chapter rejects the indirect model of ethnic voting as an explanation for voting outcomes in Ecuador's 2002 election.[113]

ECUADOR 2006

The 2006 campaign marked the emergence of a new ethnopopulist candidate, Rafael Correa, who would come to dominate Ecuadorian politics for more than a decade. Although Correa was primarily a populist, promising to reverse neoliberal reforms and attacking the traditional political and economic elites, he also sought to win indigenous votes through ethnic appeals. He declared his 'natural affinity' with the indigenous movement, donned a poncho at political rallies, sought the blessing of indigenous leaders at traditional ceremonies, and addressed crowds in Quichua (Zeas 2006, 225; Conaghan 2011, 260, 279; Madrid 2012,

[112] Full results can be found in Appendix B.
[113] This rejection comes, however, with a considerable caveat. As discussed previously in this chapter, both the low number of non-mestizo respondents and the lack of a linguistic measure of ethnicity severely restrict the scope of the mediation analysis.

104-5). Correa also adopted many of the broader anti-establishment, anti-neoliberal demands of the indigenous movement, and he won important endorsements from indigenous and social organisations that defected from Pachakutik and CONAIE (Conaghan 2011, 270; Madrid 2012, 102).

Lucio Gutiérrez, who had been forced from office a year earlier in a largely middle-class coup, also announced his intention to run again in 2006. When the electoral authorities upheld a ban on his holding public office, the PSP put forward his brother, Gilmar Gutiérrez, as its presidential candidate. Although Gutiérrez, like Correa, was primarily a populist, he also capitalised on the PSP's ties to Amazonian indigenous organisations and Evangelical groups. The endorsement and grassroots mobilisation of these networks helped boost the PSP's vote in indigenous and lower-class constituencies.[114]

Thus, through associations with indigenous organisations and leaders, as well as a combination of symbolic acts and rhetoric, both Correa and Gutiérrez attempted to signal their affinity with indigenous voters and interests. In this respect, the 2006 campaign was notably distinct from 2002. Whereas the Gutiérrez-Pachakutik ticket was widely perceived as providing the clearest representation of indigenous interests in the earlier case, several candidates and parties – Correa, Gilmar Gutiérrez, Pachakutik's Luis Macas, and leftist parties such as ID – all competed for the indigenous and lower-class vote in 2006. This electoral context exerted numerous cross-pressures on voters, exacerbating contradictions among personal and organisational loyalties, regional cleavages, ethnicity, religion, and ideology. The result was a far more fragmented vote in 2006, perhaps particularly in the case of indigenous voters.

However, the winner in the first round was neither Correa nor Gutiérrez (who finished second and third, respectively), but perennial presidential candidate Noboa. Once again, the PRIAN candidate used his personal wealth to run a highly populist campaign marked by conspicuous acts of generosity. At many campaign rallies, PRIAN officials would hand out free food, household supplies, medical treatments, and even cash in exchange for voting commitments (Conaghan 2011, 270; Freidenberg 2014, 117-19). More generally, Noboa's manifesto emphasised a wide range of direct assistance programmes, ranging from subsidised housing, to microcredit initiatives, to increased welfare payments. However, unlike his

[114] Indeed, many PSP supporters from these constituencies considered the charges against Gutiérrez and his eventual overthrow to be a conspiracy within Ecuador's wealthy establishment, whose interests were threatened by Gutiérrez's defence of the poor (Olmos 2006).

populist rivals, Noboa was not a critic of neoliberalism, and he played on his position as a successful businessman to frame himself as the 'can-do' candidate. He attacked Correa as 'the Communist comrade of Hugo Chávez', and he told supporters that he was 'God's hero' on a mission to save Ecuador (Conaghan 2011, 270). Nevertheless, in the eventual runoff with Correa, Noboa was unable to expand his vote beyond the urban coastal constituencies that had backed him in the first round, while Correa swept areas that had previously backed the PSP and ID. Ultimately, Correa won the second round with a comfortable 56.7 percent of the valid vote.

LAPOP Data

LAPOP's 2006 Ecuador survey was conducted some months before the October election, and thus the analysis in this chapter must make use of the 2008 data. These data substantially overestimate support for Correa, indicating a first-round vote share of 67.9 percent, compared to the 22.8 percent of the vote that Correa actually won (see Table 4.3a). Accordingly, the LAPOP vote shares of Correa's opponents are significantly underestimated compared to official results: just 12.6 percent for Noboa (compared to an official vote of 26.8 percent), and less than five percent for both Gutiérrez and fourth-placed León Roldós (who both won over fifteen percent according to official figures). Such large discrepancies mean that considerable caution is required in drawing wider inferences based on the 2006 vote analysis.[115]

In addition to the overestimation of Correa's vote share, there are several other features of the 2008 data that are problematic for this thesis's analysis. First, the 2008 survey did not ask respondents about their linguistic background, leaving the generic ethnic self-identification variable as the only measure of ethnicity. Furthermore, as in previous survey rounds, the majority of respondents in 2008 reported self-identification as mestizo, providing very little variation on the only available ethnicity measure. Finally, the 2008 Ecuador survey included no measures of ethnic attitudes or experience of discrimination, and therefore this aspect of the analysis is similarly missing from the 2006 case study.

[115] Indeed, Correa's LAPOP vote share constitutes a much larger overestimation than the normal 'bump' given to winners in most post-election surveys. In part, these discrepancies may result from confusion or forgetfulness among respondents. In fact, by the time of the 2008 survey, Ecuadorians had voted in both the first and second rounds of the 2006 presidential elections and in the 2007 constituent assembly elections. With the exception of the first-round presidential vote, Correa and AP won absolute majorities in each of these cases.

TABLE 4.3: Ethnicity and Vote Choice, Ecuador 2006

		SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP					
	Candidate	**White**	**Mestizo**	**Indigenous**	**Black**	**Total LAPOP**	**Total Official**
A: Overview	Álvara Noboa	1.6	10.0	2.4	2.6	12.6	26.8
	Rafael Correa	6.4	56.5	2.4	2.6	67.9	22.8
	Gilmar Gutiérrez	0.2	2.9	0.3	0.1	3.5	17.4
	León Roldós	0.3	4.3	0.0	0.1	4.8	14.8
	Other/Null	1.7	8.2	0.2	1.2	11.3	18.2
	Proportion of full sample	10.1	81.9	3.4	4.7	100.0	100.0
B: By Group	Álvara Noboa	15.5	12.2	11.6	13.9	12.6	
	Rafael Correa	63.3	69.0	70.7	55.9	67.9	
	Gilmar Gutiérrez	1.5	3.6	9.6	3.0	3.5	
	León Roldós	2.9	5.3	1.4	2.4	4.8	
	Other/Null	16.8	10.0	6.7	14.8	11.3	
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
C: By Candidate	Álvara Noboa	12.4	79.3	3.2	5.2	12.6	
	Rafael Correa	9.4	83.2	3.6	3.8	67.9	
	Gilmar Gutiérrez	4.2	82.4	9.3	4.0	3.5	
	León Roldós	6.1	90.7	1.0	2.3	4.8	
	Other/Null	15.0	72.6	2.0	10.3	11.3	
	Proportion of full sample	10.1	81.9	3.4	4.7	100.0	
D: Ethnicisation Scores	**Group-Centred**						
	SD1	.034	.007	.036	.060		
	SD2	.225	.247	.256	.197		
	Candidate-Centred				**SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP**		
	Álvara Noboa	.			.032		
	Rafael Correa				.007		
	Gilmar Gutiérrez				.076		
	León Roldós				.074		
	Other/Null				.090		

N = 2550.

Notes: Sub-table A shows the first-round vote proportions by ethnic group in LAPOP's 2008 survey sample, as well as official election results (all percent). Sub-table B shows the proportion of each ethnic group that voted for each candidate in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-table C shows the proportion of each candidate's vote share received from each ethnic group in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-table D shows group-centred ethnicisation scores (SD1 and SD2) and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores based on the LAPOP sample. SD1 is the standard deviation (SD) of each candidate's share within the ethnic group from the candidate's full sample proportions. SD2 is the SD from an 'equal-share' mean of .20 (100 percent divided by five vote outcome categories). Candidate-centred ethnicisation scores are the SD of candidate vote proportions by ethnic group from the proportions of each group in the full sample.

Source: Author's elaboration of data from LAPOP 2008 and the Consejo Nacional Electoral (http://cne.gob.ec/es/).

Group- and Candidate-Centred Ethnicisation

Table 4.3 shows the breakdown of the 2006 Ecuador vote by ethnic group and candidates' ethnic vote share, as well as the associated group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores. Like in 2002, the group-centred ethnicisation statistics show relatively low SD1 scores but higher SD2 scores. High SD2 scores are unsurprising given Correa's large share of the LAPOP vote, which produces similarly large standard deviations from the equal-share mean of 20 percent. However, the lower SD1 scores indicate a considerable degree of variation in vote choice within ethnic groups, at least proportional to overall vote shares.[116] Examination of vote choice within each ethnic group (Table 4.3b) indicates that indigenous voters supported Correa, and particularly Gutiérrez, somewhat disproportionally: 70.7 reported voting for Correa, and 9.6 percent for Gutiérrez, compared to respective overall vote shares of 67.9 and 3.5 percent. Whites also showed a slightly disproportionate preference for Noboa, with 15.5 percent reporting a vote for PRIAN compared to Noboa's overall LAPOP vote share of 12.6 percent. Overall, however, the group-centred analysis does not suggest severe ethnic bias in Ecuador's 2006 election, and given the considerable skew in the LAPOP data compared to official results, we should probably not read too much into any minor disproportionality in vote distributions.

The candidate-centred ethnicisation scores in Table 4.3d scores are notably low for all four major candidates in 2006. Correa's score is the lowest, and the ethnic breakdown of the AP vote show proportions that are largely comparable with the overall sample proportions (Table 4.3c). Though higher than Correa's, Noboa's score is also relatively low, although whites were slightly over-represented in Noboa's LAPOP vote share (12.4 percent of Noboa's vote came from whites, although whites comprised just 10.1 percent of the sample). Gutiérrez and Roldós both have somewhat higher (though not high) ethnicisation scores, the result of fewer whites in both candidates' constituencies and a disproportionately high indigenous vote in Gutiérrez's case. Once again, however, given the low number of observations for these last two candidates, we should be cautious about reading too much into the relative ethnic appeals of Gutiérrez and Roldós.

In short, analysis of the ethnic breakdown of Ecuador's 2006 vote suggests relatively low levels of ethnicisation, despite slightly disproportionate support for Correa and Gutiérrez

[116] By way of comparison, the SD2 scores in Bolivia's 2005 election are higher than Ecuador's scores in some groups and lower in others, suggesting a much higher degree of ethnic polarisation in Bolivia. This is also reflected in Ecuador's SD1 scores, which are much lower than those for the Bolivian elections and somewhat lower than, or comparable to, the Peruvian cases (see Chapter Five).

among indigenous voters and for Noboa among whites. However, although some ethnic vote distributions are *proportionally* skewed (albeit not severely), Correa still won clear majorities across all ethnic groups in absolute terms, at least as far as LAPOP's 2008 sample is concerned.

Direct Predictors of Vote Choice: Main Effects

Table 4.4 shows the effects of voter characteristics on the overall probability of voting for each major candidate in Ecuador's 2006 election, based on a multinomial logit model (see Appendix B for full output). The analysis generates few significant effects for the ethnicity measures available, reflecting the apparent low levels of ethnicisation identified in the preceding vote-share analysis. Indeed, the regression analysis generates only one statistically significant effect for the ethnic self-identification measures, suggesting a positive association between indigenous self-identification and a vote for Gutiérrez. This effect equates to an increase in predicted vote probability of 7.2 percentage points compared to mestizos and 8.0 percentage points compared to whites.[117] This finding appears to confirm the persisting base of support for the Gutiérrez brothers and the PSP in certain indigenous constituencies. However, with this one exception, the vote analysis finds little evidence for ethnic voting of any kind in Ecuador's 2006 election.

The vote analysis also included a range of sociodemographic and political attitude measures, several of which produce statistically significant marginal effects. First, both Correa and Gutiérrez appear to have benefited from their broad populist appeals to poorer voters, with an increase in voter income ('Income') producing a 2.2 percentage point decrease in Correa's predicted vote probability and a 0.8 percentage point decrease for Gutiérrez.[118] Second, as in most elections studied in this thesis, political ideology ('Rightist ideology') appears to play a significant role in voters' electoral considerations. Correa's anti-neoliberal populist platform appears to have appealed to leftist voters (a one-unit change from left to right on the ideology scale produces a 2.1 percentage point decrease in predicted vote probability), while Noboa's personal and programmatic profile as a wealthy businessman and defender of neoliberalism attracted voters who considered themselves rightists (a 1.7 percentage point increase in predicted vote probability for a one-unit change on the ideology scale).

[117] The same variable has a significant negative effect on Roldós's vote, although in this case the low cell count for the relevant cross-tabulation means we should be cautious about any inferences drawn.
[118] Higher income also increased the probability of voting for Roldós, but this variable had little effect on the vote for Noboa.

TABLE 4.4: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Ecuador 2006

	NOBOA		CORREA		GUTIÉRREZ		ROLDÓS	
Voter Characteristic	Coeff.	SE	Coeff.	SE	Coeff.	SE	Coeff.	SE
White (Mestizo)	**.011**	.030	**.002**	.052	**-.008**	.019	**-.019**	.026
Indigenous (Mestizo)	**.027**	.058	**-.026**	.074	**.072^**	.038	**-.056****	.012
Black (Mestizo)	**-.006**	.035	**-.078**	.070	**.074**	.059	**-.026**	.033
Indigenous (White)	**.016**	.060	**-.028**	.078	**.080^**	.043	**-.037^**	.022
Income	**.006**	.006	**-.022****	.008	**-.008***	.003	**.011***	.004
Female	**.002**	.021	**.024**	.028	**-.027***	.011	**-.030^**	.015
Age	**-.001**	.001	**-.001**	.001	**.000**	.000	**.001^**	.001
Trust in parties	**-.008**	.006	**.015**	.010	**.004**	.003	**-.009**	.006
Resides in highlands (coast)	**-.086****	.020	**.061^**	.038	**.033****	.011	**.056****	.018
Resides in Amazon (coast)	**-.100****	.023	**.041**	.056	**.155****	.043	**.002**	.013
Resides in rural area	**-.044***	.019	**.103****	.037	**-.013**	.011	**-.006**	.020
Rightist ideology	**.017****	.004	**-.021****	.006	**-.001**	.003	**.006^**	.004
Wealth redistribution	**-.008**	.005	**.006**	.009	**-.006^**	.003	**.000**	.004
Nationalisations	**-.002**	.005	**.010**	.009	**.000**	.004	**-.008**	.005
Free trade	**.000**	.006	**.002**	.008	**-.004**	.004	**.002**	.005
Limit opposition voice	**-.003**	.005	**.024****	.009	**-.004**	.004	**.002**	.004
Direct democracy	**-.009^**	.005	**.014^**	.008	**.000**	.003	**.000**	.004
Minorities are a threat	**-.009^**	.005	**.019***	.008	**.003**	.004	**-.009***	.004

N= 1449. ^ = $p < .10$; * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$.

Notes: Coefficients are average marginal effects on overall vote probability based on the multinomial logistic regression model reported in Appendix B The effects for ethnic self-identification and region are compared to base category in parentheses.

Source: Author's calculations based on LAPOP 2008.

However, unlike the Bolivian case, neither support for wealth redistribution ('Wealth redistribution') nor support for nationalisations ('Nationalisations') had statistically significant effects on Ecuador's 2006 vote. Given that reducing inequality was a prominent rhetorical component of all four candidates' platforms, and given that most Ecuadorians tended to support such policy aims (as in Bolivia), the lack of significant effects for this variable is perhaps less surprising. However, the candidates differed markedly in their positions on nationalisations, particularly Correa and Noboa. While Correa promised to nationalise Ecuador's natural resources and regain sovereignty from foreign multinationals, Noboa railed against Correa's 'communist' state-interventionism, which he charged would make Ecuador the next Venezuela. We must presume, therefore, that any effect for this particular attitudinal measure is captured by the general ideology measure or by other sociodemographic factors.

As in 2002, both region and rural/urban residence also had significant effects on vote choice in 2006. Residence in the highlands, compared to the coast, was associated with an increase in the probability of voting for Correa, Gutiérrez, and Roldós but a decrease for Noboa, while the PSP received comparatively greater support in its eastern Amazon stronghold. These effects underline the various regional influences outlined in this chapter's preceding discussion of organisational loyalties and clientelistic politics. Finally, rural residence significantly increased the predicted probability of voting for Correa (by 10.3 percentage points) and decreased Noboa's vote by 4.4 percentage points. Correa's substantive policy proposals (price controls, agricultural import protections, and a microcredit scheme for small-scale farmers), as well as alliances with several rural-based social movements and leftist parties, appear to have won Correa considerable support in rural constituencies.[119]

In summary, the analysis finds only limited evidence that ethnic bias influenced vote choice in Ecuador's 2006 presidential election. Although self-identified indigenous voters were relatively more likely to vote for Gilmar Gutiérrez than were mestizos or whites (indicating the PSP's persisting support in certain indigenous constituencies loyal to Lucio Gutiérrez), it is worth re-emphasising Correa's strong overall performance, including among indigenous voters. Indeed, the 2006 vote analysis predicts that self-identification as indigenous was associated with an overall probability of voting for Correa of 69.3 percent,

[119] The rural/urban variable had no statistically significant effect on Gutiérrez's vote. However, this may be the result of limited sample size and the distorted vote distributions in the LAPOP data. Indeed, by most accounts Gutiérrez and the PSP performed particularly well in more rural areas, where Lucio Gutiérrez's agricultural subsidies and prices controls had been most beneficial (Olmos 2006).

compared to just 10.2 percent for Gutiérrez. Thus, although Gutiérrez may have performed better among indigenous voters relative to other groups, Correa still won the majority of indigenous voters in 2006. The latter's symbolic and substantive ethnic appeals, broad populist platform, and alliances with key social organisations linked to the indigenous movement, all appear to have extended Correa's appeal to both indigenous and non-indigenous constituencies.

Overall, however, voter ethnicity played a relatively minor role compared to other factors in 2006. Voters' concerns linked to income, political ideology, and particularly sociogeographic location (region and urban/rural residence), all appear to have mattered more than ethnicity in terms of vote choice. Thus, in broad terms, the vote analysis supports the general propositions laid out in this chapter's introduction: a combination of weak ethnic identification, multiple candidates appealing across ethnic lines, and important non-ethnic voting preferences cross-cutting ethnic divisions significantly reduces the electoral salience of ethnicity. In Ecuador's 2006 election, this appears to have been the case.

Indirect Effects of Ethnicity

As in 2002, this chapter's analysis of the indirect effects of ethnicity in Ecuador's 2006 election fails to identify any statistically significant results.[120] Based on the data available, there does not appear to be a noteworthy relationship between voters' ethnic background and the political attitudes that subsequently influenced vote choice. Thus, once again, this chapter rejects the explanatory value of the indirect model of ethnic voting, at least in the case of the 2006 presidential vote. However, as was the case in the 2002 election, this conclusion comes with a number of caveats related to the various data limitations discussed elsewhere in this chapter. In particular, the low number of non-mestizo survey respondents and the lack alternative measures for ethnicity (including a linguistic measure) severely restrict this and other aspects of the 2006 vote analysis.

ECUADOR 2009

The 2009 elections were triggered by the ratification of Ecuador's new constitution by popular referendum in late 2008. The list of names on the 2009 presidential ballot was

[120] Comparison of the Correa and the Gutiérrez votes, however, does confirm a significant direct effect for indigenous self-identification in favour of the PSP. Full results are reported in Appendix B.

remarkably similar to 2006 – Correa, Noboa, Gutiérrez, and Roldós – although in this case Lucio Gutiérrez resumed his official leadership of the PSP and Martha Roldós replaced her uncle, León Roldós, as the candidate for the Red Ética y Democrática (RED).

However, in contrast to 2006, the 2009 contest was widely perceived as a formality. Since finishing second in the 2006 first-round vote, Correa had won resounding victories in three subsequent national elections: the 2006 runoff, the 2007 constituent assembly elections, and the 2008 constitutional referendum. There was little indication that the results of the 2009 election were to produce anything other than another resounding Correa victory. Perhaps because of the perceived lack of genuine competition, the presidential campaign was relatively low-key, with little public or media interest in any of the presidential candidates other than Correa and, to some extent, Lucio Gutiérrez (EU-EOM 2009, 5, 21).

As expected, Correa won an absolute majority in the first-round vote (52.0 percent of the valid vote) and thus avoided a runoff. This was the first time an Ecuadorian president had been re-elected since 1875, and it signalled the consolidation of Correa and AP as the dominant political force in the country. Gutiérrez came a distant second with 28.2 percent of the vote, although once again the PSP performed well in the Amazon region and Gutiérrez ran second to Correa in many highland provinces. Noboa came in third with just 11.4 percent of the vote. As in previous elections, his support was concentrated in the coastal provinces, particularly around the city of Guayaquil, whose influential mayor, Jaime Nebot, endorsed Noboa's candidacy. Finally, Martha Roldós won a disappointing 4.3 percent of the valid vote, and RED failed to win any seats in the national Congress (CNE 2014, 50-54, 76).

LAPOP Data

The data for the 2009 vote analysis come from LAPOP's 2010 survey. As in 2006, the LAPOP data substantially overestimate support for Correa and underestimate support for his principal challengers (see Table 4.5a). A total of 65.7 percent of LAPOP respondents reported voting for Correa (well over the 52.0 percent he actually won) and just 10.3 percent reported backing Gutiérrez (though the PSP candidate won 28.2 percent of the official vote). The LAPOP sample is somewhat more accurate with Noboa's vote, estimating a 7.5 percent share compared to the official figure of 11.4 percent. Although these discrepancies are not as severe as 2006, the underestimation of Gutiérrez's vote is particularly noteworthy. It is unclear whether PSP voters were more hesitant about reporting their vote to interviewers, or whether the concentration of Gutiérrez's vote in more remote rural and Amazonian areas

resulted in its under-representation. Either way, these discrepancies mean any inferences based on LAPOP's 2010 data must be extremely cautious.

The ethnicity measures from the 2010 survey are once again problematic. Although the 2010 questionnaire included a measure of respondents' linguistic background, only 3.2 percent of the model sample reported having a parent who spoke an indigenous language (N = 65).[121] Similarly, just 2.2 percent of the model sample reported self-identification as indigenous (N = 46), only 3.7 percent as black (N = 51), and 10.4 percent as white (N = 139).[122] Once again, the Ecuador survey did not include a measure of cultural identification, which might have produced more variation in responses. Thus, the vast majority of respondents in the 2010 sample are classified as Spanish-speaking mestizos, a data feature that substantially limits the scope of any analysis of ethnic voting.

Group- and Candidate-Centred Ethnicisation

Table 4.5 shows both the breakdown of vote shares by candidate and ethnic group and the group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores for Ecuador's 2009 election. As in 2006, the overall success of Correa (especially according to respondents in the LAPOP sample) means that the SD2 group-centred scores are relatively high; the proportion of each group's vote that went to Correa was well above the equal-share mean of 25 percent, while the share going to other candidates was below 25 percent (Table 4.5d).[123] However, the SD1 scores are low, indicating that most groups included some supporters of all three major candidates. The scores are highest in the indigenous groups (both linguistic and self-identified), reflecting the near-total rejection of Noboa's candidacy in these constituencies and the disproportionate support for Gutiérrez in the indigenous-language group. Indeed, Table 4.5b shows that Gutiérrez won 20.7 percent of the vote among indigenous-language speakers (compared to just 10.3 percent overall), while Noboa won just 2.4 percent (compared to PRIAN's overall share of 7.5 percent).[124] Finally, the white group resembled the sample proportions for both Correa and Noboa but showed a slightly disproportionate preference for Gutiérrez (12.6 percent compared to 10.3 percent).

[121] 'Model sample' refers to the full sample once cases with missing data are excluded.
[122] Frequencies and percentages appear somewhat discrepant because percentages take into account LAPOP's multilevel survey design.
[123] Elsewhere, the equal-share has been 20 percent. However, due to very limited support for candidates outside the top three, the 2009 analysis is based on just four outcome categories (Correa, Noboa, Gutiérrez, and other). Thus, the equal-share mean is 25 percent.
[124] However, given the low number of respondents who reported an indigenous-language background in the 2010 sample, these proportions translate into just 12 and two voters, respectively, casting serious doubt on any inferences about wider electoral tendencies.

TABLE 4.5: Ethnicity and Vote Choice, Ecuador 2009

		LINGUISTIC GROUP		SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP				Total LAPOP	Total Official
		Spanish	Indigenous	White	Mestizo	Indigenous	Black		
A: Overview	Rafael Correa	63.4	2.3	6.6	54.8	1.5	2.8	65.7	52.0
	Lucio Gutiérrez	9.6	0.7	1.3	8.6	0.2	0.3	10.3	28.2
	Álvaro Noboa	7.4	0.1	0.7	6.3	0.1	0.5	7.5	11.4
	Other/Null	16.1	0.4	1.4	13.9	0.3	0.8	16.5	8.4
	Proportion of full sample	96.5	3.5	10.1	83.6	2.0	4.4	100.0	100.0
B: By Group	Rafael Correa	65.7	66.7	66.1	65.6	74.2	63.9	65.7	
	Lucio Gutiérrez	9.9	20.7	12.6	10.3	7.6	6.8	10.3	
	Álvaro Noboa	7.7	2.4	7.0	7.5	4.3	10.7	7.5	
	Other/Null	16.7	10.2	14.3	16.7	13.9	18.6	16.5	
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
C: By Candidate	Rafael Correa	96.4	3.6	10.1	83.4	2.2	4.3	65.7	
	Lucio Gutiérrez	92.9	7.1	12.3	83.3	1.5	2.9	10.3	
	Álvaro Noboa	98.9	1.1	9.3	93.3	1.1	6.2	7.5	
	Other/Null	96.5	3.5	10.1	83.6	2.0	4.4	16.5	
	Proportion of full sample	96.5	3.5	10.1	83.6	2.0	4.4	100.0	
D: Ethnicisation Scores	**Group-Centred**								
	SD1	.002	.057	.014	.001	.042	.027		
	SD2	.237	.249	.239	.237	.286	.228		
	Candidate-Centred	**LINGUISTIC GROUP**			**SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP**				
	Rafael Correa	.001			.002				
	Lucio Gutiérrez	.036			.028				
	Álvaro Noboa	.024			.015				
	Other/Null	.013			.018				

N = 2619.

Notes: Sub-table A shows the first-round vote proportions by ethnic group (linguistic and self-identified, which should be read separately) in LAPOP's 2010 survey sample, as well as official election results (all percent). Sub-table B shows the proportion of each ethnic group that voted for each candidate in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-table C shows the proportion of each candidate's vote share received from each ethnic group in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-table D shows group-centred ethnicisation scores (SD1 and SD2) and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores based on the LAPOP sample. SD1 is the standard deviation (SD) of each candidate's share within the ethnic group from the candidate's full sample proportions. SD2 is the SD from an 'equal-share' mean of .25 (100 percent divided by four vote outcome categories). Candidate-centred ethnicisation scores are the SD of candidate vote proportions by ethnic group (linguistic and self-identified, which should be read separately) from the proportions of each group in the full sample.

Source: Author's elaboration of data from LAPOP 2010 and the Consejo Nacional Electoral (http://cne.gob.ec/es/).

The breakdown of each candidate's vote share by ethnic group confirms the trend implied by the group-centred analysis. Correa's appeal appears to have been more or less proportionately distributed across all ethnic groups (Table 4.5c), and this is reflected in an extremely low candidate-centred ethnicisation score of just .002 (Table 4.5d). Gutiérrez's score is slightly higher, reflecting the disproportionate support for the PSP among indigenous-language speakers (who comprised 7.1 percent of Gutiérrez's vote, but just 3.5 percent of the full sample) and whites (12.3 percent of Gutiérrez's share, compared to a sample proportion of 10.1 percent). Noboa's score is similar to Gutiérrez's although the Noboa's disproportionately poor performance among indigenous groups produces a slightly higher standard deviation from the sample proportions.

In summary, the analysis of vote distributions in the 2009 election indicates relatively low levels of ethnicisation. Correa, in particular, appears to have appealed widely across ethnic groups, winning clear majorities in each case. Relatively speaking, Gutiérrez did slightly better among indigenous-language speakers, and Noboa was particularly weak among indigenous voters (according to both linguistic and self-identification measures). Yet, in general, the examination of group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation in 2009 suggests ethnicity had only a very limited impact on vote choice.

Direct Predictors of Vote Choice: Main Effects

Table 4.6 shows the marginal effects of various voter characteristics on the predicted probability of voting for each major candidate in Ecuador's 2009 election. Full results from the base mlogit model are included in Appendix B.

First, as in 2006, the regression analysis only generates significant marginal effects for one candidate in 2009. An indigenous-language background is associated with a 10.7 percentage point increase in the predicted probability of voting for Gutiérrez. However, self-identification as indigenous is also linked to an 8.8 percentage point *decrease* compared with mestizos, while self-identification as white is associated with a 4.3 percentage point increase. These somewhat contradictory findings result from the peculiar relationship between the two ethnicity measures with regard to Correa's and Gutiérrez's vote. In general, it is probably not useful to interpret either ethnicity variable in this case. The effect for the linguistic measure is highly dependent on ethnic self-identification (the former is nowhere near statistical significant if self-identification is excluded from the model), and the effects of both variables are based on relative few observations (just 12 indigenous-language speakers, and four self-

TABLE 4.6: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Ecuador 2009

	CORREA		GUTIÉRREZ		NOBOA	
Voter Characteristic	**Coeff.**	**SE**	**Coeff.**	**SE**	**Coeff.**	**SE**
Parents speak indigenous language	**.026**	.090	**[.107*]**	.045	**[-.062]**	.061
White (Mestizo)	**.022**	.040	**.043^**	.025	**-.035**	.035
Indigenous (Mestizo)	**-.019**	.099	**[-.088**]**	.015	**[.000]**	.073
Indigenous (White)	**-.041**	.114	**[-.131**]**	.027	**[.136^]**	.073
Income	**.011**	.011	**.003**	.005	**.000**	.007
Female	**-.016**	.034	**-.002**	.017	**.025**	.027
Age	**.002**	.001	**.000**	.001	**-.001**	.001
Trust in parties	**.017^**	.010	**.002**	.007	**-.017***	.007
Participation in protests	**-.070***	.028	**.016**	.024	**.008**	.022
National economy has improved	**.111****	.042	**-.031**	.021	**-.050***	.025
Personal finances have improved	**.064^**	.038	**.003**	.023	**-.045^**	.024
Resides in highlands (coast)	**.063***	.026	**.020**	.020	**.002**	.026
Resides in Amazon (coast)	**-.053**	.051	**.074***	.029	**.021**	.039
Resides in rural area	**.085***	.040	**.046^**	.025	**-.083****	.029
Rightist ideology	**-.017****	.005	**.008***	.003	**.005**	.004
Wealth redistribution	**.007**	.011	**-.018****	.006	**.014**	.010
Social security	**.000**	.011	**.016**	.010	**-.014**	.010
Nationalisations	**.026****	.007	**-.008***	.004	**-.011***	.005
Free trade	**.008**	.007	**-.006**	.005	**-.017****	.006
Limit opposition voice	**.028****	.008	**-.015****	.004	**-.004**	.006
Direct democracy	**-.017^**	.009	**.010***	.005	**.003**	.007
Minorities are a threat	**.013**	.009	**-.001**	.005	**-.008**	.008

N= 1410. ^ = $p < .10$; * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$.

Notes: Coefficients are average marginal effects on overall vote probability based on the multinomial logistic regression model reported in Appendix B. The effects for ethnic self-identification and region are compared to base category in parentheses. Square brackets "[x]" indicate parameter estimates that are especially questionable; see discussion in main text.

Source: Author's calculations based on LAPOP 2010.

identified indigenous respondents, report voting for Gutiérrez in the model sample). For the purposes of the current discussion, then, it is probably sufficient to note the overwhelming support among indigenous voters in general for Correa – in the model sample, 67.4 percent of self-identified indigenous voters supporter Correa (31 out of 46), and 63.1 percent of indigenous-language speakers (41 out of 65) – and to avoid straining the interpretation of coefficients that are both highly sensitive to other variables and reliant on few observations.

Aside from the ethnicity variables, the analysis generates several statistically significant effects for other voter characteristics. With regard to political attitudes, Correa's state-interventionist agenda appears to have won him support among leftists ('Rightist ideology') and those who favoured further nationalisations ('Nationalisations'). However, all things being equal, voters' attitudes towards state-led wealth redistribution ('Wealth redistribution') had no statistically significant effect on Correa's vote.[125] In contrast, Gutiérrez's record of neoliberal adjustment during his 2002-2005 presidency may help explain the increased support for the PSP among rightist voters and among those opposed to state interventionism (in this case, both in terms of opposition to state-led wealth redistribution and nationalisations). Opposition to nationalisations also increased Noboa's vote probabilities. This is the effect we might expect given Noboa's personal background as a wealthy private businessman, his frequent criticism of state interventionism in Ecuador and elsewhere, and PRIAN's neoliberal programmatic agenda. Finally, the analysis finds no statistically significant effects for income ('Income'), suggesting that no single candidate drew disproportionate support from any particular socioeconomic sector in 2009.

A key feature of the 2009 elections was that Correa ran as the incumbent. As a result, we might expect voters' broad assessment of Correa's first-term performance to influence voting preferences, and the analysis provides some indication that this was in fact the case. Positive, compared to negative, views of the national economy ('National economy has improved') are associated with an 11.1 percentage point increase in Correa's predicted vote probability, while higher levels of trust in political parties ('Trust in parties') is associated with a 1.7 percentage point increase for a one-unit change on the 1-7 scale. Voters who had *not* taken part in political protests in the preceding year ('Participation in protests') were also more likely to have supported Correa (by 7.0 percentage points). Both the latter two measures

[125] As indicated with regard to previous vote models, the lack of significance for this measure may result from a lack of variation in voter attitudes (most voters support the policy goal), as well as most candidates declaring their commitment to reducing inequality.

can be read as partial proxies for broader voter satisfaction with the political status quo and with the currently dominant political actors. In general, these measures had the reverse associations for Correa's principal challengers, particularly in Noboa's case. Negative economic assessments, participation in protests, and low levels of trust in political parties were all positively associated with a vote for PRIAN.

As in 2006, region was also a significant vote predictor in 2009, with Correa significantly more popular in the highlands (compared to coastal areas) and Gutiérrez gaining greater support in the PSP's Amazon stronghold. Both Correa and Gutiérrez also won support among rural voters (increased vote probabilities of 8.5 and 4.6 percentage points, respectively, compared with urban voters). Meanwhile, urban residence was associated with an 8.3 percentage point increase in Noboa's vote probability. As indicated in the discussion of the 2002 and 2006 results, this chapter would argue that both region and urban/rural residence may capture a latent effect for community and organisational loyalties linked to clientelistic relations. However, as in 2002 and 2006, the LAPOP data provide no means of testing these hypotheses directly, and thus any inferences remain speculative.[126]

In summary, this chapter suggests that the largely negligible effect of ethnicity on vote choice in 2009, at least in statistical terms, is the combined result of Correa's overwhelming support among indigenous voters, the relative lack of variation in survey responses to ethnicity measures, and wider factors linked to Ecuador's social and political context. With regard to the latter, this chapter argues that weak ethnic identification (compounded by limited survey measures), numerous electoral cross-pressures, and the presence of a dominant incumbent all contributed to a lack of observable ethnic voting in 2009. Indeed, several of the non-ethnic voter characteristics that produce statistically significant effects in the 2009 analysis – ideology and associated issue stands, region, rural/urban residence, and assessments of the incumbent – would appear to support such hypotheses. However, data limitations severely limit the scope of the 2009 vote analysis, and thus the interpretation of these findings remains dubious.

[126] Support for a president's general right to limit the voice of the political opposition ('Limit opposition voice') was, unsurprisingly, associated with a vote for the incumbent Correa. As discussed in relation to Bolivia's 2009 election, this measure is probably best read as support for the *specific* incumbent to limit the voice of the *specific* political opposition of the time, rather than more normative voter preferences about executive powers.

Indirect Effects of Ethnicity

As in previous cases, the analysis of indirect effects in Ecuador's 2009 election generated no statistically significant results.[127] Once again, however, the low number of survey respondents who either self-identified as indigenous or reported family knowledge of an indigenous language severely restricts the mediation analysis. Thus, this chapter's findings of negligible indirect effects of ethnicity in the 2009 presidential elections come with the same caveats concerning data limitations that applied to previous vote analyses.

Conclusion

This chapter's analysis of ethnic voting in Ecuador's recent presidential elections has been significantly restricted by limitations in the available data. The exceptionally low number of survey respondents who report non-mestizo identities or family knowledge of an indigenous language results in very little variation on these key independent variables, and thus the potential for identifying meaningful statistical relationships between ethnicity and vote choice is sharply reduced.

However, this chapter has also argued that several features of Ecuador's specific electoral and wider sociopolitical context may also have contributed to the limited evidence of ethnic voting. Comparatively weak ethnic identification across much of Ecuadorian society, the presence of multiple candidates whose appeals cross-cut ethnic divides, and the especially contradictory set electoral cross-pressures faced by many Ecuadorian voters (and perhaps particularly indigenous voters), may have combined to reduce the prevalence of observable ethnic voting. Data limitations, particularly the lack of wider measures of ethnicity such as cultural identification, have precluded the exploration of more subtle potential effects for ethnicity on voting. Nevertheless, where these contextual conditions were arguably most conducive to ethnic voting in the 2002 election – with more limited competition for the indigenous vote, where support from indigenous and social movements coalesced behind a single candidate (reducing the prevalence of cross-pressures based on organisational loyalties and interests), and where no incumbent sought re-election – the analysis *did* find some evidence that ethnicity shaped electoral preferences. This lends some weight to the propositions regarding contextual influences outlined above.

[127] Results from the mediation analysis are included in Appendix B.

In sum, further research is needed to assess better the ways in which ethnicity shapes electoral behaviour in Ecuadorian elections. This chapter has offered some tentative (and partial) explanations for the pattern of electoral behaviour observed in three recent presidential elections, but it has not developed fully or examined systematically the associated propositions.[128]

[128] These general propositions are elaborated further in the final chapter.

Chapter Five

Peru

This chapter examines ethnic voting in Peru's 2006 and 2011 presidential elections. In many respects, Peru is an anomalous case as far as ethnic politics in the Andes is concerned. Despite demographic and societal features that are comparable with its regional neighbours – a large and marginalised indigenous population, substantial ethnic inequalities, and pervasive discrimination – ethnic movements and parties have been conspicuously absent in Peru. A number of factors may account for such exceptionalism, and these are briefly outlined below. Nevertheless, this chapter argues that, despite the absence of a major indigenous movement or party, ethnicity still plays an important role in contemporary Peruvian politics and in electoral behaviour particularly. Prominent presidential candidates have employed ethnic appeals in their campaigns since the 1990s, and voting outcomes at both the group and individual level are shaped in important ways by ethnicity. Indeed, this chapter's analysis outlines trends in Peruvian voting behaviour, and in wider sociopolitical and specific electoral contexts, that are in many ways comparable with the Bolivian case examined in Chapter Three. However, the chapter also concludes that Peruvian electoral politics is considerably more inchoate, and ethnicity's role in shaping voters' preferences is considerably more volatile and conditional than in Bolivia. Compared to Ecuador, the evidence for ethnic voting is considerably stronger in both Peruvian electoral cases.

As in the preceding chapters, the Peruvian analysis is framed in terms of three conceptual models of ethnic voting: the expressive model, in which voting constitutes a largely unconditional expression of psychological ethnic group allegiance or prejudice; the heuristic model, where voters' employ ethnic stereotypes to aid candidate evaluations; and the indirect model, where ethnic background shapes electorally significant political attitudes. However, the available survey data preclude a direct test to distinguish expressive from heuristic motivations, although the analysis may at times suggest the predominance of one or the other form of ethnic voting (for example, significant electoral effects for ethnocentrist or racist-attitude variables might suggest expressive voting). Thus, as in Chapters Three and Four, the analysis in this chapter tends to attribute the direct impact of ethnicity on voting

outcomes to a broadly defined ethnic bias, conceived as some combination of expressive and heuristic ethnic voting. Chapter Six offers further insight into the micro-level nature of ethnic voting along these lines through the examination of experimental data from Peru.

Peruvian Exceptionalism

In terms of ethnic politics, Peru has often been considered an outlier among the central Andean countries. Unlike Bolivia and Ecuador, Peru has not produced a nationally relevant indigenous movement, or an indigenous political party that has been able to compete successfully in national elections (Albó 1991; Degregori 1993; Paredes 2008; Van Cott 2005). Several indigenous organisations have formed at the local or regional level in Peru (Degregori 1993; Green 2006; Cánepa 2008; Paredes 2008), and some indigenous-based electoral movements have also performed well in subnational elections. However, neither these electoral movements, nor the indigenous organisations from which they have emerged, have been able to translate their local success to the national level (Madrid 2012, 109-12). As a result, the Peruvian indigenous movement remains weak and fragmented at the national level, and no indigenous parties have emerged to compete in national elections. The following paragraphs discuss the causes of this surprising omission and outline the implications for electoral behaviour.

First, some scholars have argued that pervasive anti-indigenous discrimination may help explain the relative lack of indigenous mobilisation in Peru. Such discrimination has not only discouraged indigenous individuals from identifying publicly as indigenous, but the underlying discriminatory discourse of indigenous inferiority has also shaped important aspects of government policy. In particular, scholars have argued that such discriminatory beliefs underpinned the state-led development policies of the mid-twentieth century, which equated rural development with cultural 'deindigenisation'. Such deindigenisation was to be achieved through education projects to promote Spanish literacy and discourage traditional practices, and through the co-option of indigenous communities into class-based peasant organisations (Paredes 2008, 14-25; Davies 1974; Manrique and Flores Galindo 1986; Degregori 1990, 1998; Mallon 1995; de la Cadena 1998, 2000, 2008; Manrique 2002; Reñique 2004). Such 'deindigenisation' was aided by the mass migration of rural indigenous Peruvians to the major cities, particularly Lima, from the 1960s onward. This sociopolitical context not only led many indigenous Peruvians to abandon their cultural markers and practices (as a result of migration and/or to avoid social stigma), but in many cases it also

made it strategically more useful to organise along non-ethnic lines. Peasant organisations and class-based urban interest groups typically had greater access to state resources and channels of political influence than did indigenous communities (Paredes 2008, 14-15; Yashar 2005).

A second explanation for the lack ethnic mobilisation in Peru focuses on the historical strength of leftist parties. For example, Roberta Rice (2012, 29) argues that strong and cohesive indigenous movements tend to emerge in countries where indigenous people have been incorporated by multiclass, populist parties, rather than in countries with a historic pattern of class-based peasant mobilisation. According to Rice, the political left had only limited success historically in establishing class-based organisations in Bolivia and Ecuador. As a result, both indigenous traditional forms of association (e.g., *ayllus* and *comunas*) and ethnic identities persisted alongside the class-based identities promoted by leftist parties. In contrast, the Peruvian left was far more successful in fostering forms of popular political incorporation in which class-based identities and organising predominated. Ultimately, these ended up overshadowing ethnic identification in Peru (Rice 2012; Rovira 2014).

A third explanation for the lack of an indigenous movement in Peru emphasizes the more recent internal conflict of the 1980s and early 1990s. The political opening created by democratisation in the early 1980s was precisely the context in which indigenous movements emerged in Bolivia and Ecuador. However, despite a similar return to civilian government, internal conflict severely inhibited *any* form of political organising in Peru, particularly in the highlands where the majority of indigenous people reside. Indeed, the Shining Path insurgency targeted many incipient indigenous and peasant leaders and organisations in the highlands, pre-empting the development of a national indigenous movement in the 1980s. Furthermore, even when the security situation improved in the early 1990s, the authoritarian and centralising government of Alberto Fujimori continued to restrict political associational space. Lack of political opportunity, then, may partly explain the absence of a national indigenous movement (Van Cott 2005, 163-66; Yashar 2005; Rice 2006).[129]

A combination of these factors is likely to have contributed to the absence of a national Peruvian indigenous movement, and it is not the intention of the current discussion to adjudicate the relative worth of alternative explanations. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the lack of a national indigenous movement in Peru is a primary cause of the

[129] Other scholars have partially contested this argument, pointing to Amazonian indigenous organisations that continued to develop and mobilise throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Greene 2006; Cánepa 2008).

subsequent absence of an indigenous political party. Indeed, although institutional factors may also have played some role (e.g., exceptionally prohibitive party-registration requirements), this chapter argues that such social movement factors were probably more influential (Madrid 2012, 112-8; Blancas Bustamente 2005; Van Cott 2005). As a number of studies have shown, the indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador provided crucial material and human resources to facilitate the formation of subsequent political parties (Van Cott 2003). The indigenous movements also played a wider, but no less important, role in raising ethnic consciousness among indigenous and indigenous-mestizo groups and in politicising ethnic identities in ways that linked ethnicity to broader substantive issues (Van Cott 2003, 2005; Yashar 2005; see also discussion in Chapters Three and Four). These social movement factors were key to the development of indigenous parties in Bolivia and Ecuador, and thus the absence of a comparable social movement in Peru may have contributed to the absence of a Peruvian indigenous party.

Peru's exceptionalism in this regard has certain implications for voting behaviour. First, and most generally, it underlines the relatively low salience of ethnicity in national politics; ethnic identity is not a banner around which Peruvians have traditionally mobilised. For example, unlike in Bolivia where the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR) extended suffrage to indigenous citizens in the 1950s, literacy restrictions on voting remained in place in Peru until 1980. These restrictions de facto excluded many indigenous Peruvians from electoral participation, even in the brief interludes of democratic rule that allowed for competitive elections. Even once such restrictions were lifted, the principal parties that contested the 1980 and 1985 elections – the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), Acción Popular (AP), and the Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC) – largely avoided ethnic appeals in their campaigns, preferring to focus on class-based, clientelistic, and personalistic appeals (Madrid 2012, 121; Cotler 1995). Moreover, few of these Lima-based parties recruited indigenous candidates; just five percent of congressional candidates had indigenous names between 1980 and 1990 (Paredes 2008, 12). Although leftist parties in the 1980s directed some policy proposals towards Peru's indigenous population (e.g., demands for the recognition of indigenous land rights, bilingual education, and the protection of natural resources), their appeals were primarily class-based, and they did not seek to mobilise voters around ethnic identities explicitly (Madrid 2012, 122). Thus, judging from Peru's twentieth-century political history, we might not expect ethnic appeals to be a conspicuous

element in most parties' electoral strategies, and we might not expect ethnicity to feature prominently in voters' electoral considerations.

Second, the previous discussion of Peru's exceptionalism suggests that the lack of ethnic mobilisation is not simply the result of institutional barriers or the electoral strategies of political elites, as outlined above. Rather, the lack of ethnic mobilisation may in part reflect weak ethnic identification and consciousness in Peruvian society more broadly. Indeed, according to the 2010 survey from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), just 3.3 percent of Peruvians self-identified as indigenous, compared to 19.0 percent of Bolivians.[130] Furthermore, national census data indicate that the proportion of Peruvians who speak an indigenous language has dropped steadily throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, from over fifty percent in 1940 to just fifteen percent in 2007 (Pajuelo Teves 2006, 43; Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática 2007, 94-7). This decline would appear to corroborate the 'deindigenising' effects of *mestizaje* and mass migration as outlined previously. In terms of contemporary voting behaviour, if fewer Peruvians identify socially in ethnic terms, then ethnic appeals reliant on psychological attachments to ethnic group identities are unlikely to resonate widely. Similarly, ethnic prejudice is likely to be somewhat less widespread and less politically salient. Overall, weak ethnic identification and limited ethnic consciousness are likely to reduce the occurrence of ethnic voting, particularly along the lines of the expressive model.

Third, weak ethnic identification and limited ethnic politicisation cast doubts on the electoral relevance of ethnic heuristics in Peru. Without an indigenous movement to connect wider substantive issues with certain ethnic identities in voters' political perceptions, Peruvian voters may not attribute particular explanatory value to ethnic heuristics. If an ethnic perceptual frame is not considered useful as a means to assess and understand political actors and issues, then heuristic ethnic voting is likely to be extremely limited.

Finally, if indigenous candidates have limited opportunities to compete in national elections, then voters may often face a ballot paper without a major indigenous candidate on it. The lack of an indigenous movement may deprive indigenous leaders of the organisational resources to launch a national campaign, while anti-indigenous discrimination may limit indigenous opportunities in mainstream parties (Paredes 2008). If there is no indigenous

[130] Unless stated otherwise, all elaborations of LAPOP data are the author's.

candidate on the ballot, then indigenous voters – irrespective of their electoral priorities – are unable to engage in ethnic voting.

Ethnic Voting without Ethnic Movements or Parties

However, despite its partial exceptionalism along the lines outlined above, Peru also shares key social, cultural, and political characteristics with its Andean neighbours. In many cases, these similarities relate to sociopolitical factors that are conducive to ethnic voting in Bolivia and, to a lesser extent, in Ecuador. First, and most generally, although Peru lacks a national indigenous movement or party, prominent mestizo and indigenous-mestizo candidates have employed various electoral appeals in their campaigns, and the empirical evidence is indicative of widespread ethnic voting. Indeed, Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000), Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006), and Ollanta Humala (2011-2016) have all pursued electoral strategies that, at least in broad terms, fall within Raúl Madrid's definition of ethnopopulism, and they have all won disproportionate support among indigenous voters.[131] This chapter's analysis finds strong statistical evidence for ethnic voting in Peru's 2006 and 2011 elections specifically, and Chapter Six presents experimental data from Peru that are clearly indicative of ethnic voting behaviour. Thus, despite the relative absence of explicit ethnic mobilisation in recent Peruvian political history (and the continued absence of a national indigenous movement or party), ethnicity has nevertheless emerged as an important component of contemporary electoral politics.

Second, although the electoral context outlined above is not necessarily indicative of individuals who identify strongly in ethnic terms, it does suggest some degree of ethnic consciousness. Indeed, this chapter argues that although ethnic identification is generally weaker in Peru, and ethnic polarisation is lower, at least compared with Bolivia, ethnic identities are still socially salient in several respects. For example, many Peruvians retain a sense of indigenous identity, even if some opt to identify in public as mestizos. Indeed, although just 7.4 percent of respondents to LAPOP's 2012 survey reported self-identification with a 'generic' indigenous ethnic category (and 79.7 percent self-identified as mestizo), other surveys that include a wider range of ethnicity measures (cultural identification, non-mutually exclusive or continuous measures, linguistic background, and so forth) typically produce considerably higher estimates. According to one recent review, most surveys tend to

[131] Although Fujimori is of Japanese descent, as an ethnic minority from a poor Lima neighbourhood, Fujimori had far more in common with indigenous and indigenous-mestizo sectors than many of his electoral opponents from the traditional social and political elites (Roberts 1995).

put Peru's indigenous population anywhere between twenty and fifty percent of the national population (Sulmont Haak 2010, 11-17). In fact, the LAPOP 2012 data produces somewhat comparable estimates itself according to linguistic measures, finding 13.3 percent of respondents had knowledge of an indigenous language, and 30.5 percent had at least one parent who spoke an indigenous language. In short, most data seem to suggest that a substantial minority of Peruvians identify to some extent with an indigenous identity or background, conditions that are potentially conducive to expressive ethnic voting.

More concretely, individuals from an indigenous background, irrespective of how they self-identify, are more likely to experience discrimination based on physiological, linguistic, and other descent-based attributes (Sulmont 2011). In addition, as in Bolivia and Ecuador, Peruvians from an indigenous background tend to be poorer, less educated, and have less access to health care than their non-indigenous counterparts (e.g., Hall and Patrinos 2004, chapter 7; UNICEF 2011, 34-35, 44-49, 62-67). These trends are reflected in the LAPOP data examined in this chapter: Peruvians from an indigenous background have an average income that is almost thirty percent lower than their non-indigenous counterparts; they are less likely to have completed secondary education; and they are twice as likely to have experienced discrimination in the year prior to the survey.[132] Thus, it seems likely that many indigenous and indigenous-mestizo Peruvians may have numerous grievances based on persisting ethnic inequalities and discrimination. Such grievances may contribute further to expressive ethnic voting by increasing resentment towards privileged or discriminatory groups.

However, ethnic voting in Peru need not be limited to indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters. Many white and white-mestizo Peruvians may also have psychological attachments to non-indigenous cultures and backgrounds, or a particular antipathy towards indigenous groups and identities. As in previous chapters, the analysis presented here uses the term white-mestizo to refer to self-identified mestizos who identify more with their European family roots (or at least a Peruvian national identity based more on European ancestry and culture) and who feel little or no connection to an indigenous cultural or personal

[132] According to LAPOP's 2012 survey, respondents who had at least one parent who spoke an indigenous language had an average monthly household income of $190 (US dollars) compared to $265 for respondents with two Spanish-speaking parents. Using the same ethnicity measure, 63 percent of indigenous Peruvians reported having completed secondary education, compared to 73 percent of non-indigenous respondents. According to LAPOP's 2010 survey, 32 percent of indigenous respondents reported having experienced discrimination based on physical appearance in the preceding year, compared to just 15 percent among non-indigenous respondents (the 2012 survey did not include questions on discrimination).

background.[133] Although such white-mestizo backgrounds by no means imply ethnic prejudice, there is little doubt that anti-indigenous prejudice is widespread across Peruvian society. Broader ethnic attachments to non-indigenous identities, whether or not combined with ethnic prejudice, may well affect the electoral (as well as social) behaviour of non-indigenous voters along the lines of the expressive model of ethnic voting.

Third, this chapter argues that ethnic heuristics may still be electorally relevant despite ethnicity's relatively low social and political salience in Peru. Although no indigenous movement or party has had the national profile to reinforce a political ethnic heuristic in the same way as in Bolivia or Ecuador, a series of Peruvian ethnopopulist candidates have performed a similar function, at least in some respects. Although Fujimori, Toledo, and Humala campaigned on somewhat distinct programmatic platforms – both compared with each other, and compared with the explicitly leftist ethnopopulist candidates in Bolivia and Ecuador – all three of these Peruvian candidates focused their attention on the lower socioeconomic classes, promised increased social spending, and were critical of, if not hostile to, political and economic elites.[134] Moreover, their campaigns explicitly linked a non-elite substantive agenda to their non-elite and non-white (if not indigenous) personal backgrounds, while seeking to reinforce popular perceptions about the elite interests and political priorities of their white or white-mestizo opponents.

Indeed, in many cases, Peruvian ethnopopulists have run against candidates from the traditional political establishment, or those who are members of social and economic national elites: Mario Vargas Llosa was Fujimori's primary competitor in 1990; Alan García and Lourdes Flores comprised the principal opposition to Toledo in 2001 and again to Humala in 2006; and Pedro Pablo Kuczynski was one of three candidates to contest the 2011 election with Humala. As well as their personal ties to the political and socioeconomic oligarchy, these opposing candidates tended to run on platforms widely perceived as favourable to elite interests; they promoted neoliberal reform and foreign investment; and they were harsh critics of leftist movements and governments elsewhere in the region. They are also fair-skinned, Spanish-speakers, and from middle- and upper-class families from Peru's major coastal

[133] In fact, 72.2 percent of self-identified mestizos from LAPOP's 2012 survey sample came from families in which neither parent spoke an indigenous language. This compares to 36.2 percent in Bolivia. Although a non-indigenous language background does not equate to a more European, rather than an indigenous, cultural identity, it seems reasonable to infer that at least some of these Spanish-speaking Peruvian mestizos may feel little connection to an indigenous identity. Furthermore, more Peruvians than Bolivians self-identified as white in the 2010 surveys: 12.8 percent compared to 7.2 percent.

[134] Although all three candidates campaigned initially on these platforms, they all pursued more orthodox neoliberal policies once in office.

cities. Most travel regularly to the United States and Europe, where many of them were educated, have worked extended periods of their professional lives, and have close family ties. In these respects, the way in which recent political actors and processes have politicised ethnicity in Peru is somewhat comparable to Bolivia and Ecuador, and it seems likely that such ethnic politicisation may well have contributed to the construction of a comparable ethnic heuristic in Peru.

In addition to the recent campaign activities of Peruvian ethnopopulists, it seems likely that many voters in Peru have also paid attention to the rhetoric and behaviour of Bolivian and Ecuador indigenous parties and movements; indeed, the nature and merit of leaders and political movements in other Latin American countries have been prominent themes in several recent Peruvian campaigns.[135] Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that Peruvian popular perceptions about the types of substantive agendas linked to certain ethnic identities (i.e., ethnic heuristics) may also have been influenced by political discourses and developments elsewhere in the region.

Moreover, even if ethnic identities have only limited salience politically in Peru, there is little doubt that Peruvian social relations – everyday social experiences and interactions – are shaped significantly by ethnicity. Ethnic background remains an important determiner of social and economic status and sociocultural values and preferences, and ethnic discrimination is pervasive throughout society. Thus, outside the political sphere, social experiences in the context of ethnic inequalities may have taught many Peruvian voters the relevance of an ethnic heuristic for understanding and predicting the broad values, interests, and behaviour of social others. In short, even without strong ethnic identification, and in the absence of a national indigenous movement or party, there are ample reasons to believe that Peruvian voters may make use of ethnic heuristics in their electoral decision-making. However, it is also likely that heuristically derived assessments of electoral candidates may be comparatively more fragile in Peru and subject to substantial re-evaluation in the context of new information. With regards to this chapter's analysis, the use of ethnic heuristics may contribute to an observable ethnic bias in voting outcomes, although the survey data cannot easily determine whether such bias results from expressive or heuristic voting. However, the

[135] For example, Humala's perceived Humala was routinely attacked by his rivals in both 2006 and 2011 for his perceived similarity to, and admiration for, both Bolivia's Evo Morales and Venezuela's Hugo Chávez. These links were among the most cited concerns cited by voters in relation to Humala's candidacy (Pimental 2011, 26).

experimental data examined in Chapter Six strongly suggest the latter, providing evidence for widespread ethnic heuristic use in the decision-making of Peruvian voters.

Fourth, the lack of indigenous candidates or parties need not preclude ethnic voting, even along expressive lines. As Madrid has argued, voters may still prefer an ethnically proximate candidate to an ethnically distant alternative in cases where no co-ethnic candidate stands (2011, 275-6). As discussed, many mestizo and indigenous-mestizo candidates have employed ethnic appeals in recent Peruvian elections, and these candidates may provide some degree of descriptive representation for indigenous, as well as indigenous-mestizo, Peruvians. In fact, given the weakness of ethnic identification in Peru, many voters may identify *more* closely with such indigenous-mestizo candidates in descriptive terms than with an indigenous candidate running on an explicitly indigenous platform. The ethnic voting patterns identified in this chapter's analysis indicate a clear preference for ethnically proximate candidates, corroborating (in 2006) and extending (to 2011) Madrid's analysis in this respect. More generally, this thesis argues that ethnic voting should not be restricted conceptually to cases of strict co-ethnic support, particularly in societies such as those in the Andes where ethnic identities are multiple and fluid.

Finally, the societal conditions outlined above, in which individuals from distinct ethnic backgrounds tend to be divided spatially, socially, and economically, are likely to produce similar substantive interests and preferences within ethnic groups. On the one hand, such ethnic divisions mean many co-ethnics will often share material interests because of similar social circumstances (e.g., indigenous Peruvians are disproportionately poor, they make up a majority of agricultural workers, and so forth). On the other hand, such divisions mean individual voters may be socialized in diverse cultural environments, leading to broad ideological preferences and values that are similar within, and distinct across, ethnic groups. In this context, it is quite conceivable that ethnic voting patterns at the group level may simply reflect substantive preferences and interests shaped by ethnic background. However, although the analysis in this chapter finds some evidence for this indirect form of ethnic voting, it also suggests a more direct effect for ethnic background on vote choice indicative of ethnic bias.

In summary, despite weak ethnic identification, low ethnic polarisation, and the absence of a national indigenous movement or party, Peru exhibits certain broad sociopolitical conditions that are conducive to ethnic voting. In these respects, Peru is

comparable with its regional neighbours, Bolivia and Ecuador. Although the ethnic dimension to Peruvian ethnopopulism has been notably less prominent, at least compared to Bolivia, Peru's post-1980 political landscape both helped raise ethnic consciousness and reinforced an ethnic heuristic. Increased ethnic consciousness, combined with long-standing ethnic inequalities and discrimination, may help strengthen (and itself implies) feelings of ethnic solidarity, resentment, or prejudice. Thus, there is some reason to believe that expressive ethnic voting may occur in Peru. With regard to ethnic heuristics, both long-term sociocultural experience and more recent political developments (both within Peru and elsewhere in the region) may have worked to connect an indigenous (or non-white) ethnic background with a political agenda that promotes inequality reduction, poverty assistance, public works, and non-elite nationalism. In contrast, a white or white-mestizo identity may have become linked to orthodox neoliberalism, an institutionalised and/or technocratic style of government and, for some voters, the promotion of national and international elite interests to the detriment of social equality.

However, if Peruvian voters identify less strongly with ethnic group identities, and ethnic relations are relatively less polarised, then we might expect ethnic voting patterns to be more volatile and conditional. In particular, we might expect ethnic allegiances to be considerably weaker than in either Bolivia or Ecuador and, therefore, expressive ethnic voting to be less predominant. More generally, we might expect the effect of ethnic bias – both expressive and heuristic – to be more easily countered by other, non-ethnic voting criteria. Nevertheless, at least as far as electoral politics is concerned, this chapter argues that Peruvian exceptionalism may often be overstated. Ethnicity has emerged as an important component of contemporary electoral processes in Peru, and voters' perceptions of ethnic identities and issues are likely to influence electoral behaviour in ways that are variously comparable with Bolivia and Ecuador.

The Emergence and Significance of the Indigenous Vote in Peru

Although the politicisation of ethnicity in Peru has occurred later and in some respects to a lesser degree than in Bolivia and Ecuador, several prominent electoral candidates have successfully exploited Peru's ethnic differences for electoral benefit. In many ways, these Peruvian ethnopopulists have adopted electoral strategies and achieved patterns of electoral results similar to their Bolivian and Ecuadorian counterparts. In some other respects,

however, Peruvian ethnopopulism has diverged from both the Bolivian and Ecuadorian experiences.

The first notable use of ethnic appeals in a recent presidential campaign was by Alberto Fujimori in 1990.[136] Fujimori, the son of Japanese immigrants, emerged as the surprise winner in 1990, defeating the renowned Peruvian novelist – and electoral frontrunner – Mario Vargas Llosa. Although Fujimori's appeal was more populist than ethnic, his campaign also capitalised on Peru's ethnic divides and inequalities (Degregori 1991; Levitsky 1992; Carrión 1997, 286-7). Fujimori concentrated his campaign in poorer areas, offered a range of concrete policy proposals aimed at poorer voters, and criticised traditional parties and elites (Degregori 1991; Roberts 1995; Graham and Kane 1998; Taylor 2001, 6-7). Although he remained vague about his own economic policies, he explicitly criticised Vargas Llosa's prescription of neoliberal 'shock therapy' to tackle Peru's economic crisis (Roberts 1995, 100).[137]

However, Fujimori also framed his electoral contest with Vargas Llosa in ethnic terms, and he employed a range of symbolic ethnic appeals. At one point, he described the campaign as 'one *chino* and four *cholos* against the whites', contrasting his own background as a non-white immigrant and the indigenous-mestizo (*cholo*) background of his four vice presidential candidates to the white, upper-class background of Vargas Llosa (Carrión 1997, 287).[138] In fact, Fujimori and his co-candidates had far more in common with Peru's highland indigenous and urban *cholo* voters than did the aristocratic Vargas Llosa (Roberts 1995, 94), and Fujimori used these loose descriptive ties – including ethnic ties – to reinforce the claim that he would be 'a President like you' (Cambio 90 1990, np). In the 1990 election, then, Fujimori combined ethnic, personalist, anti-establishment, and substantive policy appeals to win clear majorities in highland indigenous constituencies, as well as strong support among Peru's lower class, indigenous-mestizo urban voters (Madrid 2012, 123-4, 132-4).

In the 2001 elections, Alejandro Toledo employed even more explicit ethnic appeals in his campaign and won similarly impressive vote shares in indigenous areas (Madrid 2012, 126-7). However, like Fujimori, Toledo also relied heavily on populist and personalist

[136] Fernando Belaúnde, founder of Acción Popular, also included ethnic appeals as a component of his broader nationalist-populist project in the 1960s (Belaúnde Terry 1959 [1994], 26-40).
[137] Once in office, however, Fujimori enacted neoliberal reforms that went far beyond those originally proposed by Vargas Llosa.
[138] Despite his Japanese origins, Fujimori was often referred to as *el chino*.

appeals. He made a range of substantive policy pledges (e.g., to extend public health insurance, introduce an agricultural bank, and develop water and sanitation infrastructure) and declared himself 'the President for the poor'. Toledo foregrounded his own humble origins as a shoe-shiner, and he emphasised his outsider status – in this case, in relation to the corrupt Fujimori regime (Madrid 2012 134-5; Lee 2010). Yet Toledo also made much of his ethnic background as an indigenous Peruvian. He publicly identified himself, and was widely referred to, as *El Cholo*, and his campaign employed numerous symbolic ethnic appeals: Toledo compared himself to the Incan emperor Pachacútec; he adopted an Incan cross as the party's logo; and he regularly appeared at campaign rallies in indigenous dress (Madrid 2012, 125-7; Barr 2003, 1164; García and Lucero 2008; Lee 2011).[139] Moreover, Toledo forged alliances with several indigenous organisations, and he recruited numerous indigenous and indigenous-mestizo candidates to his party lists (Paredes 2008, 10; Madrid 2012, 126).

Like Fujimori in 1990, then, Toledo offered both substantive and descriptive representation to indigenous and indigenous-mestizo Peruvians. Although his promise to be a president for the poor was key to Toledo's appeal, so too were the ethnic descriptive ties between Toledo and many non-white voters. As Toledo's wife, Eliane Karp, observed in reference to the 2000 campaign, Toledo established an 'irrepressible chemistry' with many lower-class, non-white Peruvians, for whom 'an ethnic factor, a brutal identification' played a key role (Relea 2000, 8). In the 2001 election, Toledo won more than fifty percent of the vote in most indigenous-majority provinces, comfortably out-performing his principal rivals, APRA's Alan García, and the PPC's Lourdes Flores (Madrid 2012, 126-7).

Finally, Ollanta Humala emerged as the prominent ethnopopulist candidate in 2006. Humala was a dark-skinned former army colonel with a Quechua name, whose family originated from Peru's southern highlands. Like Fujimori and Toledo before him, Humala's appeal was primarily populist, yet ethnic appeals were also important to his electoral platform. Indeed, the analysis in this chapter finds a significant association between a voter's ethnic background and a vote for Humala in the 2006 presidential elections, an association replicated in 2011 when Humala ran again. In both cases, Humala performed

[139] Toledo also played on his Stanford University education and subsequent academic and political achievements, casting himself as the embodiment of *cholo* entrepreneurship and aspirationalism (Toledo 2012, np).

disproportionately well in indigenous areas (Madrid 2012, 129), just as Fujimori and Toledo had done in 1990 and 2000, respectively.[140]

In summary, three out of Peru's last four presidents have been elected in campaigns that employed some form of ethnic appeal. Fujimori (1990), Toledo (2001), and Humala (2011) all won disproportionate shares of the indigenous vote and, with it, the presidency.[141] Humala also topped the 2006 first-round vote and won a clear majority of indigenous votes in the process. These candidates both physically and biographically resembled Peru's non-elite, non-white majority to a far greater extent than their principal electoral opponents, who were typically drawn from the traditional political and economic elites. Such descriptive representation, combined with explicit ethnic appeals that encourage pride in Peru's indigenous heritage, may well have contributed to increased ethnic consciousness among indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters. Like in Bolivia and Ecuador, pride in Peru's indigenous culture and heritage has also been linked to patriotism and a popular nationalism. For example, in 2006 Humala spoke of the 'real Peruvians' he had met in the national police and armed forces, before citing a list of indigenous surnames (Caballero Rojas 2006; cited in Madrid 2012, 128).

Moreover, all three of these candidates also presented themselves as political outsiders, foregrounded their own humble origins and closeness to the people, and made substantive programmatic appeals aimed at non-elite sectors and interests (e.g., poverty subvention programmes, public investment in key infrastructure projects in poorer areas, a higher minimum wage, and so forth). Thus, these Peruvian ethnopopulists appealed to indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters on both substantive and ethnic grounds. This chapter's analysis indicates that, at least with regard to the 2006 and 2011 elections, both types of appeal were central to Humala's electoral success.

Overview of the 2005 and 2009 Presidential Elections

Several features of the Peruvian 2006 and 2011 presidential elections were conducive to ethnic voting along the lines outlined above. Most importantly, both elections included at least one major candidate who made explicit ethnic appeals to voters, as well as a prominent opponent who was popularly linked to a white, elite, Lima electoral base. All things being

[140] The 2006 and 2011 elections are discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
[141] The 1995 election was fought more on Fujimori's record, and the 2000 election was plagued by allegations of fraud (Toledo still won a majority of indigenous voters in first-round voting in 2000, before withdrawing from the second round in protest).

equal, such electoral conditions are conducive to both expressive and heuristic ethnic voting, and they constitute a point of convergence with the Bolivian cases examined in Chapter Three.

However, unlike Bolivia, where only two candidates were viable contenders, in the two Peruvian elections three or four candidates had a realistic chance of winning the presidency. Moreover, in both these cases, the major candidates represented various (and inconsistent) combinations of descriptive and substantive traits, including at least two candidates who made some appeals to indigenous and indigenous-mestizo constituencies. For example, Bolivia's 2005 and 2009 elections were two-way contests between an indigenous candidate at the head of a leftist, redistributive, nationalist party with strong support in highland regions (Evo Morales), and a white, wealthy businessman and career politician from the lowlands, who led a centre-right coalition promising neoliberal orthodoxy (Jorge Quiroga and Manfred Reyes Villa, respectively). In Peru's 2006 and 2011 elections, in contrast, Humala's nationalist, ethnopopulist platform faced competition for the indigenous and indigenous-mestizo vote from several candidates. In 2006, García won support among many lower-class voters, including some indigenous voters, based on his centre-left, populist appeals. In 2011, Keiko Fujimori combined neoliberal macroeconomic policy with wide-ranging pledges to expand social programmes, and she capitalised on clientelistic networks and 'partisan' loyalties among many poor and indigenous voters dating from her father's presidency (Sánchez-Sibony 2012, 113). Former president Alejandro Toledo also generated some support among indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters in 2011, drawing both on ethnic descriptive ties and his personal 'rags-to-riches' story as an emblem of *cholo* aspirationalism.

In some of these latter respects – competition for the indigenous vote, candidates who appeal across regional, ethnic, and socioeconomic divides, and the resulting electoral cross-pressures on voters – the Peruvian cases bear some resemblance to the Ecuadorian campaigns examined in Chapter Four. However, despite such cross-cutting electoral appeals, Humala remained the clearest perceived representative of indigenous and indigenous-mestizo constituencies in both the 2006 and 2011 Peruvian elections, and he received the endorsement of most indigenous and peasant organisations. Indeed, the electoral environment in Peru resulted in a considerably less fragmented indigenous vote compared with Ecuador, where Pachakutik, Rafael Correa, Lucio Gutiérrez, and several traditional leftist parties all claimed

sectors of the indigenous electorate and won support from diverse factions across influential indigenous and social movements.

Nevertheless, polling during the 2006 and 2011 Peruvian campaigns indicated electoral preferences that were extremely volatile, and the likely outcome of the first-round vote remained highly uncertain even on election day (Ipsos 2011a, 2011b, 2011c; Thomson Reuters 2011). In terms of ethnic voting, such volatile electoral preferences suggest weak and conditional voter-candidate ties. Combined with weak ethnic identification at the individual level and low ethnic polarisation at the group level, such voter-candidate linkages are not indicative of expressive ethnic voting. However, this type of inchoate electoral environment may be particularly conducive to the use of heuristics, including ethnic heuristics. In this respect, the Peruvian case diverges from the Ecuadorian examples. Organisational affiliations – to indigenous organisations, social movements, church groups, as well as political parties and candidates – and associated clientelistic relations are arguably less developed and/or less political influential in Peru compared with Ecuador, with the result that the Peruvian electorate is perhaps especially inchoate and non-aligned electorally. Thus, although lingering ethnic attachments and prejudice may play a role in Peruvian voting behaviour, this chapter argues that heuristic ethnic voting is more consistent with Peru's contemporary electoral context in both 2006 and 2011.

PERU 2006

The ballot for the first round of the 2006 Peruvian general elections included twenty presidential candidates, with polls indicating that at least five candidates were viable contenders in the weeks before polling day (Ipsos 2006). Unsurprisingly given the wide electoral field, no single candidate won an absolute majority in the first round of voting, leading to a runoff election between the first- and second-placed candidates: Ollanta Humala (Unión por el Perú, UPP) and former president Alan García (APRA). García ultimately won the second round with 52.6 percent of the valid vote, gaining the majority of those voters who had supported the third-placed candidate, Lourdes Flores (Unidad Nacional, UN). In addition to Humala, García, and Flores, the principal first-round challengers included Martha Chávez, the candidate for ex-president Alberto Fujimori's party-movement Alianza por el Futuro (AF), and former interim president Valentín Paniagua (Frente de Centro, FC). The ruling party, Perú Posible (PP), withdrew its presidential candidate because of party in-fighting over

congressional lists and extremely low approval ratings for the out-going incumbent, Alejandro Toledo.[142]

The three leading candidates for most of the campaign – Humala, García, and Flores – drew their base of support from quite distinct constituencies. Humala and the UPP relied on the support of poorer indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters from Peru's southern highlands, and their campaign centred on these constituencies. Although Humala never presented himself as an indigenous candidate, his name, appearance, and family background all conveyed his Andean origins and contrasted him to the other two candidates in 2006, García and Flores, who are both light-skinned Limeños. Furthermore, throughout his campaign Humala frequently employed symbolic ethnic appeals, just as Alberto Fujimori and particularly Toledo had done in 1990 and 2001. Humala reminded voters in interviews that he had been named after an Incan general (Fregosi 2007, 8); he chose an Inca clay pot as his party's logo; he used the rainbow flag of the Incas for campaign rallies and materials; and he periodically dressed in indigenous clothing and used Quechua phrases (Madrid 2012, 127).

In addition to these symbolic appeals, Humala included numerous indigenous and indigenous-mestizo candidates on the UPP's congressional lists (Paredes 2008, 11), and he forged some alliances with peasant and indigenous organisations (Madrid 2012, 127-8). The UPP's governing plan also embraced several indigenous demands, including the redefinition of Peru as a multicultural country, support for multicultural education and the wider use of indigenous languages, and the recognition of indigenous customs and medicine (Humala Tasso 2006, 70-1; cited in Madrid 2012, 128). Humala also frequently denounced the ethnic discrimination suffered by Peru's indigenous and indigenous-mestizo communities, and he emphasized the indigenous heritage of all 'real Peruvians' (Caballero Rojas 2006).

However, Humala fell very much within Madrid's definition of an ethnopopulist. Indeed, arguably more important than his ethnic appeals was Humala's use of conventional populist appeals. His campaign was highly personalised; it focused primarily on poorer Peruvians; and it regularly attacked the political establishment and perceived US imperialism (Madrid 2012, 136-44). Humala's populist credentials also led to parallels being drawn between him and left-populist leaders elsewhere in the region, particularly Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Evo Morales in Bolivia – associations that ultimately damaged Humala's candidacy (Pimental 2011, 26). Indeed, Humala's meetings with both Chávez and Morales in

[142] Peruvian electoral regulations prevented Toledo from seeking personal re-election.

early 2006, as well as Chávez's public endorsement of Humala and repeated criticism of García and Flores, fuelled repeated attacks on Humala by his domestic opponents. Both García and Flores used such associations to stoke fear among centre-right voters about the influence of Humala's 'friends in Cuba and Venezuela' and to exaggerate the radicalism of Humala's political project (Martín and García 2006).

In contrast to Humala's indigenous and indigenous-mestizo highland base, Flores drew her support almost exclusively from Lima's wealthier white and white-mestizo classes. Through her personal background, appearance, and political affiliation (the PPC is the principal traditional party of the centre-right), Flores was firmly associated with Lima's middle and upper classes (Cameron 2006, np). The UN's programme offered neoliberal continuity and social conservatism, and it was well supported among Lima's business community. Between the two poles of Humala and Flores, García sought to position himself as a centre-left moderate who offered the path of 'responsible change' (APRA 2006). He distanced himself from the more radical aspects of his 1985-1990 presidency, and he attacked Humala as a demagogue and a puppet of Chávez. Yet García also echoed Chávez in his criticism of Flores, condemning her as 'the candidate of the rich' who, against the wishes of the electorate, wanted to take Peru down 'the path to the Right' (Chávez 2006, 14; Chuquizuta 2006). Ultimately, García's strategy paid off as the APRA candidate narrowly beat Flores to win second place, and then, with the reluctant support of many UN voters, defeated Humala more comfortably in the second round.

In summary, although the extent of polarisation in Peru's 2006 electoral campaign does not compare to the Bolivian cases discussed in Chapter Three, the former constituted a somewhat comparable, though more fragmented, electoral landscape. In Humala and Flores, Peruvian voters were faced with two candidates who proposed quite distinct political agendas and reflected quite different sectors of Peruvian society. On the one hand, Humala was a mestizo with Andean origins who combined ethnic and populist appeals to mobilise support among poorer indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters. Most of these voters lived in Peru's highland and Amazon regions, they had been historically excluded from national politics, and they had experienced few of the benefits of recent economic growth. On the other hand, Flores was a career politician from the white Lima elite who led a well-established conservative party of the centre-right. Both the UN's political programme and Flores personally were widely perceived as sympathetic to the interests of the same wealthy, white, Limeño classes.

Thus, the 2006 Peruvian presidential election included many of the same ingredients conducive to ethnic voting that marked the Bolivian campaigns examined in Chapter Three: an electorate in which regional and ethnic divides were often aligned with economic and class inequalities, and an electoral field that included two prominent candidates who drew much of their support from different sides of these correlated cleavage lines. Unlike Bolivia, however, Peru's 2006 campaign also included a viable third candidate in García, who, under Peru's electoral rules, was able to win the presidency by ensuring he was at least the second-choice candidate for a majority of voters.

Official Results and LAPOP Data

This chapter focuses on the first-round vote and primarily on the top three candidates (Humala, García, and Flores), although it includes brief mention of the fourth-placed Chávez. Together, these top three candidates won almost eighty percent of the valid votes. Humala topped the first-round count (30.6 percent), García (24.3 percent) finished just marginally ahead of Flores (23.8 percent), and Chávez finished fourth with 7.4 percent.

The 2006 LAPOP survey was conducted some months after the first-round vote and estimated the official results with a good degree of accuracy (see Table 5.1a). The Peru survey included the standard LAPOP questions on generic ethnic self-identification (white, mestizo, indigenous) and family linguistic background (one or both parents had knowledge of an indigenous language). It also included the same measures as other LAPOP surveys for income and political ideology. However, there were no direct measures of respondents' support for wealth redistribution or nationalisations in Peru 2006, and this analysis only tests a measure of support for a free-trade agreement with the United States. Although this is not directly comparable to the wealth redistribution or nationalisation questions employed in other LAPOP surveys, it may capture some broader attitudes towards state interventionism and macroeconomic policy. Finally, the 2006 survey did not include direct questions about ethnic attitudes, although it asked respondents about their experience of ethnic discrimination. In addition to the discrimination measure, this chapter tests the effects of respondents' level of trust in Peruvian indigenous organisations as a partial proxy for broader attitudes to indigenous groups.

Group- and Candidate-centred Ethnicisation

Table 5.1 shows breakdown of the 2006 presidential vote according to ethnic group, including both group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores. Group-centred scores offer

TABLE 5.1: Ethnicity and Vote Choice, Peru 2006

		LINGUISTIC GROUP		SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP			Total LAPOP	Total Official
		Spanish	Indigenous	White	Mestizo	Indigenous		
A: Overview	Ollanta Humala	15.4	17.0	3.0	26.2	3.3	32.4	30.6
	Alan García	19.3	7.1	4.2	20.9	1.3	26.5	24.3
	Lourdes Flores	15.8	5.1	3.8	16.6	0.5	20.9	23.8
	Martha Chávez	2.2	0.7	0.2	2.3	0.2	2.9	7.4
	Other/Null	12.0	5.3	2.0	14.6	0.7	17.3	13.9
	Proportion of full sample	64.8	35.2	13.3	80.7	6.1	100.0	100.0
B: By Group	Ollanta Humala	24.7	48.4	22.4	32.4	53.8	32.4	
	Alan García	29.9	20.2	31.7	25.9	21.8	26.5	
	Lourdes Flores	24.5	14.4	28.8	20.5	9.0	20.9	
	Martha Chávez	3.4	2.0	1.8	3.0	3.8	2.9	
	Other/Null	18.6	15.1	15.3	18.1	11.6	17.3	
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
C: By Candidate	Ollanta Humala	47.5	52.5	9.2	80.7	10.1	32.4	
	Alan García	73.2	26.8	15.9	79.1	5.0	26.5	
	Lourdes Flores	75.7	24.3	18.3	79.1	2.6	20.9	
	Martha Chávez	75.8	24.2	8.2	83.8	8.0	2.9	
	Other/Null	69.4	30.6	11.7	84.2	4.1	17.3	
	Proportion of full sample	64.8	35.2	13.3	80.7	6.1	100.0	
D: Ethnicisation Scores	**Group-Centred**							
	SD1	.035	.064	.053	.004	.089		
	SD2	.091	.154	.107	.098	.179		
	Candidate-Centred	**LINGUISTIC GROUP**		**SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP**				
	Ollanta Humala	.173		.027				
	Alan García	.084		.018				
	Lourdes Flores	.109		.034				
	Martha Chávez	.110		.033				
	Other/Null	.046		.024				

N = 1281.

Notes: Sub-table A shows the first-round vote proportions by ethnic group (linguistic and cultural identification, which should be read separately) in LAPOP's 2006 survey sample, as well as official election results (all percent). Sub-table B shows the proportion of each ethnic group that voted for each candidate in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-table C shows the proportion of each candidate's vote share received from each ethnic group in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-table D shows group-centred ethnicisation scores (SD1 and SD2) and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores based on the LAPOP sample. SD1 is the standard deviation (SD) of each candidate's share within the ethnic group from the candidate's full sample proportions. SD2 is the SD from an 'equal-share' mean of .20 (100 percent divided by five vote outcome categories). Candidate-centred ethnicisation scores are the SD of candidate vote proportions by ethnic group (linguistic and cultural identification, which should be read separately) from the proportions of each group in the full sample.

Source: Author's elaboration of data from LAPOP 2006 and the Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (www.onpe.gob.pe).

a general measure of the distribution of votes across candidates within each ethnic group, and they give some indication of the relative salience of ethnicity to different groups. Candidate-centred scores reflect the proportion of a candidate's total vote share received from each ethnic group and thus provide insight into the electoral base and appeal of different candidates.

Overall, both group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores are somewhat lower for Peru's 2006 election than for the two Bolivian cases. This is what one might expect given the Peruvian socioethnic context described above. Nevertheless, Table 5.1 also shows some disproportionality in vote distributions across ethnic groups and in the ethnic composition of candidate vote shares in this Peruvian case.[143]

Group-Centred Ethnicisation

The group-centred scores Table 5.1d indicate slightly lower levels of vote concentration within ethnic groups compared with the Bolivian cases (lower SD1 scores in the Peruvian case), but considerably high concentrations compared with Ecuador (compare with Tables 3.1d, 3.8d, 4.1d, 4.3d, 4.5d). The SD2 scores are considerably lower than Bolivia and both the later Ecuadorian cases (2006 and 2009), although they are broadly comparable with Ecuador 2002. Higher SD2 scores underline the overall fragmentation of the vote in Peru and, as a result, the smaller standard deviations from the equal-share mean (in this case 20 percent).

Nevertheless, the pattern of group-centred ethnicisation scores follows a similar trend to that in Bolivia and Ecuador (although less pronounced than the former), with the highest scores in the linguistic and self-identified indigenous groups, mid-level scores in the self-identified white group, and the lowest scores among mestizos. In terms of specific candidate preferences, Table 5.1b shows both indigenous groups disproportionately favoured Humala in their vote choice, with the UPP candidate winning 48.4 percent of voters with an indigenous-language background and 53.8 percent of self-identified indigenous voters (compared to Humala's overall LAPOP vote share of 32.4 percent). As a result, García and particularly Flores won disproportionately low proportions of the indigenous vote; indeed, Flores carried just 9.0 percent of self-identified indigenous voters. However, she performed particularly

[143] Given the data limitations outlined in Chapter Four, comparison between Peru and Ecuador is less useful. In general, Peru's group-centred scores are higher (indicating more homogeneous voting preferences within ethnic groups), while candidate-centred scores are roughly comparable (although the Ecuadorian equivalents vary considerably across candidates and electoral cycles).

well among self-identified white voters, winning a 28.8 percent share of that group compared to her overall LAPOP share of 20.9 percent. García also did well among self-identified whites, winning a 31.7 percent share (compared to his overall proportion of 26.5 percent), while Humala won a respectable 22.4 percent (but still 10.0 percentage points below his overall share).

Overall, the decomposition of vote distributions within ethnic groups suggests some degree of ethnic bias, with a clear indigenous preference for Humala and a more modest preference among white and non-indigenous mestizos for García and Flores. Of the latter two, García appears to have won the broadest cross-section of support, with relatively proportional vote shares in most groups.

Candidate-Centred Ethnicisation

The breakdown of each candidate's vote share by ethnic group confirms these trends. More than half (52.5 percent) of Humala's vote came from indigenous-language voters, despite the group comprising just 35.2 percent of the overall sample (Table 5.1c). According to the self-identification groups, indigenous voters accounted for 10.1 percent of Humala's supporters, although only 6.1 percent of the sample self-identified as indigenous. Both García and Flores relied on non-indigenous language voters for around three-quarters of their vote (73.2 percent and 75.7 percent, respectively), with just 5.0 percent for García and 2.6 percent for Flores coming from self-identified indigenous voters. On the other hand, while only 9.2 percent of Humala's vote came from self-identified whites, 18.3 percent of Flores' supporters were white, as were 15.9 percent of García's.

These vote compositions result in higher candidate-centred ethnicisation scores for Humala and Flores and relatively low scores for García (Table 5.1d). Humala's linguistic-group score is noticeably higher than his self-identification score, indicating that the UPP performed particularly well among indigenous-mestizos (many of whom self-identify as mestizo) in addition to winning strong support among self-identified indigenous. Flores, in contrast, has a higher score on the self-identification measure, reflecting her disproportionate support from white voters and disproportionate rejection by self-identified indigenous voters. As the group-centred analysis suggests, García's vote was the most diverse, and the APRA leader's candidate-centred scores are considerably lower than those for either Humala or Flores on each of the ethnicity measures.

The breakdown of vote distributions in Peru's 2006 election, then, suggests a significant role for ethnicity in voting. The following analysis helps determine whether these patterns of overall vote share can be causally linked to ethnicity, or whether other, non-ethnic factors may explain such voting behaviour.

Direct Predictors of Vote Choice: Main Effects

Table 5.2 shows the effects of various voter characteristics on the predicted probability of voting for each major candidate in 2006. The results are elaborated from a multinomial logit (mlogit) model that tests the effect of ethnicity, sociodemographic factors, and various economic and political perceptions and attitudes on first-round vote choice. The full results of the model are reported in Appendix V.

Ethnicity Variables

First, as the overall vote share analysis suggests, the results reported in Table 5.2 indicate a significant role for ethnicity in shaping vote choice, particularly in terms of the linguistic measure. Indeed, an indigenous-language background is associated with a 13.3 percentage point increase in the overall probability of voting for Humala and a 6.9 percentage point decrease in the probability of voting for Flores. However, once other factors are controlled for, linguistic group has no significant impact on García's vote probability.

However, the ethnic self-identification measure generates few significant effects, with only the effect of indigenous over white voters reaching a generous .10 significance level (indicating a 16.4 percentage point increase in probability in favour of Flores if the voter is white). However, these estimates are based on extremely low cell counts for the relevant cross-tabulations (e.g., only two out of 39 self-identified indigenous voters reported voting for Flores), and thus provide a weak basis for wider inferences. Indeed, in the case of Peru 2006, the linguistic variable is probably more useful analytically than the self-identification measure, providing both higher cross-tabulation cell counts and capturing a more consistent behavioural divide among voters.[144]

The significant effects of the linguistic measure and, for the most part, non-significant effects of the self-identification variables underline the relative low electoral salience of ethnic identification in Peru. However, the electoral significance of a voter's family linguistic

[144] This is not unique to the Peruvian case. Several studies of ethnic voting elsewhere have found linguistic background to be a more consistent predictor of vote choice than alternative ethnicity measures (Birnir 2007, 98-99).

TABLE 5.2: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2006

	HUMALA		GARCÍA		FLORES		CHÁVEZ	
Voter Characteristic	Coeff.	SE	Coeff.	SE	Coeff.	SE	Coeff.	SE
Parents speak ind. language	**.133****	.044	**-.013**	.031	**-.069****	.023	**-.017^**	.010
White (Mestizo)	**-.060**	.040	**.065**	.048	**.043**	.042	**-.037****	.008
Indigenous (Mestizo)	**-.028**	.061	**.068**	.096	**-.120**	.083	**.091**	.083
Indigenous (White)	**.032**	.071	**.003**	.118	**-.164^**	.097	**.127**	.081
Income	**-.018***	.008	**-.008**	.010	**.028****	.009	**.000**	.003
Female	**-.092****	.028	**-.022**	.029	**.134****	.021	**-.012**	.011
Age	**.000**	.001	**.002^**	.001	**-.002***	.001	**.000**	.001
Trust in parties	**-.028****	.009	**.012**	.014	**.001**	.012	**.002**	.005
Participation in protests	**.085***	.038	**-.006**	.069	**-.064**	.067	**-.023**	.023
National economy improved	**-.036**	.058	**-.059**	.040	**.075^**	.042	**.007**	.016
Personal finances improved	**-.017**	.049	**.024**	.032	**-.015**	.051	**-.049^**	.027
Resides in north (Lima)	**-.001**	.045	**.079**	.062	**-.080^**	.040	**.008**	.017
Resides in Amazon (Lima)	**.113^**	.068	**-.100***	.044	**-.079**	.055	**.026**	.030
Resides in highlands (Lima)	**-.039**	.057	**.025**	.060	**-.042**	.037	**-.024***	.011
Resides in rural area	**.040**	.046	**-.021**	.059	**.050**	.051	**-.011**	.017
Grew up in rural area	**.072^**	.037	**-.061**	.051	**-.052**	.046	**.013**	.014
Rightist ideology	**-.041****	.007	**.016^**	.010	**.018***	.007	**.002**	.003
Supports FTA with USA	**-.180****	.033	**.108****	.034	**.087****	.029	**-.013**	.011
Limit opposition voice	**-.029**	.026	**.029**	.035	**-.031**	.028	**.037****	.013
'Strongman' populist leader	**.027**	.027	**-.011**	.036	**-.048**	.030	**-.009**	.015

N= 655. ^ = $p < .10$; * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$.

Notes: Coefficients are average marginal effects on overall vote probability based on the multinomial logistic regression model reported in Appendix V. The effects for ethnic self-identification and region are compared to base category in parentheses.

Source: Author's calculations based on LAPOP 2006.

group suggests that wider sociocultural background, rather than explicit ethnic self-identification, still influences vote choice. A combination of lingering ethnic attachments, common social experiences, and perhaps the use of an ethnic heuristic – connecting ethnic background with a broad range of likely preferences, priorities, and characteristics beyond those tested explicitly in the statistical models – may help shape voting preferences across a wide demographic. In short, the significance of the linguistic measure suggests a role for ethnic bias, but one that is not entirely derived from strong psychological group attachments, which are more likely to be captured by self-identification measures.

Non-Ethnic Variables

In addition to the ethnicity variables, the 2006 vote analysis generates a number of significant effects for voters' non-ethnic characteristics. Table 5.2 shows significant effects of voter income ('Income'), gender ('Female'), trust in political parties ('Trust in parties'), participation in political protests ('Participation in protests'), and having a rural background ('Grew up in rural area'). It also indicates a significant relationship between vote choice and both political ideology ('Rightist ideology') and support for the Free Trade Agreement with the United States ('Supports FTA'). Of particular interest to the current analysis are the effects of income, political ideology, and support for the FTA.

First, Table 5.2 shows significant effects of voter income on vote choice. Wealthier voters were more likely to vote for Flores in 2006, with a one-unit increase in income band producing a 2.8 percentage point rise in predicted vote probability. In contrast, income was negatively associated with a vote for Humala (a 1.8 percentage point decrease), and it had no significant effect on García's vote probabilities. These findings add weight to the characterisation of Flores as 'the candidate of the rich', while underlining the appeal of Humala's ethnopopulist platform among poorer voters.

Second, political ideology had significant effects on predicted vote probabilities for all three major candidates. A one-unit change from left to right on the ideology scale was associated with a 4.1 percentage point decrease in Humala's vote, and a 1.6 and 1.8 percentage point increase for García and Flores, respectively. Humala, then, appealed to voters not only along ethnic and class lines, but also in terms of political ideology, winning greater support among leftist voters even when other factors are controlled for. García and Flores, in contrast, drew greater support from more right-leaning sectors of the electorate in 2006.

Finally, approval of the FTA with the United States, which was due for ratification shortly after the election, was associated with an 18.0 percentage point drop in the predicted probability of voting for Humala and an increase in support for both his rivals (10.8 percentage points for García and 8.7 for Flores). The FTA was a key issue in the 2006 campaign, and each candidate's stand on the subject appears to have played an important role in the electoral calculations of many voters. Humala promised to repeal the agreement, while both García and Flores promised ratification, albeit in García's case on the condition of some renegotiation of its terms. As discussed above, although attitudes towards the FTA did not necessarily translate into broader macroeconomic preferences, the variable can be taken as a partial proxy for voters' endorsement or opposition to the neoliberal policy model pursued by previous Peruvian governments. This model was explicitly rejected by the Humala campaign, but it was broadly endorsed (albeit with varying degrees of qualification) by both García and Flores.

In addition to these variables, several other features of the 2006 vote analysis are worthy of note. First, without an incumbent in the race, voters' perception of national economic performance ('National economy has improved') appears to have had only limited influence on electoral preferences. Nevertheless, voters who believed the national economy had improved in the previous year were 7.5 percentage points more likely to vote for Flores than voters who perceived no change or a worsening of macroeconomic performance. Of the three major candidates, Flores may well have been seen as the presidential option offering the greatest continuity in terms of economic policy.

Second, voters who had participated in political protests in the previous year were 8.5 percentage points more likely to vote for Humala than those who had not, while lower trust in political parties also increased Humala's predicted vote probability by 2.8 percentage points for a one-unit change on the 1-7 response scale. Humala, in short, appears to have appealed to many voters along traditional populist lines, winning support among voters dissatisfied with the political status quo.

Third, and perhaps surprisingly, region is not particularly significant once other factors are controlled for, although all things being equal Amazonian voters were more likely to vote for Humala than were Lima residents. However, voters who grew up in rural areas were 7.2 percentage points more likely to support Humala compared to those raised in urban areas, even if current urban-rural residence was not a significant vote predictor. The former

variable may pick up a particular indigenous-mestizo constituency that is not captured fully by linguistic group or explicit ethnic self-identification, incorporating urban migrants of indigenous descent with voters who remain in rural areas.

In summary, the initial analysis of Peru's 2006 vote suggests a causal role for ethnicity, particularly in terms of linguistic background. Indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters were far more likely to support Humala even when a wide range of potential confounders are controlled for, while white and non-indigenous voters were more likely to back García or Flores. However, in addition to Humala's apparent ethnic appeals, his populist programmatic appeals were also important. Humala appealed to voters who were generally poorer, more leftist in their ideology, from rural backgrounds, and more opposed to neoliberalism than supporters of García and Flores. The following section, which examines the interaction of ethnicity with income, political ideology, and support for the FTA, offers a more detailed assessment of how ethnic and non-ethnic factors may have combined to shape voting outcomes in Peru's 2006 election.

Decomposed Effects

In addition to the main effects reported in Table 5.2 the 2006 vote analysis also examined the interaction of ethnicity with other non-ethnic voter characteristics (Figures 5.1 and 5.2). This decomposition analysis examined the predicted vote probabilities (APRs) and average marginal effects (AMEs) on vote probabilities according to various interactions between ethnicity and non-ethnic voter characteristics.[145] Detailed output from the decomposition analysis is included in Appendix V, but some noteworthy findings are summarised below. Examining the interactions of ethnicity with these non-ethnic voter characteristics can help both to assess the relative salience of ethnicity to vote choice across groups and to understand better how ethnic and non-ethnic factors combine to determine electoral outcomes.

Income

The main effects reported in Table 5.2 suggest a negative effect for income on Humala's vote probabilities, a positive effect for Flores, and no effect for García. Overall, the decomposed effects are broadly in line with these trends, yet they also reveal some important nuances. First, Humala's populist appeals to lower-income voters did not seem to resonate

[145] Both APRs and AMEs are calculated from the same base mlogit model used in vote analysis in Table 5.2 with additional two-way interaction terms for ethnicity with each non-ethnic vote predictor.

FIGURE 5.1: Predicted Probability of Vote Choice, by Linginguistic Group, Peru 2006



N = 655; ^ = $p < .10$; * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$. Plots show adjusted predicted vote probabilities, with 95 percent confidence intervals, for the candidate indicated according to ethnic group and each non-ethnic voter characteristic (APRs). Coefficients in the legend are average marginal effects (AMEs) by ethnic group for the relevant non-ethnic characteristic. Results are based on a multinomial logistic regression model with two-way interactions between voter ethnicity and each non-ethnic characteristic (see Appendix C for full output).
Source: Author's calculations based on LAPOP 2006.

FIGURE 5.2: Predicted Probability of Vote Choice, by Self-Identified Group, Peru 2006

HUMALA



		Average Marginal Effects
INCOME	White	-.004
	Mestiza	-.016*
	Indigenous	-.055**
RIGHT IDEOLOGY	White	-.057^
	Mestiza	-.042**
	Indigenous	-.018
FTA with USA	White	-.296**
	Mestiza	-.178**
	Indigenous	-.202^

GARCÍA



		Average Marginal Effects
INCOME	White	-.025
	Mestiza	-.008
	Indigenous	.059**
RIGHT IDEOLOGY	White	.063
	Mestiza	.011
	Indigenous	-.048**
FTA with USA	White	.175^
	Mestiza	.115**
	Indigenous	.194

FIGURE 5.2 continued

FLORES



		Average Marginal Effects
INCOME	White	.020
	Mestiza	.031*
	Indigenous	
RIGHT IDEOLOGY	White	.021
	Mestiza	.020**
	Indigenous	
FTA with USA	White	.044
	Mestiza	.099**
	Indigenous	

N = 655; ^ = $p < .10$; * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$. Plots show adjusted predicted vote probabilities, with 95 percent confidence intervals, for the candidate indicated according to ethnic group and each non-ethnic voter characteristic (APRs). Coefficients are average marginal effects (AMEs) by ethnic group for the relevant non-ethnic characteristic. Results are based on a multinomial logistic regression model with two-way interactions between voter ethnicity and each non-ethnic characteristic (see Appendix C for full output).
Source: Author's calculations based on LAPOP 2006.

with *non*-indigenous voters in 2006. Among indigenous-language and self-identified indigenous voters, as well as self-identified mestizos, Humala's APRs increased from around thirty percent at higher income levels to around sixty percent at lower income levels.[146] However, among non-indigenous language and self-identified white voters Humala's APRs remained in the thirty percent region irrespective of income. These findings suggest some form of ethnic bias (either positive among indigenous voters, or negative among non-indigenous voters, or both) conditioned Humala's income-based appeal. The principal beneficiary was the centre-left García, who had comparable APRs to Humala among poorer non-indigenous voters (around thirty percent), with both candidates preferred over Flores (APRs below twenty percent).

In summary, although income clearly influenced vote choice in Peru's 2006 election, its effects were somewhat conditional on ethnic background. Humala's ethnopopulist platform appealed to many poor voters but particularly to those with some indigenous background. Poorer non-indigenous voters, however, were equally likely to vote for García as Humala. Wealthy voters across all ethnic groups were more likely to vote for Flores than otherwise comparable poor voters, although Flores won very few indigenous votes overall, as we have seen.

Political Ideology

The main effects indicate a positive association between leftist ideology and a vote for Humala, while more rightist ideology was associated with support for García and Flores. The decomposition analysis does little to alter this overall interpretation, with the AMEs replicating the trend in main effects in most cases.

However, the APR plots in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 can help demonstrate the substantive impact of different hypothetical voter profiles on likely vote choice. The effect of political ideology can be seen in the comparison between two hypothetical non-indigenous language speakers, one leftist and one rightist (Figure 5.1). Although the leftist voter was most likely to vote for Humala (APRs close to fifty percent, compared to less than twenty percent for both García and Flores), the rightist voter was more likely to choose APRA or the UN (APRs around thirty-five percent, compared to fifteen percent for Humala). Similarly, a rightist indigenous-language voter was most likely to vote for García (thirty to forty percent) or

[146] As in Chapter Three, APRs are rounded to the nearest five percent. In most cases, confidence intervals are sufficiently wide to make more precise estimations inappropriate. In any case, the objective of the decomposition analysis is to examine broad trends rather than precise point estimates.

possibly Flores (twenty-five percent), while a leftist voter from the same background was far more likely to support Humala (APRs over sixty percent). The APR plots can also help underline the impact of ethnic bias on likely vote choice. Indeed, in most cases voters with an indigenous-language background were significantly more likely to vote for Humala, and significantly less likely to vote for Flores, than ideologically comparable non-indigenous voters (Figure 5.1).[147] Once again, then, the decomposition analysis suggests substantive preferences and ethnic bias combine to shape voting outcomes.

Approval of FTA with the United States

The main effects indicate that attitudes on this policy issue were a highly significant predictor of vote choice, a finding confirmed by analysis of the decomposed effects. However, there are signs that the effects of this policy variable were also conditioned, at least to some extent, by ethnic biases. For example, approval of the FTA was associated a decrease of between fifteen and twenty percentage points in the predicted probability of voting for Humala across all ethnic groups. However, although the APRs are comparable in each group among opponents of the FTA (around forty to fifty percent), there are some significant ethnic differences among supporters of the FTA that are indicative of ethnic bias: whereas indigenous and indigenous-mestizo supporters of the FTA still have APRs of voting for Humala of around twenty to thirty percent, the APRs for non-indigenous mestizos and whites drop below twenty percent. Thus, although voters' position on the FTA issue had important effects on vote probabilities, positive ethnic bias among indigenous voters and/or negative bias among white voters appears to have mitigated these policy effects, at least in Humala's case.

Similarly, ethnic bias appears to have played a significant role in conditioning the effects of support for the FTA on the predicted probability of voting for Flores. Although approval of the FTA was positively associated with a vote the UN across all groups, the AME is only statistically significant for non-indigenous mestizos (i.e. the non-indigenous language group and self-identified mestizo group). The APRs indicate that indigenous-language supporters of the FTA were still significantly less likely to vote for Flores compared to non-indigenous voters, despite the UN's explicit promise to ratify the agreement. On the other

[147] These ethnic differences were less pronounced in García's case, however, underlining APRA's broad demographic appeal in 2006.

hand, whites who opposed the FTA were generally more likely to support Flores than attitudinally comparable mestizos.[148]

In short, voters' position on Peru's ratification of the FTA with the United States clearly affected electoral considerations. Humala's promise to repeal the agreement significantly increased his support among voters who agreed with the UPP's position, while the (conditional) endorsement of the FTA by both García and Flores gained them votes among the FTA's supporters. However, these policy effects were still conditioned by ethnic bias. Indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters who supported the FTA were just as likely to vote for Humala as García – and *more likely* to vote for Humala than Flores – despite each candidate taking clear stands on the issue. White voters, for their part, were generally more likely to vote for Humala if they opposed the FTA, although a considerable minority still reported support for García and Flores (APRs above twenty percent for both).

Direct Predictors of Vote Choice: Attitudes towards Ethnic Groups and Issues

As discussed at the start of this case study, the 2006 Peru survey did not include any direct measure of ethnic attitudes. There were, however, several questions about experiences of discrimination, as well as a variable measuring trust in Peru's indigenous movements. These measures were tested for their effect on vote choice, both in terms of main effects and via their interaction with ethnicity measures. However, the analysis generated few useful results. Some brief points of interested are summarised in the text below, and the full statistical output is included in Appendix V.

The analysis finds no significant main effects for voters' trust in the indigenous movement or their experience of discrimination. However, in the interaction with the self-identification measure of ethnicity, the analysis suggests a possible positive relationship between experience of discrimination and a vote for Humala among indigenous voters, although the AME is not statistically significant ($p = .136$). Only when the political attitude measures are dropped from the model does the effect of discrimination reach statistical significance ($p < .05$). The analysis also generates a negative coefficient for trust in the indigenous movement in the white group (with regard to Flores), although once again the AME is not significant ($p = .155$). However, in Humala's case, the AME for the indigenous

[148] The FTA issue was also important for García's vote, although in this case the AMEs are largely comparable across ethnic groups.

group is positive and significant (at the .10 level; $p = .062$), indicating a 4.0 percentage point increase in vote probability.

Overall, then, trust in the indigenous movement and experience of discrimination appear to have had little effect on vote choice in 2006. However, the AMEs identified, though often not statistically significant, hint at a possible positive relationship between trust in the indigenous movement and increased indigenous support for Humala, as well as distrust in the movement among whites and support for Flores. If the indigenous movement is taken as a proxy for broader indigenous political demands, then this might suggest some ethnic bias based on perceived group-based interests.

Discrimination may also have had some influence on increasing Humala's support among indigenous voters. This might suggest discrimination works to increase resentment among victimised groups towards the perpetrators of discriminatory acts – in this case whites and white-mestizos and their political representatives (García and particularly Flores). Discrimination may also strengthen perceptions that group interests can only be served by ethnically proximate candidates who have their group's interests at heart (heuristic ethnic bias), while Humala's explicit criticism of discriminatory practices may also have had increased resonance among victims.

Indirect Effects of Ethnicity

The mediation analysis for Peru's 2006 election tests the indirect effects of ethnicity on a vote for Humala over García, and for Humala over Flores. However, the analysis finds no significant indirect effects for any ethnicity measure in the Humala-García comparison, although it does confirm a significant direct effect for an indigenous-language background in favour of Humala. Thus, Table 5.3 only reports a summary of ethnicity's indirect effects on the log-odds of voting for Humala over Flores in 2006.[149]

The analysis finds significant total indirect effects for an indigenous-language background in favour of Humala, but not for any self-identification ethnicity measure. As with the direct-effects analysis, it seems that ethnic identification has little impact on Peruvian voting behaviour, even indirectly, but the wider sociocultural background captured by the linguistic measure is much more influential. Nevertheless, the significant total indirect effects for linguistic background on vote choice do not capture the full influence of ethnicity

[149] Full results from the mediation analysis are included in Appendix C.

TABLE 5.3: Summary of Mediation Analysis, Peru 2006

	Coefficient	SE	Significant Mediation Pathway	Total *N*
Family Linguistic Group (indigenous)				342
Total indirect effects	.084^*	.048	Income (.037; -.606*/-.298**)	
Direct effect	.114^*	.065	Rightist ideology (.037; -.587*/-.310**)	
Total effect	.198^*	.071		
Proportion of total effect mediated	.424			
White (mestizo)				322
Total indirect effects	-.013	.060		
Direct effect	-.146^*	.068		
Total effect	-.159	.088		
Proportion of total effect mediated	.081			
Indigenous (mestizo)				298
Total indirect effects	.064	.047	Income (.027; -.767^/-.340**)	
Direct effect	.050	.085	Strong leader (.021; 1.281*/.597^)	
Total effect	.114	.105		
Proportion of total effect mediated	.562			

Notes: Table presents a summary of the mediation analysis. Full constituent tables of the output can be found in Appendix V. Coefficients are standardised indirect, direct, and total effects of the ethnicity measure indicated on a vote for Humala over Flores. ^ and * indicated indicate coefficients are significant at the .05 level according to the percentile and bias-correction methods, respectively. 'Proportion of total effect mediated' is based on the product of coefficients/*Y*-standardisation method. KHB and LDE are only shown where estimates are appreciably different (see Chapter Two for further discussion on methods). Coefficients for significant mediation pathways are: overall indirect effect via the mediator (standardised); effect of ethnicity measure on mediator (unstandardised); and effect of mediator on vote choice (unstandardised). Coefficients may be linear or non-linear, depending on the mediator.
Source: Author's calculations based on LAPOP 2006.

on electoral outcomes; the mediation analysis indicates that approximately 42.4 percent of the total effect is accounted for by ethnicity's direct effect on vote choice. In addition, despite non-significant total indirect effects, two specific mediation pathways generate significant indirect effects for the indigenous self-identification measure (compared to mestizo self-identification), once again in favour of Humala. The analysis also finds a significant direct effect in favour of Flores for self-identification as white (compared with mestizo), but no indirect effects.

More detailed examination of the mediation pathways reveals an important role for voter income, political ideology, and voters' preferred style of political leadership ('Strong leader') in mediating ethnicity's effect. First, voter income contributes to significant mediated effects for an indigenous-language background and self-identification as indigenous, through largely comparable mediation pathways. In both cases, an indigenous background was associated with lower household income compared with non-indigenous language voters or mestizos, respectively, which in turn was associated with a vote for Humala over Flores. Thus, an indigenous background increased support for Humala by helping to determine voters' material conditions. However, this indirect effect based on economic circumstances did not account fully for ethnic voting patterns, and an indigenous-language background also had a significant *direct* effect on Humala's vote, indicative of heuristic or affective ethnic bias.

Second, as we saw in the Bolivian cases, political ideology seems to have played a significant mediator role in Peru's 2006 vote. Overall, an indigenous-language background was associated with more leftist ideological views, which in turn were associated with a vote for Humala over Flores. As numerous studies have shown, the social and cultural environment of an individual's upbringing has an important role in political socialisation, particularly with regard to broad worldviews and attitudes (Campbell et. al. 1960, chapter 7; Kinder and Sears 1981). Compared with self-identification, linguistic group is likely to be a more reliable measure of a voters' socioethnic background in which such socialisation takes place. In Peru, an indigenous background appears to contribute to more leftist ideological positions compared to non-indigenous voters, even when other factors (region, income, education, and so forth) are controlled for. However, once again, in the 2006 analysis these indirect effects of an indigenous-language background were in addition to, not instead of, ethnicity's direct effects. Thus, the analysis provides only partial support for the indirect model of ethnic voting.

Third, the analysis suggests that indigenous self-identification may have had an indirect effect on vote choice (in favour of Humala) by helping to shape the perceived preferred characteristics of political leaders. The 'Strong leader' variable measures voters' preference for a president who 'follows the will of the People even if it means breaking some laws', over a president who 'always obeys the laws even if the People do not like it'. The mediation analysis indicates that self-identified indigenous voters were more likely to express preference for the former type of populist leader – a preference that was, in turn, associated with a vote for Humala over Flores. This mediation pathway suggests that Humala's appeal as a populist outsider may have had particular traction among indigenous constituents. This sector of Peruvian society may be less committed to an institutionalised democratic process they see as rigged to favour the vested interests of the economic and political elites, preferring a strong, populist leader who will follow the will of the people (Cotler 1995).

In summary, the mediation analysis finds that voters with an indigenous background were more likely to live in lower-income households, to hold leftist ideological views, and to prefer a political leader who promised direct implementation of popular demands. Each of these predispositions was linked with a preference for Humala over Flores, suggesting that Humala's broad populist appeals, in addition to his ethnic appeals, may have resonated particularly with indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters. However, the analysis still finds significant direct effects for linguistic group and self-identification as white, results that suggest heuristic or expressive ethnic bias (or a combination of the two) still has an important influence on Peruvian electoral behaviour.

PERU 2011

In many ways, Peru's electoral landscape in 2011 resembled the 2006 campaign. Once again, electoral regulations barred the out-going president, Alan García, from running for personal re-election, and abysmal approval ratings convinced his party, APRA, to forego running an alternative candidate. As in 2006, the electoral field was crowded, with 11 presidential tickets on the ballot paper come election day, with at least four candidates who stood a realistic chance of making the inevitable second round (Sánchez-Sibony 2012, 110-11). These four candidates offered a similar range of electoral options as Peruvian voters had faced in 2006: they reflected many of the same regional, ethnic, and class constituencies; they comprised a similar range of populist outsiders, well-known political personalities, and

professional technocrats; and they ran on political platforms that, despite their generally vague, catch-all nature, offered some broad ideological and programmatic alternatives.

Ollanta Humala, the eventual winner, again ran on the ticket of a broad centre-left coalition, Gana Perú (GP). Under the direction of a new team of Brazilian campaign advisors, Humala went to considerable lengths to moderate his more radical 2006 image. The red polo shirt, occasional poncho, and fiery highland rallies from the 2006 campaign were replaced with a white shirt, a suit and tie, and slick, professional television spots delivered in a sober, earnest tone, against neutral backdrops. The more radical proposals from the 2006 manifesto (such as calls for a new constitution and the reversal of prior privatisations) were dropped or moderated in 2011, with Humala insisting that he would preserve many of the broad aspects of current macroeconomic policy. Humala and GP also distanced themselves from Hugo Chávez and Evo Morales, preferring to compare their project to the more moderate, and widely respected, template of Lula da Silva and the Partido dos Trabalhadores in Brazil (Jímenez 2011). Nevertheless, Humala's personal and family background, his campaign's continued focus on the lower classes, and its overarching message of a transformation in political and economic paradigms, all mean that Humala's 2011 candidacy can still be framed in the broad terms of ethnopopulism.[150]

Humala's eventual opponent in the second round was Keiko Fujimori, popularly known by her first name. Keiko was the daughter of former president Alberto Fujimori, who was jailed in 2005 for corruption and human rights abuses committed during his 1990-2000 government. Despite his criminal convictions, Alberto Fujimori had remained popular among many Peruvians, who credited him with ending the armed insurgency of the 1980s and controlling Peru's hyperinflation. Keiko ran on a highly personalistic platform that emphasised the key elements her father's neopopulist political movement: crime reduction and citizen security; economic neoliberalism; and direct assistance programmes for the poor. Her electoral vehicle in 2011 was Fuerza 2011 (F11), and although she made some efforts to separate her candidacy from the more negative aspects of the Fujimori legacy, many prominent members of her father's organisation were candidates or advisors for F11 in 2011.

The third-placed candidate in 2011 was Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, or PPK as he was popularly known. Kuczynski headed the centre-right coalition Alianza por el Gran Cambio

[150] Gana Perú's manifesto was titled 'The Great Transformation' and explicitly advocated strengthening public companies (though not nationalisations), reorienting the economy towards national development, introducing some price controls (e.g. on gas), and a number of extensions to social programmes aimed at the poor (Gana Perú 2011, 14, 58-77, 80-84, 173-8).

(APGC), which included Flores's PPC and several smaller parties. Indeed, if Humala can be seen as reprising his 2006 role as the ethnopopulist candidate in 2011 (albeit a toned-down version), then Kuczynski and APGC can be seen as a partial replacement for Flores and UN. Kuczynski himself is a Limeño of Polish descent who prior to 2011 worked as an investment banker in the United States and as an economist at the World Bank and at Peru's Central Bank. He subsequently served as minister of mining, minister of finance, and ultimately as Prime Minister in Toledo's 2001-2006 government. Kuczynski's family and professional background, the political characteristics of the parties in his coalition, and his personal appearance (he is tall and fair-skinned), all contributed to the image of a neoliberal technocrat who represented the wealthy, white Lima constituencies that had backed Flores in 2006.

Unlike Flores, however, Kuczynski's 2011 campaign attracted particularly vocal support from middle- and upper-class university students in several of Peru's major cities. A segment of this support achieved some notoriety via its strident and often racist advocacy of Kuczynski's candidacy. Known as the *PPKausas* ('those for the PPK cause'), these activists used social media to promote Kuczynski and attack his rivals and their supporters, with particularly vitriolic racist tirades directed at the perceived indigenous support base of both Humala and Fujimori. The activities of the *PPKausas* and particularly the wider media debate that they provoked brought racist discourses, which are normally confined to closed social circles, into the public sphere and worked to increase the salience of ethnicity and ethnic issues in the 2011 campaign (Ardito 2011; Bruce 2011; Sifuentes 2011).

The final viable candidate going into the first-round vote was former president Alejandro Toledo, who once again ran on his Perú Posible (PP) ticket. As discussed previously in this chapter, Toledo is a dark-skinned, self-declared *cholo* (indigenous-mestizo) who grew up in a poor highland community to the north of Lima. In his previous campaigns (1995, 2000, and 2001), Toledo had made much of his indigenous background, and he had won disproportionate support among indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters.

In 2011, Toledo led opinion polls for much of the campaign, but his base of support was badly hit by Kuczynski's entrance into the race. Indeed, Toledo and Kuczynski ran on near-identical platforms, and, having served in the same administration, they often called on the same government record to promote their presidential credentials. The presence of both Toledo and Kuczynski on the ballot paper split the centrist vote – those voters who feared Humala's ethnopopulism, yet strongly opposed *Fujimorismo* – and was undoubtedly a major

factor in the failure of either Toledo or Kuczynski to reach the second round. However, the similarities between the two also make their head-to-head comparison of particular analytic interest; it provides a 'real-world' case of two candidates who are largely comparable in terms of programme and record, but who differ markedly in their respective ethnic backgrounds. Analysis of Toledo's and Kuczynski's vote characteristics, then, provides an opportunity to assess ethnicity's influence on vote choice through a controlled comparison case study.

As in 2006, these diverse candidate profiles represented and appealed to voters along various ideological, regional, ethnic, and class lines. Humala's ethnopopulist platform appealed most to poorer indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters in Peru's highland and Amazon regions, while Kuczynski in particular attracted support from the educated, white, middle- and upper-classes in Peru's major cities. Both Fujimori and Toledo drew their support from somewhat wider constituencies. Many poorer and indigenous voters were still loyal to Fujimori, and the F11 candidate finished second to Humala in most highland and Amazon regions. However, the long-term commitment of *Fujimorismo* to neoliberal reform brought it strong support from the business community, and the party appealed to many urban middle-class voters concerned with rising crime and insecurity. Toledo's preference for neoliberal economics, evidenced through the policies of his previous government, also won him support among many voters from the professional middle classes. Moreover, his personal background – including his ethnic profile – gained him support among poorer indigenous voters, particularly in his native Ancash department and the Amazon.

Thus, the 2011 Peruvian campaign included many of the key ingredients conducive to ethnic voting that were identified in the previous discussion of the 2006 election (and, indeed, in the analysis of the two Bolivian cases). Ethnic, regional, and class divides remained pronounced in Peruvian society, and the 2011 electoral field included prominent candidates whose personal and political profiles linked them, in the minds of many voters, to particular socioethnic groups and interests. The entrance of racial discourses into the public sphere, aided by the 'activism' of the *PPKausas* and the associated media attention, contributed in particular to the increased salience of ethnic identities and inter-ethnic relations in the campaign. Finally, in addition to the juxtaposition of Humala and Kuczynski, the comparison of the latter with the programmatically similar Toledo provides a particularly interesting case for testing ethnicity's role in voting.

Official Results and LAPOP Data

As in 2006, Humala topped the first-round count, winning an almost identical 31.7 percent of the valid vote. Fujimori finished second with 23.6 percent, Kuczynski third with 18.5 percent, and Toledo fourth with 15.6 percent. Humala and Fujimori thus progressed to a second round runoff, which Humala won with 53.4 percent of the valid vote. The following analysis, however, focuses on the first-round vote only.

The data used come from LAPOP's 2012 survey. The LAPOP vote-share estimates are broadly in line with the official results, although they significantly underestimate support for both Kuczynski and Toledo, and overestimate support for Humala and Fujimori (see Table 5.4a). These inaccuracies may result, in part, from confusion among respondents about the first- and second-round vote (support for both second-round contestants is exaggerated). In any case, the vote shares in the LAPOP sample are large enough for meaningful statistical analysis, and they follow the general trend of the official results.

Nevertheless, some aspects of the vote analysis are limited by the low number of observations for particular combinations of characteristics. For example, just nine indigenous-language respondents reported voting for Kuczynski in the model sample (i.e., the sample once all cases with missing data have been excluded). Just one self-identified indigenous respondent voted for Kuczynski, and just four for Toledo. The validity of inferences drawn from statistical estimates based on so few observations is highly dubious. This problem is compounded by the fact that many questions in the 2012 survey, including most questions relating to ethnic attitudes, were only posed to half the sample. Thus, the model sample for the analysis of ethnic attitudes is just $N = 352$, which, combined with the low overall frequency of affirmative responses to ethnic attitude questions, severely limits this aspects of the Peru 2011 analysis.

Group- and Candidate-Centred Ethnicisation

The group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores for Peru 2011 are reported in Table 5.4d. In general, the 2011 SD1 scores are lower compared to 2006, suggesting the distribution of votes within ethnic groups was relatively less concentrated in 2011. This is probably the result of Humala's wider appeal in 2011, as well as the multi-ethnic electoral base of a rejuvenated *Fujimorismo*. The SD2 scores are slightly higher than 2006, reflecting the overall increase in the vote share of the top two candidates in 2011 (and thus proportions that are further from the equal-share mean of 20 percent).

TABLE 5.4: Ethnicity and Vote Choice, Peru 2011

		LINGUISTIC GROUP		SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP				Total
		Spanish	Indigenous	White	Mestizo	Indigenous	Total LAPOP	Official
A: Overview	Ollanta Humala	27.3	18.3	3.4	37.7	4.4	45.5	31.7
	Keiko Fujimori	21.3	6.6	2.5	23.8	1.7	28.0	23.6
	Pedro Pablo Kuczynski	8.3	1.3	1.1	8.2	0.3	9.6	18.5
	Alejandro Toledo	4.4	2.2	0.4	5.7	0.5	6.6	15.6
	Other/Null	7.6	2.6	0.9	8.6	0.8	10.3	10.6
	Proportion of full sample	69.0	31.0	8.2	84.0	7.7	100.0	100.0
B: By Group	Ollanta Humala	39.5	58.9	41.2	44.9	57.3	45.5	
	Keiko Fujimori	30.9	21.4	29.9	28.3	22.0	28.0	
	Pedro Pablo Kuczynski	21.1	4.1	13.4	9.8	3.3	9.6	
	Alejandro Toledo	6.4	7.1	5.2	6.8	6.5	6.6	
	Other/Null	11.1	8.5	10.3	10.2	10.9	10.3	
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
C: By Candidate	Ollanta Humala	59.9	40.1	7.4	82.8	9.7	45.5	
	Keiko Fujimori	76.3	23.7	8.8	85.1	6.1	28.0	
	Pedro Pablo Kuczynski	86.8	13.2	11.5	85.9	2.7	9.6	
	Alejandro Toledo	66.7	33.3	6.4	86.0	7.6	6.6	
	Other/Null	74.4	25.6	8.3	83.5	8.2	10.3	
	Proportion of full sample	69.0	31.0	8.2	84.0	7.7	100.0	
D: Ethnicisation Scores	**Group-Centred**							
	SD1	.025	.055	.023	.003	.049		
	SD2	.129	.203	.135	.146	.197		
	Candidate-Centred	**LINGUISTIC GROUP**		**SELF-IDENTIFIED GROUP**				
	Ollanta Humala	.091		.013				
	Keiko Fujimori	.073		.011				
	Pedro Pablo Kuczynski	.178		.034				
	Alejandro Toledo	.023		.013				
	Other/Null	.054		.003				

N = 1177.

Notes: Sub-table A shows the first-round vote proportions by ethnic group (linguistic and cultural identification, which should be read separately) in LAPOP's 2012 survey sample, as well as official election results (all percent). Sub-table B shows the proportion of each ethnic group that voted for each candidate in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-table C shows the proportion of each candidate's vote share received from each ethnic group in the LAPOP sample (percent). Sub-table D shows group-centred ethnicisation scores (SD1 and SD2) and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores based on the LAPOP sample. SD1 is the standard deviation (SD) of each candidate's share within the ethnic group from the candidate's full sample proportions. SD2 is the SD from an 'equal-share' mean of .20 (100 percent divided by five vote outcome categories). Candidate-centred ethnicisation scores are the SD of candidate vote proportions by ethnic group (linguistic and cultural identification, which should be read separately) from the proportions of each group in the full sample.

Source: Author's elaboration of data from LAPOP 2012 and the Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (www.onpe.gob.pe).

Nevertheless, although voters across ethnic groups supported a range of candidates in 2011, voting preferences were still noticeably more concentrated in indigenous groups (both linguistic and self-identified). Table 5.4b shows that 58.9 percent of voters with an indigenous-language background, and 57.3 percent of self-identified indigenous voters, supported Humala in the first round, proportions well above GP's overall LAPOP share of 45.5 percent. However, Humala also appeared to win a substantial share of the white vote in 2011 – 41.2 percent compared to just 22.4 percent in 2006. This expansion of Humala's appeal is also reflected in a 39.5 percent share of the vote in the non-indigenous language group, compared to just 23.7 percent in 2006 (compare Tables 5.1 and 5.4).[151] However, despite Humala's gains in non-indigenous groups, these proportions are still below GP's overall vote share in 2011.

In contrast, both Fujimori and Kuczynski won shares of the non-indigenous language and white vote that were in excess of their overall vote proportions, although Fujimori also performed respectably in indigenous groups (21-22 percent compared to an overall share of 28.0 percent). However, although these distributions appear to indicate some continued indigenous support for *Fujimorismo*, Kuczynksi's candidacy was broadly rejected by most voters with an indigenous background (just a 3-4 percent vote for Kuczysnki, compared to an overall 9.6 percent share). Finally, support for Toledo in the LAPOP sample is low across all groups (an average of just 6.4 percent), although the PP candidate seems to have done slightly worse among whites (5.2 percent) and slightly better among indigenous-language speakers (7.1 percent).

The candidate-centred ethnicisation scores reflect the broad trends of the group-centred analysis. Humala's 2011 scores are approximately half his 2006 scores, indicating a substantial increase in the breadth of his appeal across ethnic groups (compare Tables 5.1d and 5.4d). Indeed, almost 59.9 percent of Humala's vote came from non-indigenous voters in 2011, compared with just 47.5 percent in 2006, despite comparable proportions of each linguistic group across survey samples (compare Tables 5.1a, 5.1c, 5.4a, and 5.4c). Similarly, although the portion of Humala's vote accounted for by white voters decreased slightly between 2006 and 2011 (from 9.2 to 7.4 percent), the latter contribution was actually closer to the overall proportion of whites in the sample (7.7 percent in 2011 compared to 13.3 percent in 2006). Nevertheless, Humala still relied disproportionately on indigenous voters in

[151] However, higher 2011 proportions may also be inflated by the overestimation of Humala's total vote share in the LAPOP sample.

2011, with 40.1 percent of his vote comprised of voters with an indigenous-language background and 9.7 percent accounted for by self-identified indigenous (compared to sample proportions of 31.0 and 7.7 percent, respectively).

As the group-centred breakdown indicates, Fujimori also gained some support from indigenous constituents, with 23.7 percent and 6.1 percent of her vote coming from indigenous-language and self-identified indigenous voters, respectively (Table 5.4c). Fujimori's respectable performance among indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters, as well as among whites and non-indigenous mestizos, generates a relatively low candidate-perspective ethnicisation score for the F11 candidate (Table 5.4d). In contrast, the candidate-centred analysis produces particularly high ethnicisation scores for Kuczynski (.178 and .034), comfortably higher than Flores in 2006. This reflects the severe under-representation of indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters in Kuczynski's vote; just 13.2 percent came from voters with an indigenous-language background (compared to 31.0 percent in the sample), and just 2.7 percent came from self-identified indigenous voters (compared to 7.7 percent in the sample). Meanwhile, almost 11.5 percent of Kuczynksi's vote came from self-identified whites, well above the 8.2 percent sample proportion. Finally, although Toledo's overall numbers are low in the LAPOP sample, the composition of his vote approximates the full sample proportions, suggesting that the PP candidate appealed across ethnic groups in 2011, albeit to a limited degree. Toledo's candidate-centred ethnicisation scores are, as a result, relatively low.

In summary, ethnic background appears to have played some role in shaping the electoral constituencies of the major candidates in Peru's 2011 election. Indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters showed a disproportionate preference for Humala and GP, while Kuczynski performed particularly poorly among those groups but disproportionately well among whites and non-indigenous mestizos. Although Fujimori also performed slightly better among non-indigenous voters, her populist appeals and the historical links between *Fujimorismo* and indigenous voters brought her a substantial minority of the vote in the latter constituencies. Nevertheless, the analysis also shows that representatives of all ethnic groups can be found among the supporters of each major candidate, albeit unevenly distributed. At first glance, then, there seems to be only limited evidence for expressive ethnic voting in the 2011 Peruvian election; all candidates won some votes across ethnic lines, and ethnic background did not definitely predetermine electoral choices.

Direct Predictors of Vote Choice: Main Effects

Table 5.5 shows the effects of voter characteristics on the overall predicted probability of voting for each major candidate in Peru's 2011 election. As in previous cases, the results are elaborated from a mlogit model, the results of which are reported in Appendix V. The analysis generates statistically significant effects for the linguistic measure of ethnicity (and, in the case of Kuczynski, for the self-identification measure), even when a range of potential confounders are controlled for. These findings strengthen the inference of a causal relationship between voters' wider sociocultural background and vote choice in Peru. However, as in previous case studies, the analysis of Peru's 2011 vote also finds significant effects for several other demographic factors, as well as key measures of ideological and policy preferences.

Ethnicity Variables

The mlogit model reported in Table 5.5 predicts a 15.4 percentage point increase in the overall probability of voting for Humala for voters with an indigenous-language background. In contrast, the same linguistic background is negatively associated with Kuczynski's vote, decreasing the probability of a vote for the APGC by 8.5 percentage points. These effects underline both the broad support for Humala among indigenous and indigenous-mestizos and Kuczynski's particularly limited appeal to these groups. The linguistic measure is non-significant for both Fujimori and Toledo, indicating the more ethnically diverse appeal of both these candidates. In addition to the linguistic measure, indigenous self-identification is also negatively associated with a vote for Kuczynski compared to both mestizos and whites. However, as noted previously, these estimates are based on very few observations.

Overall, the results of regression analysis appear to confirm a causal role for ethnicity in the 2011 election. In particular, the disproportionate support for Humala among indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters, as well as the concentration of Kuczynski's support among whites and non-indigenous mestizos, is not explained fully by sociodemographic factors, economic perceptions, or political attitudes. As in 2006, the linguistic measure of ethnicity is a much better predictor of vote choice compared to ethnic self-identification. This reinforces the view that ethnic identification may have relatively low electoral salience in Peru, but that wider sociocultural background may have quite substantial effects on voting behaviour.

TABLE 5.5: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2011

	HUMALA		FUJIMORI		KUCZYNSKI		TOLEDO	
Voter Characteristic	**Coeff.**	**SE**	**Coeff.**	**SE**	**Coeff.**	**SE**	**Coeff.**	**SE**
Parents speak ind. language	**.154****	.050	**-.078**	.049	**-.085****	.027	**.030**	.023
White (Mestizo)	**-.023**	.064	**.030**	.057	**.027**	.041	**-.007**	.027
Indigenous (Mestizo)	**-.006**	.083	**.115**	.077	**-.071***	.033	**.002**	.043
Indigenous (White)	**.017**	.096	**.085**	.101	**-.098^**	.053	**.009**	.045
Income	**-.008**	.006	**-.011***	.005	**.009****	.003	**.007***	.003
Female	**-.177****	.037	**.114****	.027	**.015**	.021	**.020**	.018
Age	**.002***	.001	**-.002**	.001	**-.002****	.001	**.001**	.001
Trust in parties	**.003**	.011	**-.003**	.010	**.002**	.007	**.002**	.006
Participation in protests	**.152****	.045	**-.100***	.049	**-.036**	.041	**.000**	.025
National economy has improved	**-.024**	.041	**.055**	.042	**-.002**	.040	**-.033**	.025
Personal finances have improved	**.050**	.044	**-.035**	.042	**-.031**	.029	**.019**	.019
Resides in north (Lima)	**.088**	.056	**-.033**	.047	**-.034**	.029	**.023**	.026
Resides in Amazon (Lima)	**.050**	.062	**.013**	.065	**-.017**	.029	**.030**	.033
Resides in highlands (Lima)	**.024**	.059	**-.071**	.062	**.033**	.044	**-.001**	.027
Resides in rural area	**.047**	.047	**.024**	.048	**-.061^**	.030	**.024**	.024
Rightist ideology	**-.004**	.008	**.011**	.008	**.005**	.006	**-.003**	.004
Wealth redistribution	**.033^**	.017	**.001**	.015	**-.013**	.010	**-.007**	.007
Public health service	**-.016**	.017	**-.004**	.015	**.004**	.011	**.013**	.009
Nationalisations	**.023***	.009	**-.012**	.008	**-.014***	.006	**-.009^**	.005
Free trade	**-.018**	.015	**.015**	.013	**-.008**	.008	**-.002**	.006
Limit opposition voice	**.010**	.012	**-.010**	.012	**.001**	.007	**.000**	.006
Direct democracy	**.014**	.013	**-.008**	.012	**-.003**	.007	**.004**	.006
Minorities are a threat	**-.018**	.014	**.011**	.012	**.005**	.007	**-.002**	.006

N= 807. ^ = $p < .10$; * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$.

Notes: Coefficients are average marginal effects on overall vote probability based on the multinomial logistic regression model reported in Appendix V. The effects for ethnic self-identification and region are compared to base category in parentheses.

Source: Author's calculations based on LAPOP 2012.

TABLE 5.6: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2011: Kuczynski over Toledo

Voter Characteristic	Coeff.	SE
Parents speak indigenous language	**-.458****	.108
White (Mestizo)	**.079**	.230
Indigenous (Mestizo)	**-.181**	.231
Indigenous (White)	**-.260**	.103
Income	**.012**	.014
Female	**.008**	.096
Age	**-.009****	.002
Trust in parties	**.006**	.023
Participation in protests	**-.101**	.114
National economy has improved	**-.016**	.133
Personal finances have improved	**-.221***	.105
Resides in north (Lima)	**-.184**	.131
Resides in Amazon (Lima)	**-.203***	.099
Resides in highlands (Lima)	**.150**	.103
Resides in rural area	**-.129**	.090
Rightist ideology	**.028**	.025
Wealth redistribution	**-.007**	.041
Public health service	**-.038**	.058
Nationalisations	**-.010**	.023
Free trade	**-.001**	.031
Limit opposition voice	**-.001**	.037
Direct democracy	**-.007**	.023
Minorities are a threat	**.027**	.039

N= 131. ^ = $p < .10$; * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$.

Notes: Coefficients are average marginal effects predicted probability of voting for Kuczynski over Toledo based on a reduced version of the multinomial logistic regression model reported in Appendix V. The effects for ethnic self-identification and region are compared to base category in parentheses.

Source: Author's calculations based on LAPOP 2012.

These effects suggest a role for ethnic bias, but they indicate such bias is not wholly (or even mostly) the product of strongly felt, inflexible group identities.

Non-Ethnic Variables

Even when ethnic variables are taken into account, the analysis reported in Table 5.5 shows significant effects of several non-ethnic voter characteristics. These include voter income ('Income'), support for state-led wealth redistribution ('Wealth redistribution'), and nationalisations in key sectors of the economy ('Nationalisations'). However, unlike in 2006, the more general measure of political ideology ('Rightist ideology') does not produce significant effects in the 2011 analysis. In part, the lack of significant effects for this general ideology measure may be explained by the inclusion of the more specific programmatic measures in 2011. Variables concerning wealth redistribution, the provision of health services, and nationalisations may all capture aspects of voters' ideological preferences.

First, income appears to have had less impact on vote choice in 2011 than it did in 2006. However, in this case the particular characteristics of the 2011 electoral field may provide part of the explanation. Table 5.5 shows that an increase in income band was negatively associated with Fujimori's vote probabilities (by an average of 1.1 percentage points) and positively associated with both Kuczynski's and Toledo's votes (an increase of just under one percentage point), but that it had no effect in Humala's case. It would be misleading, though, to claim that Fujimori appealed more to poorer voters than did Humala; in fact, the mean income of both candidates' supporters is nearly identical (7.9 and 7.7 respectively, based on an income-band scale that runs 0-16). In fact, the analysis suggests that several other voter characteristics – in particular ethnicity, participation in protests ('Participation in protests'), and attitudes towards state interventionism ('Wealth redistribution' and 'Nationalisations') – may explain support for Humala better than income. In other words, a typical Humala voter differed from supporters of Fujimori, Kuczynski, and Toledo on a wide range of non-income variables that ultimately confound any overall effect for income. In contrast, many Fujimori voters were comparable with supporters of Kuczynski and Toledo in terms of ethnicity and political attitudes, but the former tended to be significantly poorer (an average income of 7.9, compared to 9.2 for Kuczynski and 9.8 for Toledo). Thus, income emerged as a significant predictor of vote choice with regard to these latter candidates, but not in Humala's case.

Second, although political ideology may not have had significant effects in the 2011 vote analysis, two other measures of broad political attitudes – support for state-led wealth redistribution and nationalisations – were significant vote predictors. Support for both policies was associated with an increase in the predicted probability of voting for Humala and a decrease in the probability of voting for one of Humala's rivals (although not all the effects are statistically significant). Thus, despite toning down his state-interventionist rhetoric, most voters still viewed Humala as the candidate most likely to pursue such policies in 2011, and they adjusted their electoral calculations accordingly. In part, this was because GP's government plan and campaign publicity still emphasised programmatic initiatives along these lines: a windfall tax on mining to help fund expanded social programmes (Gana Perú 2011a, 71, 173-78); an increase in the minimum wage (62, 107); a reorientation of Peru's development model to a 'national market economy' (58-77); some nationalisations in strategic sectors (80-84); and recurring references to the redistribution of economic benefits (14, 160, 172-74; Partido Nacionalista Peruano 2011a, 2011b).

In part, however, this thesis would argue that the perception of Humala as a proponent of state interventionism was enhanced by his socioethnic profile. According to the prevalent ethnic heuristic, Humala's indigenous-mestizo background linked him to these types of programmatic agendas. Indeed, despite efforts by the Humala campaign to moderate the candidate's image, the GP candidate was still perceived in fairly radical terms by certain sectors of the electorate. Dire warnings about sweeping nationalisations, seizures of private property, excessive price controls, and the closing off of Peru's economy to foreign investment were recurrent themes in the right-wing press, on social media, and in the private discussions of many middle- and upper-class voters, particularly in Lima (Ardito 2011; Manrique 2011; Sifuentes 2011). Such exaggerated characterisation of Humala's political project, despite explicit information that contradicted the alleged programmatic intentions, suggests a heuristic role for ethnic stereotypes that may have had substantial impact of voters' candidate perceptions.

Finally, in terms of the LAPOP vote model, the analysis suggests that Humala remained the closest thing to 'a candidate of protest' in 2011, with voters who had participated in political protests 15.2 percentage points more likely to vote for Humala than those who had not. As in 2006, region did not have significant effects in 2011 once other factors (such as ethnicity and income) were controlled for. Rural residence had only one

significant effect, a drop of 6.1 percentage points in Kuczynski's vote probability, a finding that appears to confirm Kuczynski's base of support in the wealthier urban sectors.[152]

Kuczynski and Toledo

Table 5.6 shows the results from a reduced vote model comparing support for Kuczynski and Toledo only. As indicated previously, both candidates ran on near-identical programmatic platforms in 2011, and, having served in the same administration, they had a comparable recent political record. However, their ethnic profiles differ markedly, and thus a head-to-head comparison of their vote offers an excellent opportunity to test the basic ethnic voting hypothesis.

The analysis generates two key findings. First, voter income and all the political attitude measures are non-significant. Voters, it seems, recognised the comparability of the two candidates' programmatic agendas, and as a result these factors had little impact on vote decisions.[153] Second, the marginal effect of the linguistic ethnic measure is highly significant ($p < .001$) and quite large, indicating that voters with an indigenous-language background were almost twice as likely to vote for Toledo as for Kuczynski. The self-identification variables suggest the same underlying pattern, with self-identification as indigenous associated with a vote for Toledo and self-identification as white linked to a Kuczynski vote. However, these effects do not reach statistical significance, in part because of the relatively low number observations in this reduced model ($N = 131$). Other findings of note include Kuczynski's greater appeal among younger voters, and an increase in support for Toledo among residents of the Amazon region.

Overall, then, the head-to-head comparison of Kuczynski's and Toledo's 2011 vote indicates a substantial effect for ethnic background on vote choice. Despite the programmatic and performance comparability of the two candidates, Toledo's indigenous background won him far greater support among indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters compared to Kuczynski, a white *Limeño* and second-generation European immigrant. Ethnic bias, in short, played an important role in separating supporters of Kuczynski from those of Toledo.

* * *

[152] Economic perceptions were also non-significant, although the usefulness of these measures is reduced given the time lapse between the election and the LAPOP survey; the relevant LAPOP questions explicitly referred to 'the last 12 months'.

[153] The effect of ethnic heuristics may also have been considerably less for both candidates given that voters had recent experience of the Toledo government on which to make assessments.

In sum, ethnicity appears to have played an important role in Peru's 2011 election. Although sociodemographic factors, economic considerations, and political attitudes were also important determiners of vote choice, they do not fully account for voting outcomes at the individual level. Specifically, they do not fully explain why indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters supported Humala to such an extent, or why the same sectors were particularly disinclined towards Kuczynski. Similarly, they do not explain the extent of white and non-indigenous support for Kuczynski, or Humala's disproportionately poor performance among non-indigenous voters. Finally, they do not account for the marked ethnic divide between supporters of two programmatically similar, but ethnically distinct, candidates: Kuczynski and Toledo. The distinct ethnic profiles of these two candidates appear to have helped them develop bases of electoral support from quite different ethnic constituencies. In short, the initial analysis of the 2011 vote offers strong evidence that ethnic bias has significant effects on electoral choices in Peru.

However, neither the basic vote-share analysis (Table 5.4) nor the regression analysis (Table 5.5) is indicative of unconditional ethnic voting behaviour. Not only did voters from the same ethnic group vote for a variety of candidates, including ethnically distant candidates, but several non-ethnic characteristics are important vote predictors. These include general dissatisfaction with the political status quo, voter income, and fundamental attitudes towards the role of the state in society. These findings indicate that voters considered a wide range of criteria in reaching their vote decisions, and that programmatic factors – whether influenced by ethnic heuristics or not – were important vote determiners in Peru's 2011 election.

Decomposed Effects

Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show the decomposition of ethnicity's interactions with income, political ideology, and attitudes towards wealth redistribution and nationalisations. Full statistical output is included in Appendix V, with some illustrative examples summarised below.

Income

The main effects in Table 5.5 suggest that income had a negligible effect on the probability of voting for Humala, a negative effect on Fujimori's vote probabilities, and positive effects for both Kuczynski and Toledo. However, when the interaction between ethnicity and income is decomposed, a more complex picture emerges.

FIGURE 5.3: Predicted Probability of Vote Choice, by Linguistic Group, Peru 2011



FIGURE 5.3 continued

KUCZYNSKI



TOLEDO



N = 807; ^ = $p < .10$; * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$. Plots show adjusted predicted vote probabilities, with 95 percent confidence intervals, for the candidate indicated according to ethnic group and each non-ethnic voter characteristic (APRs). Coefficients in the legend are average marginal effects (AMEs) by ethnic group for the relevant non-ethnic characteristic. Results are based on a multinomial logistic regression model with two-way interactions between voter ethnicity and each non-ethnic characteristic (see Appendix C for full output).
Source: Author's calculations based on LAPOP 2012.

FIGURE 5.4: Predicted Probability of Vote Choice, by Self-Identified Group, Peru 2011

HUMALA



		Average Marginal Effects
INCOME	White	.000
	Mestiza	-.007
	Indigenous	-.018^
RIGHT IDEOLOGY	White	.013
	Mestiza	-.010
	Indigenous	.059*
REDISTRIBU-TION	White	.019
	Mestiza	.029
	Indigenous	.094*
NATIONALIS-ATION	White	.020
	Mestiza	.027**
	Indigenous	.022

FUJIMORI



		Average Marginal Effects
INCOME	White	-.015
	Mestiza	-.012*
	Indigenous	.017
RIGHT IDEOLOGY	White	-.019
	Mestiza	.019*
	Indigenous	-.029
REDISTRIBU-TION	White	-.022
	Mestiza	.004
	Indigenous	-.149**
NATIONALIS-ATION	White	-.052
	Mestiza	-.009
	Indigenous	-.047**

FIGURE 5.4 continued

KUCZYNSKI



	Average Marginal Effects	
INCOME	White	-.007
	Mestiza	.009*
	Indigenous	
RIGHT IDEOLOGY	White	.001
	Mestiza	.004
	Indigenous	
REDISTRIBU-TION	White	.051
	Mestiza	-.012
	Indigenous	
NATIONALIS-ATION	White	.015
	Mestiza	-.020*
	Indigenous	

N = 807; ^ = $p < .10$; * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$. Plots show adjusted predicted vote probabilities, with 95 percent confidence intervals, for the candidate indicated according to ethnic group and each non-ethnic voter characteristic (APRs). Coefficients in the legend are average marginal effects (AMEs) by ethnic group for the relevant non-ethnic characteristic. Results are based on a multinomial logistic regression model with two-way interactions between voter ethnicity and each non-ethnic characteristic (see Appendix C for full output). Estimates for Kuczynski in the indigenous group are excluded due to extremely low cross-tabulation cell counts. Similarly, low cell counts preclude the estimation of meaningful APRs or AMEs for Toledo in all but the mestizo group, which closely resembles the main effects reported in Table 5.5, and so the Toledo plots are not included here.
Source: Author's calculations based on LAPOP 2012.

One noteworthy aspect of the decomposition analysis is the indication that ethnic background may have particularly important electoral effects among poorer voters. As in 2006, Humala's ethnopopulist appeals seem to have resonated among voters from a broad indigenous background, but markedly less so among poor non-indigenous voters. For example, a poor voter from an indigenous background had an approximately seventy percent chance of voting for Humala, compared to a twenty percent chance of voting for Fujimori and less than a five percent chance of voting for either Kuczynski or Toledo. However, a poor voter from a non-indigenous background was equally likely to vote for Humala or Fujimori (forty percent in both cases) and marginally more likely to vote for Kuczynski compared to a poor indigenous voter (APRs around ten percent). We might infer that non-indigenous voters read the ethnic component of Humala's appeal to indicate the prioritisation of more indigenous group interests and values in a future GP government, interests that the non-indigenous voter did not necessarily share. More expressive ethnic preferences or prejudice may also have played a role.

A further noteworthy aspect of ethnicity's interaction with income is the broad tendency for ethnic differences to narrow or disappear at higher-income levels. This suggests that material concerns may take precedence over ethnic bias for some wealthier voters. Indeed, although ethnic bias appears to have played some role in separating poorer voters into Humala or Fujimori supporters, the appeal of both these populist candidates declined as income increased. The primary beneficiaries were Kuczynski and Toledo whose vote probabilities tended to increase with higher income. Both were well-known members of the political establishment whose professional economic training, record in office, and macroeconomic policy proposals all pointed to political and economic continuity, making them the safer economic choice for higher-income voters.

In sum, both income-based concerns and ethnic bias were important to voters in 2011, but the way in which such preferences combined to shape vote choice was not straightforward. Humala's income-based appeal was concentrated among voters from an indigenous background, while Fujimori may have been the preferred choice for many non-indigenous lower-class voters. However, both Humala and Fujimori were relatively more attractive to poorer voters than to wealthier voters, with the latter constituencies showing an

increased preference for the more predictable, internationally respected economic technocrats Kuczynski and Toledo.[154]

Political Ideology

Unlike the other cases studies examined in this and preceding chapters, political ideology does not seem to have played a prominent role Peru's 2011 vote. The main effects in Table 5.5 are statistically non-significant for each candidate, and with a few notable exceptions, the decomposition analysis generates similarly non-significant AMEs in each ethnic group.

One partial exception is the case of Fujimori. A one-unit move from left to right on the ideology scale produces a 1.9 percentage point increase in the probability of voting for Fujimori among non-indigenous language voters and within the larger self-identified mestizo group. This trend is, perhaps, what we might expect given the political profile of *Fujimorismo*; a strong defence of neoliberalism and a hard-line position on public and national security (including persisting authoritarian tendencies) are characteristics that are likely to fit with many Peruvians' perception of more right-wing political preferences. The decomposed effects indicate that such an ideological preference did indeed influence Fujimori's vote in 2011 – in the two largest ethnic groups – despite the failure of the main effects analysis to generate statistically significant effects.

Overall, the limited statistical significance of the political ideology measure may reflect the confounding effects of the new programmatic preference variables introduced in the 2011 analysis. As Table 5.5 indicates, two of these measures (wealth redistribution and nationalisations) had significant main effects on vote choice in 2011. Furthermore, both these variables, which tap more specific aspects of political ideology, were key themes in GP's manifesto. As the only electoral coalition to offer any ideological alternative to continued neoliberalism, we might expect ideological preferences in general, and these two measures in particular, to have influenced GP's vote. However, the same change in survey measures did not eliminate the effect of the general ideology variable in the case of Bolivia's 2009 election. Thus, the non-significant effects generated in the Peruvian case may also indicate a more limited ideological dimension to contemporary Peruvian politics and electoral behaviour, as some analysts have suggested (Cameron 2011). Still, the decomposed analysis does pick up

[154] Despite this general trend both Humala and Fujimori still won substantial support among wealthier voters, with the analysis predicting probabilities around forty and twenty percent, respectively, among higher earners compared to APRs that rarely reach twenty percent for either Kuczynski or Toledo.

some significant effects missed by the main analysis, as outlined in relation to Fujimori's vote.[155]

Wealth Redistribution

The main effects model generated just one statistically significant effect for voters' stance on state-led wealth redistribution, a positive association between support for such an agenda and a vote for Humala. The decomposition analysis appears to support this general trend, with positive AMEs for Humala in all groups, although only in the indigenous groups do the AMEs reach statistical significance. There is a somewhat mixed trend in the AMEs for other candidates, although the tendency is towards negative associations, albeit mostly non-significant.

Overall, the recurring emphasis on inequality reduction throughout Humala's campaign may have helped increase GP's vote among supporters of such a programmatic agenda, although the effects are only sometimes statistically significant. As noted in regard to the Bolivian and Ecuadorian cases, the general lack of statistical significance for this variable is partly the result of a broad consensus across much of the electorate; in Peru, the average voter-stand on the wealth redistribution issue is between 5.5 and 5.8 (on a 1-7 scale) across all ethnic groups, indicating moderate to strong support for such a policy goal.[156] Similarly, all the major candidates expressed their desire to create a fairer society, with the controversy centring more on the means and extent of inequality reduction.

Nationalisations

The decomposition of ethnicity's interaction with voters' stance on nationalisations does not significantly alter the interpretation of the main effects. That is, support for nationalisations significantly increased the probability of voting for Humala across all ethnic groups and decreased support for his principal opponents, particularly Kuczynski. This trend is unsurprising, given that GP was the only electoral alternative to propose nationalisations of any kind (Gana Perú 2011, 80-4).

[155] The positive effect for rightist ideology on Humala's vote in the self-identified indigenous group may reflect varying understandings of the terms 'left' and 'right' across groups (for example, the association of 'right' with social and religious conservatism, nationalism, and so forth). However, because we are dealing with relatively few observations, we should probably not stretch the interpretation too far in this case.

[156] Furthermore, the standard deviation of group means for the wealth redistribution measure is just 1.3, compared to 1.9 for the nationalisation variable and 3.5 for the political ideology variable. This confirms the greater degree of consensus in views on wealth redistribution.

However, despite the relatively consistent trend in the AMEs and APRs across ethnic groups, ethnic background still appears to have played some conditional (and conditioning) role in vote choice. For example, the AMEs in Humala's case do not reach statistical significance in the non-indigenous language group. An examination of the APR plots indicates that approval of nationalisations did not generate the same levels of support for Humala among non-indigenous voters as it did among voters with an indigenous background: APRs were comparable among opponents of nationalisations in both groups (around forty percent), yet among supporters of the policy an indigenous voter was significantly more likely to vote for Humala than a non-indigenous voter (APRs over sixty percent, compared to under fifty percent). Overall, this pattern suggests some role for ethnic bias in mitigating positive policy effects among non-indigenous voters, at least in Humala's case.

Direct Predictors of Vote Choice: Ethnic Attitudes and Issues

The 2011 vote analysis finds no evidence that ethnic attitudes influenced vote choice. As noted at the start of this case study, only half the respondents to the LAPOP 2012 survey were asked questions related to such attitudes, and responses indicative of ethnic prejudice were extremely rare. These data features severely limit this aspect of the 2011 vote analysis.

Where the data allow for meaningful analysis, the results indicate no significant main or marginal effects for the three ethnic attitude variables tested. These are: (i) the perceived cause of higher poverty levels among dark-skinned Peruvians; (ii) support for racial quotas in universities; and (iii) whether dark-skinned people make worse political leaders than light-skinned people. Even a reduced model, which drops the political attitude measures to increase the sample size, does not produce any statistically significant results.[157] Thus, and whilst bearing in mind the above caveats regarding sample size, this analysis of the LAPOP data finds no evidence that ethnic attitudes influenced vote choice in Peru's 2011 election.

Indirect Effects of Ethnicity

The mediation analysis for the 2011 vote tested the indirect effects of ethnicity on a vote for Humala over Fujimori, and for Humala over Kuczynski. As in 2006, the analysis only finds significant indirect effects in the more polarised comparison (in this case, between

[157] Full results are included in Appendix C. In the 2012 round of LAPOP surveys, references to 'indigenous' were replaced with 'dark-skinned'.

Humala and Kuczynski), but it also confirms a positive direct effect of an indigenous-language background on a vote for Humala over Fujimori.[158]

Table 5.6 shows a summary of the vote for Humala over Kuczynski. The analysis finds a significant total indirect effect for an indigenous-language background in favour of Humala, but no significant indirect effects for the self-identification measure. The analysis estimates that approximately 21.1 percent of the total effect is mediated. The estimates in the first three model summaries are based on analyses that exclude the ethnic attitude variables, while the final model summary includes these measures. As noted above, the inclusion of the ethnic attitude variables means reducing the sample size by at least fifty percent. In this case, the analysis based on the reduced model offers comparable estimates and, crucially, does not suggest a significant mediation role for ethnic attitudes. However, the total indirect effects no longer reach statistical significance with the reduced sample, and there is a change in the specific mediation pathways that produce individually significant indirect effects (see column four in Table 5.6).[159]

An examination of these specific mediation pathways finds that voters' position on the question of nationalisations generates individually significant indirect effects in both the full and reduced models. Voters with an indigenous-language background were more likely to support nationalisations, a political preference associated with a vote for Humala over Kuczynski. This can be seen as partially in line with the significant pathway for political ideology identified in the 2006 analysis. In 2006, an indigenous background was linked to more leftist ideology, which was linked to a vote for Humala over Flores (see Table 5.3). In 2011, the measure of support for nationalisations may capture a similar underlying political predisposition – support for greater state control in the economy – that was similarly linked to a vote for Humala over Kuczynski. Thus, there is some evidence from both election case studies that an indigenous background may socialise voters to favour broad state intervention in national economic matters. Moreover, both the main vote models and the mediation analysis suggest that political attitudes related to state interventionism may have had a significant influence on voting behaviour in Peru's 2006 and 2011 elections.[160]

[158] Full output for the mediation analysis is included in Appendix C.
[159] The analysis also tested the self-identification variables (including ethnic attitude measures) on the reduced sample, but it found no significant results.
[160] These findings are in line with (but go beyond) a recent study that found indigenous voters in Latin America to prefer leftist candidates in general (Moreno Morales 2015).

TABLE 5.7: Summary Mediation Analysis, Peru 2011

	Coefficient	SE	Significant Mediation Pathways	Total *N*
Family Linguistic Group (indigenous)				476
Total indirect effects	.091 ^ *	.032	Income (.043; -1.537**/-.126**)	
Direct effect	.340 ^ *	.085	Nationalisations (.036; .682**/.237**)	
Total effect	.431 ^ *	.077		
Proportion of total effect mediated	.211			
White (mestizo)				438
Total indirect effects	.015	.026		
Direct effect	-.024	.073		
Total effect	-.009	.069		
Proportion of total effect mediated	-1.746			
Indigenous (mestizo)				436
Total indirect effects	-.012	.029		
Direct effect	.172 *	.088		
Total effect	.159 *	.088		
Proportion of total effect mediated	-.078			
Family Linguistic Group (indigenous): with Ethnic Attitude Variables				180
Total indirect effects	.081	.093	Nationalisations (.058; .736^/.468*)	
Direct effect	.383 ^ *	.179	FTA (.041; -.465/-.522*)	
Total effect	.464 ^ *	.170		
Proportion of total effect mediated	.175			

Notes: Table presents a summary of the mediation analysis. Full constituent tables of the output can be found in Appendix C. The first three sub-tables show estimates based on models that dropped the ethnic attitude variables to increase sample size. The final sub-table is based on models including the ethnic attitude measures. The estimates produced are broadly comparable (compare first and last sub-tables). Coefficients are standardised indirect, direct, and total effects of the ethnicity measure indicated on a vote for Humala over Kuczynski. ^ and * indicated indicate coefficients are significant at the .05 level according to the percentile and bias-correction methods, respectively. 'Proportion of total effect mediated' is based on the product of coefficients/*Y*-standardisation method. KHB and LDE are only shown where estimates are appreciably different (see Chapter Two for further discussion on methods). Coefficients for significant mediation pathways are: overall indirect effect via the mediator (standardised); effect of ethnicity measure on mediator (unstandardised); and effect of mediator on vote choice (unstandardised). Coefficients may be linear or non-linear, depending on the mediator.
Source: Author's calculations based on LAPOP 2012.

Analysis of the full model also finds individually significant indirect effects for voter income, once again reproducing the results from 2006. Voters with an indigenous background are likely to have lower household incomes, and lower-income voters were, in general, more likely to vote for Humala over Kuczynski. However, the indirect effects via income are not significant in the reduced model (once ethnic attitudes are added), although the direction of the constituent effects remains unchanged. Whether the lack of significance reflects the confounding influence of ethnic attitudes, or simply the loss of statistical power as a result of the reduced sample size, is unclear. The fact that no ethnic-attitude variables are involved in significant individual or total indirect effects, and the comparable coefficients for the income variable, suggest the latter.

The analysis of the reduced model also indicates individually significant indirect effects via voters' general support for free-trade agreements (FTA). An indigenous background is associated with greater opposition to free-trade agreements, a political attitude linked to a vote for Humala over Kuczynski. This is, perhaps, what we might expect given the general association of an indigenous background with greater support for a state interventionist, nationalist macroeconomic model.

In summary, the mediation analysis for the 2011 vote provides a similar picture to the 2006 analysis. There is strong evidence that an indigenous-language background may help shape both voters' material circumstances and certain broader political attitudes, particularly related to the role of the state, and that the resulting indirect effect of ethnicity on vote choice is statistically significant. The self-identification measures appear to be less consistently linked to material or attitudinal characteristics, at least once linguistic background is taken into account. However, as in 2006, the indirect effects identified in 2011 do not fully capture the impact of ethnicity on vote choice, and thus they provide only partial support for the indirect model of ethnic voting. Indeed, the confirmation by the mediation analysis of significant direct effects for ethnicity, even when indirect influences are taken into account, provides further evidence that ethnic bias (whether expressive or heuristic) remains an important component of contemporary Peruvian voting behaviour.

Chapter Six

How Voters Decide: Ethnic Voting at the Micro Level in Peru

This chapter examines ethnic voting behaviour at the micro level of individual voters' decision-making. The analysis in the preceding chapters has relied mostly on survey data to examine ethnic voting in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. Although this analysis has indicated an important role for ethnicity in shaping electoral outcomes in several cases, it provides only limited insight into the underlying processes that drive such political behaviour. In particular, and as noted throughout the previous chapters' discussion, the survey-based analysis cannot easily determine whether expressive or heuristic ethnic voting accounts best for the observed ethnic bias in individual-level vote patterns. The experimental data examined in this chapter specifically address such questions about the *nature*, not just the occurrence, of ethnic voting in the Andes. The experiment allows us to examine how voters perceive ethnic issues and ethnic identities in the context of an electoral campaign, and, through examining individual voters' decision-making processes, provides insight into precisely what role ethnicity and ethnic attitudes play in voting.

As outlined in Chapter One, understanding the nature of ethnic voting in these terms is important, both theoretically and empirically, because the way in which ethnicity shapes voting behaviour could indicate – and contribute to – quite different underlying sociopolitical phenomena. These, in turn, may have quite different implications in terms of assessing the quality and terms of democratic representation and accountability, the political priorities and electoral strategies of politicians, and the prospects for future democratic stability. For example, if voting is primarily an expressive act of group allegiance, then elections become a simple question of demographics. Voters lose control over the political agenda, while politicians can act at will, already assured the unconditional support of co-ethnics. Furthermore, this scenario may drive ethnic polarisation as politicians seek to mobilise voters by stirring inter-ethnic distrust and resentment. Alternatively, however, if voters use ethnicity

as a shortcut to programmatic information, then these threats to democratic processes and stability are somewhat less severe. In this latter scenario, substantive representation is the ultimate electoral goal, and ethnic voting is primarily a means for achieving such representation. Although politicians may still manipulate stereotypes for electoral benefit, they cannot rely on unconditional support if they fail on performance and programmatic assessments.

The primary source of data for this chapter's analysis is a voting experiment carried out in Peru in September and October 2013. The experiment was designed to distinguish explicitly between expressive and heuristic forms of ethnic voting, and to trace the constituent processes of the latter in particular. Peru was chosen for the experimental study because its contemporary political landscape remains particularly inchoate (a condition conducive to heuristic use in general), and because it lacks a single, dominant, 'real-world' political personality. Given that the experiment was concerned with the potential influence of a *generalised* ethnic heuristic, the absence of a dominant 'real-world' figure such as Evo Morales or Rafael Correa was advantageous. The exceptional political dominance of these individual politicians would unavoidably influence perceptions about more general political 'types', and thus a context without such figures may produce results that are somewhat less contextually bound.[161]

The chapter is structured as follows. The first section reviews the conceptual basis for the heuristic model of ethnic voting, including discussion of the Peruvian context specifically. Many of these arguments have been elaborated in more detail in Chapter One, and this section serves only as a brief summary. The second section provides an overview of the basic design and procedures of the voting experiment. A more detailed technical description of the experimental set-up was included in Chapter Two, and the outline provide in this chapter is primarily intended only to aid interpretation of the subsequent discussion of results. These are presented in the third, fourth, and fifth sections as they relate to three principal hypotheses: (i) that voters make initial assumptions about candidates based on ethnic stereotypes; (ii) that voters adjust their stereotype-based evaluations in the light of new information; and (iii) that voters ultimately select candidates they perceive as closest to their substantive, rather than (only) descriptive, characteristics. These three hypotheses should all hold if the heuristic

[161] Of course, contemporary 'real-world' political personalities undoubtedly influenced Peruvian experiment participants as well. The argument is only that the Peruvian context may reduce such effects, at least relative to Bolivia and Ecuador.

ethnic voting model is correct. The final section draws some initial conclusions, which are elaborated further in the final chapter.

Ethnic Heuristics and Voting in Peru

This thesis argues that most voters in the Andes, and in Peru particularly, seek some degree of substantive representation when they vote in national elections. Substantive, in this case, is defined as preferences and interests linked to material concerns, or to political ideology and specific issue preferences. Descriptive ties, including psychological attachments to ethnic group identities and prejudice, may play some role in voters' decision-making, but few voters would be willing to vote entirely against their substantive preferences in order to ensure ethnic descriptive representation. However, in the complex information environment of an election campaign, the task of determining which candidate or party best represents key substantive preferences is not straightforward. Faced with uncertainty, voters may often turn to heuristics to aid their decision-making, using a particular characteristic of the candidate as an indicator from which to estimate wider substantive and personal preferences and traits.

In many democracies, party identities fulfil such a heuristic function (e.g., Downs 1957; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Popkin 1991), yet the absence of stable parties in Peru means voters must find alternative political heuristics. This thesis argues that, in a society where ethnic differences remain socially salient, voters may use a candidate's perceived ethnic identity as an information shortcut to estimate their likely programmatic and personal characteristics (McDermott 1998; Brubaker et al. 2004; Posner 2005; Ferree 2006; Birnir 2007, 2009).[162] Thus, voters in Peru – and possibly elsewhere in the Andes – may seek ethnic descriptive representation in order to achieve substantive representation, using ethnic heuristics to simplify the decision-making process in a highly complex information environment.

Furthermore, as Chapter Five has argued, several features of Peruvian historical and contemporary sociopolitical development have been conducive to the construction of such an ethnic heuristic. In terms of wider social relations, ethnic background remains an important determinant of socioeconomic status and social opportunities, while ethnic discrimination is a prominent feature of every-day social interactions. Thus, social experience may have taught

[162] Ethnicity is not the only alternative heuristic to party identities. Studies have shown how several other candidate characteristics may serve a heuristic purpose for voters in certain contexts, including gender (Jones 2011; Ditonto et al. 2013) and other aspects of physical appearance (Rosenberg and McCafferty 1987; Todorov et al. 2005; Lawson et al. 2010).

many Peruvian voters the relevance of an ethnic heuristic for understanding and predicting the broad values, interests, and behaviour of social others. More specifically, the way in which ethnicity has been politicised in Peru (and elsewhere in the Andes) may have reinforced and further defined the content of such an ethnic heuristic. Although no indigenous movement or party in Peru has had the national platform to develop a political ethnic heuristic in the same way as in Bolivia or Ecuador, a series of Peruvian ethnopopulist candidates have performed a similar function, at least in some respects. Fujimori, Toledo, and Humala campaigned on somewhat distinct programmatic platforms, yet all three candidates focused their attention on the lower socioeconomic classes, promised increased social spending, and were critical, if not hostile to, political and economic elites. Crucially, their campaigns explicitly framed such non-elite substantive agendas in terms of their own non-elite and non-white (if not indigenous) personal backgrounds. They also sought to reinforce popular perceptions about the elite interests and political priorities of their white or white-mestizo opponents. In this way, Peruvian ethnopopulism may have helped introduce an ethnic heuristic into the consciousness of Peruvian voters, in similar ways to indigenous movements and parties elsewhere in the Andes.

Finally, Peruvian voters are unlikely to have been entirely unaware of political events and trends in neighbouring countries; in fact, the political experiences of other countries in the region have been the source of considerable controversy in recent Peruvian election campaigns.[163] Thus, it seems likely that Peruvian popular perceptions about the types of substantive agendas linked to certain ethnic identities (i.e., ethnic heuristics) may also have been influenced by political discourses and developments elsewhere in the region.

In short, both long-term sociocultural experience, and more recent political developments (both within Peru and elsewhere), may have worked to connect an indigenous (or non-white) ethnic background with a political agenda that promotes inequality reduction, poverty assistance, public works, and popular nationalism. In contrast, a white or white-mestizo identity may come to be linked to orthodox neoliberalism, and, for some voters, the promotion of national and international elite interests to the detriment of social equality. The ethnic heuristic hypothesised and tested by the Peruvian voting experiment is defined in these broad terms.

[163] For example, the extent to which Ollanta Humala's political project resembled those of Bolivia's Evo Morales or Venezuela's Hugo Chávez was a recurrent controversy in both the 2006 and 2011 campaign. See discussion in Chapter Five.

The Peruvian Voting Experiment

The experiment took the form of a computer-based mock election in which participants gathered and evaluated information about hypothetical candidates in a simulated presidential campaign. Data from the experiment are used to test a series of hypotheses that specify distinct mechanism through which ethnicity might shape vote decisions. Most focus on how the perceived ethnicity of electoral candidates might fulfil a heuristic function for voters, providing an information shortcut to the programmatic, social, attitudinal, and personal characteristics of the candidate. However, a more direct effect for ethnicity in the vote decision is also considered, where strong feelings of ethnic solidarity and/or prejudice are hypothesised to shape voters' preferences. Thus the experiment provides a direct empirical test of the expressive and heuristic models of ethnic voting, as well as a wealth of data on the micro-level processes involved in the latter.

Experiment Design and Procedures

The experiments were conducted in Peru during September and October 2013, and participants were recruited by local research assistants in various locations across the country. Most participants completed the experiment online by logging into the project's website. On accessing the experiment platform, each subject was randomly assigned to one of three experimental groups: two 'treatment' groups (T1 and T2) and a control group (C). As outlined in Chapter Two, the experiment consisted of a mock presidential campaign simulated on the computer, and participants played the role of voters, searching and evaluating information about two hypothetical candidates. The simulated campaign involved three phases (P1, P2, and P3), each lasting five minutes. Each phase contained different types of information about the two candidates, and voters completed mini-questionnaires at the end of each phase. These questionnaires captured 'live' data about voters' impressions and preferences regarding the candidates and the campaign in general. These were then compared across experimental groups exposed to distinct candidate profiles, and between experimental phases with distinct information content.

During the first phase of the campaign (P1), voters in all groups were only exposed to information about the candidates' personal background, as well as some non-substantial 'filler' information. Crucially, information about each candidate's ethnic background was also included during P1, but only for T1 and T2. In the control group, all references to ethnicity were omitted. In T1 and T2, the two candidates were Guillermo Olarte Rojas and

Luis Romero Kaufmann. Olarte was presented explicitly as a dark-skinned mestizo with family origins in the southern highlands, and he spoke the indigenous language Quechua, as well as Spanish, as a child. Romero was presented as a light-skinned, second-generation European immigrant, and he did not speak an indigenous language.[164] Aside from ethnic background, the two candidates' personal profiles were near-identical.

However, although the candidates' personal characteristics were consistent across all phases and groups, their respective programmatic profiles varied according to experimental group. In T1, Olarte adopted a left-nationalist programme (favouring strategic nationalisations, more powers for the president vis-à-vis congress, higher taxes and social spending) and a self-proclaimed moderate leftist ideology. Romero, for his part, offered a neoliberal programme, taking the opposite stand to Olarte on each of these broad issues. However, in T2 these programmatic profiles were reversed so that Olarte emerged as the neoliberal, and Romero as the left-nationalist. The two control-group candidates were exact 'de-ethnicisised' copies of the T2 candidates: Juan Sánchez García was a copy of Olarte as he appeared in T2 (neoliberal); Luis Rodríguez López was a copy of Romero as he appeared in T2 (left-nationalist).[165] Programmatic information was introduced via opposition attack advertisements and rebuttals in P2, and through explicit candidate statements in P3. Table 6.1 summarises the experimental set-up.

Before the experiment, 'voters' completed a short questionnaire about their sociodemographic background and political preferences, including the four broad issue/ideology measures noted above (i.e., support for nationalisations, for increased presidential powers, higher social spending, and left-right political ideology). In addition, at the end of each phase, voters were asked to rate the candidates in terms of their perceived position on the same four issue/ideology preferences, as well as to give general 'feeling thermometer' ratings. The programmatic measures were based on scales running from zero to 100 and were constructed so that zero represented the neoliberal 'pole' and 100 represented the left-nationalist 'pole'. These four issue/ideology preferences have been key controversies in recent Peruvian elections, and they reflect important components of the ethnic heuristic

[164] Candidate ethnicity was introduced through various information items referring to family and linguistic background, explicit ethnic labels used in news reports, and finally a photo.

[165] Family names were selected to suggest ethnic origins, but with enough ambiguity to avoid alerting participants to the experiment's purpose. Olarte is associated with the southern highlands while Rojas is connected with a lower-class background. Romero, in contrast, is associated with wealthy elites, while Kaufmann is clearly of non-Hispanic European origin. García, Sánchez, Rodríguez, and López are four of the most common family names in Peru, and do not carry such specific socioethnic associations.

being tested in this chapter. They also have partial equivalents in the LAPOP surveys, facilitating some comparison between the survey- and experiment-based analyses.

Voters were also asked to indicate other impressions about the candidates, including social-group associations and each candidate's personal characteristics. For social-group associations, voters were asked to indicate which social groups they thought would benefit from the election of one or the other candidate. They were able to choose none or all groups from a list of eight, including: trade unions; private companies; *campesinos* (peasants); educated professionals (doctors, lawyers, university professors, and so forth); foreign investors; a rich Lima resident; employers; and mining companies. These groups represent important social and cultural class identities and interests in contemporary Peruvian society, and many of them are linked to the broad socioethnic stereotypes under investigation here. For personal candidate characteristics, voters could select none or all of eight traits for both candidates, including: hardworking and honest; a democrat; competent; modern; sophisticated; qualified; populist; and rash. Once again, many of these are characteristics typically linked to ethnic stereotypes, and they have recurrently emerged in popular debates about 'real-world' electoral candidates in recent Peruvian elections.[166]

Hypotheses

This chapter argues that voters use a candidate's perceived ethnic identity as an information shortcut to make a wide range of assumptions about the candidate's programmatic preferences, more general affinity with certain social groups and interests, and personal characteristics. Programmatic profile refers not only to a candidate's stand on specific policy issues (e.g. nationalisations or public spending), but also to their broader political ideology. Social-group association refers to voters' general impressions about those social groups and interests that the candidate will favour and which will benefit most from the candidate's election. These may well be linked to programmatic profile, but they exceed simple calculations about the utility of policy *A* or *B* for a certain group, including assumptions about clientelistic benefits and a candidate's wider sympathies, loyalties, networks, and personal as well as political priorities. Perceived programmatic preferences are also likely to affect assumptions about a candidate's personal characteristics, the third aspect

[166] For example, see Ardito (2011), Bruce (2011), Manrique (2011), and Sifuentes (2011), amongst others, on the prominence of ethnic stereotypes in online political debates and 'activism' surrounding the 2011 presidential campaign.

TABLE 6.1: Experimental Set-up

Group	Candidate	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3
T1	**ROMERO**			
	ETHNICITY	White/European descent	White/European descent	White/European descent
	PROGRAMME	None	Neoliberal (attack ads from Olarte only)	Neoliberal (explicit statements)
	OLARTE			
	ETHNICITY	Indigenous/Andean descent	Indigenous/Andean descent	Indigenous/Andean descent
	PRORGAMME	None	Left-nationalist (attack ads from Romero only)	Left-nationalist (explicit statements)
T2	**ROMERO**			
	ETHNICITY	AS T1	White/European descent	White/European descent
	PROGRAMME	AS T1	Left-nationalist (attack ads from Olarte only)	Left-nationalist (explicit statements)
	OLARTE			
	ETHNICITY	AS T1	Indigenous/Andean descent	Indigenous/Andean descent
	PROGRAMME	AS T1	Neoliberal (attack ads from Romero only)	Neoliberal (explicit statements)
C	**RODRÍGUEZ** (copy of Romero T2)			
	ETHNICITY	None	None	None
	PROGRAMME	None	Left-nationalist (attack ads from Sánchez only)	Left-nationalist (explicit statements)
	SÁNCHEZ (copy of Olarte T2)			
	ETHNICITY	None	None	None
	PROGRAMME	None	Neoliberal (attack ads from Rodríguez only)	Neoliberal (explicit statements)

The total sample was *N* = 217 (T1 = 75; T2 = 79; C = 63). Given that T1 and T2 are identical in P1, the analysis of P1 data in the following section uses a combined T1/T2 group.

TABLE 6.2: Hypotheses

H1: Voters will make assumptions about candidates after P1 based on ethnic background

In the absence of specific information, voters will make assumptions about a candidate's profile based on ethnic background. Therefore, there will be consistent differences in the characteristics attributed to candidates after P1 according to the stereotypic association of indigenous/Andean with left-nationalist, and white/European with neoliberal.

H1a: Voters will make assumptions about each candidate's stand on specific programmatic issues and political ideology.

H1b: Voters will make assumptions about each candidate's affinity with certain social groups or interests.

H1c: Voters will make assumptions about each candidate's personal characteristics.

H2: Voters will *partially* adjust their candidate assessments in the light of specific information in P2 and P3.

When faced with specific information in P2 and P3, voters will adjust their initial assumptions accordingly. However, such adjustments will only be partial, and T2 voters will tend to perceive candidates as being closer to their stereotypic position than otherwise-identical T1 and control-group candidates. Adjustments will be modest after P2, when information is introduced in the more contestable form of opposition attack ads, and more substantial after P3, when the candidates explicitly state their positions.

H2a: Voters will *partially* correct their assumptions about each candidate's programmatic profile after P2, and more so after P3, where such corrections are necessary.

H2b: Voters will *partially* adjust their assumptions about the each candidate's social-group associations according to the programmatic profile revealed during P2 and P3. However, because there is no specific information about candidate-social group associations, such adjustments will be less pronounced than in H2a.

H2c: Voters will *partially* adjust their assumptions about each candidate's personal characteristics according to the programmatic profile revealed during P2 and P3. However, because there is no specific information about candidates' personal characteristics, and because ethnicity-trait stereotypic associations are likely to be more inflexible than programmatic or social-group associations, such adjustments will be less pronounced than in either H2a or H2b.

H3: Voters will tend to vote for the candidate they perceive as being closest to their own interests.

Most voters will seek to vote in line with their self-reported political preferences – that is, they will seek substantive representation. If the adjustments specified in H2 are achieved, then most voters will vote 'correctly'. However, the vote pattern will be more inconsistent in T2 because voters will be more uncertain about candidates' 'true' profile and may be subject to greater cross-pressures.

H3a: Voters will tend to select the candidate whom they perceive as being closest to their own programmatic preferences. Whether stereotypes affect vote choice will depend on the extent of 'corrections' made in H2a and the relative strength of the processes specified by H3b and H3c.

H3b: Voters will tend to select the candidate they associate with social group(s) and interests closest to their own. However, the current data are insufficient for assessing this relationship directly, so H3b will not be explicitly tested.

H3c: Voters will tend to select the candidate whom they associate with positive personal characteristics. Whether stereotypes influence vote choice will depend on the relative strength of linkages between personal characteristics and programme, and between personal characteristics and ethnic stereotypes.

of candidate profile examined, although in this case more deep-seated beliefs about 'intrinsic' ethnic types may exert more influence.

The analysis investigates two related mechanisms through which ethnic heuristics might influence voting behaviour, both informed by existing theory on stereotypes and decision-making. The first mechanism involves the use of ethnic stereotypes as information shortcuts; the second refers to the resistance of stereotypes to change (Fiske and Taylor 1991; Zaller 1992). Thus, this chapter proposes that voters will not only make stereotype-based assumptions about candidates that go well beyond the actual information available, but that they will also tend to play down the significance of actual information that contradicts those stereotype-based expectations.[167]

The experiment works on (and tests) the assumption that most voters in Peru conceive of broadly similar ethnic stereotypes – in other words, that the content of the ethnic heuristic is, in general terms, comparable across demographic, social, cultural and political divides. It proposes that most voters will associate a candidate of 'white/European descent' with a broadly defined neoliberal programmatic profile, while most voters will associate a candidate of 'indigenous/Andean descent' with a similarly broad left-nationalist programmatic profile. In terms of the programmatic and ideology measures outlined above (i.e., support for nationalisations, increased presidential powers, increased public spending, and leftist ideology), we might expect voters to place the white/European candidate lower on the scale measures (closer to the neoliberal 'pole') and the indigenous/Andean candidate higher on the scale measures (closer to the left-nationalist 'pole'). This basic assumption underpins the more specific hypotheses that structure this analysis (see Table 6.2).

In addressing these specific hypotheses – all of which relate to the role of ethnic heuristics in voting – this chapter will necessarily consider two versions of a null hypothesis as well: (i) that ethnicity has no effect on candidate evaluation or vote choice; and (ii) that voters primarily select candidates based on psychological group attachments, not programmatic assessments, whether the latter are influenced by stereotypes or not (i.e. the expressive model). The former is addressed, and largely rejected, through the presentation of evidence in support of the more specific hypotheses regarding heuristic use; the latter is

[167] Such effects have been identified elsewhere in relation to party stereotypes. For example, a U.S. study found that voters consistently neglected information that was inconsistent with party labels when formulating candidate evaluations (Rahn 1993).

briefly addressed in reference to both initial candidate assessments and final vote choice, but it finds only limited support in the data.

Results from the Peruvian Voting Experiment

The remainder of this chapter presents the key findings from the Peruvian voting experiment. After a brief discussion of a possible direct effect of ethnicity on initial candidate assessments, the following subsections deal with each of the hypotheses stated Table 6.2. First, voters' assumptions about candidate profiles after Phase One (P1) are examined, with the discussion focusing on programmatic profile (H1a), social-group associations (H1b), and personal characteristics (H1c). Second, the effect of new information on voters' candidate evaluations at Phase Two (P2) and Phase Three (P3) is assessed, again in reference to programme (H2a), social-group associations (H2b), and personal characteristics (H2c). Third, the effect of each aspect of candidate profile is examined in relation to final vote choice (H3a, H3b, and H3c). This subsection also includes discussion of direct ethnic effects.

Voter ethnicity and initial candidate preferences

Table 6.3 shows the effects of voters' self-identified ethnic identity and linguistic background on candidate 'feeling thermometers' after P1. The results are generated by a series of ordinary-least-squares (OLS) linear regression models, with voters' thermometer rating of Olarte over Romero (T1 and T2), and Sánchez over Rodriguez (control group), as the dependent variable. A separate model was run for each ethnicity measure and candidate pair, and controls were included for other sociodemographic factors (age, sex, income, and so forth), voters' self-reported political predispositions, and their relative placement of the candidates on the four issue/ideology measures after P1 (e.g., the placement of Olarte, over Romero, on the nationalisations issue).

According to this analysis, voter ethnicity appears to have had little impact on initial candidate preferences. Self-identification as white is associated with a slightly higher thermometer rating for Romero (the White/European candidate) compared with Olarte (the Indigenous/Andean candidate), while self-identification as indigenous or *cholo* is associated with a relatively higher thermometer rating for Olarte. However, in neither case do the effects reach statistical significance ($p > .10$). The effect of linguistic background on P1 thermometer ratings appears to be negligible.

TABLE 6.3: Effects of Voter Ethnicity on Candidate Feeling Thermometers after Phase One

Ethnicity measure	Candidate Comparison	Coefficient and standard errors	
Self-identification as white	Olarte over Romero	-3.33	(5.54)
	Sánchez over Rodriguez	- 0.37	(7.50)
Self-identification as indigenous or *cholo*[168]	Olarte over Romero	4.13	(4.47)
	Sánchez over Rodriguez	8.30	(8.73)
Indigenous language background	Olarte over Romero	1.86	(4.50)
	Sánchez over Rodriguez	1.53	(9.95)

N=152 (T1/T2 group); *N* = 60 (control group); ^ = $p < .10$; * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$.
Coefficients are the effect of voter ethnicity (column one) on the relative thermometer rating of the indicated candidate pair, based on separate linear regression models (one model for each ethnicity-measure/candidate-comparison combination).
Source: Peruvian voting experiment

[168] *Cholo* is a generally understood to denote a mestizo of more indigenous appearance or with more immediate links to a rural indigenous family background. In this sense, it is comparable to the term indigenous-mestizo.

Overall, these results may indicate some slight preference among white voters for the European/white candidate, and a similar preference among indigenous and *cholo* voters for the Indigenous/Andean candidate. However, once other sociodemographic and political preferences are taken into account, these effects appear minimal. Affective preferences for an ethnically-proximate candidate, then, appear to have had little impact on voters' general feelings about the candidates in the Peruvian experiment.

Do Voters Make Assumptions about Candidates Based on Ethnic Background? (H1)

Programmatic Profile (H1a)

Voters made several significant assumptions about candidates' programmatic profiles after P1. At the group level (Figure 6.1), Romero was placed lower on all three issue scales (nationalisations, presidential powers, and public spending) compared to his control-group copy (Rodríguez), indicating that voters considered Romero less likely to pursue each of these policy initiatives. However, the difference was not quite statistically significant in the case of the presidential powers issue. Romero was also placed significantly lower than Olarte, his T1/T2 opponent, on the nationalisation issue, and significantly further to the right compared to both Olarte and Rodríguez in terms of political ideology. Olarte, for his part, was placed at comparable levels to his control-group copy (Sánchez) on each issue measure, but significantly further to the left in terms of political ideology.

Results at the individual level show a similar pattern (Table 6.4). Experimental group had a significant effect on candidate issue-placement on the nationalisation and public spending measures for the Romero/Rodríguez pair, and on political ideology for both the Romero/Rodríguez and Olarte/Sánchez pairs. In the case of Romero/Rodríguez, T1/T2 membership was negatively associated with candidate placement on the nationalisation and public spending measures (-11.25 and -8.56, respectively), as well as an ideological placement significantly further to the right (-11.62). For the Olarte/Sánchez pair, T1/T2 membership did not have significant effects for any of the policy measures, but it was significantly associated with an ideological placement towards the left (+12.38).

Overall, then, it seems that voters made some initial assumptions about candidates' programmatic profiles based on ethnic background. They tended to perceive the white/European candidate (Romero) as being less inclined towards nationalisation or increased social spending, and they saw him as more right-wing in general. Conversely, voters tended to see the indigenous/Andean candidate (Olarte) as being significantly further

FIGURE 6.1



N=213; ^ = $p < .10$; * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$.
The annotation on each group label refers to the significance of a proportions test between the two candidates within the given group. The annotation with the graph title refers to a significance of proportions test between the cross-group candidate pairs indicated: OS is Olarte (T1/2) with Sánchez (C); RD is Romero (T1/2) with Rodríguez (C).
Source: Peruvian voting experiment

TABLE 6.4: Effect of Experimental Group on Candidate Placement after Phase One

Issue Stand	Candidate Pair	Coefficient	Std. Error
Nationalise key sectors	**Olarte**/Sánchez	- 0.21	4.10
	Romero/Rodríguez	- 11.25**	4.25
Increase presidential powers	**Olarte**/Sánchez	- 4.97	3.82
	Romero/Rodríguez	- 3.77	3.82
Increase public spending	**Olarte**/Sánchez	- 0.32	3.85
	Romero/Rodríguez	- 8.56*	3.43
Left political ideology	**Olarte**/Sánchez	12.38**	3.20
	Romero/Rodríguez	- 11.62**	3.20

N = 215; ^ = $p < .10$; * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$.
Coefficients are the marginal effects of control-group membership on candidate placement for the given candidate pair, based on linear regression models with voters' sociodemographic and political preference characteristics as controls.

to the left ideologically, although these assumptions did not translate into significantly different perceptions about the candidate's stand on specific programmatic issues. In general, results from P1 offer partial support for H1a, particularly in the case of the white/European stereotype and particularly on the nationalisation issue and political ideology. Given the vote models in Chapters Three to Five found voters' political ideology and support for nationalisations to be among the most significant vote predictors, the apparent influence of ethnic stereotypes on these specific aspects of candidate profiles may be of particular importance.

Social-Group Associations (H1b)

Voters also made quite substantial assumptions after P1 regarding the social groups and interests that were likely to benefit from the election of one or another candidate. Figure 6.2 shows the proportion of voters (within each experimental group) who identified each social group or interest as a likely beneficiary from each candidate's election. Annotations on the graph titles indicate a significant difference between the proportions received by the candidate pair indicated (e.g., OS* indicates that the difference between Olarte and Sánchez's proportions is significant at the .05 level). Annotations on the group legend indicate a significant difference between the proportions received by each candidate within the given group (e.g., T1/T2** indicates that the difference between Olarte and Romero's proportions within the combined T1/T2 group is significant at the .001 level).

Figure 6.2 shows that over 59 percent of T1/T2 voters considered the election of Olarte to benefit trade unions and their members, while 61 percent saw Olarte as the best option for *campesinos* (peasants). Voters predicted Olarte would be a particularly unfavourable option for wealthy Limeños (3 percent), foreign investors (12 percent), employers (16 percent), and mining companies (14 percent). In contrast, a Romero presidency was perceived to benefit private business (62 percent), foreign investors (57 percent), wealthy Limeños (35 percent), employers (33 percent), and mining companies (35 percent). Trade unions (13 percent) and *campesinos* (16 percent) were the groups/interests considered least likely to benefit. In each of these cases, the proportion of voters identifying the candidate in question with the particular social group/interest was significantly different from the proportion associated with his T1/T2 opponent, with his control-group copy, or both.

FIGURE 6.2



N=154 (T1/T2); *N* = 60 (C); ^ = $p < .10$; * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$.
Graphs show the proportion of group members (percent) that indicated the social group/interest would particularly benefit from the election of a given candidate. Voters could select none or all of the social group/interests for each candidate in their group.
The annotation on group labels refers to the significance of a proportions test between the two candidates within the given group. The annotation with graph titles refers to the significance of a proportions test between the cross-group candidate pairs indicated: OS is Olarte (T1/2) with Sánchez (C); RD is Romero (T1/2) with Rodríguez (C).
Source: Peruvian voting experiment

FIGURE 6.3



N=154 (T1/T2); *N* = 60 (C); ^ = $p < .10$; * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$.
Graphs show the proportion of group members (percent) that described each candidate with the term shown. Voters could select none or all of the descriptions for each candidate in their group.
The annotation on group labels refers to the significance of a proportions test between the two candidates within the given group. The annotation with graph titles refers to the significance of a proportions test between the cross-group candidate pairs indicated: OS is Olarte (T1/2) with Sánchez (C); RD is Romero (T1/2) with Rodríguez (C).
Source: Peruvian voting experiment

These social-group associations are broadly in line with the programmatic assumptions reported in Figure 6.1 and Table 6.4. We might expect the presumed leftist candidate (Olarte) to be perceived as beneficial for trade unions and *campesinos*, and the presumed rightist candidate (Romero, who opposes nationalisation) as the best choice for private business and the rich. Whether the assumptions reported in Figure 6.2 are only the result of voters' prior calculations regarding programmatic profiles, or whether they reflect more general impressions about candidate-social group associations, is discussed in reference to the P2 and P3 data. However, based on the P1 findings, it is clear that voters perceived certain candidates as significantly more likely to favour the interests of certain social groups, and that these evaluations were reached with little substantive information aside from ethnic background. These findings, then, offer support for H1b.

Personal Characteristics (H1c)

Voters also appeared to make a series of assumptions about the personal characteristics of both candidates at P1. Figure 6.3 shows the same proportions as Figure 6.2 but based on the ascription of personal characteristics to each candidate by experimental group. Annotations on the graph titles and legends should be read in the same manner as in Figure 6.2.

Figure 6.3 shows a significantly greater proportion of T1/T2 voters described the white/European candidate (Romero) as 'modern' and 'sophisticated' compared to his indigenous/Andean opponent (Olarte). In the case of the 'modern' description, Romero's proportion was also significantly higher than his control-group copy (Rodríguez). However, significantly more voters described Olarte as 'hardworking and honest' compared to both Romero and Sánchez. Olarte was also perceived as 'populist' by a significantly larger proportion of voters compared with Romero, while the latter was also perceived as less 'populist' than his control-group copy, Rodríguez.

In short, faced with two candidates whose personal profiles were effectively identical except for ethnic background, and with no more substantive information to go on, voters in T1/T2 clearly attributed quite different sets of characteristics to each candidate. Again, whether the ascription of such personal characteristics is linked to presumed programmatic profile, or whether they reflect more deep-seated perceptions of 'intrinsic' socioethnic types, is unclear at P1. This question is addressed in the discussion of P2 and P3 data, below.

How Do Voters Respond to More Specific Information about the Candidates? (H2)

The findings from P1 of the election simulation suggest that voters use ethnic stereotypes to make assumptions about a candidate's stand on specific programmatic issues, their political ideology, social-group associations, and a range of personal characteristics. But how are these initial perceptions affected by exposure to more specific information about the candidates in P2 and P3?

Programmatic Profile (H2a)

Figures 6.4 to 6.7 show voters' candidate placements on the four issue/ideology measures at each phase of the campaign. The graph plots show the predicted placement of each candidate on the four issue/ideology measures across the three experimental phases and groups. The coefficients in the graph legend indicate the marginal effects of experimental phase on these candidate placements by group (e.g., the effect of moving from P1 to P2 on a T1 voter's placement of Olarte on the nationalisation measure), while the coefficients in the graph plots indicate the marginal effects of experimental group on voters' candidate placements at each phase (e.g., the effect of being in T1 compared to T2 on the placement of Olarte on the nationalisation issue at P1). The marginal effects and predictions are generated by a series of multilevel, mixed-effects linear models with the placement of each candidate pair on each issue/ideology measure as the dependent variable. The experiment dataset was converted to longitudinal panel data for the analysis of such within-subject change.

If H2a is correct, then one would expect to see voters adjust their initial stereotype-based assumptions from P1 in light of more specific information about the candidates after P2 and P3. One might expect such 'corrections' to be modest after P2, when the new information was introduced in more contestable form through opposition attack ads. One might expect the corrections to be more decisive after P3, however, when candidates explicitly stated their positions on the issues. Because voters in T2 were faced with a candidate pair that reversed the hypothesised associations between ethnicity and programme, one might also expect such corrections to be most apparent in T2. Indeed, the absence of such corrections would indicate highly inflexible and resistant stereotypes.

Overall, Figures 6.4 to 6.7 indicate the general pattern of correction outlined above. In T1, voters 'confirmed' their P1 evaluations as they accessed information that supported their initial stereotype-based placements, increasing/decreasing their candidate placements towards the two ends of the issue-measure scales. The pattern was quite consistent on all measures

FIGURE 6.4



N=214; ^ = $p < .10$; * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$.
Graphs show the predicted placement of the neoliberal and left-nationalist candidate in each group after each experimental phase, based on multilevel mixed-effects linear regression models (see Appendix E for full output). Coefficients in the legend are the marginal effects of phase, by group. Coefficients in the graph plot are the marginal effects of group, by phase, for the head-to-head comparison indicated by the arrows (e.g., the effect of T1 membership compared to C, or T1 membership compared to T2). Dashed arrows indicate coefficients with $p < .150$.
Source: Peruvian voting experiment

FIGURE 6.5



N=214; ^ = $p < .10$; * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$.
Graphs show the predicted placement of the neoliberal and left-nationalist candidate in each group after each experimental phase, based on multilevel mixed-effects linear regression models (see Appendix E for full output). Coefficients in the legend are the marginal effects of phase, by group. Coefficients in the graph plot are the marginal effects of group, by phase, for the head-to-head comparison indicated by the arrows (e.g., the effect of T1 membership compared to C, or T1 membership compared to T2). Dashed arrows indicate coefficients with $p < .150$.
Source: Peruvian voting experiment

FIGURE 6.6



N=214; ^ = $p < .10$; * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$.
Graphs show the predicted placement of the neoliberal and left-nationalist candidate in each group after each experimental phase, based on multilevel mixed-effects linear regression models (see Appendix E for full output). Coefficients in the legend are the marginal effects of phase, by group. Coefficients in the graph plot are the marginal effects of group, by phase, for the head-to-head comparison indicated by the arrows (e.g., the effect of T1 membership compared to C, or T1 membership compared to T2). Dashed arrows indicate coefficients with $p < .150$.
Source: Peruvian voting experiment

FIGURE 6.7



N=214; ^ = $p < .10$; * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$.
Graphs show the predicted placement of the neoliberal and left-nationalist candidate in each group after each experimental phase, based on multilevel mixed-effects linear regression models (see Appendix E for full output). Coefficients in the legend are the marginal effects of phase, by group. Coefficients in the graph plot are the marginal effects of group, by phase, for the head-to-head comparison indicated by the arrows (e.g., the effect of T1 membership compared to C, or T1 membership compared to T2). Dashed arrows indicate coefficients with $p < .150$.
Source: Peruvian voting experiment

FIGURE 6.8



N=214
The *x*-axis shows the difference (linear prediction) between the left-nationalist and neoliberal candidate in each group (T1: Olarte-Romero; T2: Romero-Olarte; C: Rodríguez-Sánchez). At P2 and P3, then, positive values indicate correct identification of the candidates' relative stances. At P1, positive values (circled) indicate stereotype-consistent perceptions in T1 (Olarte-Romero), and negative values (circled) indicate stereotype-consistent perceptions in T2 (Romero-Olarte). The control group (C Group) is directly comparable with T2.
Source: Peruvian voting experiment.

except the public spending issue, where candidate placements did not change significantly at any phase (Figure 6.6). Moving from P1 to P2 had significant effects on Romero's nationalisation placement (-8.81) and significant effects for both candidates on the presidential powers measure (-8.77 for Romero and +10.81 for Olarte; see Figure 6.5). However, there were no significant changes between P2 and P3 on any issue, suggesting that T1 voters were generally satisfied with the reliability of P2 information. T1 voters also 'confirmed' their ideological evaluations of both candidates (Figure 6.7), with significant changes from P1 to P3 for Romero (-6.67) and Olarte (+5.40). In general, results in the control group resembled T1, although in many cases the candidate placements were more polarised. This is perhaps unsurprising given that voters in the control group made their assessments based *only* on programmatic information.

The effects of phase were even more pronounced in T2. Changes between P1 and P2 were in the 'correct' direction for both candidates for each issue/ideology measure, although the effects fall outside conventional levels of statistical significance for Olarte on the presidential powers issues, and for both candidates on public spending (Figure 6.5 and 6.6). The change between P2 and P3 was also significant on the nationalisation issue (Figure 6.4), suggesting that voters were initially sceptical of the counter-stereotype information they received in P2. In general, changes from P1 to P3 tend to be larger in T2 compared with T1 and the control group, reflecting the need for voters in T2 to 'correct' initial stereotype-based assumptions that proved contrary to the candidate's actual programmatic profile. This is particularly evident in the case of political ideology (Figure 6.7), where stereotype effects appeared particularly large at P1 and where the change between P1 and P3 was 12-16 percentage points (compared to the 'confirmatory' changes of 5-6 points in T1).

The ideology variable is also exceptional in being the only measure where experimental group still had a significant effect for both candidates at P3 (Figure 6.7). Romero in T1 (Neoliberal) was rated more than ten points further to the right than Olarte in T2 (Neoliberal), while Olarte in T1 (Left-nationalist) was rated more than five points further to the left than Romero in T2 (Left-nationalist). Olarte in T2 (Neoliberal) was also rated eight points to the left of his control-group copy (Sánchez), but group was not significant for the Romero/Rodríguez pair (Left-nationalists). However, on the three specific programmatic issues, the effect of group at P2 and P3 was more mixed. Compared with T1, membership in T2 did not have a significant effect on candidate placement on any of the three measures. Compared with the control group, membership in T2 was significant for the nationalisation

and presidential powers issues at both P2 and P3, but only for the left-nationalist profile (Figure 6.5 and 6.6). However, as Figure 6.5 and 6.6 indicate visually, these effects may have more to do with the overall higher placements reported by control-group members (higher than the ratings of *both* candidates in T1 and T2), rather than any specific effect for T2. Additionally, the effect of T2 compared to the control group is significant for the neoliberal profile on the presidential powers issue (at P2), although the effect runs counter to the hypothesised direction in this case.

Overall, there is mixed evidence for the effect of initial stereotype-based assumptions on voters' evaluation of subsequent political information. Although initial assumptions appear to have affected perceptions about candidates' political ideology, they tended to have far less consistent effects on specific issue placements. This probably reflects the wider conceptual scope of the political ideology measure, which in contrast to the single-issue measures was not directly addressed by the information pieces in P2 and P3.[169] In other words, voters had more room to construct ideological profiles according to their particular stereotypical associations and their own understanding of the ideological labels, whereas explicit statements about each issue stance were more difficult to ignore.

In summary, it is clear that voters in all groups were quite responsive to the information they received in P2 and P3, even if it ran counter to their initial assumptions, and the general trend shows that voters correctly identified the programmatic distinctions between candidates. Figure 6.8 confirms this trend, showing that the predicted difference between candidate pairs is comparable across the three groups, both in terms of direction (i.e. voters correctly identified which candidate was lower/higher on the issue scale) and magnitude (i.e. the perceived distance between the two candidates). However, as the above discussion has suggested, the one exception is the political ideology measure, where the difference between candidates in T2 was in the correct direction (Romero placed to the left of Olarte), but significantly smaller than the corresponding difference in T1. In other words, although T2 voters correctly perceived the relative ideological positions of their candidates, they considered them to be much closer ideologically than T1 voters did. In fact, T2 membership

[169] The ideology question was modelled on the equivalent question used in the LAPOP surveys. It asks respondents to place themselves on a left-right scale according to their own understanding of these terms. Despite the explicit subjectivity of the wording, analysis of LAPOP responses shows a relatively high degree of consistency between stated ideological position and more specific attitudes towards the role of the state, particularly with regard to economic matters (Zechmeister and Corral 2010).

was associated with an 18-point decrease in the perceived difference between the candidates, compared with T1 (Figure 6.8).[170]

Social-Group Associations (H2b)

In general, a comparison of Figures 6.2 and 6.9 shows that candidate-social group associations were adjusted, where necessary, according to the programmatic profile of the candidates. In other words, where specific information accessed in P2 and P3 confirmed stereotype-based assumptions (T1), the difference in the proportion of candidate-social group associations widened at P3; where specific information in P2 and P3 contradicted stereotype-based assumptions (T2), the difference in proportions was (partially) reversed between P1 and P3. In fact, in T2 only two candidate-social group associations did *not* reverse their relative proportions between P1 and P3: in the 'rich Lima' category Romero's higher proportion at P1 was replicated at P3 (although the difference was not statistically significant in the latter case), while the proportions for the 'employers' category became virtually identical at P3 (rather than showing a clear reverse).[171] However, on all other social-group associations, however, the proportions in T2 were reversed over the course of the campaign, suggesting that voters perceived such associations as being closely linked to programmatic profile. In the control group, where voters had *only* programmatic information to go on, the proportions were largely comparable to T2 at P3, reinforcing the conclusion that programmatic profile was an important indicator of candidate-social group associations.

Nevertheless, and despite this general trend, Figure 6.9 shows that the difference in proportions between the candidates was considerably smaller in T2 compared with T1. Indeed, within-group differences are statistically significant in only four out of eight cases in T2, compared to seven out of eight cases for T1, and six out of eight cases for the control group (see annotation on *x*-axis). Substantively, this means that many more T2 voters believed that certain social groups and interests would still benefit from the election of a candidate whose programmatic profile turned out to be quite unfavourable to the group. For example, despite explicit policy pledges that made Olarte the unambiguous best choice for

[170] However, experimental group is not significant for either the T1/C or T2/C group comparisons (the C group difference is approximately half-way between the T1 and T2 group differences). This suggests that the T1/T2 difference results from a combination of an 'enhancement' effect in the T1 group (i.e. specific information that confirms stereotype-based expectations results in relatively clear perceptions of ideological difference) and an 'inhibiting' effect in the T2 group (i.e. specific information that counters stereotype-based expectations results in more cautious perceptions of ideological difference).

[171] There were also only limited differences in the proportion of voters who associated each candidate with the 'educated professional' category, at both P1 and P3.

FIGURE 6.9



N=214; ^ = $p < .10$; * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$.
The annotation on group labels refers to the significance of a proportions test between the two candidates within the given group. The annotation on graph titles refers to the significance of a proportions test between the cross-group candidate pairs indicated: RO is Romero (T1) with Olarte (T2); OR is Olarte (T1) with Romero (T2); OS is Olarte (T2) with Sánchez (C); RD is Romero (T2) with Rodríguez (C).
Source: Peruvian voting experiment.

foreign investors, private employers, and wealthy Limeños (at least on economic grounds), a considerable minority of voters still perceived Romero as the candidate with these groups' interests at heart.[172] Conversely, even when Romero undoubtedly proposed the most favourable programme for trade unions and their members and offered policies that were highly beneficial for *campesinos*, many voters still identified Olarte as the candidate most likely to serve those constituencies.[173] Thus, although a candidate's programmatic profile clearly influenced voters' perception of social-group associations, stereotype-based assumptions about the 'natural' constituencies of a white/European or an indigenous/Andean politician still carried considerable weight. Overall, these findings are in line with H2b.

Personal Characteristics

Compared with social-group associations, the changes in proportions of voter-ascribed personal characteristics between P1 and P3 are considerably less pronounced (see Figures 6.3 and 6.10). Indeed, in no cases are the proportions reversed in T2 so that the candidate with a significantly higher proportion at P1 has a significantly lower proportion at P3. In fact, Romero (the white/European candidate) was considered 'modern', 'sophisticated', and qualified by a significantly larger proportion of voters than Olarte (the indigenous/Andean candidate), even when the two were programmatically identical (in the graph, both RO and OR comparisons are statistically significant). Furthermore, on the'sophistication' measure, Romero's proportion was significantly larger than Olarte's irrespective of programmatic profile (i.e. *within* both T1 and T2, as well as between groups). Romero was also considered 'modern' and 'sophisticated' by a larger proportion of T2 voters than his control-group copy, Rodríguez (in the graph, RD comparison is significant).

[172] For instance, when both candidates were neoliberals, Romero was identified as the best option for foreign investors by 64 percent of voters (T1), compared with Olarte's 46 percent (T2). However, when both candidates were left-nationalists, 29 percent of voters still considered Romero to be the best option for investors (T2) compared to just 12 percent for Olarte (T1). Similarly, 48 percent of voters thought a neoliberal Romero was the best choice for private 'employers', compared to 19 percent for a left-nationalist Olarte (T1). Yet when the programmatic profiles were reversed (T2), near-identical proportions of voters associated a left-nationalist Romero and a neoliberal Olarte with the same employers' interests (38 and 39 percent, respectively). Finally, Romero was considered the best candidate for wealthy Limeños by 37 percent of voters as a neoliberal, compared to Olarte's 14 percent (T1), and 22 percent as a left-nationalist, compared to 3 percent for Olarte (T2).

[173] An Olarte presidency was considered to benefit trade union interests by 27 percent of T2 voters, despite the candidate's strongly neoliberal profile. Although this is less than the 38 percent who believed Romero to be the trade union candidate in T2, the difference is not statistically significant. Moreover, the 27 percent of T2 voters who linked Olarte with trade union interests is significantly more than Romero's 7 percent in T1, which is the directly comparable candidate pair in programmatic terms. Similarly, only 12 percent of voters considered Romero the best candidate for *campesinos*, compared with Olarte's 32 percent, when both were neoliberals, and by 47 percent of voters, compared with Olarte's 67 percent, when both were left-nationalists.

FIGURE 6.10



N=214; ^ = p <. 10; * = p < .05; ** = p < .01.
The annotation on group labels refers to the significance of a proportions test between the two candidates within the given group. The annotation on graph titles refers to the significance of a proportions test between the cross-group candidate pairs indicated: RO is Romero (T1) with Olarte (T2); OR is Olarte (T1) with Romero (T2); OS is Olarte (T2) with Sánchez (C); RD is Romero (T2) with Rodríguez (C).
Source: Peruvian voting experiment.

In addition to the differences on 'modern', 'sophisticated', and 'qualified', Olarte was described as 'populist' by a larger proportion of voters than Romero within both T1 and T2. Moreover, the differences between programmatically identical pairs *across* T1 and T2, as well as between T2 and the control group, are statistically significant in all cases. In other words, voters considered Olarte to be more populist than both Romero and Sánchez (Olarte's control-group copy) irrespective of programmatic profile, while they also considered Romero to be less 'populist' than any other candidate. Only in the 'hardworking and honest' category was a neoliberal Olarte significantly higher than a programmatically identical Romero (29 percent compared to 17 percent), although as left-nationalists the two candidates received near-identical proportions.

In short, although the overall pattern of P1-P3 changes is comparable to the social-group associations – that is, differences tended to increase in T1 and partially reverse in T2 – the adjustments were considerably less pronounced in the case of personal characteristics. Indeed, in several T2 cases the distribution of ascribed personal characteristics at P3 followed the same hierarchy as at P1. Thus, it appears that the ascription of personal trairs to candidates was only partially influenced by programmatic profile, and without specific information to counter P1 stereotype-based assumptions, many voters maintained their initial assessments.

Conceptually, it seems likely that the ascription of personal traits to candidates may reflect far less flexible notions of ethnic stereotypes compared to programmatic and social-group associations. Indeed, many of the personal characteristics identified here have been prominent in popular debates about real-world electoral candidates in Peru, with terms such as 'modern', 'sophisticated', and 'qualified' featuring heavily in legitimating descriptions of white/European candidates (often explicitly set against the *absence* of such characteristics in non-white opponents), while 'honesty', 'hard work', and 'closeness to the people' recur in positive descriptions of indigenous/Andean candidates. Conversely, many negative descriptions of non-white politicians employ the terms 'populist', 'unrefined', or 'backward', while white candidates may be discredited as 'foreigners' and 'snobs' who 'do not understand the country'.[174] Overall, then, the findings of the election simulation are in line with these real-word observations.

[174] See, for example, Ardito (2011) and Manrique (2011) on the ethnic stereotypes that permeated popular online discussion regarding the 2011 Peruvian election. See Muñoz (2011) on the importance of Humala's perceived honesty – particularly among indigenous voters – as a driver of his 2011 vote.

How Do Voters Actually Cast their Votes? (H3)

The preceding section has shown how voters tended to 'correct' their assessment of candidates, particularly on programmatic issues, in cases where initial assumptions proved inaccurate. But how would voters actually cast their votes? Might voters ignore these adjusted assessments and simply vote for the candidate they preferred at P1? Even if voters' disregard for the information they received was not so blatant, might more cautious candidate issue-placements (at least on some measures), or more ambiguous perceptions of social-group associations and personal characteristics, have more subtle effects on vote choice?

Direct Ethnic Effects

The simulation provides no clear evidence that voters are prepared to set aside programmatic or other sociopolitical assessments in order to select candidates based solely on ethnicity. Neither categorical nor linguistic measures of ethnicity are statistically significant predictors of P3 thermometer ratings or final vote choice (see Appendix Table D5-D8). More generally, there is little evidence that voters maintain their initial P1 preferences irrespective of information accessed later in the campaign: P1 thermometer ratings do a rather poor job at predicting final vote choice.[175] Thus, at least in this simulated election, it appears that voters either subordinated expressive ethnic biases to other criteria in reaching their vote decision, or they were not particularly influenced by such biases in the first place. In short, this simulation finds little evidence of expressive ethnic voting, and it suggests that most voters will not seek to maintain ethnic descriptive representation at the expense of substantive representation.

Programmatic Profile (H3a)

The analysis in the previous section has shown how voters were generally willing to alter their initial preferences as they progressed through the campaign, suggesting that initial stereotype-based assumptions were relatively flexible. But did this mean that voters set aside their initial assumptions and voted unambiguously for the candidate closest to their self-reported preferences?

The simplest way to examine the relationship between voters' political preferences and vote choice is to assess the former's predictive power in relation to the latter. The results

[175] The only significant effect is for Olarte in T2, where a 10-unit increase in the P1 thermometer rating is associated with a very modest one percent increase in vote probability (see Appendix D).

from this analysis, a simple logistic regression model, are reported in Appendix Table D8. These results highlight an important difference among the three experiment groups: whereas six out of the seven issue-measures from the pre-experiment questionnaire are significant predictors of vote choice in T1, and three out of seven in the control group, only one measure is significant for T2 voters. These findings suggest that T1 and control-group voters selected candidates whose profiles were, at least to some extent, in line with their own substantive preferences; T2 voters did not. However, although these findings provide some initial insight into voting patterns and underlying motivations, the analysis does not take into consideration whether or not the voter had correctly identified the candidates' position in the first place. In other words, did T2 voters select candidates who were unfavourable to their substantive interests because they prioritised other criteria, or because they simply misidentified the candidates' relative stands on the issues? Furthermore, this type of analysis is not immediately indicative of actual vote choice; that is, it provides evidence of effects on vote probabilities, rather than the predicted vote probabilities themselves.

Figures 6.11 and 6.12 provide a more nuanced (and more easily interpretable) picture of voting behaviour in each group. Both figures show the predicted probability of voting for the left-nationalist candidate according to a voter's position on the four issue/ideology measures. In Figure 6.11 the variable measuring voters' position is simply the mean of their self-reported scores on the four issue/ideology scales from the pre-experiment questionnaire (support nationalisation, presidential powers, public spending, and leftist political ideology). Because the original scales ran from zero to 100, values below 50 on this combined measure indicate a voter who is, on average, closer to the neoliberal end of the scale, while values over 50 indicate an average position towards the left-nationalist end of the scale.

Figure 6.12 employs a slightly different measure of 'voter-candidate affinity', calculated as the mean of the distances between voter and candidate on the four issue/ideology measures. The variable is calculated so that values to the right of zero on the *x*-axis (labelled 'no difference' in the graph) indicate that the voter's self-reported position is progressively closer to the position of the left-nationalist candidate *as perceived by the voter*, while values to the left of zero indicate that the voter's position is progressively closer to the *perceived* stand of the neoliberal. The key difference between these two variables is that the voter-candidate affinity measure (Figure 6.12) expresses how closely a voter's preferences match each candidate's *perceived* position, while the voter issue-stance measure (Figure

FIGURE 6.11



N = 214.
The graphs show the predicted probabilities (within 95 percent confidence intervals) of voting for the left-nationalist candidate by average voter issue-stance (the mean of voters' self-reported stance on nationalisations, presidential powers, public spending, and political ideology). The results are from a logistic regression model that includes an interaction term for group and voter issue stance and controls for voters' sociodemographic characteristics.

FIGURE 6.12



N = 214.

The graphs show the predicted probabilities (within 95 percent confidence intervals) of voting for the left-nationalist candidate by average voter-candidate affinity, a measure of the relative distance between voters' self-reported stance on nationalisations, presidential powers, public spending, and political ideology and the voters' P3 placement of each candidate on the same measures. Values to the right of the horizontal 'no difference' marker indicate greater relative proximity to the left-nationalist candidate; values to the left of the marker indicate greater proximity to the neoliberal candidate. The results are from a logistic regression model that includes an interaction term for group and voter-candidate affinity and controls for voters' sociodemographic characteristics.

6.11) indicates the proximity of a voter's preferences to the 'objective' programmatic poles of neoliberal and left-nationalist.[176] The predicted vote probabilities are generated by a logistic regression model with vote choice as the dependent variable, and an interaction term between experimental group and either the voter-issue or voter-candidate affinity variable. Controls for voters' demographic background are also included.

The *y*-axis in both cases shows the predicted probability of voting for the left-nationalist candidate in each group. Thus values above 0.5 indicate the prediction of a left-nationalist vote, while values below 0.5 indicate the prediction of a neoliberal vote. In general, if voters selected candidates in line with their self-reported substantive preferences, then we should see a positive trend in the predicted probabilities, with probabilities over 50 percent for voters with a more left-nationalist profile (the upper-right quadrant of the graphs) and probabilities below 50 percent for voters with a more neoliberal profile (the lower-left quadrant of the graphs).

Overall, Figure 6.11 and 6.12 show very similar trends, at least for T1 and T2. In T1, the strong positive trend indicates that voters tended to select the candidate who was broadly in line with their self-reported substantive preferences. The predicted probabilities of voting for the left-nationalist candidate are significantly greater than 50 percent for voters whose profiles placed them closer to the left-nationalist pole (Figure 6.11) or closer to the perceived position of the left-nationalist candidate (Figure 6.12). Meanwhile, the predicted vote probabilities are significantly less than 50 percent for those voters closer to the neoliberal pole or closer to the perceived position of the neoliberal candidate. The results in the control group closely resemble T1 for the voter-candidate affinity measure (Figure 6.12), indicating that most control-group voters were also likely to select the candidate they perceived as being closest to their own substantive preferences. The anomalous results in Figure 6.11for the control group – indicating similar predicted vote probabilities irrespective of voter profile – are probably best explained by the calculation method for the voter-issue variable.[177]

In contrast with T1 and the control group, the predicted vote probabilities in T2 are not significantly different from 50 percent for most voter profiles (in both Figures 6.11 and 6.12). This indicates that T2 voters were, in general, much less likely to vote in line with their

[176] Overall, we might argue that the voter-candidate affinity variable is a better measure of voting motivations. It is based on the voter's own perception of their electoral options rather than the voter-issue variable, which does not account for misidentified candidate profiles in the first place or for potential misinterpretations of the zero to 100 scale.
[177] This issue is discussed in Appendix D.

self-reported substantive preferences, at least as far as these four issue/ideology measures are concerned.

This chapter would argue that the broad pattern of voting behaviour outlined above resulted from greater uncertainty among T2 voters, compared with T1 and control-group voters, about various aspects of the candidates' profiles. Although T2 voters tended to correctly identify the relative stands of their candidates on programmatic issues (Figure 6.8), the assessments they reported – particularly in terms of political ideology – were sometimes more cautious compared with T1 voters and the control group. At least some T2 voters, then, appeared to consider the two candidates to be somewhat closer programmatically than their counterparts in other groups. Similarly, the perception of social-group associations among T2 voters also suggests ambiguity, with considerable minorities identifying social groups and interests with a candidate whose programme was distinctly unfavourable to the group in question.

In short, in the later phases of the campaign, T2 voters were faced with information that contradicted many of their initial expectations. This helped to increase voters' confusion and uncertainty regarding candidate profiles and the 'correct' vote choice, and it may have caused different aspects of a candidate's profile to exert contradictory pressures on voters (some assessments were still based on initial stereotypical assumptions, others were based on information accessed subsequently). This chapter argues that voters in T2 resolved these ambiguities in idiosyncratic ways depending on individual priorities, preconceptions, strategies for information search and processing, and the specific information pieces accessed during the experiment. The result, overall, was a far less consistent pattern of vote choice in T2.[178] In contrast, in T1 and the control group most indicators about the candidates were relatively consistent with voters' expectations, and different aspects of candidates' profiles may have been perceived as less contradictory, making the vote choice much more straightforward.

Social-group Associations (H3b)

The simulation data do not offer the possibility of assessing directly the effects of social-group associations on vote choice. In order to do so, we would need more detailed data on voters' perceptions of certain social groups, as well as some measure of identification with

[178] It is possible that less instrumental biases – affective group loyalties, resentment, or prejudices – also have greater influence when other aspects of a candidate's profile are perceived as being more ambiguous. However, the current data are insufficient to test such a hypothesis.

each group. However, it seems reasonable to assume that social-group associations will influence electoral decision-making to some extent. Several studies have shown that voters often perceive their own interests in terms of wider group interests (e.g. Ferree 2006, 805), and thus the perception of a particular candidate's affinity with specific social interests may well influence voting preferences.

In terms of the hypotheses presented in this chapter, the previous section made clear that voters' perceptions of social-group associations were significantly affected by programmatic profile. However, the findings also indicated that such associations were considerably more persistent – that is, more resistant to adjustment in the light of new information – than similar assumptions about specific programmatic positions. This suggests that ethnic stereotypes may have a particularly important influence on voters' candidate evaluation by shaping these broader social-group associations (compared with more specific programmatic assumptions). These social-group associations contribute to voters' general impressions about a candidate's networks, loyalties, and personal as well as political priorities, impressions that may, in turn, shape voting preferences.

Personal Characteristics (H3c)

The effect of a candidate's perceived personal characteristics on vote choice is easier to assess. However, the data provide no means of weighting characteristics in terms of salience to the voter, and the causal direction of any effects is questionable (do perceived positive characteristics affect vote choice, or do voters attribute positive characteristics to the candidate they have already decided to support?). Nonetheless, while keeping these caveats in mind, examination of the link between a candidate's personal characteristics and vote choice reveals significant positive associations in most cases, even when sociodemographic and political preferences are taken into account.[179]

In the experiment, being described as 'hardworking and honest' had a significant positive effect on both Olarte's and Romero's vote probabilities. 'Competence' and 'sophistication' were positively associated with Olarte's vote probabilities (but not Romero's), while 'qualified' was significant for Romero in both groups and for Olarte in T2. In contrast, being described as 'populist' had a negative effect on vote probabilities for all candidates, although it was only significant for the left-nationalist profile.

[179] See Figure D1.

Although this chapter cannot offer firm conclusions about the processes linking ethnic stereotypes, a candidate's perceived personal characteristics, and vote choice, a number of cases suggest that an effect exists. 'Hardworking and honest' and 'populist' were both disproportionately associated with the indigenous/Andean candidate (Figures 6.2 and 6.10), and both have significant effects on vote probabilities. The extremely skewed pattern of distribution for the 'populist' description may indicate a particularly damaging association for Olarte's candidacy; the combination of a left-nationalist programmatic profile and an indigenous/Andean ethnic background appears to provoke a far more negative reaction than the combination of the same programmatic profile with a white/European ethnic background (60 percent describe the former as 'populist', compared to just 22 percent for the latter). In terms of the white/European candidate, both 'competency' and 'sophistication' were disproportionately associated with Romero, but the ascription of these characteristics only appears to affect Olarte's vote probabilities. This suggests that the perceived absence of such characteristics may be an important factor contributing to more negative views of the indigenous/Andean candidate (or, of course, vice versa).

In short, although the extent of the relationship between stereotypes, personal characteristics, and vote choice is not explored fully here, ethnic background certainly appears to shape voters' ascription of personal traits to candidates. These, in turn, have significant effects on vote probabilities, lending some support to H3c. However, it seems likely that the unequal ascription of personal traits to candidates with different ethnic backgrounds (but otherwise-identical profiles), and the relative resilience of those ascriptions to change, indicate a form of stereotypical association that is far more inflexible than programmatic or social-group assumptions. In fact, the former may well constitute processes closer to the affective ties and prejudices implied by the expressive identity model of ethnic voting.

Conclusion

Data from the Peruvian voting experiment provide some evidence that ethnic stereotypes serve a heuristic purpose in voters' decision-making. In the absence of actual information, many voters appear to make initial assumptions about a candidate's programmatic profile, social-group associations, and personal characteristics based in part on the candidate's perceived ethnic background. However, there is little evidence from the

experimental data that these stereotype-based assumptions are entirely fixed or inflexible. When voters had access to specific information about a candidate's programmatic agenda, most adjusted their candidate assessments accordingly, even if this meant reversing initial assumptions. In short, voters were responsive to what candidates said and did; they were persuadable, at least to some extent.[180]

Nevertheless, despite this general trend of adjustment in light of better information, initial stereotype-based assumptions may still influence subsequent candidate evaluations. This may be particularly true of more general impressions about electoral candidates that cannot be unambiguously countered by a specific piece of factual information or an explicit statement by the candidate. Indeed, almost all voters in the experiment accurately perceived the two candidates' stands on the three specific policy issues tested, whether they were in the stereotype-consistent (T1), stereotype–inconsistent (T2) or control group (C). Similarly, most voters accurately identified their candidates' relative position on the conceptually broader ideology measure, although in this case stereotype-based assumptions appeared to mitigate the impact of specific policy information.

However, when voters were asked about social-group associations and personal characteristics, neither of which was addressed explicitly by information pieces in the experiment, the effect of stereotypes was particularly apparent. Certainly, a majority of voters still reported social-group associations in line with the candidate's programmatic profile, making adjustments in light of new information where necessary. Yet a sizeable minority continued to perceive such associations according to their initial stereotype-based assumptions. These voters appeared to play down or ignore information indicating a programmatic profile that was clearly antithetical to the social group or interest in question.

Finally, in the case of personal characteristics, the pattern of ascribing traits to candidates suggests more deep-seated assumptions about 'intrinsic' ethnic types. Although a candidate's programmatic profile appears to have played a role in these trait ascriptions, counter-stereotype adjustments according to programme were considerably less pronounced. In general, this suggests that some attitudes about ethnic identities are more indicative of the affective ties and prejudices that drive expressive, rather than heuristic, ethnic voting.

[180] We might presume that voters in the 'real world' are similarly responsive to politicians' speech and actions outside the campaign period, although in many cases electoral campaigns remain the primary source of voter information.

Overall, it appears that a combination of initial assumptions and only partial subsequent adjustments had some effect on vote choice in the voting experiment. Where a candidate's explicit programme ran counter to stereotype-based expectations, and thus where different aspects of the candidate's profile may have appeared contradictory, voters were much less likely to vote in line with their self-expressed political preferences. Uncertainty, confusion, and (perceived) contradictory pressures may have led individual voters to view key aspects of a candidate's profile differently or to prioritize different selection criteria. Less clear-cut programmatic options may also have increased the influence of less instrumental motivations, such as feelings of ethnic solidarity and ethnic prejudice. Nevertheless, this chapter would argue that the distinct voting patterns among the three experimental groups suggest an important role for ethnic heuristics, although not necessarily at the expense of more expressive voting behaviour.

Drawing wider inferences from an experiment involving only 217 participants is obviously problematic. Nevertheless, the findings from the voting experiment would seem to suggest that ethnic stereotypes may shape important aspects of voters' decision-making in Peru. In an inchoate electoral environment without stable political parties, where multiple candidates contest elections, and where politicians routinely subordinate programmatic distinction to vague catch-all appeals, voters turn to whatever decision-making aids are available. In Peru, and perhaps in several other Latin American countries, ethnic identities – understood in the broadest possible terms – may provide one such decision-making tool. Overall, this chapter would argue that the use of ethnic heuristic may often contribute to observable ethnic voting outcomes in Latin America. However, it does not deny some causal role for affective ethnic loyalties and prejudice. Indeed, the personal-trait ascriptions assessed in Figures 6.3 and 6.10 suggest that less instrumental ethnic sentiments and attitudes are still important components of contemporary electoral behaviour in the region.

Chapter Seven

Conclusion

The rise of ethnic politics has been a prominent feature of Latin America's recent political history, particularly in the central Andean countries of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. Beginning in the 1980s, indigenous social movements emerged as influential national political actors in both Bolivia and Ecuador and they played a central role in the subsequent formation of indigenous parties in both cases. More generally, various mestizo parties and politicians have increasingly incorporated ethnic appeals into their political projects and campaigns, in Peru as well as Bolivia and Ecuador. These candidates have forged alliances with indigenous organisations, run indigenous candidates, embraced indigenous symbols and specific policy demands, and framed aspects of their personal and political identities in ethnic terms, broadly defined. In many cases, such ethnic appeals have been integrated into wider populist platforms, while the most electorally successful indigenous parties have similarly combined ethnic and populist appeals. This type of ethnopopulism has the potential to appeal across a wide section of the electorate – to many lower class mestizos and whites, as well as indigenous voters – and it has emerged as a key ingredient of electoral politics in the Andes.

This thesis has focused on the impact of ethnic politics in the electoral arena, and specifically in presidential voting. It has argued that the occurrence and nature of ethnic voting in the Andes – and perhaps Latin American more generally – is shaped by three sets of factors: the region's specific ethnic landscape; the way in which ethnicity has been politicised; and both the specific electoral and wider political context of the campaigns in question. It has argued that broad similarities in each of these respects, both across countries and over time, have produced patterns of electoral behaviour that are in many ways comparable in the three countries examined. However, it has also argued that variation in these general contextual conditions may explain some of the differences observed in voting patterns among countries and electoral cycles.

With regard to electoral behaviour specifically, this thesis has argued that ethnic voting in recent Andean presidential elections can be explained in terms of three broad causal

mechanisms: the expressive model, in which voting constitutes a more or less unconditional expression of ethnic group allegiance; the heuristic model, where voters use ethnicity as an information shortcut; and the indirect model, where ethnic background helps determine broad political preferences and material circumstances, which in turn influence vote choice. Comparing evidence in support of each of these three conceptual models has been a key objective of the analysis, and one that may provide important insights into the workings of contemporary democratic politics in the region. Indeed, the prevalence of one or another form of ethnic voting has significant implications for assessing the nature and terms of democratic representation and accountability, the effectiveness of various campaign strategies, and the wider prospects for democratic stability and social peace. As such, determining the nature of ethnic voting in presidential elections has both direct empirical significance for Latin American democracies and wider theoretical significance for studies of ethnic politics elsewhere.

This concluding chapter proceeds as follows. First, it outlines the key features of ethnic politicisation in Latin America and how they may affect voting behaviour along the lines of the three vote models proposed. In the course of this discussion, the principal empirical findings from the preceding chapters are reviewed. Second, it offers some initial thoughts on how variation in wider contextual factors may account for distinct vote patterns across countries and electoral cycles. Third, it draws out some of the implications of this thesis's findings in terms of contemporary Latin American democracy as well as comparative studies of ethnic politics more generally. Finally, it suggests a number of areas for further research.

The Occurrence, Nature, and Implications of Ethnic Voting in the Andes

This thesis makes several contributions to the literature on ethnic politics and electoral democracy in the Andes. Most generally, it develops a strong overall case for ethnic voting in presidential elections across the region. The analysis goes beyond existing studies in examining a greater number of individual elections using comparable data, testing more diverse ethnicity measures (including ethnic attitudes), and examining interactions between ethnicity and non-ethnic voter characteristics. However, the thesis also examines the nature, not just occurrence, of ethnic voting. By examining the ways in which ethnicity shapes the preferences and electoral decision-making of individual voters, the analysis provides new

insight into the underlying processes that drive such political behaviour. These have potentially significant implications for assessing wider democratic processes in the Andes.

Expressive Ethnic Voting

The analysis in this thesis indicates an important role for ethnic bias in presidential voting. Ethnopopulist candidates in all three countries have won disproportionate shares of the indigenous and indigenous-mestizo vote, while several white electoral opponents have performed disproportionately well among non-indigenous voters. These voting patterns cannot be explained in terms of other demographic factors or political preferences, suggesting a direct causal role for ethnic bias in voting behaviour. Although the survey-based analysis cannot easily determine the underlying nature of such bias – whether it results from expressive or heuristic motivations – several findings indicate a more expressive dimension, particularly in Bolivia. Moreover, although the Peruvian voting experiment finds strongest support for the heuristic model, there is also some evidence for expressive voting in the simulated campaign.

First, the relative effect of different measures of ethnicity on vote choice may provide some insight into voting motivations in the survey-based analyses (Chapters Three to Five). For example, in Bolivia both linguistic background and explicit ethnic identification (as indigenous or white, compared to mestizo, and as Aymara or Quechua, compared to non-indigenous) had statistically significant effects on vote choice. In partial contrast, only the linguistic measure was significantly linked to voting outcomes in Peru, while a single measure of indigenous self-identification generated significant effects in Ecuador 2002. A link between linguistic group and vote choice suggests that voters' wider sociolcultural background may have influenced electoral behaviour, at least in Bolivia and Peru. However, significant effects for the self-identification measure indicate that more explicit group attachements may also shape presidential voting, particularly in Bolivia.[181] Choosing to self-identify as white, or declaring no identification with any indigenous culture, may relfect a particular subgroup of non-indigenous language speakers who consider themselves especially detached from indigenous culture, values, and interests. Of course, ethnic bias in the voting behaviour of such subgroups may still derive from ethnic heuristic use or more homogenous in-group preferences on substantive issues. However, as far as the Bolivian analysis is concerned, the facts that self-identification differentiates behaviour among voters who share

[181] In Ecuador, the LAPOP surveys did not record linguistic group before 2008, limiting comparison between these two ethnicity measures in the Ecuadorian case.

similar ethnic backgrounds (at least in terms of linguistic group), and that the vote models include controls for a wide range of demographic and attitudinal characteristics, suggest a role for more psychological group attachments and/or prejudice.

Moreover, several variables measuring inter-ethnic distrust or prejudice were directly linked to vote choice in Bolivia. Indigenous voters who expressed a preference for an ethnic in-group leader were significantly more likely to vote for Morales in 2005. In the same election, negative views of Aymara Bolivians reduced support for Morales, while negative views of whites increased the probability of a MAS vote. Similarly, voters who believed indigenous poverty resulted from innate biological or cultural deficiencies, or who disapproved of a son or daughter marrying an indigenous person, were significantly less likely to vote for Morales in 2009. Such effects are more indicative of electoral preferences influenced by psychological group attachments, including prejudice towards specific out-groups, rather than the more instrumentalist motivations underlying heuristic voting.

It is noteworthy that similar measures did not generally produce statistically significant effects in Ecuador or Peru, although data limitations are no doubt part of the explanation (ethnic attitudes were not recorded in most Ecuador surveys and for only half the Peru 2012 sample). In fact, Peruvian indigenous and mestizo voters reported comparable levels of ethnic discrimination to their Bolivian counterparts (and the proportions are only slightly lower for Ecuador), suggesting some of the same social conditions conducive to expressive voting may exist in Ecuador and Peru. However, in these latter cases, the electoral impact of ethnic attitudes remains unclear. At least for Peru, the voting experiment provides some additional support for expressive voting. It indicates a possible relationship between voter ethnicity and initial candidate approval ratings, even when substantive preferences are controlled for, although the effects fall outside conventional levels of statistical significance. It also shows how voters' assumptions about the personal characteristics of candidates tend to persist through the campaign irrespective of changing non-ethnic profiles (indicative, perhaps, of more deep-seated beliefs about intrinsic ethnic types). Yet, in general, the experimental data offer far stronger support for the heuristic model, and expressive ethnic bias appears to have had only limited impact on voting in the experiment.

In sum, expressive ethnic voting may play some role in Andean presidential elections. Overall, the evidence is strongest in the Bolivian case, although data limitations for Peru and especially Ecuador may contribute to this finding. However, Bolivia's particular social and

political context may also increase the prevalence of expressive ethnic bias. Strong ethnic identification at the individual level, the prominent use of ethnic appeals by politicians, greater alignment of ethnic divisions with other social cleavages, and a polarised political environment, are all conditions typically conducive to more expressive voting.

However, even in Bolivia there is little evidence for an unconditional relationship between voter ethnicity and electoral choice. Vote models from all three countries show predicted vote probabilities that vary within, not only across, ethnic groups, indicating a conditional relationship in which ethnic bias and substantive preferences combine to shape voting outcomes. On the one hand, this means ethnic bias may mitigate the effect of programmatic preferences in many cases, leading some voters to select candidates who do not represent their positions on important policy issues. However, these patterns of interaction also underline a pervasive instrumentalist dimension to voting behaviour in the region, indicating as they do the continued importance of substantive preferences in many voters' decision-making.

Heuristic Ethnic Voting

The case for a more instrumentalist dimension to Andean electoral behaviour is further strengthened by the experimental findings (Chapter Six). Voters in the Peruvian experiment made far-reaching initial assumptions about candidate characteristics based primarily on ethnic background. These included assumptions about the candidates' political preferences (particularly ideology and support for nationalisations), their relative affinity with distinct social groups and interests (including trade unions, peasants, private business, and wealthy residents of the capital city), and the candidates' personal characteristics (most noticeably with regard to honesty, competency, sophistication, and a populist leadership style).[182] The experiment also showed how, when faced with explicit information about the candidates, voters only adjusted their initial assumptions to some extent. Adjustments were most pronounced concerning specific policy stands, but considerably less so concerning more general ideological preferences, social-group associations, and personal characteristics.

This thesis has argued that, where candidates' programmatic profiles proved contrary to stereotype-based expectations (T2 group in the experiment), voters were more uncertain about candidates' 'true' characteristics, and they perceived greater contradictions between

[182] The apparent influence of ethnic stereotypes on voters' assessments of a candidate's ideological preferences (including the issue of nationalisations specifically) may be particularly important given the significant effects these characteristics had on vote choice in the survey-based analyses.

known characteristics (explicitly stated in the experiment; e.g., policy positions) and assumed characteristics (based on stereotypic associations *not* explicitly countered in the experiment; e.g., social-group associations and personal traits). As a result, vote choice was more unpredictable under these conditions, and it produced a more ambiguous relationship between substantive preferences and voting outcomes. In light of these experimental findings, this thesis has argued that similar heuristic use may account for some of the ethnic bias observed in the survey-based analysis, both in Peru and elsewhere in the Andes, although the relative influence of expressive and heuristic bias is likely to vary considerably.

However, the nature of the experiment's design and data raise several concerns about external validity, and thus the general salience of heuristic ethnic voting in real-world Andean elections. These concerns relate both to the experimental procedures themselves and their relationship to the conceptual propositions being examined. However, this thesis maintains that wider inferences based on the experimental data are justifiable, and that limitations inherent in the experiment do not entirely negate the external validity of its findings.

First, although the experimental sample was relatively small, comprising just 217 participants, it was nonetheless large enough to permit meaningful statistical analysis. Moreover, it reflected a broad cross-section of Peruvian society (and, at least to some extent, a more general Andean population), even if it cannot be considered fully representative of a national or regional electorate. Second, despite the inevitably contrived nature of the simulated campaign, it still captured several key features of a real-world election. Voters faced a dynamic and complex information environment (multiple information items and contradictory sources), they experienced time and effort pressures (actively seeking out information in a time-limited setting), and they were able to shape their own decision-making strategies and context (based on what information they accessed, ignored, or simply missed).

Third, theory suggests that heuristic use is most prevalent when voters have limited prior knowledge of candidates. Thus, by presenting two candidates who were entirely unknown, the experiment created an environment that was exceptionally conducive to heuristic voting. Yet such an outcome was by no means inevitable. In order to identify heuristic ethnic voting, participants actually needed to use ethnic stereotypes in this way. Furthermore, the experimental procedure did not preclude other forms of ethnic voting; expressive voting could (and perhaps did) take place, as the preceding discussion has

outlined.[183] Certainly, the experimental campaign diverged from many real-world elections in that it provided only unknown candidates. Yet political newcomers are not unusual in Andean elections, and thus the simulated campaign reflected an important feature of the region's electoral politics.

Of course, if heuristic use is most prominent when voters have little previous knowledge of candidates, then the prevalence of heuristic ethnic voting will vary according to specific electoral contexts. For example, we might expect heuristic use to be quite prominent in voters' evaluation of Humala in 2006, but considerably less so in the cases of Morales or Correa by 2009. Assessment of the incumbent's substantive performance or more expressive ethnic voting may play a greater role in these latter cases.[184] Nevertheless, in the inchoate electoral environment of the Andes, where parties lack stable programmatic identities, multiple candidates contest elections, and vague catch-all appeals dominate campaigns, voters' recourse to electoral heuristics, including ethnic heuristics, is likely to remain high. Moreover, according to the experiment, stereotype-based assumptions not only affected initial candidate evaluations, but they also influenced voters' assessment of subsequent political information. Thus, ethnic heuristics may continue to shape candidate evaluations beyond voters' initial assumptions.

Finally, the wider context of elections will not only influence heuristic use by providing familiar or unknown candidates, but, over time, it may also affect the content of the ethnic heuristics themselves. If ethnic heuristics vary across countries and regions, then the broader significance of the Peruvian experiment is called into question. For example, we might argue that, in the Andean context, recent social and political experiences in Bolivia and Ecuador have worked to develop an ethnic heuristic linking indigenous identity with left-nationalism. Prominent indigenous movements and parties have consistenly promoted nationalism and state-interventionism as defining features of their political identities. Yet the same cannot be said for Peru, where ethnopopulists have included both free-market entrepreneurs (e.g., Alberto Fujimori and Alejandro Toledo) and nationalist state-

[183] In fact, similar experimental techniques have been used to identify exactly the type of in-group favouritism and out-group prejudice implied by the expressive model. These have even included studies focused explicitly on ethnic voting (e.g., Goodyear-Grant and Tolley 2015). For its part, indirect voting was not tested in the experiment because the experimental data add nothing to such a test compared with the survey-based analysis (whether or not voters use ethnic heuristics has little impact on indirect voting, which deals with the prior effect of ethnicity on political attitudes). With this in mind, examination of the indirect model focused on the survey data, which provided much larger and nationally representative samples.

[184] For example, the vote models in Chapters Three and Four indicate that voters' economic assessments are important predictors of support for both Correa and Morales in the 2009 elections.

interventionists (e.g., Ollanta Humala). Thus, we might question whether the political content of ethnic stereotypes is consistent across the region.

However, despite some variation, broad similarities among the central Andean countries – especially in terms of ethnic relations and the politicisation of ethnicity – suggest a degree of comparability. Indeed, although we might expect the link between indigenous ethnicity and left-nationalism to be relatively less prevalent in Peru, voters in the Peruvian experiment made precisely this assumption about their candidates. Thus, it seems plausible that voters in Bolivia and Ecuador (where the stereotypic associations tested in the experiment are arguable more likely) may employ a similar ethnic heuristic to their Peruvian counterparts, at least in the context of lesser known candidates.

Indirect Ethnic Voting

This thesis has also argued that ethnicity may play a more indirect role in voting behaviour. The mediation analyses reported in Chapters Three to Five indicate ethnic background may help shape various voter characteristics – socioeconomic status, political ideology and policy preferences, and attitudes towards other ethnic groups – that subsequently influence voting decisions. Although some previous studies have implied similar indirect effects (e.g., Moreno Morales 2015), they have not tested explicitly the mediation pathways implied (i.e., ethnicity → political attitude or interest → vote choice). This thesis's analysis does so, finding indirect effects for ethnicity on vote choice mediated through political ideology, socioeconomic status, several issue-based preferences, and attitudes towards other ethnic groups.

In particular, the analysis has shown how voters from a broadly-defined indigenous background tend to be poorer and more left-wing ideologically, characteristics that are consistently linked to vote choice across the region. At least in Bolivia (the only case where full data were available), indigenous voters also tended to have more negative views of whites, while non-indigenous Bolivians were on average more likely to express negative feelings towards indigenous groups, particularly Aymaras. Both these attitudes were also linked to vote choice in Bolivia 2005 and 2009.

More generally, the analysis suggests that broader measures of ethnicity, such as linguistic group or cultural identification, may have more consistent indirect effects on voting outcomes than explicit self-identification. Linguistic group or cultural identification had statistically significant indirect effects in all four elections from Bolivia and Peru, while self-

identification with a generic ethnic category (white, mestizo, indigenous) produced significant effects only in Bolivia 2009.[185] As argued previously with regard to expressive voting, we might hypothesise that measures of linguistic or cultural group reflect voters' broader ethnic background, and thus capture socialised interests and preferences better than self-identification as white or indigenous. The latter may signal more politicised expressions of group allegiance, which are likely to connect more directly with voting outcomes (indicative, perhaps, of expressive ethnic voting).[186]

Overall, the analysis suggests that mediated effects may sometimes contribute to ethnic voting patterns in the Andes. However, in most cases examined, the indirect effects were supplementary to, rather than encompassing of, ethnicity's direct effect on voting. Thus, although the indirect voting hypothesis provides some insight into ethnicity's multifaceted role in electoral behaviour, homogenous preferences within ethnic groups do not appear to account fully for voting outcomes in the region. Looking beyond the Andes, we might surmise that indirect ethnic voting is likely to occur where ethnic groups are more geographically and socioeconomically concentrated (leading to more homogenous material conditions and socialised political preferences), yet where political behaviour is not overwhelmingly driven by unconditional group allegiances or prejudice. These are key characteristics of the central Andean democracies, but similar conditions may also apply to many multi-ethnic polities beyond the region.

Wider Implications for Electoral Democracy in the Andes

The findings presented in this thesis have several implications for studies of contemporary electoral democracy in the Andes. First, both the survey- and experiment-based analyses suggest that voters are at least partly concerned with substantive representation when casting their vote, not merely with achieving ethnic descriptive representation. In most cases, substantive preferences condition the effect of ethnic bias on voting outcomes, a feature that is not indicative of unconditional group allegiances. Moreover, many voters may seek ethnic descriptive representation in part to improve substantive representation, relying to some extent on ethnic heuristics in their candidate evaluations. If these inferences are correct, then elections should retain key representative and accountability functions. Voters should still exert some control over the programmatic political agenda, and leaders should be held

[185] Data limitations precluded mediation analysis in Ecuador.
[186] For example, according to the mediation analysis, linguistic group had both indirect and direct effects on vote choice in Peru 2006 and 2011, while self-identification as white had only direct effects. In contrast, cultural identification as Aymara or Quechua had indirect, but not direct, effects on vote choice in both Bolivian cases.

accountable, at least to some extent, based on their substantive performance. Indeed, there is little in the preceding chapters' analyses to indicate politicians can ignore voters' programmatic preferences – either as candidates or elected leaders – and still retain significant support based only on ethnic descriptive ties.

These findings have obvious implications for candidates' electoral strategies. They suggest candidates may gain some electoral advantage from ethnic appeals, drawing on both expressive ethnic biases and capitalising on various assumptions linked to ethnic stereotypes. However, this thesis has shown that expressive preferences are rarely unconditional in terms of electoral choice, while stereotypic assumptions are not immutable (although some may be considerably more or less easy to debunk). Ultimately, however, the findings in this thesis suggest that successful candidates will need to develop and communicate a political agenda that voters perceive as providing substantive, not just descriptive, representation (or, of course, develop other 'substantive' forms of electoral incentivisation linked to organisational ties, clientelistic benefits, and so forth).

Finally, in terms of wider inter-ethnic relations, this thesis finds some evidence that conditions may exist to facilitate further ethnic polarisation. Electoral choices that are, at least in part, influenced by ethnic in-group attachments and/or out-group resentment provide candidates with some incentive to stoke inter-ethnic tensions as a means of mobilising electoral support. This has been most evident in Bolivia, particularly in 2009. Similarly, even if ethnic voting resembles the heuristic model, there are clear risks associated with the reinforcement and manipulation of ethnic stereotypes by candidates seeking an electoral advantage. Yet, overall, the key characteristics of voters' electoral behaviour outlined in this thesis – especially the strong instrumentalist dimension to voters' decision-making – suggest mobilisation strategies that prioritise ethnic descriptive over substantive appeals will garner little popular support. Thus, at least for the time being, mainstream politicians are unlikely to opt for ethnically antagonistic electoral appeals, and the prospects for severe ethnic polarisation or conflict remain low.

Contextual Factors

Although this thesis has focused primarily on ethnic voting at the micro level of individual voters' electoral choices, it has also included some discussion of wider contextual factors. Specifically, it has argued that some of the variation across countries and electoral

cycles can be explained by divergent national ethnic landscapes and both the specific electoral and wider political context of the election campaign.

First, it has argued that the strength of ethnic identification at the individual level inevitably affects ethnic voting behaviour. For example, most of the data suggest that indigenous ethnic identification is considerably weaker in Ecuador and Peru compared to Bolivia (see introductory discussion in Chapters Three, Four, and Five). If voters' place less importance on ethnic group identities, then we might expect expressive (and perhaps heuristic) ethnic voting to be relatively less prevalent. The vote models reported in Chapters Three to Five appear to support this general hypothesis, as the preceding discussion has summarised. Whereas both ethnic self-identification and linguistic background were important factors in explaining vote choice in Bolivia, only the broader linguistic measure was consistently linked to vote choice Peru. Meanwhile, the effect of voter ethnicity on vote choice in Ecuador was much more limited, with ethnic background only emerging as a potentially significant factor in the 2002 election.[187]

Second, although the nature and strength of ethnic identification are products of long-term social and political processes, contemporary political events may raise the electoral salience of ethnicity in the shorter term. For example, Bolivia's polarised political environment may well have contributed to a higher incidence of ethnic voting in both 2005 and 2009. In both cases, the two principal electoral options captured and exacerbated a multi-cleavage divide in which regional, socioeconomic, ideological, outsider-establishment, and ethnic differences tended to align. Moreover, compared with Ecuador and Peru, the political rhetoric of the major candidates and their supporters was considerably more antagonistic, and it included a pronounced ethnic (and sometimes racist) component. Both elections were also preceded by sustained periods of political and social conflict, including instances of ethnic violence. These factors are likely to strengthen ethnic in-group solidarity and out-group prejudice, which, in the context of numerically large ethnic groups (and Bolivia has the largest indigenous population in the region), is likely to increase the prevalence of ethnic voting and expressive ethnic voting in particular. The vote analyses in Chapters Three to Five

[187] As discussed in Chapter Four, data limitations may also affect the identification of ethnic voting in the Ecuadorian case.

appear to support such a hypothesis, with both the group- and individual-level data indicating the particular salience of ethnicity to presidential voting outcomes in Bolivia.[188]

Third, this thesis has argued that electoral cross-pressure may significantly reduce ethnic voting. Comparison between Ecuador on the one hand, and Bolivia and Peru on the other, is informative in this regard. Cross-pressures are, of course, linked to the number and profile of candidates competing for the vote of a particular constituency (see below), but they also derive from various features of the wider sociopolitical context. Although cross-pressures affect voters in all democracies, this thesis has argued that the electoral pushes and pulls of partisan or organisational loyalties, associated clientelistic benefits, regional identities, religious affiliations, and programmatic preferences are arguably more contradictory in Ecuador than in either Bolivia or Peru. Moreover, these pressures tend to cross-cut ethnic divides in Ecuador, while they have to a greater extent tended to align with ethnic cleavages in Bolivia and Peru, as discussed previously. The presence of such cross-pressures, then, is likely to reduce the observable relationship between voter ethnicity and vote choice in Ecuador, and to a lesser extent in Peru, compared with Bolivia.

Finally, Chapter Four has argued that considerably greater competition for the indigenous vote in Ecuador may help explain the more limited occurrence of ethnic voting in this country. In Bolivia, only a few small parties challenged Morales for the indigenous vote, and Humala similarly emerged as the clearest perceived representative of indigenous and indigenous-mestizo constituencies in Peru (although he faced some competition from Toledo and Keiko Fujimori in 2011).[189] In contrast, several prominent parties and candidates have actively wooed indigenous voters in Ecuador, including Pachakutik (2002 and 2006), Lucio and Gilmar Gutiérrez (in 2002, 2006, and 2009), Correa (in 2006 and 2009), and several major leftist parties (e.g., Izquierda Democrática in both 2002 and 2006). Many of these candidates have pursued alliances with indigenous and social organisations, employed direct ethnic appeals to indigenous voters, and adopted conventional populist and clientelistic electoral strategies. In this context, we might expect ethnic voting in general to be more

[188] For example, both group- and candidate-centred ethnicisation scores are considerably higher in both Bolivian cases compared to Ecuador and Peru, while voter ethnicity (including explicit self-identification) and measures of ethnic prejudice are consistently linked to vote choice in the individual-level analysis (see previous discussion on expressive ethnic voting).

[189] Political polarisation along ethnic lines (as well as regional, class, and ideological lines) may also have contributed to increased ethnic voting in Bolivia, particularly in 2009. Recent Ecuadorian and Peruvian electoral politics have, at least relative to Bolivia, been less polarised in general. Moreover, in cases of heightened political tensions, ethnicity has typically been a less pronounced feature of such polarisation in both Ecuador and Peru.

limited, with multiple candidates offering indigenous and indigenous-mestizo voters some combination of descriptive, substantive, and clientelistic incentives.

In summary, this thesis has argued that the occurrence, and perhaps the nature, of ethnic voting depends not just on attitudes towards ethnic identities and issues among voters, but also on the profile of the candidates who run, their electoral strategies, and the wider electoral-political context, particularly the nature of electoral cross-pressures. Each of these factors may, under certain circumstances, work to increase or reduce the relative salience of ethnicity to political behaviour, thus enhancing or mitigating the role of ethnic voting (in some or all of its forms) in shaping electoral outcomes.

Beyond the Andes

This thesis also contributes to the wider comparative literature on ethnic politics and elections. First, it follows scholars such as Ferree (2006) and Birnir (2007, 2009) in proposing an expanded conceptual framework for the study of ethnic voting, one which takes into account the multifaceted nature of ethnicity's influence on electoral behaviour. Such an approach may be particularly appropriate in societies with a high degree of ethnic mixing, comparatively weak ethnic identification, and low ethnic polarisation. The Andes, and perhaps Latin America more generally, constitutes one such case, but similar conditions also characterise societies elsewhere in the world. In such contexts, ethnic voting is unlikely to consist of an unconditional relationship between voter ethnicity and vote choice, but rather a more complex and conditional combination of psychological ethnic attachments, varying perceptions about socioethnic identities and issues, and substantive political preferences. This thesis's analysis of the expressive, heuristic, and indirect models of ethnic voting (as well as a 'policy-as-usual' vote model) provides a framework for empirical analysis that encompasses each of these dimensions.

More specifically, this thesis has argued that our understanding of ethnic voting can be enhanced by including a wider set of variables in the analysis: a range of ethnicity measures; ethnic attitudes as well as demographic markers; various non-ethnic voter characteristics; and the interactions among these sets of characteristics. Moreover, it has argued that examining the underlying causal processes – how and why such characteristics come to produce voting outcomes – is as important for causal explanation as the identification of the overarching cause-effect relationship. Indeed, expressive, heuristic, and indirect ethnic voting might all be observationally similar in survey data, and thus failure to

examine the underlying processes precludes an accurate assessment of the wider political implications of ethnic voting. These conceptual propositions regarding research design, as well as the methods adopted in this study to address such propositions (particularly, the use of a voting simulation experiment), may be of use for studies of ethnic voting elsewhere.

The study of diverse ethnic voting models in this thesis also helps integrate the Andean case into the wider literature on ethnic voting. In this respect, the examination of heuristic voting is perhaps of particular significance. Several more recent studies of ethnic voting outside Latin America have found ethnic heuristics to play an important role in voters' decision-making (e.g., Posner 2005; Ferree 2006; Birnir 2009), yet no previous study sought to examine the nature of Latin American ethnic voting in these terms. The findings of this thesis suggest the types of heuristic ethnic voting identified elsewhere may also play an important role in Latin America.

Finally, although the studies cited above have developed and tested various hypotheses regarding heuristic ethnic voting, they have not examined the precise content of such heuristics, or the way in which associated assumptions are influenced by new information. This study has shown how ethnic stereotypes signal a wide range of candidate characteristics, including both specific personal and programmatic traits, as well as the candidate's perceived affinity with certain social groups. It has also traced the processes by which heuristic assumptions are adjusted in the light of new information, a key requisite for determining the extent of heuristics' electoral influence. The Peruvian voting experiment has provided insight into what types of political information accomplish more or less changes in voters' candidate assessments, and which types of assumed candidate characteristics (programmatic, social-group, or personal traits) are most resistant to change.

Future Research

The analysis in this thesis suggests a number of areas for further research. First, the findings from the experimental study require testing on a larger, more geographically-diverse sample in order to strengthen any wider inferences. Similar experiments could be conducted in Peru and other countries in the region following the general methods and fieldwork approaches outlined in this thesis. Second, future studies will need to test the experimental findings in the 'real world'. Although the type of effects in question are not easily accessed outside an experimental context, carefully designed survey questions (e.g., about voters'

candidate-social group associations) and more qualitative approaches (e.g. quasi-experimental focus groups concerned with real candidates) can provide valuable insight.[190]

More generally, although both the survey- and experiment-based analyses shed new light on aspects of voters' decision-making, they do not explicitly address the behaviour of politicians, and they only superficially examine the impact of wider contextual factors. The electoral strategies employed by candidates (the content, style, and tone of campaigning, including the use of ethnic appeals), as well as the specific electoral and wider political context of the campaign (the number and profiles of candidates, the dynamics of electoral cross-pressures, the role of social, political, and organisational networks, and so forth), are clearly fundamental to how voters' make their decisions. Furthermore, these factors affect how voters engage with, and perceive, democratic politics more generally. This thesis has offered a number of broad hypotheses regarding the effects of such contextual factors on cross-country and over-time variation in voting behaviour, yet future studies would need to test and extend these propositions more systematically. Integrating an analysis of candidates' campaign strategies and several of the key contextual variables outlined above into the type of voter-centric analysis reported in this thesis, would be a particularly intriguing area for future research.

[190] For example, a study in South Africa used surveys to collect voters' impressions about the ethnic groups most likely to benefit from the election of one or another party. These data were then used to test the influence of ethnic heuristics on electoral preferences (Ferree 2006).

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Appendix A: Bolivia (Chapter Three)

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics: Model Sample, Bolivia 2006

Table A2: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005 (with generic self-identification)

Table A3: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005 (with cultural identification)

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Table A18: Descriptive Statistics: Model Sample, Bolivia 2010

Table A19: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009 (with generic self-identification)

Table A20: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009 (with cultural identification)

Table A21: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009: Linguistic Interactions

Table A22: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009: Self-Identification Interactions

Table A23: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009 (with generic self-identification)

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Table A25: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009: Linguistic Interactions

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Table A28: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Linguistic Background on Voting for Morales over Reyes Villa, Bolivia 2009

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Table A35: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Identification with Aymara culture (compared with Quechua culture) on Voting for Morales over Reyes Villa, Bolivia 2009

Table A36: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Identification with Aymara culture (compared with a lowland indigenous culture) on Voting for Morales over Reyes Villa, Bolivia 2009

Table A37: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Identification with Quechua culture (compared with a lowland indigenous culture) on Voting for Morales over Reyes Villa, Bolivia 2009

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics: Model Sample, Bolivia 2006

Personal Linguistic Background		White	Mestiza	Indigenous	Black	Total
Spanish speakers						
	Evo Morales	29	282	46	2	359
	Jorge Quiroga	59	209	24	3	295
	Samuel Doria	9	62	8	0	79
	Michiaki Nagatani	14	38	11	0	63
	Other/Null	5	47	8	1	61
Indigenous-language speakers						
	Evo Morales	3	98	77	3	181
	Jorge Quiroga	1	10	5	1	17
	Samuel Doria		2	2		4
	Michiaki Nagatani	1	4	2		7
	Other/Null		7	5	1	13
Total		121	759	188	11	1,079

Cells show unweighted counts of respondents in the model sample, by vote choice and ethnic group.
Source: Author's elaboration based on LAPOP 2006.

Table A2: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005 (with generic self-identification)

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
MORALES	base outcome					
QUIROGA						
White (Mestizo)	0.955	0.358	2.670	0.008	0.251	1.659
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-0.433	0.359	-1.210	0.228	-1.139	0.273
Speaks an indigenous language	-1.320	0.341	-3.870	0.000	-1.991	-0.648
Income	0.159	0.085	1.870	0.063	-0.008	0.326
Female	-0.110	0.201	-0.550	0.585	-0.505	0.285
Age	-0.007	0.007	-0.930	0.353	-0.021	0.007
Trust in parties	-0.005	0.071	-0.070	0.942	-0.145	0.134
Participation in protests	-0.180	0.201	-0.890	0.372	-0.575	0.216
National economy has improved	-0.413	0.224	-1.840	0.066	-0.854	0.028
Personal finances have improved	0.336	0.255	1.310	0.190	-0.167	0.838
Resides in media luna	1.163	0.213	5.450	0.000	0.743	1.583
Resides in rural area	0.044	0.099	0.440	0.659	-0.150	0.238
Rightist ideology	0.325	0.053	6.130	0.000	0.220	0.429
Supports gas nationalisation	-0.133	0.041	-3.260	0.001	-0.214	-0.053
Strongman populist leader	0.153	0.170	0.900	0.370	-0.183	0.488
Direct democracy	-0.161	0.298	-0.540	0.590	-0.749	0.426
Minority to follow majority	0.032	0.276	0.120	0.907	-0.511	0.575
Constant	-1.979	0.645	-3.070	0.002	-3.248	-0.710
DORIA						
White (Mestizo)	0.317	0.529	0.600	0.549	-0.725	1.359
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-0.229	0.515	-0.440	0.658	-1.242	0.785
Speaks an indigenous language	-1.219	0.539	-2.260	0.025	-2.280	-0.157
Income	0.134	0.121	1.110	0.268	-0.104	0.371
Female	-0.042	0.306	-0.140	0.892	-0.645	0.561
Age	-0.012	0.014	-0.870	0.383	-0.039	0.015
Trust in parties	-0.069	0.120	-0.580	0.566	-0.306	0.168
Participation in protests	-0.522	0.443	-1.180	0.240	-1.394	0.350
National economy has improved	-0.033	0.410	-0.080	0.936	-0.839	0.773
Personal finances have improved	0.198	0.354	0.560	0.576	-0.499	0.896
Resides in media luna	1.640	0.381	4.300	0.000	0.889	2.391
Resides in rural area	-0.170	0.186	-0.910	0.362	-0.536	0.197
Rightist ideology	0.133	0.063	2.090	0.037	0.008	0.258
Supports gas nationalisation	-0.150	0.075	-1.980	0.048	-0.298	-0.001
Strongman populist leader	0.216	0.213	1.020	0.310	-0.203	0.635
Direct democracy	-0.946	0.537	-1.760	0.079	-2.004	0.111
Minority to follow majority	0.118	0.423	0.280	0.781	-0.714	0.950
Constant	-1.476	1.063	-1.390	0.166	-3.569	0.617
NAGATANI						
White (Mestizo)	1.268	0.506	2.500	0.013	0.271	2.264
Indigenous (Mestizo)	0.199	0.558	0.360	0.721	-0.899	1.297
Speaks an indigenous language	-0.067	0.633	-0.110	0.916	-1.314	1.179
Income	0.042	0.153	0.280	0.783	-0.258	0.343
Female	-0.122	0.344	-0.350	0.723	-0.798	0.554
Age	0.047	0.012	3.780	0.000	0.022	0.071
Trust in parties	-0.011	0.128	-0.080	0.933	-0.262	0.240
Participation in protests	-0.530	0.416	-1.270	0.204	-1.350	0.289
National economy has improved	-0.034	0.420	-0.080	0.935	-0.860	0.792
Personal finances have improved	-0.479	0.430	-1.110	0.267	-1.326	0.368
Resides in media luna	2.472	0.432	5.730	0.000	1.622	3.321
Resides in rural area	-0.051	0.174	-0.290	0.772	-0.394	0.293
Rightist ideology	0.444	0.084	5.300	0.000	0.279	0.608
Supports gas nationalisation	-0.194	0.092	-2.110	0.036	-0.375	-0.013
Strongman populist leader	0.288	0.251	1.150	0.253	-0.207	0.783
Direct democracy	-1.152	0.701	-1.640	0.102	-2.532	0.229
Minority to follow majority	-1.135	0.577	-1.970	0.050	-2.270	0.001
Constant	-6.405	1.680	-3.810	0.000	-9.713	-3.097

N = 1079. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2006 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales).
Source: LAPOP 2006.

Table A3: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005 (with cultural identification)

Voter Characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
MORALES	base outcome					
QUIROGA						
Quechua (none)	-0.512	0.273	-1.880	0.061	-1.049	0.024
Aymara (none)	-1.192	0.388	-3.070	0.002	-1.955	-0.428
Other Indigenous (none)	0.057	0.432	0.130	0.894	-0.792	0.907
Speaks an indigenous language	-1.242	0.333	-3.730	0.000	-1.898	-0.587

Table A3: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005 (with cultural identification)

Voter Characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
Income	0.157	0.088	1.780	0.076	-0.016	0.330
Female	-0.134	0.202	-0.660	0.508	-0.531	0.263
Age	-0.005	0.007	-0.820	0.413	-0.018	0.008
Trust in parties	0.023	0.068	0.330	0.740	-0.111	0.156
Participation in protests	-0.132	0.202	-0.650	0.516	-0.529	0.266
National economy has improved	-0.292	0.223	-1.310	0.192	-0.731	0.147
Personal finances have improved	0.275	0.248	1.110	0.270	-0.214	0.764
Resides in media luna	0.610	0.234	2.610	0.010	0.150	1.071
Resides in rural area	0.040	0.098	0.420	0.678	-0.151	0.232
Rightist ideology	0.306	0.052	5.920	0.000	0.204	0.407
Supports gas nationalisation	-0.116	0.039	-2.930	0.004	-0.193	-0.038
Strongman populist leader	0.185	0.165	1.120	0.263	-0.140	0.510
Direct democracy	-0.072	0.300	-0.240	0.810	-0.662	0.518
Minority to follow majority	-0.091	0.279	-0.330	0.744	-0.640	0.458
Constant	-1.526	0.709	-2.150	0.032	-2.921	-0.130
DORIA						
Quechua (none)	0.106	0.380	0.280	0.781	-0.642	0.853
Aymara (none)	0.110	0.545	0.200	0.840	-0.963	1.184
Other Indigenous (none)	-0.100	0.547	-0.180	0.855	-1.176	0.976
Speaks an indigenous language	-1.328	0.568	-2.340	0.020	-2.445	-0.211
Income	0.160	0.124	1.290	0.197	-0.084	0.404
Female	-0.014	0.320	-0.040	0.966	-0.644	0.617
Age	-0.007	0.012	-0.570	0.572	-0.030	0.016
Trust in parties	-0.062	0.119	-0.520	0.601	-0.296	0.171
Participation in protests	-0.612	0.434	-1.410	0.159	-1.466	0.242
National economy has improved	-0.016	0.415	-0.040	0.968	-0.834	0.801
Personal finances have improved	0.254	0.343	0.740	0.461	-0.422	0.929
Resides in media luna	1.602	0.388	4.130	0.000	0.838	2.367
Resides in rural area	-0.170	0.186	-0.910	0.363	-0.536	0.197
Rightist ideology	0.136	0.068	2.010	0.046	0.003	0.268
Supports gas nationalisation	-0.145	0.076	-1.900	0.059	-0.294	0.005
Strongman populist leader	0.219	0.209	1.050	0.295	-0.192	0.631
Direct democracy	-0.842	0.540	-1.560	0.121	-1.905	0.222
Minority to follow majority	0.119	0.424	0.280	0.780	-0.716	0.953
Constant	-1.917	1.096	-1.750	0.081	-4.075	0.240
NAGATANI						
Quechua (none)	-2.052	0.468	-4.380	0.000	-2.974	-1.130
Aymara (none)	-3.198	0.848	-3.770	0.000	-4.867	-1.529
Other Indigenous (none)	0.326	0.532	0.610	0.541	-0.723	1.374
Speaks an indigenous language	1.035	0.582	1.780	0.077	-0.111	2.181
Income	-0.015	0.159	-0.090	0.925	-0.328	0.298
Female	-0.119	0.367	-0.320	0.747	-0.842	0.604
Age	0.051	0.013	3.890	0.000	0.025	0.077
Trust in parties	0.002	0.129	0.020	0.987	-0.251	0.255
Participation in protests	-0.274	0.417	-0.660	0.513	-1.095	0.548
National economy has improved	0.004	0.429	0.010	0.993	-0.840	0.848
Personal finances have improved	-0.203	0.393	-0.520	0.606	-0.976	0.571
Resides in media luna	1.294	0.478	2.710	0.007	0.354	2.234
Resides in rural area	-0.077	0.205	-0.380	0.707	-0.481	0.327
Rightist ideology	0.380	0.082	4.630	0.000	0.219	0.542
Supports gas nationalisation	-0.161	0.097	-1.660	0.098	-0.352	0.030
Strongman populist leader	0.316	0.249	1.270	0.204	-0.173	0.806
Direct democracy	-1.086	0.654	-1.660	0.098	-2.375	0.202
Minority to follow majority	-1.269	0.584	-2.180	0.030	-2.418	-0.121
Constant	-4.848	1.760	-2.760	0.006	-8.311	-1.384

N = 1077. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2006 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales).
Source: LAPOP 2006

Table A4: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005: Linguistic Interactions

Voter characteristics	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
MORALES	base outcome					
QUIROGA						
White (Mestizo)	0.967	0.356	2.710	0.007	0.266	1.668
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-0.403	0.362	-1.120	0.266	-1.115	0.309
Speaks an indigenous language	-3.749	1.729	-2.170	0.031	-7.152	-0.346
Income	0.146	0.091	1.610	0.108	-0.032	0.324
Female	-0.117	0.204	-0.580	0.565	-0.519	0.284
Age	-0.007	0.007	-0.940	0.346	-0.021	0.007
Trust in parties	-0.013	0.072	-0.180	0.861	-0.153	0.128
Participation in protests	-0.171	0.203	-0.840	0.402	-0.571	0.229
National economy has improved	-0.427	0.224	-1.910	0.058	-0.867	0.014
Personal finances have improved	0.337	0.255	1.320	0.187	-0.165	0.839
Resides in media luna	1.179	0.217	5.420	0.000	0.751	1.607
Resides in rural area	0.043	0.098	0.440	0.663	-0.151	0.236
Rightist ideology	0.321	0.057	5.640	0.000	0.209	0.433
Supports gas nationalisation	-0.148	0.044	-3.380	0.001	-0.234	-0.062
Strongman populist leader	0.176	0.190	0.930	0.354	-0.197	0.550
Direct democracy	-0.140	0.324	-0.430	0.666	-0.778	0.498
Minority to follow majority	0.024	0.301	0.080	0.937	-0.569	0.616
INTERACTIONS: Ind. language *						
Rightist ideology	0.105	0.130	0.810	0.421	-0.151	0.360
Supports gas nationalisation	0.168	0.195	0.860	0.390	-0.216	0.552
Strongman populist leader	-0.114	0.540	-0.210	0.833	-1.176	0.948
Direct democracy	-0.071	0.934	-0.080	0.939	-1.909	1.767
Minority to follow majority	-0.243	0.923	-0.260	0.792	-2.060	1.573
Income	0.201	0.250	0.810	0.421	-0.290	0.693
Constant	-1.794	0.692	-2.590	0.010	-3.157	-0.432
DORIA						
White (Mestizo)	0.298	0.528	0.560	0.573	-0.742	1.337

Table A4: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005: Linguistic Interactions

Voter characteristics	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-0.231	0.545	-0.420	0.673	-1.303	0.842
Speaks an indigenous language	0.212	1.881	0.110	0.910	-3.490	3.915
Income	0.154	0.125	1.230	0.219	-0.092	0.399
Female	-0.040	0.314	-0.130	0.899	-0.658	0.578
Age	-0.012	0.014	-0.850	0.396	-0.040	0.016
Trust in parties	-0.067	0.123	-0.540	0.588	-0.309	0.176
Participation in protests	-0.500	0.444	-1.130	0.261	-1.373	0.374
National economy has improved	-0.065	0.409	-0.160	0.873	-0.871	0.741
Personal finances have improved	0.179	0.361	0.500	0.620	-0.532	0.890
Resides in media luna	1.670	0.378	4.420	0.000	0.926	2.415
Resides in rural area	-0.195	0.185	-1.060	0.292	-0.558	0.169
Rightist ideology	0.135	0.069	1.970	0.050	0.000	0.271
Supports gas nationalisation	-0.143	0.076	-1.890	0.060	-0.292	0.006
Strongman populist leader	0.289	0.228	1.270	0.205	-0.159	0.738
Direct democracy	-1.219	0.626	-1.950	0.053	-2.453	0.014
Minority to follow majority	0.012	0.467	0.030	0.979	-0.907	0.932
INTERACTIONS: Ind. language *						
Rightist ideology	-0.066	0.229	-0.290	0.774	-0.515	0.384
Supports gas nationalisation	0.032	0.295	0.110	0.915	-0.548	0.612
Strongman populist leader	-0.921	0.862	-1.070	0.287	-2.618	0.777
Direct democracy	2.145	1.074	2.000	0.047	0.032	4.259
Minority to follow majority	0.698	1.019	0.690	0.494	-1.307	2.704
Income	-0.548	0.779	-0.700	0.482	-2.082	0.985
Constant	-1.604	1.112	-1.440	0.150	-3.792	0.585
NAGATANI						
White (Mestizo)	1.258	0.502	2.510	0.013	0.270	2.247
Indigenous (Mestizo)	0.261	0.548	0.480	0.634	-0.818	1.340
Speaks an indigenous language	0.336	4.574	0.070	0.942	-8.669	9.340
Income	0.084	0.137	0.610	0.540	-0.186	0.354
Female	-0.129	0.359	-0.360	0.720	-0.835	0.577
Age	0.048	0.011	4.320	0.000	0.026	0.069
Trust in parties	-0.029	0.121	-0.240	0.812	-0.266	0.209
Participation in protests	-0.588	0.419	-1.400	0.161	-1.412	0.236
National economy has improved	-0.038	0.425	-0.090	0.928	-0.874	0.798
Personal finances have improved	-0.503	0.428	-1.180	0.241	-1.346	0.339
Resides in media luna	2.553	0.444	5.740	0.000	1.678	3.428
Resides in rural area	-0.001	0.170	-0.010	0.995	-0.336	0.334
Rightist ideology	0.452	0.091	4.990	0.000	0.274	0.630
Supports gas nationalisation	-0.199	0.090	-2.210	0.028	-0.376	-0.022
Strongman populist leader	0.271	0.283	0.960	0.340	-0.287	0.829
Direct democracy	-0.799	0.733	-1.090	0.277	-2.242	0.645
Minority to follow majority	-1.629	0.617	-2.640	0.009	-2.844	-0.414
INTERACTIONS: Ind. language *						
Rightist ideology	-0.014	0.233	-0.060	0.953	-0.472	0.445
Supports gas nationalisation	-0.040	0.313	-0.130	0.899	-0.657	0.577
Strongman populist leader	0.069	0.528	0.130	0.896	-0.970	1.108
Direct democracy	-14.397	1.235	-11.660	0.000	-16.828	-11.965
Minority to follow majority	1.627	1.338	1.220	0.225	-1.008	4.262
Income	-0.005	0.421	-0.010	0.991	-0.833	0.824
Constant	-6.688	1.342	-4.980	0.000	-9.329	-4.046

N = 1077. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2006 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales), with two-interactions between linguistic group and the non-ethnic voter characteristics indicated.
Source: LAPOP 2006.

Table A5: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005: Self-Identification Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
MORALES						
QUIROGA						
White (Mestizo)	4.733	2.315	2.040	0.042	0.176	9.290
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-3.548	1.929	-1.840	0.067	-7.345	0.248
Speaks an indigenous language	-1.346	0.353	-3.820	0.000	-2.041	-0.652
Income	0.204	0.087	2.340	0.020	0.033	0.375
Female	-0.091	0.203	-0.450	0.655	-0.490	0.309
Age	-0.005	0.007	-0.750	0.452	-0.019	0.009
Trust in parties	0.007	0.072	0.100	0.919	-0.135	0.149
Participation in protests	-0.185	0.202	-0.920	0.360	-0.583	0.212
National economy has improved	-0.397	0.229	-1.730	0.084	-0.848	0.054
Personal finances have improved	0.318	0.256	1.240	0.215	-0.185	0.822
Resides in media luna	1.141	0.212	5.390	0.000	0.724	1.558
Resides in rural area	0.029	0.102	0.290	0.774	-0.171	0.230
Rightist ideology	0.315	0.065	4.870	0.000	0.188	0.442
Supports gas nationalisation	-0.141	0.046	-3.060	0.002	-0.232	-0.050
Strongman populist leader	0.233	0.196	1.190	0.235	-0.153	0.620
Direct democracy	-0.031	0.361	-0.090	0.931	-0.741	0.679
Minority to follow majority	-0.041	0.334	-0.120	0.903	-0.698	0.617
INTERACTIONS						
White * Rightist ideology	-0.108	0.159	-0.680	0.497	-0.420	0.204
Indigenous * Rightist ideology	0.233	0.175	1.330	0.183	-0.111	0.577
White * Supports gas national.	-0.059	0.145	-0.410	0.683	-0.344	0.226
Indigenous * Supports gas national.	0.199	0.143	1.390	0.165	-0.083	0.481
White * Strongman pop. leader	-0.668	0.574	-1.160	0.245	-1.798	0.462
Indigenous * Strongman pop. Leader	0.059	0.481	0.120	0.902	-0.887	1.005
White * Direct democracy	-0.788	0.802	-0.980	0.326	-2.366	0.790
Indigenous * Direct democracy	-0.006	0.982	-0.010	0.995	-1.939	1.927
White * Minority follow maj.	0.829	0.872	0.950	0.343	-0.889	2.546
Indigenous * Minority follow maj.	-0.458	0.844	-0.540	0.587	-2.119	1.202
White * Income	-0.524	0.260	-2.020	0.045	-1.036	-0.012
Indigenous * Income	0.103	0.223	0.460	0.646	-0.336	0.542
Constant	-2.164	0.723	-2.990	0.003	-3.587	-0.741

Table A5: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005: Self-Identification Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
DORIA						
White (Mestizo)	-2.180	3.241	-0.670	0.502	-8.560	4.201
Indigenous (Mestizo)	1.542	1.977	0.780	0.436	-2.350	5.435
Speaks an indigenous language	-1.288	0.626	-2.060	0.041	-2.520	-0.055
Income	0.144	0.130	1.110	0.269	-0.112	0.401
Female	-0.050	0.305	-0.160	0.869	-0.650	0.550
Age	-0.013	0.015	-0.890	0.376	-0.043	0.016
Trust in parties	-0.075	0.122	-0.610	0.539	-0.314	0.165
Participation in protests	-0.523	0.446	-1.170	0.242	-1.401	0.355
National economy has improved	-0.077	0.421	-0.180	0.854	-0.906	0.751
Personal finances have improved	0.235	0.379	0.620	0.537	-0.512	0.981
Resides in media luna	1.688	0.394	4.290	0.000	0.913	2.463
Resides in rural area	-0.202	0.189	-1.070	0.287	-0.575	0.171
Rightist ideology	0.135	0.080	1.680	0.094	-0.023	0.293
Supports gas nationalisation	-0.148	0.083	-1.780	0.076	-0.311	0.015
Strongman populist leader	0.206	0.231	0.890	0.372	-0.248	0.660
Direct democracy	-0.902	0.596	-1.510	0.132	-2.076	0.272
Minority to follow majority	-0.010	0.484	-0.020	0.983	-0.962	0.942
INTERACTIONS						
White * Rightist ideology	-0.084	0.151	-0.560	0.576	-0.381	0.213
Indigenous * Rightist ideology	-0.084	0.151	-0.560	0.576	-0.381	0.213
White * Supports gas national.	0.297	0.199	1.490	0.137	-0.095	0.689
Indigenous * Supports gas national.	-0.322	0.155	-2.080	0.039	-0.628	-0.017
White * Strongman pop. leader	0.609	0.797	0.760	0.445	-0.960	2.178
Indigenous * Strongman pop. Leader	-0.196	0.509	-0.380	0.701	-1.198	0.807
White * Direct democracy	-14.002	0.991	-14.130	0.000	-15.953	-12.051
Indigenous * Direct democracy	0.013	1.064	0.010	0.990	-2.082	2.108
White * Minority follow maj.	-14.199	1.015	-13.980	0.000	-16.198	-12.200
Indigenous * Minority follow maj.	1.931	1.171	1.650	0.100	-0.375	4.237
White * Income	0.003	0.371	0.010	0.994	-0.728	0.734
Indigenous * Income	-0.199	0.467	-0.430	0.671	-1.119	0.721
Constant	-1.422	1.209	-1.180	0.241	-3.803	0.959
NAGATANI						
White (Mestizo)	0.808	3.420	0.240	0.813	-5.925	7.540
Indigenous (Mestizo)	1.037	2.141	0.480	0.629	-3.179	5.252
Speaks an indigenous language	0.013	0.622	0.020	0.983	-1.210	1.237
Income	0.009	0.205	0.040	0.966	-0.396	0.413
Female	-0.223	0.361	-0.620	0.537	-0.933	0.487
Age	0.052	0.012	4.350	0.000	0.028	0.076
Trust in parties	-0.006	0.123	-0.050	0.961	-0.249	0.237
Participation in protests	-0.620	0.423	-1.460	0.144	-1.453	0.213
National economy has improved	-0.069	0.423	-0.160	0.871	-0.902	0.764
Personal finances have improved	-0.567	0.411	-1.380	0.169	-1.377	0.242
Resides in media luna	2.483	0.456	5.450	0.000	1.586	3.379
Resides in rural area	-0.043	0.169	-0.260	0.798	-0.376	0.290
Rightist ideology	0.445	0.126	3.540	0.000	0.197	0.692
Supports gas nationalisation	-0.227	0.112	-2.030	0.044	-0.447	-0.006
Strongman populist leader	0.471	0.323	1.460	0.145	-0.164	1.107
Direct democracy	-1.018	0.931	-1.090	0.275	-2.851	0.815
Minority to follow majority	-1.700	0.719	-2.360	0.019	-3.116	-0.284
INTERACTIONS						
White * Rightist ideology	0.077	0.223	0.350	0.730	-0.363	0.517
Indigenous * Rightist ideology	-0.221	0.186	-1.190	0.237	-0.588	0.146
White * Supports gas national.	0.166	0.277	0.600	0.548	-0.378	0.711
Indigenous * Supports gas national.	-0.110	0.190	-0.580	0.562	-0.485	0.264
White * Strongman pop. leader	-0.454	0.660	-0.690	0.492	-1.754	0.845
Indigenous * Strongman pop. Leader	-0.720	0.575	-1.250	0.211	-1.851	0.411
White * Direct democracy	0.234	1.193	0.200	0.844	-2.115	2.584
Indigenous * Direct democracy	-0.577	1.649	-0.350	0.727	-3.823	2.669
White * Minority follow maj.	2.165	1.292	1.680	0.095	-0.379	4.709
Indigenous * Minority follow maj.	-12.445	0.988	-12.600	0.000	-14.390	-10.500
White * Income	-0.275	0.351	-0.780	0.434	-0.966	0.416
Indigenous * Income	0.621	0.279	2.230	0.027	0.072	1.170
Constant	-6.401	2.147	-2.980	0.003	-10.627	-2.175

N = 1079. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2006 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales), with two-interactions between self-identified group and the non-ethnic voter characteristics indicated.
Source: LAPOP 2006.

Table A6: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005 (with generic self-identification)

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
MORALES						
QUIROGA						
White (Mestizo)	0.773	0.428	1.800	0.072	-0.071	1.616
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-0.186	0.365	-0.510	0.611	-0.904	0.533
Speaks an indigenous language	-1.138	0.416	-2.740	0.007	-1.957	-0.319
Income	0.150	0.103	1.450	0.147	-0.053	0.352
Female	-0.139	0.233	-0.590	0.553	-0.598	0.321
Age	-0.007	0.008	-0.830	0.409	-0.023	0.009
Trust in parties	-0.006	0.085	-0.070	0.943	-0.174	0.162
Participation in protests	-0.648	0.248	-2.610	0.009	-1.137	-0.160
National economy has improved	-0.686	0.294	-2.330	0.020	-1.265	-0.107
Personal finances have improved	0.599	0.289	2.080	0.039	0.031	1.167
Resides in media luna	0.888	0.247	3.590	0.000	0.401	1.374
Resides in rural area	0.064	0.141	0.450	0.653	-0.215	0.342
Rightist ideology	0.292	0.061	4.790	0.000	0.172	0.412
Supports gas nationalisation	-0.055	0.047	-1.180	0.240	-0.147	0.037
Strongman populist leader	0.166	0.187	0.890	0.376	-0.202	0.534
Direct democracy	-0.211	0.388	-0.540	0.586	-0.975	0.552
Minority to follow majority	0.072	0.357	0.200	0.841	-0.631	0.775

Table A6: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005 (with generic self-identification)

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity	-0.157	0.328	-0.480	0.633	-0.804	0.490
One national culture	0.092	0.345	0.270	0.790	-0.587	0.771
Negative view of Aymara	1.069	0.339	3.150	0.002	0.401	1.737
Negative view of Quechua	0.077	0.329	0.230	0.816	-0.572	0.725
Negative view of Camba	-0.352	0.308	-1.140	0.254	-0.960	0.255
Negative view of White	-0.565	0.268	-2.110	0.036	-1.093	-0.037
Experience of discrimination	-0.097	0.089	-1.090	0.276	-0.272	0.078
Constant	-2.148	0.846	-2.540	0.012	-3.814	-0.482
DORIA						
White (Mestizo)	0.189	0.675	0.280	0.780	-1.140	1.518
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-0.343	0.609	-0.560	0.574	-1.542	0.856
Speaks an indigenous language	-2.405	1.019	-2.360	0.019	-4.411	-0.398
Income	-0.009	0.148	-0.060	0.954	-0.300	0.283
Female	-0.011	0.398	-0.030	0.977	-0.795	0.772
Age	-0.020	0.016	-1.220	0.222	-0.051	0.012
Trust in parties	0.024	0.140	0.170	0.866	-0.252	0.300
Participation in protests	-0.685	0.443	-1.550	0.123	-1.557	0.187
National economy has improved	0.376	0.440	0.850	0.394	-0.490	1.241
Personal finances have improved	0.170	0.389	0.440	0.663	-0.596	0.936
Resides in media luna	1.490	0.394	3.790	0.000	0.715	2.265
Resides in rural area	-0.517	0.281	-1.840	0.066	-1.070	0.035
Rightist ideology	0.142	0.080	1.770	0.078	-0.016	0.299
Supports gas nationalisation	-0.148	0.087	-1.710	0.089	-0.319	0.023
Strongman populist leader	0.224	0.235	0.950	0.341	-0.238	0.687
Direct democracy	-1.334	0.780	-1.710	0.088	-2.870	0.202
Minority to follow majority	0.420	0.582	0.720	0.471	-0.726	1.565
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity	0.555	0.524	1.060	0.290	-0.476	1.586
One national culture	-1.554	1.031	-1.510	0.133	-3.584	0.476
Negative view of Aymara	0.450	0.457	0.990	0.325	-0.450	1.350
Negative view of Quechua	0.655	0.563	1.160	0.246	-0.454	1.764
Negative view of Camba	-0.253	0.439	-0.580	0.566	-1.117	0.612
Negative view of White	-0.195	0.419	-0.470	0.642	-1.020	0.630
Experience of discrimination	-0.193	0.159	-1.210	0.227	-0.506	0.120
Constant	-0.555	1.059	-0.520	0.601	-2.640	1.530
NAGATANI						
White (Mestizo)	1.488	0.589	2.530	0.012	0.329	2.647
Indigenous (Mestizo)	0.720	0.600	1.200	0.232	-0.462	1.902
Speaks an indigenous language	0.766	0.627	1.220	0.223	-0.468	2.000
Income	0.072	0.180	0.400	0.691	-0.283	0.426
Female	-0.478	0.429	-1.110	0.267	-1.323	0.368
Age	0.049	0.011	4.520	0.000	0.027	0.070
Trust in parties	0.097	0.136	0.710	0.478	-0.172	0.365
Participation in protests	-0.645	0.506	-1.270	0.204	-1.640	0.351
National economy has improved	0.468	0.549	0.850	0.395	-0.613	1.549
Personal finances have improved	-0.325	0.552	-0.590	0.557	-1.412	0.763
Resides in media luna	2.109	0.467	4.520	0.000	1.190	3.029
Resides in rural area	-0.226	0.221	-1.020	0.308	-0.661	0.209
Rightist ideology	0.407	0.107	3.820	0.000	0.197	0.617
Supports gas nationalisation	-0.165	0.109	-1.510	0.132	-0.380	0.050
Strongman populist leader	0.272	0.333	0.820	0.415	-0.384	0.927
Direct democracy	-1.443	0.726	-1.990	0.048	-2.874	-0.013
Minority to follow majority	-1.080	0.591	-1.830	0.069	-2.245	0.085
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity	-0.312	0.563	-0.550	0.580	-1.422	0.798
One national culture	-0.027	0.604	-0.040	0.965	-1.217	1.163
Negative view of Aymara	0.897	0.591	1.520	0.130	-0.266	2.061
Negative view of Quechua	0.461	0.521	0.890	0.377	-0.565	1.488
Negative view of Camba	-0.102	0.520	-0.200	0.845	-1.126	0.922
Negative view of White	-0.804	0.453	-1.770	0.077	-1.697	0.088
Experience of discrimination	-0.626	0.227	-2.760	0.006	-1.073	-0.179
Constant	-6.425	1.767	-3.640	0.000	-9.905	-2.945

N = 787. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2006 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales).
Source: LAPOP 2006.

Table A7: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005 (with cultural identification)

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
MORALES						
QUIROGA						
Quechua (none)	-0.221	0.360	-0.610	0.540	-0.931	0.489
Aymara (none)	-0.670	0.470	-1.430	0.155	-1.595	0.255
Other Indigenous (none)	-0.176	0.520	-0.340	0.736	-1.200	0.848
Speaks an indigenous language	-1.107	0.423	-2.610	0.009	-1.941	-0.273
Income	0.142	0.101	1.410	0.161	-0.057	0.342
Female	-0.156	0.226	-0.690	0.492	-0.602	0.290
Age	-0.007	0.008	-0.890	0.374	-0.022	0.008
Trust in parties	0.018	0.081	0.220	0.824	-0.142	0.179
Participation in protests	-0.576	0.237	-2.430	0.016	-1.043	-0.109
National economy has improved	-0.572	0.282	-2.030	0.044	-1.128	-0.016
Personal finances have improved	0.538	0.283	1.900	0.059	-0.020	1.095
Resides in media luna	0.619	0.303	2.050	0.042	0.023	1.215
Resides in rural area	0.067	0.139	0.480	0.629	-0.206	0.340
Rightist ideology	0.292	0.057	5.090	0.000	0.179	0.406
Supports gas nationalisation	-0.050	0.045	-1.110	0.269	-0.139	0.039
Strongman populist leader	0.188	0.187	1.010	0.314	-0.179	0.556
Direct democracy	-0.129	0.365	-0.350	0.723	-0.848	0.590
Minority to follow majority	-0.041	0.345	-0.120	0.905	-0.720	0.638
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity	-0.141	0.309	-0.450	0.650	-0.750	0.469
One national culture	0.099	0.346	0.290	0.775	-0.582	0.780
Negative view of Aymara	0.908	0.338	2.690	0.008	0.243	1.573
Negative view of Quechua	0.093	0.342	0.270	0.786	-0.580	0.766
Negative view of Camba	-0.244	0.308	-0.790	0.430	-0.851	0.364

Table A7: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2005 (with cultural identification)

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
Negative view of White	-0.490	0.271	-1.810	0.071	-1.024	0.043
Experience of discrimination	-0.124	0.089	-1.390	0.165	-0.299	0.051
Constant	-1.908	0.879	-2.170	0.031	-3.639	-0.176
DORIA						
Quechua (none)	0.186	0.493	0.380	0.706	-0.785	1.157
Aymara (none)	0.307	0.691	0.440	0.657	-1.053	1.667
Other Indigenous (none)	-0.145	0.621	-0.230	0.815	-1.368	1.077
Speaks an indigenous language	-2.451	1.030	-2.380	0.018	-4.479	-0.423
Income	0.028	0.146	0.190	0.847	-0.260	0.316
Female	0.055	0.401	0.140	0.891	-0.735	0.845
Age	-0.013	0.014	-0.910	0.363	-0.041	0.015
Trust in parties	-0.001	0.137	-0.010	0.992	-0.271	0.268
Participation in protests	-0.810	0.427	-1.900	0.059	-1.651	0.030
National economy has improved	0.324	0.462	0.700	0.484	-0.586	1.234
Personal finances have improved	0.269	0.377	0.710	0.477	-0.474	1.012
Resides in media luna	1.640	0.473	3.470	0.001	0.708	2.571
Resides in rural area	-0.460	0.262	-1.760	0.080	-0.975	0.055
Rightist ideology	0.155	0.084	1.850	0.065	-0.010	0.321
Supports gas nationalisation	-0.144	0.092	-1.570	0.118	-0.326	0.037
Strongman populist leader	0.196	0.232	0.850	0.399	-0.261	0.653
Direct democracy	-1.198	0.758	-1.580	0.115	-2.690	0.294
Minority to follow majority	0.379	0.559	0.680	0.498	-0.721	1.479
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity	0.383	0.540	0.710	0.479	-0.680	1.447
One national culture	-1.420	0.967	-1.470	0.143	-3.324	0.484
Negative view of Aymara	0.416	0.457	0.910	0.364	-0.485	1.316
Negative view of Quechua	0.573	0.582	0.990	0.325	-0.572	1.719
Negative view of Camba	-0.131	0.445	-0.290	0.769	-1.006	0.745
Negative view of White	-0.313	0.418	-0.750	0.454	-1.136	0.509
Experience of discrimination	-0.213	0.162	-1.310	0.191	-0.532	0.106
Constant	-1.159	1.072	-1.080	0.281	-3.271	0.953
NAGATANI						
Quechua (none)	-1.696	0.538	-3.150	0.002	-2.755	-0.637
Aymara (none)	-3.332	0.828	-4.030	0.000	-4.962	-1.702
Other Indigenous (none)	0.538	0.570	0.940	0.346	-0.584	1.660
Speaks an indigenous language	1.780	0.702	2.540	0.012	0.398	3.162
Income	-0.050	0.166	-0.300	0.761	-0.377	0.276
Female	-0.422	0.432	-0.980	0.330	-1.273	0.429
Age	0.062	0.013	4.880	0.000	0.037	0.087
Trust in parties	0.057	0.136	0.420	0.675	-0.210	0.324
Participation in protests	-0.303	0.490	-0.620	0.536	-1.268	0.661
National economy has improved	0.450	0.538	0.830	0.405	-0.611	1.510
Personal finances have improved	-0.067	0.488	-0.140	0.891	-1.028	0.894
Resides in media luna	1.163	0.469	2.480	0.014	0.239	2.087
Resides in rural area	-0.273	0.228	-1.200	0.232	-0.722	0.176
Rightist ideology	0.346	0.099	3.490	0.001	0.151	0.542
Supports gas nationalisation	-0.174	0.111	-1.570	0.117	-0.392	0.044
Strongman populist leader	0.381	0.306	1.250	0.214	-0.221	0.982
Direct democracy	-1.593	0.732	-2.180	0.031	-3.035	-0.151
Minority to follow majority	-1.251	0.567	-2.210	0.028	-2.367	-0.135
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity	0.239	0.494	0.480	0.629	-0.734	1.211
One national culture	0.329	0.522	0.630	0.529	-0.699	1.357
Negative view of Aymara	0.174	0.572	0.300	0.762	-0.954	1.301
Negative view of Quechua	0.922	0.534	1.730	0.085	-0.129	1.973
Negative view of Camba	0.133	0.561	0.240	0.812	-0.971	1.238
Negative view of White	-1.142	0.456	-2.500	0.013	-2.041	-0.243
Experience of discrimination	-0.612	0.234	-2.620	0.009	-1.073	-0.152

N = 783. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2006 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales).
Source: LAPOP 2006.

Table A8: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice (generic self-identification), Bolivia 2005: Linguistic Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
MORALES						
QUIROGA						
White (Mestizo)	0.678	0.429	1.580	0.115	-0.166	1.522
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-0.169	0.387	-0.440	0.662	-0.931	0.592
Speaks an indigenous language	-6.799	3.514	-1.930	0.054	-13.720	0.121
Income	0.162	0.114	1.420	0.156	-0.062	0.386
Female	-0.167	0.234	-0.720	0.475	-0.627	0.293
Age	-0.007	0.008	-0.830	0.408	-0.023	0.009
Trust in parties	-0.015	0.086	-0.170	0.862	-0.185	0.155
Participation in protests	-0.707	0.254	-2.780	0.006	-1.207	-0.206
National economy has improved	-0.697	0.295	-2.360	0.019	-1.278	-0.116
Personal finances have improved	0.516	0.292	1.770	0.078	-0.059	1.091
Resides in media luna	0.919	0.269	3.420	0.001	0.389	1.448
Resides in rural area	0.063	0.146	0.430	0.666	-0.224	0.350
Rightist ideology	0.299	0.069	4.310	0.000	0.163	0.436
Supports gas nationalisation	-0.072	0.050	-1.450	0.147	-0.171	0.026
Strongman populist leader	0.150	0.203	0.740	0.460	-0.249	0.550
Direct democracy	-0.124	0.417	-0.300	0.766	-0.946	0.697
Minority to follow majority	0.027	0.389	0.070	0.945	-0.739	0.792
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity	0.078	0.359	0.220	0.827	-0.629	0.786
One national culture	0.138	0.364	0.380	0.706	-0.580	0.855
Negative view of Aymara	0.954	0.368	2.590	0.010	0.229	1.678
Negative view of Quechua	0.179	0.350	0.510	0.611	-0.512	0.869
Negative view of Camba	-0.407	0.326	-1.250	0.213	-1.049	0.235
Negative view of White	-0.539	0.285	-1.890	0.060	-1.100	0.023
Experience of discrimination	-0.078	0.102	-0.770	0.444	-0.278	0.122
INTERACTIONS: Ind. language *						
Rightist ideology	0.200	0.163	1.230	0.222	-0.121	0.522
Supports gas nationalisation	0.507	0.263	1.930	0.055	-0.010	1.024

Table A8: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice (generic self-identification), Bolivia 2005: Linguistic Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
Strongman populist leader	0.356	0.581	0.610	0.541	-0.788	1.499
Direct democracy	-21.101	1.385	-15.240	0.000	-23.829	-18.374
Minority to follow majority	-0.797	1.412	-0.560	0.573	-3.579	1.985
Income	0.111	0.499	0.220	0.825	-0.872	1.094
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity	-2.152	1.387	-1.550	0.122	-4.884	0.580
One national culture	-1.845	0.964	-1.910	0.057	-3.744	0.054
Negative view of Aymara	0.789	0.881	0.900	0.371	-0.946	2.525
Negative view of Quechua	-1.769	0.900	-1.970	0.050	-3.542	0.003
Negative view of Camba	1.844	0.912	2.020	0.044	0.048	3.639
Negative view of White	-0.494	0.995	-0.500	0.620	-2.455	1.466
Experience of discrimination	-0.037	0.313	-0.120	0.906	-0.653	0.579
Constant	-2.031	0.921	-2.210	0.028	-3.844	-0.218
DORIA						
White (Mestizo)	0.022	0.657	0.030	0.974	-1.272	1.315
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-0.606	0.700	-0.870	0.387	-1.983	0.772
Speaks an indigenous language	0.241	2.509	0.100	0.923	-4.699	5.182
Income	0.015	0.158	0.090	0.927	-0.297	0.326
Female	-0.042	0.415	-0.100	0.919	-0.859	0.775
Age	-0.020	0.016	-1.260	0.208	-0.052	0.011
Trust in parties	0.019	0.149	0.120	0.901	-0.276	0.313
Participation in protests	-0.667	0.448	-1.490	0.138	-1.548	0.215
National economy has improved	0.279	0.456	0.610	0.541	-0.618	1.176
Personal finances have improved	0.028	0.390	0.070	0.943	-0.740	0.796
Resides in media luna	1.646	0.386	4.270	0.000	0.886	2.406
Resides in rural area	-0.685	0.321	-2.130	0.034	-1.317	-0.052
Rightist ideology	0.151	0.085	1.780	0.076	-0.016	0.317
Supports gas nationalisation	-0.135	0.090	-1.490	0.137	-0.312	0.043
Strongman populist leader	0.280	0.239	1.170	0.242	-0.190	0.750
Direct democracy	-1.640	0.854	-1.920	0.056	-3.321	0.041
Minority to follow majority	0.173	0.617	0.280	0.779	-1.041	1.388
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity	0.839	0.519	1.610	0.108	-0.184	1.861
One national culture	-1.496	1.036	-1.440	0.150	-3.536	0.545
Negative view of Aymara	0.379	0.490	0.770	0.440	-0.585	1.343
Negative view of Quechua	0.659	0.620	1.060	0.289	-0.562	1.880
Negative view of Camba	-0.261	0.457	-0.570	0.568	-1.161	0.638
Negative view of White	-0.183	0.428	-0.430	0.670	-1.026	0.660
Experience of discrimination	-0.134	0.153	-0.870	0.383	-0.436	0.168
INTERACTIONS: Ind. language *						
Rightist ideology	-2.356	0.262	-9.010	0.000	-2.871	-1.841
Supports gas nationalisation	-1.897	0.161	-11.750	0.000	-2.215	-1.579
Strongman populist leader	-5.835	0.854	-6.840	0.000	-7.516	-4.154
Direct democracy	14.674	1.176	12.480	0.000	12.359	16.990
Minority to follow majority	11.001	1.000	11.000	0.000	9.031	12.970
Income	-1.796	0.478	-3.750	0.000	-2.737	-0.854
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity	-4.591	1.215	-3.780	0.000	-6.984	-2.199
One national culture	1.375	1.365	1.010	0.315	-1.313	4.063
Negative view of Aymara	8.482	0.977	8.680	0.000	6.557	10.406
Negative view of Quechua	5.456	1.483	3.680	0.000	2.536	8.376
Negative view of Camba	-4.923	1.201	-4.100	0.000	-7.289	-2.557
Negative view of White	-1.884	1.422	-1.320	0.186	-4.684	0.916
Experience of discrimination	-2.145	0.446	-4.810	0.000	-3.023	-1.267
Constant	-0.546	1.126	-0.480	0.628	-2.762	1.671
NAGATANI						
White (Mestizo)	1.434	0.604	2.370	0.018	0.244	2.623
Indigenous (Mestizo)	1.234	0.640	1.930	0.055	-0.026	2.493
Speaks an indigenous language	194.478	7.886	24.660	0.000	178.947	210.009
Income	0.245	0.185	1.320	0.187	-0.120	0.610
Female	-0.156	0.436	-0.360	0.721	-1.016	0.703
Age	0.045	0.011	4.010	0.000	0.023	0.067
Trust in parties	0.093	0.139	0.670	0.503	-0.181	0.367
Participation in protests	-0.889	0.616	-1.440	0.150	-2.101	0.324
National economy has improved	0.326	0.517	0.630	0.529	-0.692	1.344
Personal finances have improved	-0.634	0.590	-1.070	0.284	-1.796	0.528
Resides in media luna	2.362	0.560	4.210	0.000	1.258	3.465
Resides in rural area	0.008	0.208	0.040	0.970	-0.402	0.418
Rightist ideology	0.423	0.125	3.390	0.001	0.177	0.669
Supports gas nationalisation	-0.161	0.103	-1.550	0.121	-0.364	0.043
Strongman populist leader	0.122	0.351	0.350	0.727	-0.568	0.813
Direct democracy	-1.149	0.772	-1.490	0.138	-2.668	0.371
Minority to follow majority	-1.851	0.854	-2.170	0.031	-3.533	-0.170
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity	0.401	0.534	0.750	0.453	-0.651	1.453
One national culture	0.037	0.648	0.060	0.954	-1.239	1.313
Negative view of Aymara	1.139	0.656	1.740	0.084	-0.153	2.432
Negative view of Quechua	0.084	0.552	0.150	0.880	-1.003	1.170
Negative view of Camba	-0.316	0.542	-0.580	0.560	-1.382	0.751
Negative view of White	-0.447	0.499	-0.890	0.372	-1.430	0.537
Experience of discrimination	-0.345	0.207	-1.670	0.097	-0.752	0.062
INTERACTIONS: Ind. language *						
Rightist ideology	-3.967	0.486	-8.170	0.000	-4.923	-3.011
Supports gas nationalisation	2.322	0.461	5.040	0.000	1.415	3.229
Strongman populist leader	26.420	1.705	15.490	0.000	23.062	29.779
Direct democracy	-75.060	5.420	-13.850	0.000	-85.734	-64.385
Minority to follow majority	-57.708	2.541	-22.710	0.000	-62.712	-52.703
Income	-40.465	1.521	-26.610	0.000	-43.460	-37.471
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity	-163.753	5.683	-28.810	0.000	-174.945	-152.561
One national culture	13.706	1.455	9.420	0.000	10.840	16.571
Negative view of Aymara	-29.928	2.225	-13.450	0.000	-34.310	-25.546
Negative view of Quechua	48.535	2.100	23.120	0.000	44.400	52.670
Negative view of Camba	-27.445	1.629	-16.850	0.000	-30.652	-24.237
Negative view of White	-122.171	5.301	-23.050	0.000	-132.611	-111.731
Experience of discrimination	-91.531	3.321	-27.560	0.000	-98.070	-84.991
Constant	-7.732	1.752	-4.410	0.000	-11.183	-4.281

Table A8: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice (generic self-identification), Bolivia 2005: Linguistic Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	

N = 787. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2006 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales), with two-interactions between linguistic group and the non-ethnic/ethnic attitude voter characteristics indicated.
Source: LAPOP 2006.

Table A9: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice (generic self-identification), Bolivia 2005: Self-Identification Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
MORALES	base outcome					
QUIROGA						
White (Mestizo)	5.969	3.827	1.560	0.120	-1.568	13.507
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-2.648	2.357	-1.120	0.262	-7.290	1.994
Speaks an indigenous language	-1.150	0.470	-2.440	0.015	-2.076	-0.223
Income	0.231	0.107	2.160	0.032	0.020	0.442
Female	-0.221	0.246	-0.900	0.368	-0.705	0.262
Age	-0.009	0.008	-1.110	0.268	-0.026	0.007
Trust in parties	0.010	0.090	0.110	0.915	-0.169	0.188
Participation in protests	-0.560	0.246	-2.280	0.024	-1.044	-0.076
National economy has improved	-0.711	0.311	-2.290	0.023	-1.323	-0.099
Personal finances have improved	0.472	0.300	1.570	0.117	-0.118	1.062
Resides in media luna	0.908	0.259	3.500	0.001	0.397	1.418
Resides in rural area	0.062	0.148	0.420	0.674	-0.228	0.353
Rightist ideology	0.311	0.074	4.200	0.000	0.165	0.456
Supports gas nationalisation	-0.090	0.052	-1.710	0.088	-0.193	0.014
Strongman populist leader	0.174	0.222	0.780	0.434	-0.263	0.612
Direct democracy	-0.141	0.467	-0.300	0.764	-1.061	0.780
Minority to follow majority	0.044	0.407	0.110	0.915	-0.758	0.845
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity	0.225	0.368	0.610	0.540	-0.499	0.949
One national culture	-0.361	0.416	-0.870	0.387	-1.181	0.459
Negative view of Aymara	0.775	0.381	2.030	0.043	0.024	1.525
Negative view of Quechua	0.356	0.364	0.980	0.329	-0.361	1.074
Negative view of Camba	-0.089	0.354	-0.250	0.802	-0.786	0.608
Negative view of White	-0.540	0.303	-1.780	0.076	-1.138	0.057
Experience of discrimination	-0.063	0.103	-0.610	0.542	-0.266	0.140
INTERACTIONS						
White * Rightist ideology	-0.184	0.213	-0.860	0.389	-0.603	0.236
Indigenous * Rightist ideology	0.147	0.223	0.660	0.510	-0.292	0.586
White * Supports gas national.	0.084	0.151	0.560	0.577	-0.212	0.381
Indigenous * Supports gas national.	0.161	0.186	0.860	0.388	-0.206	0.528
White * Strongman pop. leader	-0.051	0.620	-0.080	0.934	-1.273	1.171
Indigenous * Strongman pop. Leader	0.074	0.678	0.110	0.913	-1.262	1.411
White * Direct democracy	-0.384	1.228	-0.310	0.755	-2.802	2.034
Indigenous * Direct democracy	0.718	1.158	0.620	0.536	-1.564	2.999
White * Minority follow maj.	0.065	1.467	0.040	0.965	-2.825	2.954
Indigenous * Minority follow maj.	-0.608	1.059	-0.570	0.567	-2.694	1.478
White * Income	-0.881	0.497	-1.770	0.077	-1.859	0.098
Indigenous * Income	0.165	0.287	0.570	0.566	-0.400	0.730
White * Prefer leaders same et.	-0.156	0.953	-0.160	0.870	-2.034	1.722
Indigenous * Prefer leaders same et.	-2.090	0.702	-2.980	0.003	-3.472	-0.708
White * One nat. cult.	1.690	1.072	1.580	0.116	-0.422	3.802
Indigenous * One nat. cult.	1.920	0.990	1.940	0.053	-0.029	3.870
White * Neg. Aymara	-0.085	1.085	-0.080	0.937	-2.223	2.052
Indigenous * Neg. Aymara	2.918	1.267	2.300	0.022	0.422	5.414
White * Neg. Quechua	-0.263	1.006	-0.260	0.794	-2.244	1.718
Indigenous * Neg Quechua	-1.168	1.190	-0.980	0.328	-3.512	1.177
White * Neg. Camba	-1.987	0.848	-2.340	0.020	-3.656	-0.317
Indigenous * Neg. Camba	0.253	0.972	0.260	0.795	-1.661	2.167
White * Neg. White	0.058	0.801	0.070	0.942	-1.519	1.635
Indigenous * Neg. White	-1.824	1.148	-1.590	0.114	-4.085	0.438
White * Discrimination	-0.228	0.296	-0.770	0.442	-0.811	0.355
Indigenous * Discrimination	-0.127	0.241	-0.530	0.598	-0.601	0.347
Constant	-2.374	0.938	-2.530	0.012	-4.222	-0.526
DORIA						
White (Mestizo)	3.658	3.765	0.970	0.332	-3.757	11.073
Indigenous (Mestizo)	9.881	3.593	2.750	0.006	2.805	16.956
Speaks an indigenous language	-10.455	4.958	-2.110	0.036	-20.218	-0.692
Income	0.056	0.181	0.310	0.758	-0.301	0.412
Female	-0.266	0.455	-0.580	0.559	-1.162	0.630
Age	-0.028	0.018	-1.490	0.137	-0.064	0.009
Trust in parties	0.016	0.148	0.110	0.914	-0.275	0.308
Participation in protests	-0.571	0.478	-1.190	0.233	-1.512	0.370
National economy has improved	0.331	0.474	0.700	0.486	-0.603	1.265
Personal finances have improved	0.156	0.426	0.370	0.714	-0.683	0.995
Resides in media luna	1.727	0.416	4.150	0.000	0.907	2.547
Resides in rural area	-0.788	0.399	-1.980	0.049	-1.573	-0.003
Rightist ideology	0.190	0.100	1.900	0.059	-0.007	0.388
Supports gas nationalisation	-0.168	0.102	-1.650	0.099	-0.368	0.032
Strongman populist leader	0.348	0.273	1.270	0.204	-0.190	0.886
Direct democracy	-1.509	0.907	-1.660	0.097	-3.295	0.277
Minority to follow majority	0.212	0.696	0.300	0.761	-1.158	1.582
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity	1.174	0.655	1.790	0.074	-0.116	2.463
One national culture	-1.440	1.052	-1.370	0.172	-3.511	0.631
Negative view of Aymara	0.076	0.737	0.100	0.918	-1.375	1.528
Negative view of Quechua	1.071	0.775	1.380	0.168	-0.456	2.598
Negative view of Camba	0.196	0.493	0.400	0.692	-0.775	1.166
Negative view of White	-0.584	0.444	-1.320	0.189	-1.458	0.290
Experience of discrimination	-0.209	0.183	-1.140	0.256	-0.569	0.152
INTERACTIONS						
White * Rightist ideology	-0.676	0.278	-2.430	0.016	-1.223	-0.129
Indigenous * Rightist ideology	-0.169	0.572	-0.290	0.769	-1.296	0.959
White * Supports gas national.	0.396	0.318	1.250	0.214	-0.230	1.022
Indigenous * Supports gas national.	-1.190	0.747	-1.590	0.112	-2.661	0.281

Table A9: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice (generic self-identification), Bolivia 2005: Self-Identification Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
White * Strongman pop. leader	0.666	0.886	0.750	0.453	-1.078	2.410
Indigenous * Strongman pop. Leader	-0.811	1.121	-0.720	0.470	-3.018	1.396
White * Direct democracy	-19.309	1.484	-13.010	0.000	-22.233	-16.386
Indigenous * Direct democracy	-7.055	4.784	-1.470	0.142	-16.477	2.367
White * Minority follow maj.	-18.877	1.614	-11.700	0.000	-22.055	-15.699
Indigenous * Minority follow maj.	12.953	5.450	2.380	0.018	2.220	23.685
White * Income	-0.718	0.592	-1.210	0.226	-1.883	0.447
Indigenous * Income	-1.630	1.281	-1.270	0.205	-4.152	0.893
White * Prefer leaders same et.	1.482	1.317	1.120	0.262	-1.112	4.076
Indigenous * Prefer leaders same et.	-16.088	6.833	-2.350	0.019	-29.544	-2.632
White * One nat. cult.	-3.011	2.072	-1.450	0.147	-7.091	1.069
Indigenous * One nat. cult.	3.835	2.502	1.530	0.127	-1.093	8.762
White * Neg. Aymara	1.219	2.082	0.590	0.559	-2.881	5.319
Indigenous * Neg. Aymara	10.196	5.431	1.880	0.062	-0.498	20.891
White * Neg. Quechua	-3.785	1.588	-2.380	0.018	-6.912	-0.659
Indigenous * Neg Quechua	-4.756	1.988	-2.390	0.017	-8.672	-0.841
White * Neg. Camba	-0.745	1.139	-0.650	0.513	-2.988	1.498
Indigenous * Neg. Camba	0.013	2.028	0.010	0.995	-3.980	4.007
White * Neg. White	1.580	1.127	1.400	0.162	-0.639	3.799
Indigenous * Neg. White	-2.245	1.867	-1.200	0.230	-5.921	1.432
White * Discrimination	0.984	0.582	1.690	0.092	-0.161	2.130
Indigenous * Discrimination	-0.750	0.765	-0.980	0.328	-2.257	0.757
Constant	-0.502	1.412	-0.360	0.722	-3.282	2.278
NAGATANTI						
White (Mestizo)	-1.272	4.039	-0.310	0.753	-9.226	6.682
Indigenous (Mestizo)	1.466	3.246	0.450	0.652	-4.927	7.859
Speaks an indigenous language	0.656	0.721	0.910	0.364	-0.764	2.076
Income	0.025	0.240	0.100	0.917	-0.447	0.497
Female	-0.794	0.517	-1.540	0.126	-1.812	0.225
Age	0.053	0.012	4.460	0.000	0.029	0.076
Trust in parties	0.046	0.151	0.310	0.760	-0.251	0.344
Participation in protests	-0.430	0.616	-0.700	0.486	-1.643	0.783
National economy has improved	0.530	0.574	0.920	0.356	-0.600	1.661
Personal finances have improved	-0.654	0.579	-1.130	0.260	-1.795	0.486
Resides in media luna	2.476	0.655	3.780	0.000	1.186	3.765
Resides in rural area	-0.258	0.254	-1.020	0.310	-0.759	0.242
Rightist ideology	0.430	0.150	2.880	0.004	0.136	0.725
Supports gas nationalisation	-0.216	0.143	-1.510	0.132	-0.496	0.065
Strongman populist leader	0.498	0.445	1.120	0.264	-0.378	1.375
Direct democracy	-1.645	1.184	-1.390	0.166	-3.977	0.687
Minority to follow majority	-1.881	1.057	-1.780	0.076	-3.963	0.201
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity	0.323	0.754	0.430	0.669	-1.163	1.809
One national culture	-0.481	0.931	-0.520	0.606	-2.315	1.353
Negative view of Aymara	0.627	0.837	0.750	0.454	-1.022	2.276
Negative view of Quechua	0.581	0.665	0.870	0.383	-0.729	1.891
Negative view of Camba	0.284	0.675	0.420	0.674	-1.044	1.612
Negative view of White	-1.042	0.624	-1.670	0.096	-2.272	0.187
Experience of discrimination	-0.508	0.251	-2.030	0.044	-1.002	-0.014
INTERACTIONS						
White * Rightist ideology	0.320	0.304	1.050	0.293	-0.278	0.919
Indigenous * Rightist ideology	-0.433	0.293	-1.480	0.140	-1.009	0.143
White * Supports gas national.	0.247	0.259	0.950	0.341	-0.263	0.756
Indigenous * Supports gas national.	-0.273	0.229	-1.190	0.234	-0.724	0.178
White * Strongman pop. leader	-0.313	0.994	-0.310	0.754	-2.271	1.646
Indigenous * Strongman pop. Leader	0.335	1.298	0.260	0.797	-2.222	2.892
White * Direct democracy	0.724	1.862	0.390	0.698	-2.942	4.391
Indigenous * Direct democracy	2.423	1.699	1.430	0.155	-0.922	5.768
White * Minority follow maj.	1.998	1.837	1.090	0.278	-1.620	5.615
Indigenous * Minority follow maj.	-12.485	2.390	-5.220	0.000	-17.191	-7.778
White * Income	-0.358	0.551	-0.650	0.516	-1.443	0.726
Indigenous * Income	1.201	0.550	2.180	0.030	0.118	2.283
White * Prefer leaders same et.	-0.354	1.545	-0.230	0.819	-3.398	2.689
Indigenous * Prefer leaders same et.	-15.821	1.307	-12.100	0.000	-18.395	-13.247
White * One nat. cult.	2.162	1.512	1.430	0.154	-0.816	5.141
Indigenous * One nat. cult.	2.135	1.366	1.560	0.119	-0.554	4.825
White * Neg. Aymara	-0.533	1.457	-0.370	0.715	-3.403	2.337
Indigenous * Neg. Aymara	4.294	1.891	2.270	0.024	0.570	8.017
White * Neg. Quechua	0.929	1.492	0.620	0.534	-2.009	3.866
Indigenous * Neg Quechua	-1.187	1.851	-0.640	0.522	-4.833	2.459
White * Neg. Camba	-0.849	1.273	-0.670	0.505	-3.355	1.657
Indigenous * Neg. Camba	-1.694	1.739	-0.970	0.331	-5.119	1.730
White * Neg. White	1.335	1.372	0.970	0.331	-1.367	4.038
Indigenous * Neg. White	-3.249	1.686	-1.930	0.055	-6.569	0.071
White * Discrimination	-1.262	1.140	-1.110	0.269	-3.508	0.983
Indigenous * Discrimination	0.476	0.426	1.120	0.265	-0.363	1.315
Constant	-6.317	2.095	-3.020	0.003	-10.442	-2.192

N = 787. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2006 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales), with two-interactions between self-identified group and the non-ethnic/ethnic attitude voter characteristics indicated.
Source: LAPOP 2006.

Table A10: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice (cultural identification), Bolivia 2005: Cultural Identification Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
MORALES						
QUIROGA						
None	-0.882	1.934	-0.460	0.649	-4.691	2.927
Aymara	-2.285	1.867	-1.220	0.222	-5.962	1.393
Other Indigenous	4.274	2.251	1.900	0.059	-0.160	8.708
Speaks Indigenous language	-1.132	0.450	-2.510	0.013	-2.018	-0.245
Income	0.209	0.176	1.190	0.237	-0.138	0.555
Female	-0.125	0.257	-0.490	0.626	-0.631	0.381

Table A10: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice (cultural identification), Bolivia 2005: Cultural Identification Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
Age	-0.012	0.009	-1.330	0.184	-0.030	0.006
Trust in parties	0.002	0.084	0.030	0.979	-0.164	0.168
Participation in protests	-0.511	0.261	-1.960	0.051	-1.024	0.002
National economy has improved	-0.611	0.333	-1.840	0.068	-1.267	0.045
Personal finances have improved	0.473	0.271	1.740	0.082	-0.061	1.007
Resides in media luna	0.673	0.342	1.970	0.050	-0.001	1.347
Resides in rural area	-0.013	0.130	-0.100	0.920	-0.269	0.243
Rightist ideology	0.305	0.088	3.470	0.001	0.132	0.478
Supports gas nationalisation	-0.027	0.091	-0.290	0.770	-0.205	0.152
Strongman populist leader	0.024	0.329	0.070	0.941	-0.624	0.673
Direct democracy	-0.924	0.637	-1.450	0.148	-2.178	0.331
Minority to follow majority	-0.263	0.637	-0.410	0.680	-1.517	0.991
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity	-0.089	0.511	-0.170	0.862	-1.096	0.918
One national culture	0.366	0.515	0.710	0.478	-0.648	1.380
Negative view of Aymara	0.685	0.607	1.130	0.260	-0.511	1.881
Negative view of Quechua	-0.218	0.609	-0.360	0.721	-1.418	0.982
Negative view of Camba	-0.337	0.585	-0.580	0.565	-1.489	0.814
Negative view of White	-0.438	0.483	-0.910	0.366	-1.390	0.514
Experience of discrimination	-0.006	0.160	-0.040	0.969	-0.322	0.309
INTERACTIONS						
None * Rightist ideology	0.236	0.155	1.530	0.128	-0.069	0.541
Aymara * Rightist ideology	-0.050	0.187	-0.260	0.791	-0.419	0.319
Other Indigenous * Rightist ideology	-0.056	0.204	-0.280	0.784	-0.459	0.346
None * Supports gas national.	-0.128	0.121	-1.060	0.291	-0.368	0.111
Aymara * Supports gas national.	0.203	0.163	1.240	0.215	-0.118	0.523
Other Indigenous * Supports gas national.	-0.141	0.204	-0.690	0.490	-0.542	0.260
None * Strongman pop. leader	-0.142	0.490	-0.290	0.772	-1.107	0.823
Aymara * Strongman pop. Leader	0.664	0.510	1.300	0.194	-0.340	1.668
Other Indigenous * Strongman pop. leader	0.468	0.770	0.610	0.544	-1.048	1.984
None * Direct democracy	2.152	0.954	2.260	0.025	0.274	4.030
Aymara * Direct democracy	1.493	1.165	1.280	0.201	-0.801	3.787
Other Indigenous * Direct democracy	-1.165	1.244	-0.940	0.350	-3.615	1.286
None * Minority follow maj.	0.032	0.837	0.040	0.970	-1.616	1.679
Aymara * Minority follow maj.	1.056	1.197	0.880	0.379	-1.302	3.414
Other Indigenous * Minority follow maj.	-1.942	1.240	-1.570	0.118	-4.383	0.499
None * Income	-0.020	0.252	-0.080	0.938	-0.515	0.476
Aymara * Income	-0.026	0.315	-0.080	0.934	-0.647	0.595
Other Indigenous * Income	-0.440	0.309	-1.420	0.156	-1.049	0.169
None * Prefer leaders same et.	0.487	0.821	0.590	0.554	-1.129	2.103
Aymara * Prefer leaders same et.	-0.371	1.131	-0.330	0.743	-2.599	1.857
Other Indigenous * Prefer leaders same et.	0.179	1.301	0.140	0.891	-2.383	2.741
None * One nat. cult.	-0.438	0.754	-0.580	0.562	-1.923	1.047
Aymara * One nat. cult.	-1.032	1.101	-0.940	0.349	-3.200	1.135
Other Indigenous * One nat. cult.	-0.498	0.924	-0.540	0.590	-2.319	1.322
None * Neg. Aymara	1.372	0.999	1.370	0.171	-0.595	3.339
Aymara * Neg. Aymara	-0.298	0.904	-0.330	0.742	-2.079	1.483
Other Indigenous * Neg. Aymara	3.335	1.289	2.590	0.010	0.797	5.873
None * Neg. Quechua	-0.283	1.032	-0.270	0.784	-2.316	1.750
Aymara * Neg Quechua	1.794	0.971	1.850	0.066	-0.119	3.706
Other Indigenous * Neg. Quechua	-3.684	1.294	-2.850	0.005	-6.233	-1.136
None * Neg. Camba	-0.523	0.756	-0.690	0.490	-2.013	0.966
Aymara * Neg. Camba	0.231	0.940	0.250	0.806	-1.620	2.081
Other Indigenous * Neg. Camba	0.620	1.009	0.620	0.539	-1.366	2.607
None * Neg. White	0.973	0.735	1.320	0.187	-0.475	2.420
Aymara * Neg. White	-1.025	0.786	-1.300	0.194	-2.574	0.524
Other Indigenous * Neg. White	-0.575	0.991	-0.580	0.562	-2.526	1.376
None * Discrimination	-0.213	0.253	-0.840	0.402	-0.712	0.286
Aymara * Discrimination	-0.089	0.302	-0.290	0.768	-0.683	0.505
Other Indigenous * Discrimination	-0.473	0.290	-1.630	0.104	-1.043	0.097
Constant	-1.904	1.392	-1.370	0.173	-4.645	0.837
DORIA						
None	-1.982	4.055	-0.490	0.625	-9.967	6.003
Aymara	-7.042	4.794	-1.470	0.143	-16.484	2.399
Other Indigenous	-4.274	7.051	-0.610	0.545	-18.160	9.611
Speaks Indigenous language	-3.735	1.481	-2.520	0.012	-6.651	-0.819
Income	-0.605	0.558	-1.080	0.279	-1.703	0.494
Female	0.162	0.479	0.340	0.735	-0.780	1.105
Age	-0.025	0.015	-1.700	0.090	-0.054	0.004
Trust in parties	0.104	0.146	0.710	0.479	-0.184	0.392
Participation in protests	-1.180	0.503	-2.350	0.020	-2.170	-0.189
National economy has improved	0.656	0.532	1.230	0.219	-0.392	1.704
Personal finances have improved	0.048	0.510	0.090	0.925	-0.957	1.052
Resides in media luna	1.605	0.539	2.980	0.003	0.543	2.666
Resides in rural area	-0.608	0.261	-2.330	0.021	-1.122	-0.094
Rightist ideology	0.451	0.209	2.150	0.032	0.039	0.863
Supports gas nationalisation	-0.402	0.223	-1.800	0.073	-0.841	0.038
Strongman populist leader	0.512	0.432	1.180	0.237	-0.339	1.363
Direct democracy	-3.176	1.680	-1.890	0.060	-6.486	0.133
Minority to follow majority	3.670	1.103	3.330	0.001	1.497	5.843
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity	-0.849	1.269	-0.670	0.504	-3.348	1.651
One national culture	0.278	1.062	0.260	0.794	-1.814	2.369
Negative view of Aymara	-1.123	1.053	-1.070	0.287	-3.198	0.951
Negative view of Quechua	3.906	1.241	3.150	0.002	1.462	6.350
Negative view of Camba	-1.583	1.529	-1.040	0.302	-4.595	1.428
Negative view of White	0.023	1.281	0.020	0.986	-2.500	2.545
Experience of discrimination	-0.545	0.413	-1.320	0.188	-1.357	0.268
INTERACTIONS						
None * Rightist ideology	-0.343	0.264	-1.300	0.195	-0.864	0.177
Aymara * Rightist ideology	0.902	0.371	2.430	0.016	0.171	1.634
Other Indigenous * Rightist ideology	-0.564	0.402	-1.400	0.162	-1.356	0.228
None * Supports gas national.	0.234	0.251	0.930	0.353	-0.261	0.729
Aymara * Supports gas national.	0.007	0.353	0.020	0.984	-0.689	0.703

Table A10: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice (cultural identification), Bolivia 2005: Cultural Identification Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
Other Indigenous * Supports gas national.	0.734	0.481	1.530	0.128	-0.213	1.682
None * Strongman pop. leader	-0.745	0.625	-1.190	0.234	-1.975	0.485
Aymara * Strongman pop. Leader	3.187	1.104	2.890	0.004	1.013	5.361
Other Indigenous * Strongman pop. leader	0.027	1.481	0.020	0.985	-2.889	2.943
None * Direct democracy	2.593	2.142	1.210	0.227	-1.626	6.812
Aymara * Direct democracy	6.215	2.088	2.980	0.003	2.102	10.328
Other Indigenous * Direct democracy	-15.408	1.979	-7.790	0.000	-19.306	-11.511
None * Minority follow maj.	-5.968	1.540	-3.880	0.000	-9.001	-2.935
Aymara * Minority follow maj.	-20.989	1.473	-14.250	0.000	-23.889	-18.089
Other Indigenous * Minority follow maj.	-3.614	2.010	-1.800	0.073	-7.572	0.344
None * Income	0.796	0.596	1.330	0.183	-0.379	1.971
Aymara * Income	0.088	0.619	0.140	0.887	-1.130	1.307
Other Indigenous * Income	0.865	0.959	0.900	0.368	-1.025	2.754
None * Prefer leaders same et.	2.070	1.517	1.360	0.174	-0.917	5.057
Aymara * Prefer leaders same et.	3.122	1.824	1.710	0.088	-0.471	6.715
Other Indigenous * Prefer leaders same et.	1.148	2.370	0.480	0.629	-3.519	5.814
None * One nat. cult.	-4.194	1.508	-2.780	0.006	-7.164	-1.223
Aymara * One nat. cult.	-22.880	2.583	-8.860	0.000	-27.967	-17.792
Other Indigenous * One nat. cult.	-19.502	2.726	-7.150	0.000	-24.870	-14.133
None * Neg. Aymara	3.887	1.400	2.780	0.006	1.130	6.644
Aymara * Neg. Aymara	-0.871	1.334	-0.650	0.514	-3.498	1.755
Other Indigenous * Neg. Aymara	4.854	2.301	2.110	0.036	0.322	9.385
None * Neg. Quechua	-5.204	1.635	-3.180	0.002	-8.424	-1.984
Aymara * Neg Quechua	-1.673	1.711	-0.980	0.329	-5.042	1.697
Other Indigenous * Neg. Quechua	-7.247	2.065	-3.510	0.001	-11.313	-3.180
None * Neg. Camba	1.108	1.717	0.650	0.519	-2.274	4.490
Aymara * Neg. Camba	2.307	2.247	1.030	0.306	-2.118	6.733
Other Indigenous * Neg. Camba	-3.133	2.722	-1.150	0.251	-8.494	2.228
None * Neg. White	0.427	1.434	0.300	0.766	-2.398	3.252
Aymara * Neg. White	-1.598	1.703	-0.940	0.349	-4.952	1.757
Other Indigenous * Neg. White	0.402	1.975	0.200	0.839	-3.487	4.291
None * Discrimination	0.587	0.508	1.160	0.249	-0.414	1.588
Aymara * Discrimination	-0.376	0.927	-0.410	0.685	-2.203	1.450
Other Indigenous * Discrimination	-0.121	0.854	-0.140	0.888	-1.802	1.561
Constant	0.869	3.560	0.240	0.807	-6.141	7.879
NAGATANI						
None	-5.891	2.878	-2.050	0.042	-11.559	-0.223
Aymara	-62.238	5.737	-10.850	0.000	-73.536	-50.940
Other Indigenous	-4.099	3.224	-1.270	0.205	-10.448	2.250
Speaks Indigenous language	0.742	0.905	0.820	0.413	-1.041	2.525
Income	-0.645	0.350	-1.840	0.067	-1.335	0.045
Female	-0.086	0.435	-0.200	0.843	-0.942	0.770
Age	0.055	0.013	4.120	0.000	0.029	0.081
Trust in parties	0.083	0.144	0.580	0.566	-0.201	0.367
Participation in protests	-0.380	0.617	-0.620	0.538	-1.595	0.834
National economy has improved	0.289	0.578	0.500	0.618	-0.849	1.427
Personal finances have improved	-0.149	0.491	-0.300	0.762	-1.115	0.818
Resides in media luna	1.454	0.543	2.680	0.008	0.384	2.523
Resides in rural area	-0.365	0.267	-1.370	0.173	-0.890	0.161
Rightist ideology	-0.263	0.158	-1.670	0.096	-0.574	0.047
Supports gas nationalisation	-0.198	0.195	-1.020	0.311	-0.583	0.186
Strongman populist leader	0.368	0.533	0.690	0.490	-0.681	1.418
Direct democracy	-1.920	1.039	-1.850	0.066	-3.966	0.126
Minority to follow majority	0.648	0.655	0.990	0.324	-0.642	1.938
Prefer leaders of same ethnicity	-1.417	1.462	-0.970	0.333	-4.296	1.462
One national culture	0.787	1.127	0.700	0.485	-1.432	3.007
Negative view of Aymara	-0.610	0.780	-0.780	0.435	-2.147	0.927
Negative view of Quechua	1.301	0.917	1.420	0.157	-0.505	3.107
Negative view of Camba	0.766	2.059	0.370	0.710	-3.289	4.821
Negative view of White	-1.875	2.373	-0.790	0.430	-6.549	2.798
Experience of discrimination	-1.268	0.798	-1.590	0.113	-2.839	0.303
INTERACTIONS						
None * Rightist ideology	0.882	0.255	3.460	0.001	0.380	1.384
Aymara * Rightist ideology	6.520	0.438	14.880	0.000	5.657	7.383
Other Indigenous * Rightist ideology	0.613	0.285	2.150	0.032	0.052	1.173
None * Supports gas national.	-0.062	0.245	-0.260	0.799	-0.544	0.419
Aymara * Supports gas national.	1.151	0.375	3.070	0.002	0.413	1.889
Other Indigenous * Supports gas national.	0.113	0.314	0.360	0.720	-0.506	0.732
None * Strongman pop. leader	-0.689	0.695	-0.990	0.322	-2.059	0.680
Aymara * Strongman pop. Leader	1.584	1.272	1.250	0.214	-0.921	4.088
Other Indigenous * Strongman pop. leader	1.146	0.939	1.220	0.224	-0.704	2.995
None * Direct democracy	1.568	1.464	1.070	0.285	-1.314	4.451
Aymara * Direct democracy	1.058	2.917	0.360	0.717	-4.687	6.803
Other Indigenous * Direct democracy	-3.098	2.144	-1.450	0.150	-7.321	1.124
None * Minority follow maj.	-3.381	1.232	-2.740	0.006	-5.806	-0.955
Aymara * Minority follow maj.	2.383	2.875	0.830	0.408	-3.279	8.044
Other Indigenous * Minority follow maj.	-15.985	1.359	-11.760	0.000	-18.661	-13.309
None * Income	0.734	0.377	1.950	0.053	-0.008	1.476
Aymara * Income	1.355	0.959	1.410	0.159	-0.533	3.243
Other Indigenous * Income	0.686	0.570	1.200	0.230	-0.437	1.808
None * Prefer leaders same et.	3.167	1.642	1.930	0.055	-0.066	6.400
Aymara * Prefer leaders same et.	-9.303	2.091	-4.450	0.000	-13.421	-5.185
Other Indigenous * Prefer leaders same et.	1.131	1.927	0.590	0.558	-2.664	4.925
None * One nat. cult.	-0.360	1.422	-0.250	0.800	-3.161	2.441
Aymara * One nat. cult.	-31.085	2.557	-12.160	0.000	-36.121	-26.048
Other Indigenous * One nat. cult.	-0.020	1.538	-0.010	0.990	-3.048	3.009
None * Neg. Aymara	2.021	1.339	1.510	0.133	-0.616	4.659
Aymara * Neg. Aymara	0.047	1.277	0.040	0.971	-2.468	2.563
Other Indigenous * Neg. Aymara	2.955	1.920	1.540	0.125	-0.826	6.736
None * Neg. Quechua	-1.598	1.407	-1.140	0.257	-4.368	1.172
Aymara * Neg Quechua	-2.344	2.497	-0.940	0.349	-7.262	2.574
Other Indigenous * Neg. Quechua	-2.965	2.159	-1.370	0.171	-7.217	1.287

Table A10: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice (cultural identification), Bolivia 2005: Cultural Identification Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
None * Neg. Camba	-1.559	2.224	-0.700	0.484	-5.939	2.821
Aymara * Neg. Camba	1.586	2.253	0.700	0.482	-2.851	6.022
Other Indigenous * Neg. Camba	-0.372	2.216	-0.170	0.867	-4.735	3.991
None * Neg. White	2.124	2.462	0.860	0.389	-2.724	6.972
Aymara * Neg. White	-8.598	3.298	-2.610	0.010	-15.092	-2.103
Other Indigenous * Neg. White	-0.005	2.603	0.000	0.999	-5.130	5.121
None * Discrimination	0.623	0.906	0.690	0.492	-1.162	2.409
Aymara * Discrimination	-5.455	1.633	-3.340	0.001	-8.671	-2.239
Other Indigenous * Discrimination	0.510	0.882	0.580	0.563	-1.226	2.247
Constant	-0.096	1.803	-0.050	0.957	-3.648	3.455

N = 783. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2006 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales), with two-interactions between self-identified cultural group and the non-ethnic/ethnic attitude voter characteristics indicated.
Source: LAPOP 2006.

Table A11: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Personal Linguistic Background on Voting for Morales over Quiroga, Bolivia 2005

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	.008	.000	.009	-.008	.027	(P)
				-.007	.028	(BC)
Trust in parties	.002	.000	.005	-.007	.012	(P)
				-.004	.016	(BC)
Rightist ideology	.034^*	.001	.012	.013	.062	(P)
				.014	.065	(BC)
Gas nationalization	-.004	.000	.004	-.013	.003	(P)
				-.019	.001	(BC)
Strong, populist leader	-.002	.000	.003	-.009	.004	(P)
				-.013	.002	(BC)
Direct democracy	-.002	.000	.007	-.016	.012	(P)
				-.021	.008	(BC)
Minorities accede to majority	.005	.000	.009	-.011	.027	(P)
				-.009	.029	(BC)
Prefers in-group representative	-.001	.000	.010	-.022	.020	(P)
				-.021	.020	(BC)
Favours a single national culture	.001	.001	.004	-.006	.012	(P)
				-.004	.016	(BC)
Negative views of Aymara	.003	.001	.014	-.023	.032	(P)
				-.023	.031	(BC)
Negative views of Quechua	.000	-.001	.007	-.016	.014	(P)
				-.014	.015	(BC)
Negative views of Camba	.020*^	.000	.012	.001	.048	(P)
				.002	.051	(BC)
Negative views of White	.014	.001	.011	-.005	.042	(P)
				-.004	.043	(BC)
Experience of discrimination	.009	-.001	.009	-.011	.028	(P)
				-.007	.033	(BC)
Total indirect effects	**.086^***	.002	.029	.034	.146	(P)
				.030	.143	(BC)
Direct effect	**.222^***	.006	.068	.101	.365	(P)
				.096	.355	(BC)
Total effect	**.309^***	.007	.063	.193	.439	(P)
				.179	.422	(BC)
Proportion of total effect mediated	**.280**					

N = 624. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively.
Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of personal linguistic background (knowledge of an indigenous language) on vote choice (Morales over Quiroga) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: ethnic self-identification, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender nd); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (1000 repetitions, from 248 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2006.

Table A12: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as White (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Morales over Quiroga, Bolivia 2005

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	-.002	.000	.004	-.011	.005	(P)
				-.015	.002	(BC)
Trust in parties	.000	.000	.004	-.009	.008	(P)
				-.007	.010	(BC)
Rightist ideology	-.022	-.001	.014	-.052	.002	(P)
				-.053	.002	(BC)
Gas nationalization	.003	.000	.005	-.007	.014	(P)
				-.004	.017	(BC)
Strong, populist leader	-.001	.000	.008	-.019	.015	(P)
				-.021	.014	(BC)
Direct democracy	.004	.000	.007	-.008	.020	(P)
				-.004	.025	(BC)
Minorities accede to majority	.000	.000	.005	-.009	.011	(P)
				-.008	.012	(BC)
Prefers in-group representative	-.004	.000	.008	-.022	.011	(P)
				-.029	.007	(BC)
Favours a single national culture	.000	.000	.007	-.014	.017	(P)
				-.013	.018	(BC)
Negative views of Aymara	-.019*	-.001	.013	-.049	.001	(P)
				-.054	-.001	(BC)
Negative views of Quechua	-.003	.000	.009	-.024	.013	(P)
				-.028	.010	(BC)
Negative views of Camba	-.011	.000	.010	-.032	.005	(P)
				-.039	.002	(BC)
Negative views of White	-.012	-.001	.012	-.039	.008	(P)
				-.040	.007	(BC)

Table A12: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as White (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Morales over Quiroga, Bolivia 2005

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Experience of discrimination	-.001	.000	.004	-.009	.006	(P)
				-.012	.003	(BC)
Total indirect effects	**-.068**	-.002	.029	-.128	-.013	(P)
				-.125	-.010	(BC)
Direct effect	**-.146**	-.005	.062	-.272	-.030	(P)
				-.256	-.005	(BC)
Total effect	**-.214**	-.007	.059	-.336	-.104	(P)
				-.318	-.090	(BC)
Proportion of total effects mediated	**.316**					

N = 513. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively.
Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as white (compared with mestizo) on vote choice (Morales over Quiroga) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: personal linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender nd); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (1000 repetitions, from 226 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2006.

Table A13: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Indigenous (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Morales over Quiroga, Bolivia 2005

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	.018	.000	.013	-.006	.046	(P)
				-.004	.049	(BC)
Trust in parties	-.003	.000	.005	-.014	.005	(P)
				-.018	.003	(BC)
Rightist ideology	.012	-.001	.014	-.018	.039	(P)
				-.015	.042	(BC)
Gas nationalization	.000	.000	.004	-.009	.007	(P)
				-.009	.007	(BC)
Strong, populist leader	.001	.000	.003	-.007	.008	(P)
				-.004	.011	(BC)
Direct democracy	.003	.000	.006	-.008	.018	(P)
				-.004	.031	(BC)
Minorities accede to majority	-.004	.000	.008	-.022	.009	(P)
				-.030	.005	(BC)
Prefers in-group representative	.000	.001	.008	-.016	.018	(P)
				-.017	.017	(BC)
Favours a single national culture	.000	.000	.004	-.009	.007	(P)
				-.008	.007	(BC)
Negative views of Aymara	.005	.000	.015	-.026	.034	(P)
				-.025	.035	(BC)
Negative views of Quechua	-.001	.000	.006	-.014	.012	(P)
				-.020	.007	(BC)
Negative views of Camba	.004	.001	.008	-.008	.023	(P)
				-.006	.026	(BC)
Negative views of White	.014*	.001	.011	-.001	.041	(P)
				.000	.045	(BC)
Experience of discrimination	.001	.000	.004	-.006	.011	(P)
				-.003	.018	(BC)
Total indirect effects	**.049**	.001	.033	-.014	.116	(P)
				-.015	.112	(BC)
Direct effect	**.047**	.001	.062	-.073	.173	(P)
				-.076	.170	(BC)
Total effect	**.096**	.002	.068	-.032	.230	(P)
				-.045	.220	(BC)
Proportion of total effects mediated	**.599**					

N = 557. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively.
Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as indigenous (compared with mestizo) on vote choice (Morales over Quiroga) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: personal linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender nd); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (1000 repetitions, from 241 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2006.

Table A14: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Indigenous (compared with White) on Voting for Morales over Quiroga, Bolivia 2005

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	-.026	.002	.043	-.119	.056	(P)
				-.129	.049	(BC)
Trust in parties	-.007	.002	.017	-.044	.025	(P)
				-.068	.014	(BC)
Rightist ideology	.038*	.001	.025	-.003	.093	(P)
				.000	.101	(BC)
Gas nationalization	.000	.002	.009	-.015	.026	(P)
				-.019	.018	(BC)
Strong, populist leader	.026	.001	.031	-.020	.109	(P)
				-.012	.124	(BC)
Direct democracy	.004	-.002	.022	-.049	.050	(P)
				-.027	.075	(BC)
Minorities accede to majority	-.004	-.003	.026	-.065	.041	(P)
				-.074	.032	(BC)
Prefers in-group representative	.001	.002	.017	-.031	.044	(P)
				-.028	.051	(BC)
Favours a single national culture	.027	.005	.034	-.019	.115	(P)
				-.016	.129	(BC)
Negative views of Aymara	.067	.005	.051	-.009	.190	(P)
				-.008	.192	(BC)
Negative views of Quechua	-.010	.000	.024	-.065	.030	(P)

Table A14: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Indigenous (compared with White) on Voting for Morales over Quiroga, Bolivia 2005

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
				-.099	.016	(BC)
Negative views of Camba	.017	.002	.034	-.048	.095	(P)
				-.045	.095	(BC)
Negative views of White	-.005	-.002	.045	-.122	.073	(P)
				-.139	.068	(BC)
Experience of discrimination	.012	.001	.021	-.022	.062	(P)
				-.016	.070	(BC)
Total indirect effects	**.138**	.015	.095	-.044	.331	(P)
				-.080	.298	(BC)
Direct effect	**.297^***	-.004	.097	.095	.485	(P)
				.095	.479	(BC)
Total effect	**.435^***	.011	.100	.244	.624	(P)
				.195	.596	(BC)
Proportion of total effects mediated	**.318**					

N = 178. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively.
Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as indigenous (compared with white) on vote choice (Morales over Quiroga) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: personal linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender nd); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (995repetitions, from 120 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2006.

Table A15: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Aymara (compared with no indigenous) on Voting for Morales over Quiroga, Bolivia 2005

Mediation Variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	.031	.000	.030	-.025	.096	(P)
				-.022	.099	(BC)
Trust in parties	-.018	.000	.016	-.055	.007	(P)
				-.064	.004	(BC)
Rightist ideology	.047	.002	.032	-.006	.121	(P)
				-.005	.123	(BC)
Gas Nationalisation	.010	-.001	.010	-.005	.033	(P)
				-.002	.042	(BC)
Strong, populist leader	.003	.000	.012	-.021	.032	(P)
				-.014	.041	(BC)
Direct democracy	.004	-.001	.016	-.034	.039	(P)
				-.017	.059	(BC)
Minorities accede to majority	.000	.002	.018	-.038	.045	(P)
				-.040	.039	(BC)
Prefers ethnic representation	.000	.001	.012	-.025	.028	(P)
				-.032	.021	(BC)
Favours single national culture	.000	.000	.010	-.022	.022	(P)
				-.026	.020	(BC)
Negative views of Aymara	.047*	.002	.033	-.004	.123	(P)
				.000	.132	(BC)
Negative views of Quechua	.000	.001	.012	-.024	.029	(P)
				-.025	.028	(BC)
Negative views of Camba	.036	.001	.024	-.003	.086	(P)
				-.002	.089	(BC)
Negative views of White	.014	-.001	.027	-.037	.069	(P)
				-.030	.076	(BC)
Experience of discrimination	.011	-.001	.020	-.029	.050	(P)
				-.024	.056	(BC)
Total indirect effects	.184^*	.005	.070	.048	.335	(P)
				.044	.331	(BC)
Direct effect	.132	.003	.114	-.107	.355	(P)
				-.118	.343	(BC)
Total effects	.316^*	.008	.110	.101	.527	(P)
				.075	.499	(BC)
Proportion of total effect mediated	.582					

N = 310. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively.
Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as Aymara (compared with no indigenous group) on vote choice (Morales over Quiroga) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: personal linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender, undated); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are bootstrap (990 repetitions, from 163 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2006.

Table A16: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Quechua (compared with no indigenous) on Voting for Morales over Quiroga, Bolivia 2005

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	.011	.000	.012	-.009	.038	(P)
				-.006	.041	(BC)
Trust in parties	.000	.001	.004	-.007	.010	(P)
				-.015	.004	(BC)
Rightist ideology	.037^*	.001	.020	.002	.080	(P)
				.002	.079	(BC)
Gas Nationalisation	.012	-.001	.013	-.012	.040	(P)
				-.009	.044	(BC)
Strong, populist leader	.000	.000	.009	-.019	.018	(P)
				-.020	.017	(BC)
Direct democracy	.002	.000	.007	-.009	.021	(P)
				-.005	.029	(BC)
Minorities accede to majority	-.003	-.001	.009	-.025	.011	(P)
				-.027	.010	(BC)
Prefers ethnic representation	-.005	.000	.010	-.030	.012	(P)
				-.039	.005	(BC)

Table A16: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Quechua (compared with no indigenous) on Voting for Morales over Quiroga, Bolivia 2005

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Favours single national culture	.006	-.001	.009	-.010	.025	(P)
				-.005	.033	(BC)
Negative views of Aymara	.014	-.001	.017	-.017	.050	(P)
				-.012	.056	(BC)
Negative views of Quechua	-.003	-.001	.012	-.031	.017	(P)
				-.034	.014	(BC)
Negative views of Camba	.030	.001	.021	-.007	.077	(P)
				-.006	.078	(BC)
Negative views of White	.011	.001	.018	-.021	.053	(P)
				-.020	.054	(BC)
Experience of discrimination	.001	.000	.006	-.012	.016	(P)
				-.010	.019	(BC)
Total indirect effects	**.111^***	.002	.043	.027	.194	(P)
				.024	.191	(BC)
Direct effect	**.111**	.002	.076	-.036	.255	(P)
				-.042	.251	(BC)
Total effects	**.222^***	.004	.072	.080	.367	(P)
				.064	.352	(BC)
Proportion of total effect mediated	**.500**					

N = 426. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively.
Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as Quechua (compared with no indigenous group) on vote choice (Morales over Quiroga) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: personal linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender, undated); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are bootstrap (999 repetitions, from 193 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2006.

Table A17: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification with a Lowland Indigenous group (compared with no indigenous) on Voting for Morales over Quiroga, Bolivia 2005

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	.002	.001	.008	-.010	.020	(P)
				-.008	.024	(BC)
Trust in parties	-.011	.000	.011	-.035	.007	(P)
				-.039	.006	(BC)
Rightist ideology	-.001	.000	.022	-.042	.045	(P)
				-.041	.047	(BC)
Gas Nationalisation	.010	.001	.010	-.005	.035	(P)
				-.002	.040	(BC)
Strong, populist leader	.002	.001	.009	-.014	.024	(P)
				-.012	.028	(BC)
Direct democracy	.000	.002	.009	-.016	.026	(P)
				-.020	.019	(BC)
Minorities accede to majority	-.010	.000	.013	-.042	.010	(P)
				-.049	.007	(BC)
Prefers ethnic representation	.010	.004	.019	-.007	.066	(P)
				-.006	.077	(BC)
Favours single national culture	.000	.000	.009	-.021	.019	(P)
				-.016	.019	(BC)
Negative views of Aymara	.016	.001	.032	-.046	.082	(P)
				-.044	.084	(BC)
Negative views of Quechua	-.007	-.003	.017	-.055	.018	(P)
				-.057	.016	(BC)
Negative views of Camba	-.034^*	-.002	.023	-.087	-.003	(P)
				-.087	-.003	(BC)
Negative views of White	-.003	-.001	.009	-.027	.013	(P)
				-.030	.008	(BC)
Experience of discrimination	.019	-.001	.017	-.013	.055	(P)
				-.010	.061	(BC)
Total indirect effects	**-.008**	.002	.058	-.109	.109	(P)
				-.107	.119	(BC)
Direct effect	**.093**	.005	.086	-.075	.265	(P)
				-.094	.241	(BC)
Total effects	**.085**	.007	.085	-.083	.250	(P)
				-.111	.231	(BC)
Proportion of total effect mediated	**-.099**					

N = 261. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively.
Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification with a lowland indigenous group (compared with no indigenous group) on vote choice (Morales over Quiroga) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: personal linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender, undated); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are bootstrap (575 repetitions, from 134 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2006.

Table A18: Descriptive Statistics: Model Sample, Bolivia 2010

Personal linguistic background	Ethnic Self-Identification			
Vote Choice	White	Mestiza	Indigenous	Total
Spanish-speakers				
Evo Morales	18	367	54	439
Manfred Reyes Villa	27	169	1	197
Samuel Doria	3	29	0	32
Other/Null	10	102	9	121
Indigenous-language speakers				
Evo Morales	2	112	86	200
Manfred Reyes Villa	1	8	2	11
Samuel Doria	0	3	1	4
Other/Null	0	8	6	14
Total	**61**	**798**	**159**	**1018**

Cells show unweighted counts of respondents in the model sample, by vote choice and ethnic group. Source: Author's elaboration based on LAPOP 2010.

Table A19: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009 (with generic self-identification)

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
MORALES	base outcome					
REYES VILLA						
White (Mestizo)	1.909	0.345	5.530	0.000	1.226	2.592
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-1.270	0.736	-1.720	0.087	-2.725	0.186
Speaks indigenous language	-1.096	0.515	-2.130	0.035	-2.114	-0.077
Income	0.164	0.082	2.010	0.047	0.002	0.325
Female	-0.104	0.248	-0.420	0.674	-0.594	0.385
Age	-0.012	0.008	-1.540	0.125	-0.027	0.003
Trust in parties	-0.071	0.068	-1.060	0.292	-0.205	0.062
Participation in protests	1.002	0.289	3.460	0.001	0.430	1.574
National economy has improved	-1.220	0.401	-3.040	0.003	-2.013	-0.427
Personal finances have improved	-0.490	0.307	-1.600	0.113	-1.097	0.117
Resides in media luna	1.896	0.285	6.650	0.000	1.333	2.460
Resides in rural area	-0.075	0.189	-0.390	0.694	-0.449	0.300
Rightist ideology	0.416	0.077	5.400	0.000	0.264	0.568
Wealth redistribution	-0.027	0.114	-0.240	0.814	-0.253	0.199
Social security	-0.108	0.134	-0.810	0.420	-0.374	0.157
Nationalisations	-0.202	0.073	-2.760	0.007	-0.347	-0.057
Free trade	0.086	0.095	0.900	0.368	-0.102	0.274
Limit opposition voice	-0.323	0.086	-3.770	0.000	-0.492	-0.154
Direct democracy	-0.216	0.077	-2.820	0.006	-0.367	-0.064
Minorities to follow majority	0.039	0.099	0.390	0.698	-0.158	0.235
Constant	-1.271	1.087	-1.170	0.244	-3.420	0.878
DORIA						
White (Mestizo)	1.785	0.548	3.260	0.001	0.701	2.869
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-1.424	0.869	-1.640	0.104	-3.142	0.294
Speaks indigenous language	-1.017	0.662	-1.540	0.127	-2.327	0.292
Income	0.199	0.130	1.520	0.130	-0.059	0.457
Female	0.465	0.385	1.210	0.229	-0.296	1.226
Age	-0.024	0.013	-1.790	0.075	-0.050	0.002
Trust in parties	-0.107	0.139	-0.770	0.443	-0.381	0.168
Participation in protests	1.198	0.519	2.310	0.022	0.172	2.223
National economy has improved	-0.751	0.565	-1.330	0.186	-1.868	0.367
Personal finances have improved	0.202	0.415	0.490	0.626	-0.617	1.022
Resides in media luna	0.965	0.367	2.630	0.009	0.241	1.690
Resides in rural area	-0.058	0.134	-0.430	0.665	-0.323	0.206
Rightist ideology	0.242	0.077	3.140	0.002	0.090	0.394
Wealth redistribution	0.068	0.179	0.380	0.706	-0.286	0.421
Social security	-0.275	0.194	-1.420	0.159	-0.659	0.109
Nationalisations	-0.334	0.085	-3.910	0.000	-0.502	-0.165
Free trade	0.012	0.163	0.070	0.942	-0.310	0.333
Limit opposition voice	-0.286	0.114	-2.510	0.013	-0.512	-0.061
Direct democracy	-0.151	0.108	-1.390	0.166	-0.365	0.063
Minorities to follow majority	-0.033	0.140	-0.230	0.816	-0.310	0.245
Constant	-0.136	1.063	-0.130	0.898	-2.238	1.966

N = 1151. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2009 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales).
Source: LAPOP 2010.

Table A20: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009 (with cultural identification)

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
MORALES	base outcome					
REYES VILLA						
Quechua (none)	-0.432	0.341	-1.270	0.207	-1.107	0.242
Aymara (none)	-2.671	0.649	-4.110	0.000	-3.955	-1.387
Other Indigenous (none)	0.307	0.411	0.750	0.457	-0.507	1.120
Speaks indigenous language	-1.100	0.445	-2.470	0.015	-1.979	-0.221
Income	0.140	0.085	1.640	0.103	-0.029	0.309
Female	-0.159	0.262	-0.610	0.544	-0.677	0.359
Age	-0.010	0.008	-1.150	0.251	-0.026	0.007
Trust in parties	-0.086	0.073	-1.170	0.243	-0.231	0.059
Participation in protests	0.960	0.295	3.250	0.001	0.377	1.543
National economy has improved	-1.158	0.418	-2.770	0.006	-1.985	-0.331
Personal finances have improved	-0.406	0.316	-1.280	0.201	-1.031	0.219
Resides in media luna	1.195	0.268	4.460	0.000	0.665	1.725
Resides in rural area	-0.101	0.170	-0.590	0.554	-0.436	0.235
Rightist ideology	0.419	0.075	5.590	0.000	0.271	0.567
Wealth redistribution	-0.054	0.117	-0.460	0.645	-0.285	0.177
Social security	-0.080	0.129	-0.620	0.535	-0.336	0.175
Nationalisations	-0.189	0.068	-2.790	0.006	-0.323	-0.055
Free trade	0.125	0.103	1.220	0.225	-0.078	0.329
Limit opposition voice	-0.318	0.094	-3.380	0.001	-0.504	-0.132
Direct democracy	-0.163	0.077	-2.100	0.037	-0.316	-0.010
Minorities to follow majority	0.039	0.113	0.340	0.732	-0.184	0.262
Constant	-0.780	1.047	-0.750	0.457	-2.850	1.290
DORIA						
Quechua (none)	-0.053	0.512	-0.100	0.918	-1.066	0.960
Aymara (none)	-0.109	0.613	-0.180	0.860	-1.321	1.104
Other Indigenous (none)	0.656	0.532	1.230	0.220	-0.396	1.708
Speaks indigenous language	-1.204	0.726	-1.660	0.099	-2.639	0.231
Income	0.184	0.130	1.410	0.160	-0.074	0.442
Female	0.356	0.371	0.960	0.339	-0.378	1.089
Age	-0.013	0.013	-1.010	0.314	-0.039	0.013
Trust in parties	-0.115	0.150	-0.770	0.445	-0.413	0.182
Participation in protests	1.014	0.480	2.120	0.036	0.066	1.963
National economy has improved	-0.620	0.522	-1.190	0.237	-1.652	0.413
Personal finances have improved	0.306	0.372	0.820	0.412	-0.430	1.043
Resides in media luna	0.775	0.510	1.520	0.130	-0.232	1.783
Resides in rural area	-0.085	0.129	-0.660	0.511	-0.341	0.171

Table A20: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009 (with cultural identification)

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
Rightist ideology	0.234	0.075	3.130	0.002	0.086	0.381
Wealth redistribution	0.073	0.193	0.380	0.705	-0.309	0.456
Social security	-0.322	0.219	-1.470	0.144	-0.755	0.111
Nationalisations	-0.318	0.082	-3.860	0.000	-0.481	-0.155
Free trade	0.069	0.156	0.440	0.657	-0.239	0.378
Limit opposition voice	-0.275	0.117	-2.340	0.021	-0.506	-0.043
Direct democracy	-0.201	0.120	-1.670	0.097	-0.439	0.037
Minorities to follow majority	-0.076	0.137	-0.550	0.581	-0.348	0.196
Constant	-0.113	1.130	-0.100	0.921	-2.347	2.122

N = 1146. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2009 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales).
Source: LAPOP 2010.

Table A21: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009: Linguistic Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
MORALES	base outcome					
REYES VILLA						
White (Mestizo)	1.925	0.353	5.450	0.000	1.227	2.624
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-1.277	0.620	-2.060	0.041	-2.503	-0.051
Speaks indigenous language	0.596	2.689	0.220	0.825	-4.721	5.912
Income	0.150	0.089	1.680	0.094	-0.026	0.326
Female	-0.088	0.246	-0.360	0.721	-0.574	0.398
Age	-0.011	0.008	-1.490	0.138	-0.027	0.004
Trust in parties	-0.087	0.067	-1.290	0.201	-0.220	0.047
Participation in protests	1.079	0.293	3.680	0.000	0.499	1.659
National economy has improved	-1.217	0.403	-3.020	0.003	-2.013	-0.421
Personal finances have improved	-0.520	0.312	-1.660	0.098	-1.138	0.098
Resides in media luna	1.984	0.295	6.730	0.000	1.401	2.566
Resides in rural area	-0.080	0.196	-0.410	0.685	-0.468	0.308
Rightist ideology	0.447	0.083	5.380	0.000	0.282	0.611
Wealth redistribution	-0.042	0.121	-0.340	0.732	-0.282	0.198
Social security	-0.076	0.130	-0.590	0.559	-0.333	0.181
Nationalisations	-0.238	0.073	-3.240	0.001	-0.382	-0.093
Free trade	0.067	0.101	0.660	0.508	-0.133	0.268
Limit opposition voice	-0.283	0.099	-2.870	0.005	-0.478	-0.088
Direct democracy	-0.218	0.081	-2.700	0.008	-0.378	-0.058
Minorities to follow majority	0.029	0.115	0.250	0.802	-0.199	0.257
INTERACTIONS: Ind. language *						
Rightist ideology	-0.345	0.175	-1.970	0.051	-0.692	0.002
Wealth redistribution	-0.138	0.457	-0.300	0.764	-1.041	0.766
Social security	-0.171	0.544	-0.310	0.754	-1.246	0.905
Nationalisations	0.445	0.393	1.130	0.259	-0.332	1.221
Free trade	0.480	0.286	1.680	0.096	-0.085	1.045
Limit opposition voice	-0.718	0.314	-2.290	0.024	-1.338	-0.098
Direct democracy	0.102	0.246	0.410	0.679	-0.384	0.588
Minorities to follow majority	-0.146	0.242	-0.610	0.546	-0.625	0.332
Income	0.035	0.280	0.130	0.900	-0.519	0.590
Constant	-1.354	1.187	-1.140	0.256	-3.701	0.994
DORIA						
White (Mestizo)	1.801	0.561	3.210	0.002	0.692	2.910
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-1.584	0.976	-1.620	0.107	-3.514	0.345
Speaks indigenous language	1.750	3.753	0.470	0.642	-5.670	9.170
Income	0.171	0.136	1.260	0.208	-0.097	0.440
Female	0.440	0.407	1.080	0.282	-0.365	1.244
Age	-0.025	0.014	-1.880	0.063	-0.052	0.001
Trust in parties	-0.111	0.143	-0.780	0.438	-0.394	0.171
Participation in protests	1.229	0.530	2.320	0.022	0.182	2.277
National economy has improved	-0.791	0.582	-1.360	0.176	-1.942	0.360
Personal finances have improved	0.162	0.422	0.380	0.701	-0.672	0.996
Resides in media luna	0.967	0.378	2.560	0.012	0.220	1.713
Resides in rural area	-0.094	0.146	-0.640	0.523	-0.382	0.195
Rightist ideology	0.240	0.082	2.930	0.004	0.078	0.402
Wealth redistribution	0.058	0.190	0.310	0.758	-0.316	0.433
Social security	-0.255	0.208	-1.230	0.221	-0.666	0.155
Nationalisations	-0.368	0.094	-3.900	0.000	-0.555	-0.181
Free trade	0.015	0.171	0.090	0.931	-0.324	0.354
Limit opposition voice	-0.243	0.125	-1.950	0.054	-0.490	0.004
Direct democracy	-0.105	0.111	-0.940	0.349	-0.325	0.116
Minorities to follow majority	-0.073	0.151	-0.480	0.629	-0.372	0.226
INTERACTIONS: Ind. language *						
Rightist ideology	0.311	0.253	1.230	0.222	-0.190	0.812
Wealth redistribution	-0.306	0.327	-0.940	0.350	-0.953	0.340
Social security	-0.212	0.470	-0.450	0.652	-1.141	0.717
Nationalisations	0.397	0.319	1.240	0.216	-0.234	1.028
Free trade	-0.030	0.413	-0.070	0.942	-0.847	0.786
Limit opposition voice	-0.491	0.346	-1.420	0.158	-1.176	0.194
Direct democracy	-0.994	0.369	-2.690	0.008	-1.724	-0.264
Minorities to follow majority	-0.007	0.214	-0.030	0.973	-0.429	0.415
Income	0.083	0.290	0.290	0.776	-0.491	0.657
Constant	0.078	1.165	0.070	0.946	-2.225	2.382

N = 1151. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2009 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales), with two-interactions between linguistic group and the non-ethnic voter characteristics indicated.
Source: LAPOP 2010.

Table A22: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009: Self-Identification Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
MORALES	base outcome					

Table A22: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009: Self-Identification Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P > [t]	95% confidence intervals	
REYES VILLA						
White (Mestizo)	-0.318	3.942	-0.080	0.936	-8.113	7.478
Indigenous (Mestizo)	4.910	4.491	1.090	0.276	-3.970	13.791
Speaks an indigenous language	-1.166	0.460	-2.530	0.012	-2.076	-0.256
Income	0.232	0.098	2.380	0.019	0.039	0.426
Female	-0.118	0.252	-0.470	0.640	-0.616	0.380
Age	-0.012	0.008	-1.450	0.150	-0.028	0.004
Trust in parties	-0.061	0.072	-0.850	0.399	-0.204	0.082
Participation in protests	1.222	0.297	4.120	0.000	0.635	1.808
National economy has improved	-1.403	0.434	-3.240	0.002	-2.260	-0.545
Personal finances have improved	-0.480	0.316	-1.520	0.131	-1.104	0.145
Resides in media luna	1.862	0.277	6.730	0.000	1.315	2.409
Resides in rural area	-0.092	0.185	-0.500	0.621	-0.457	0.274
Rightist ideology	0.412	0.074	5.530	0.000	0.265	0.559
Wealth redistribution	-0.052	0.121	-0.430	0.666	-0.292	0.187
Social security	-0.100	0.141	-0.710	0.479	-0.379	0.179
Nationalisations	-0.249	0.081	-3.090	0.002	-0.409	-0.090
Free trade	0.115	0.099	1.160	0.247	-0.081	0.312
Limit opposition voice	-0.262	0.094	-2.800	0.006	-0.447	-0.077
Direct democracy	-0.235	0.078	-3.000	0.003	-0.391	-0.080
Minorities to follow majority	0.018	0.128	0.140	0.885	-0.234	0.271
INTERACTIONS						
White * Rightist ideology	0.906	0.318	2.850	0.005	0.277	1.536
Indigenous * Rightist ideology	-0.389	0.178	-2.180	0.031	-0.740	-0.037
White * Wealth redist.	-0.187	0.411	-0.450	0.651	-1.000	0.627
Indigenous * Wealth redist.	-0.370	0.550	-0.670	0.503	-1.457	0.717
White * Social security	0.744	0.572	1.300	0.196	-0.387	1.874
Indigenous * Social security	0.244	0.464	0.530	0.600	-0.674	1.162
White * Nationalisations	0.753	0.339	2.220	0.028	0.082	1.423
Indigenous * Nationalisations	0.354	0.407	0.870	0.386	-0.450	1.158
White * Free trade	-0.484	0.440	-1.100	0.272	-1.354	0.385
Indigenous * Free trade	-0.327	0.351	-0.930	0.353	-1.021	0.367
White * Limit opp. voice	-0.851	0.475	-1.790	0.075	-1.790	0.088
Indigenous * Limit opp. voice	-0.771	0.294	-2.620	0.010	-1.353	-0.189
White * Direct democracy	0.382	0.348	1.100	0.274	-0.306	1.070
Indigenous * Direct democracy	-0.878	0.341	-2.580	0.011	-1.552	-0.204
White * Minorities follow maj.	0.152	0.425	0.360	0.720	-0.687	0.992
Indigenous * Minorities follow maj.	0.814	0.380	2.140	0.034	0.063	1.566
White * Income	-0.995	0.343	-2.900	0.004	-1.673	-0.316
Indigenous * Income	-0.202	0.256	-0.790	0.433	-0.709	0.305
Constant	-1.496	1.291	-1.160	0.248	-4.049	1.056
DORIA						
White (Mestizo)	5.082	5.299	0.960	0.339	-5.396	15.560
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-9.980	7.455	-1.340	0.183	-24.723	4.762
Speaks an indigenous language	-1.443	0.977	-1.480	0.142	-3.376	0.489
Income	0.039	0.126	0.310	0.756	-0.210	0.288
Female	0.696	0.408	1.710	0.090	-0.111	1.503
Age	-0.015	0.013	-1.170	0.243	-0.041	0.010
Trust in parties	-0.043	0.143	-0.300	0.764	-0.326	0.240
Participation in protests	1.432	0.537	2.670	0.009	0.371	2.494
National economy has improved	-0.717	0.565	-1.270	0.207	-1.834	0.401
Personal finances have improved	0.244	0.418	0.580	0.560	-0.582	1.070
Resides in media luna	0.823	0.383	2.150	0.033	0.066	1.579
Resides in rural area	-0.095	0.145	-0.660	0.512	-0.382	0.191
Rightist ideology	0.267	0.088	3.020	0.003	0.092	0.442
Wealth redistribution	0.198	0.184	1.080	0.282	-0.165	0.562
Social security	-0.427	0.205	-2.080	0.039	-0.833	-0.022
Nationalisations	-0.345	0.106	-3.240	0.002	-0.555	-0.134
Free trade	0.085	0.176	0.480	0.631	-0.264	0.433
Limit opposition voice	-0.121	0.133	-0.910	0.362	-0.383	0.141
Direct democracy	-0.074	0.105	-0.710	0.482	-0.282	0.134
Minorities to follow majority	-0.256	0.142	-1.800	0.074	-0.537	0.025
INTERACTIONS						
White * Rightist ideology	-0.529	0.541	-0.980	0.330	-1.600	0.541
Indigenous * Rightist ideology	4.674	0.470	9.940	0.000	3.744	5.604
White * Wealth redist.	0.369	0.713	0.520	0.606	-1.041	1.779
Indigenous * Wealth redist.	-4.602	0.743	-6.190	0.000	-6.071	-3.132
White * Social security	-0.031	0.864	-0.040	0.971	-1.739	1.677
Indigenous * Social security	1.466	0.670	2.190	0.030	0.141	2.791
White * Nationalisations	-0.326	0.553	-0.590	0.557	-1.420	0.768
Indigenous * Nationalisations	0.350	0.400	0.870	0.383	-0.441	1.140
White * Free trade	-1.995	0.701	-2.850	0.005	-3.381	-0.609
Indigenous * Free trade	-9.498	0.580	-16.360	0.000	-10.645	-8.350
White * Limit opp. voice	-2.603	0.765	-3.400	0.001	-4.115	-1.091
Indigenous * Limit opp. voice	-11.618	1.282	-9.060	0.000	-14.152	-9.083
White * Direct democracy	-1.444	0.746	-1.930	0.055	-2.920	0.032
Indigenous * Direct democracy	-22.667	1.286	-17.630	0.000	-25.210	-20.124
White * Minorities follow maj.	2.781	1.311	2.120	0.036	0.188	5.374
Indigenous * Minorities follow maj.	22.723	1.478	15.380	0.000	19.801	25.646
White * Income	1.677	1.095	1.530	0.128	-0.489	3.844
Indigenous * Income	4.993	1.012	4.930	0.000	2.991	6.994
Constant	-0.216	0.960	-0.220	0.822	-2.115	1.683

N = 1151. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2009 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales), with two-interactions between self-identified group and the non-ethnic voter characteristics indicated.
Source: LAPOP 2010.

Table A23: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009 (with generic self-identification)

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P > [t]	95% confidence intervals	

MORALES	base outcome					
REYES VILLA						
White (Mestizo)	1.680	0.357	4.710	0.000	0.974	2.386
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-0.914	0.761	-1.200	0.232	-2.419	0.592
Speaks indigenous language	-1.408	0.654	-2.160	0.033	-2.701	-0.116
Income	0.143	0.090	1.600	0.113	-0.034	0.321
Female	-0.280	0.264	-1.060	0.292	-0.803	0.243
Age	-0.015	0.009	-1.750	0.082	-0.032	0.002
Trust in parties	-0.056	0.072	-0.780	0.438	-0.198	0.086
Participation in protests	1.278	0.279	4.590	0.000	0.727	1.830
National economy has improved	-1.193	0.459	-2.600	0.010	-2.101	-0.286
Personal finances have improved	-0.559	0.378	-1.480	0.142	-1.307	0.189
Resides in media luna	1.785	0.296	6.040	0.000	1.200	2.370
Resides in rural area	-0.058	0.184	-0.320	0.751	-0.421	0.305
Rightist ideology	0.335	0.077	4.330	0.000	0.182	0.489
Wealth redistribution	-0.035	0.116	-0.300	0.763	-0.264	0.194
Social security	0.005	0.147	0.030	0.975	-0.286	0.295
Nationalisations	-0.193	0.077	-2.500	0.014	-0.346	-0.040
Free trade	0.121	0.112	1.080	0.281	-0.100	0.342
Limit opposition voice	-0.335	0.087	-3.860	0.000	-0.506	-0.163
Direct democracy	-0.221	0.074	-3.000	0.003	-0.367	-0.076
Minorities to follow majority	0.044	0.104	0.420	0.672	-0.162	0.251
Mix of races 'good'	-0.002	0.095	-0.020	0.984	-0.189	0.186
Approves of inter-racial marriage	-0.276	0.109	-2.530	0.013	-0.492	-0.060
Indigenous poverty: low education	0.195	0.261	0.750	0.457	-0.322	0.711
Indigenous poverty: innate/cultural	1.041	0.294	3.550	0.001	0.461	1.622
Indigenous treated worse	-0.059	0.306	-0.190	0.848	-0.664	0.547
Indigenous political influence	-0.431	0.270	-1.600	0.113	-0.964	0.103
Experience of discrimination	-0.021	0.184	-0.120	0.908	-0.385	0.343
Constant	-0.143	1.051	-0.140	0.892	-2.222	1.937
DORIA						
White (Mestizo)	1.951	0.583	3.350	0.001	0.797	3.104
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-2.110	1.125	-1.880	0.063	-4.335	0.116
Speaks indigenous language	-0.632	0.628	-1.010	0.316	-1.875	0.611
Income	0.290	0.137	2.110	0.037	0.018	0.561
Female	-0.008	0.417	-0.020	0.984	-0.832	0.816
Age	-0.030	0.015	-1.980	0.050	-0.060	0.000
Trust in parties	-0.037	0.130	-0.280	0.777	-0.294	0.220
Participation in protests	1.601	0.641	2.500	0.014	0.333	2.869
National economy has improved	-0.944	0.551	-1.710	0.089	-2.033	0.146
Personal finances have improved	0.542	0.479	1.130	0.260	-0.405	1.490
Resides in media luna	0.755	0.386	1.960	0.053	-0.009	1.518
Resides in rural area	-0.095	0.128	-0.740	0.460	-0.349	0.159
Rightist ideology	0.294	0.097	3.040	0.003	0.103	0.486
Wealth redistribution	0.139	0.190	0.730	0.464	-0.236	0.515
Social security	-0.514	0.204	-2.520	0.013	-0.917	-0.111
Nationalisations	-0.273	0.095	-2.880	0.005	-0.461	-0.085
Free trade	-0.059	0.148	-0.400	0.691	-0.351	0.233
Limit opposition voice	-0.245	0.137	-1.780	0.077	-0.517	0.027
Direct democracy	-0.056	0.101	-0.560	0.579	-0.255	0.143
Minorities to follow majority	-0.020	0.124	-0.160	0.872	-0.265	0.225
Mix of races 'good'	0.184	0.149	1.240	0.219	-0.111	0.479
Approves of inter-racial marriage	0.191	0.148	1.290	0.199	-0.102	0.483
Indigenous poverty: low education	1.213	0.526	2.310	0.023	0.172	2.253
Indigenous poverty: innate/cultural	1.189	0.520	2.290	0.024	0.161	2.218
Indigenous treated worse	0.204	0.395	0.520	0.606	-0.576	0.985
Indigenous political influence	-0.417	0.487	-0.860	0.394	-1.381	0.547
Experience of discrimination	0.062	0.278	0.220	0.823	-0.488	0.612
Constant	-3.023	1.620	-1.870	0.064	-6.228	0.183

N = 1018. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2009 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales).
Source: LAPOP 2010.

Table A24: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009 (with cultural identification)

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
MORALES	base outcome					
REYES VILLA						
Quechua (none)	-0.244	0.387	-0.630	0.530	-1.010	0.522
Aymara (none)	-2.302	0.679	-3.390	0.001	-3.645	-0.959
Other Indigenous (none)	0.569	0.390	1.460	0.147	-0.203	1.340
Speaks indigenous language	-1.503	0.618	-2.430	0.016	-2.725	-0.282
Income	0.123	0.090	1.360	0.175	-0.055	0.301
Female	-0.283	0.283	-1.000	0.319	-0.842	0.276
Age	-0.013	0.009	-1.440	0.153	-0.031	0.005
Trust in parties	-0.083	0.078	-1.070	0.289	-0.238	0.072
Participation in protests	1.193	0.297	4.010	0.000	0.605	1.782
National economy has improved	-1.042	0.507	-2.050	0.042	-2.045	-0.039
Personal finances have improved	-0.453	0.395	-1.150	0.253	-1.234	0.328
Resides in media luna	1.178	0.303	3.890	0.000	0.578	1.777
Resides in rural area	-0.082	0.163	-0.500	0.618	-0.405	0.242
Rightist ideology	0.344	0.070	4.890	0.000	0.205	0.482
Wealth redistribution	-0.035	0.121	-0.290	0.773	-0.274	0.204
Social security	0.001	0.156	0.010	0.993	-0.308	0.310
Nationalisations	-0.185	0.077	-2.410	0.017	-0.337	-0.033
Free trade	0.194	0.115	1.690	0.094	-0.033	0.421
Limit opposition voice	-0.337	0.093	-3.630	0.000	-0.520	-0.153
Direct democracy	-0.180	0.069	-2.610	0.010	-0.316	-0.043
Minorities to follow majority	0.034	0.120	0.290	0.775	-0.202	0.271
Mix of races 'good'	-0.061	0.101	-0.600	0.547	-0.260	0.139
Approves of inter-racial marriage	-0.288	0.121	-2.380	0.019	-0.528	-0.048
Indigenous poverty: low education	0.095	0.313	0.300	0.763	-0.525	0.714

Table A24: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009 (with cultural identification)

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P > [t]	95% confidence intervals	
Indigenous poverty: innate/cultural	1.036	0.289	3.580	0.000	0.464	1.608
Indigenous treated worse	0.139	0.286	0.490	0.628	-0.427	0.704
Indigenous political influence	-0.336	0.292	-1.150	0.252	-0.913	0.242
Experience of discrimination	0.024	0.196	0.120	0.903	-0.364	0.412
Constant	0.373	1.060	0.350	0.725	-1.724	2.471
DORIA						
Quechua (none)	0.150	0.610	0.250	0.806	-1.056	1.356
Aymara (none)	0.138	0.690	0.200	0.842	-1.227	1.503
Other Indigenous (none)	0.593	0.594	1.000	0.320	-0.582	1.769
Speaks indigenous language	-0.983	0.666	-1.480	0.143	-2.301	0.335
Income	0.304	0.142	2.140	0.034	0.023	0.586
Female	-0.022	0.398	-0.060	0.955	-0.810	0.765
Age	-0.017	0.015	-1.140	0.255	-0.045	0.012
Trust in parties	-0.033	0.128	-0.260	0.794	-0.287	0.220
Participation in protests	1.191	0.618	1.930	0.056	-0.031	2.413
National economy has improved	-0.627	0.513	-1.220	0.224	-1.642	0.388
Personal finances have improved	0.577	0.408	1.420	0.159	-0.230	1.383
Resides in media luna	0.704	0.531	1.320	0.188	-0.347	1.755
Resides in rural area	-0.092	0.136	-0.680	0.498	-0.361	0.176
Rightist ideology	0.265	0.092	2.870	0.005	0.082	0.447
Wealth redistribution	0.206	0.216	0.950	0.342	-0.221	0.634
Social security	-0.567	0.233	-2.430	0.016	-1.028	-0.106
Nationalisations	-0.287	0.086	-3.340	0.001	-0.457	-0.117
Free trade	0.025	0.148	0.170	0.867	-0.268	0.318
Limit opposition voice	-0.234	0.141	-1.660	0.099	-0.513	0.045
Direct democracy	-0.125	0.115	-1.090	0.280	-0.353	0.103
Minorities to follow majority	-0.073	0.135	-0.540	0.589	-0.341	0.195
Mix of races 'good'	0.122	0.152	0.800	0.426	-0.180	0.423
Approves of inter-racial marriage	0.096	0.152	0.630	0.528	-0.205	0.397
Indigenous poverty: low education	1.318	0.625	2.110	0.037	0.081	2.554
Indigenous poverty: innate/cultural	1.501	0.613	2.450	0.016	0.288	2.713
Indigenous treated worse	0.246	0.422	0.580	0.561	-0.589	1.081
Indigenous political influence	-0.260	0.531	-0.490	0.626	-1.310	0.791
Experience of discrimination	0.071	0.259	0.270	0.784	-0.442	0.584
Constant	-3.024	1.693	-1.790	0.076	-6.374	0.325

N = 1020. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2009 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales).
Source: LAPOP 2010.

Table A25: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009: Linguistic Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P > [t]	95% confidence intervals	
MORALES	base outcome					
REYES VILLA						
White (Mestizo)	1.677	0.364	4.610	0.000	0.957	2.397
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-0.985	0.711	-1.390	0.168	-2.391	0.421
Speaks indigenous language	-18.633	2.445	-7.620	0.000	-23.469	-13.797
Income	0.151	0.091	1.670	0.097	-0.028	0.331
Female	-0.259	0.261	-1.000	0.321	-0.775	0.256
Age	-0.016	0.009	-1.860	0.065	-0.034	0.001
Trust in parties	-0.076	0.070	-1.090	0.276	-0.214	0.062
Participation in protests	1.359	0.268	5.070	0.000	0.829	1.888
National economy has improved	-1.194	0.461	-2.590	0.011	-2.106	-0.282
Personal finances have improved	-0.552	0.377	-1.460	0.145	-1.298	0.194
Resides in media luna	1.859	0.308	6.040	0.000	1.250	2.468
Resides in rural area	-0.021	0.178	-0.120	0.908	-0.372	0.331
Rightist ideology	0.350	0.076	4.600	0.000	0.200	0.501
Wealth redistribution	-0.030	0.121	-0.250	0.806	-0.270	0.210
Social security	0.007	0.150	0.040	0.964	-0.289	0.303
Nationalisations	-0.216	0.075	-2.890	0.005	-0.365	-0.068
Free trade	0.125	0.115	1.090	0.277	-0.101	0.352
Limit opposition voice	-0.336	0.086	-3.900	0.000	-0.506	-0.166
Direct democracy	-0.223	0.072	-3.110	0.002	-0.365	-0.081
Minorities to follow majority	0.035	0.106	0.330	0.741	-0.175	0.246
Mix of races 'good'	-0.025	0.095	-0.270	0.791	-0.212	0.162
Approves of inter-racial marriage	-0.306	0.113	-2.710	0.008	-0.529	-0.082
Indigenous poverty: low education	0.113	0.266	0.420	0.672	-0.413	0.639
Indigenous poverty: innate/cultural	1.045	0.311	3.360	0.001	0.430	1.659
Indigenous treated worse	-0.072	0.332	-0.220	0.829	-0.729	0.585
Indigenous political influence	-0.500	0.296	-1.690	0.094	-1.085	0.085
Experience of discrimination	0.137	0.179	0.770	0.445	-0.217	0.492
INTERACTIONS: Ind. language *						
Mix of races 'good'	0.378	0.265	1.420	0.157	-0.147	0.902
Approves of inter-racial marriage	0.257	0.339	0.760	0.450	-0.414	0.928
Indigenous poverty: low education	14.131	1.218	11.600	0.000	11.721	16.541
Indigenous poverty: innate/cultural	14.276	1.146	12.450	0.000	12.008	16.543
Indigenous treated worse	0.132	1.280	0.100	0.918	-2.401	2.665
Indigenous political influence	0.992	0.892	1.110	0.269	-0.774	2.757
Experience of discrimination	-1.376	0.722	-1.910	0.059	-2.804	0.052
Constant	0.081	1.144	0.070	0.944	-2.182	2.343
DORIA						
White (Mestizo)	2.011	0.599	3.360	0.001	0.825	3.196
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-2.449	1.371	-1.790	0.076	-5.160	0.262
Speaks indigenous language	-35.681	3.793	-9.410	0.000	-43.183	-28.179
Income	0.255	0.135	1.890	0.061	-0.012	0.521
Female	-0.003	0.442	-0.010	0.995	-0.878	0.872
Age	-0.035	0.015	-2.370	0.019	-0.064	-0.006
Trust in parties	-0.054	0.136	-0.400	0.690	-0.322	0.214
Participation in protests	1.780	0.683	2.610	0.010	0.429	3.131
National economy has improved	-0.965	0.584	-1.650	0.101	-2.120	0.190

Table A25: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009: Linguistic Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
Personal finances have improved	0.681	0.507	1.340	0.182	-0.323	1.684
Resides in media luna	0.705	0.423	1.670	0.098	-0.132	1.542
Resides in rural area	-0.218	0.161	-1.350	0.179	-0.536	0.101
Rightist ideology	0.284	0.104	2.730	0.007	0.079	0.490
Wealth redistribution	0.175	0.196	0.890	0.375	-0.213	0.563
Social security	-0.571	0.216	-2.650	0.009	-0.998	-0.144
Nationalisations	-0.295	0.107	-2.770	0.006	-0.506	-0.084
Free trade	-0.078	0.161	-0.480	0.630	-0.397	0.242
Limit opposition voice	-0.283	0.156	-1.810	0.072	-0.591	0.026
Direct democracy	-0.031	0.106	-0.290	0.771	-0.241	0.179
Minorities to follow majority	-0.005	0.140	-0.030	0.974	-0.281	0.272
Mix of races 'good'	0.135	0.165	0.820	0.414	-0.191	0.461
Approves of inter-racial marriage	0.249	0.168	1.480	0.141	-0.083	0.581
Indigenous poverty: low education	1.239	0.558	2.220	0.028	0.134	2.343
Indigenous poverty: innate/cultural	0.918	0.577	1.590	0.114	-0.224	2.059
Indigenous treated worse	0.053	0.409	0.130	0.898	-0.756	0.861
Indigenous political influence	-0.565	0.522	-1.080	0.281	-1.597	0.467
Experience of discrimination	0.062	0.326	0.190	0.851	-0.584	0.707
INTERACTIONS: Ind. language *						
Mix of races 'good'	1.218	0.500	2.440	0.016	0.229	2.206
Approves of inter-racial marriage	-0.709	0.310	-2.280	0.024	-1.323	-0.095
Indigenous poverty: low education	-1.286	1.405	-0.920	0.361	-4.064	1.492
Indigenous poverty: innate/cultural	16.020	1.310	12.230	0.000	13.429	18.612
Indigenous treated worse	1.337	1.536	0.870	0.386	-1.701	4.374
Indigenous political influence	18.342	2.246	8.170	0.000	13.899	22.785
Experience of discrimination	-1.198	0.695	-1.720	0.087	-2.573	0.177
Constant	-1.984	1.599	-1.240	0.217	-5.147	1.178

N = 1018. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2009 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales), with two-interactions between linguistic group and the non-ethnic /ethnic attitude voter characteristics indicated.
Source: LAPOP 2010.

Table A26: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009: Generic Self-Identification Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
MORALES	base outcome					
REYES VILLA						
White (Mestizo)	3.343	1.112	3.010	0.003	1.143	5.544
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-38.622	2.754	-14.030	0.000	-44.069	-33.175
Speaks indigenous language	-1.609	0.699	-2.300	0.023	-2.991	-0.227
Income	0.164	0.092	1.770	0.078	-0.019	0.347
Female	-0.248	0.260	-0.950	0.342	-0.762	0.266
Age	-0.017	0.009	-1.830	0.070	-0.035	0.001
Trust in parties	-0.086	0.072	-1.180	0.238	-0.228	0.057
Participation in protests	1.465	0.309	4.740	0.000	0.854	2.076
National economy has improved	-1.282	0.447	-2.870	0.005	-2.167	-0.397
Personal finances have improved	-0.517	0.375	-1.380	0.171	-1.258	0.225
Resides in media luna	1.763	0.294	6.000	0.000	1.182	2.345
Resides in rural area	-0.005	0.172	-0.030	0.977	-0.346	0.336
Rightist ideology	0.373	0.078	4.790	0.000	0.219	0.527
Wealth redistribution	-0.041	0.120	-0.340	0.734	-0.278	0.196
Social security	0.005	0.154	0.030	0.975	-0.300	0.309
Nationalisations	-0.220	0.077	-2.870	0.005	-0.371	-0.068
Free trade	0.159	0.113	1.410	0.162	-0.065	0.383
Limit opposition voice	-0.332	0.088	-3.780	0.000	-0.505	-0.158
Direct democracy	-0.216	0.076	-2.850	0.005	-0.366	-0.066
Minorities to follow majority	0.026	0.109	0.240	0.809	-0.189	0.242
Mix of races 'good'	-0.027	0.094	-0.290	0.771	-0.213	0.158
Approves of inter-racial marriage	-0.277	0.109	-2.550	0.012	-0.492	-0.062
Indigenous poverty: low education	0.192	0.290	0.660	0.509	-0.381	0.766
Indigenous poverty: innate/cultural	0.793	0.319	2.480	0.014	0.161	1.424
Indigenous treated worse	-0.335	0.329	-1.020	0.310	-0.987	0.316
Indigenous political influence	-0.413	0.288	-1.440	0.154	-0.982	0.156
Experience of discrimination	0.098	0.160	0.610	0.540	-0.218	0.415
INTERACTIONS: White * mix of races	-0.259	0.440	-0.590	0.557	-1.129	0.611
Indigenous * mix of races	-0.580	0.576	-1.010	0.316	-1.720	0.559
White * inter-racial marriage	0.196	0.312	0.630	0.531	-0.421	0.813
Indigenous * inter-racial marriage	15.373	1.303	11.800	0.000	12.796	17.950
White * ind. poverty: edu	-1.257	1.016	-1.240	0.218	-3.266	0.752
Indigenous * ind. poverty: edu	2.157	1.377	1.570	0.120	-0.566	4.880
White * ind. poverty: innate/cult	17.264	1.749	9.870	0.000	13.804	20.723
Indigenous * ind. poverty: innate/cult	19.998	1.859	10.760	0.000	16.321	23.675
White * ind. treated worse	-0.429	1.165	-0.370	0.713	-2.733	1.875
Indigenous * ind. treated worse	3.231	1.582	2.040	0.043	0.102	6.361
White * ind. pol. influence	-2.723	1.476	-1.840	0.067	-5.642	0.197
Indigenous * ind. pol. Influence	19.900	1.647	12.080	0.000	16.643	23.158
White * discrimination	-0.780	0.926	-0.840	0.401	-2.612	1.052
Indigenous * discrimination	-15.044	1.501	-10.020	0.000	-18.014	-12.074
DORIA						
White (Mestizo)	2.653	1.227	2.160	0.032	0.227	5.079
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-34.893	2.662	-13.110	0.000	-40.159	-29.628
Speaks indigenous language	-0.839	0.631	-1.330	0.186	-2.086	0.408
Income	0.255	0.119	2.140	0.035	0.019	0.491
Female	-0.013	0.436	-0.030	0.976	-0.876	0.849
Age	-0.030	0.014	-2.140	0.034	-0.057	-0.002
Trust in parties	-0.023	0.119	-0.190	0.850	-0.258	0.213
Participation in protests	1.889	0.661	2.860	0.005	0.581	3.198
National economy has improved	-0.956	0.549	-1.740	0.084	-2.043	0.130
Personal finances have improved	0.739	0.437	1.690	0.093	-0.125	1.603
Resides in media luna	0.818	0.400	2.050	0.043	0.027	1.610

Table A26: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009: Generic Self-Identification Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
Resides in rural area	-0.065	0.136	-0.480	0.634	-0.333	0.204
Rightist ideology	0.294	0.096	3.070	0.003	0.104	0.483
Wealth redistribution	0.129	0.211	0.610	0.542	-0.289	0.547
Social security	-0.552	0.213	-2.590	0.011	-0.973	-0.131
Nationalisations	-0.258	0.102	-2.520	0.013	-0.460	-0.056
Free trade	0.003	0.137	0.020	0.982	-0.268	0.274
Limit opposition voice	-0.184	0.146	-1.260	0.209	-0.473	0.105
Direct democracy	-0.044	0.107	-0.410	0.682	-0.257	0.168
Minorities to follow majority	-0.067	0.135	-0.490	0.622	-0.334	0.201
Mix of races 'good'	0.174	0.161	1.090	0.280	-0.143	0.492
Approves of inter-racial marriage	0.181	0.124	1.460	0.148	-0.065	0.427
Indigenous poverty: low education	1.226	0.647	1.890	0.061	-0.055	2.506
Indigenous poverty: innate/cultural	1.337	0.603	2.220	0.028	0.145	2.529
Indigenous treated worse	0.159	0.435	0.370	0.715	-0.700	1.019
Indigenous political influence	-0.365	0.528	-0.690	0.490	-1.409	0.679
Experience of discrimination	0.163	0.247	0.660	0.510	-0.325	0.650
INTERACTIONS: White * mix of races	-0.019	0.329	-0.060	0.954	-0.670	0.632
Indigenous * mix of races	-0.178	0.281	-0.630	0.528	-0.734	0.378
White * inter-racial marriage	-0.193	0.502	-0.380	0.702	-1.186	0.801
Indigenous * inter-racial marriage	0.256	0.279	0.920	0.359	-0.295	0.808
White * ind. poverty: edu	1.210	1.059	1.140	0.255	-0.885	3.305
Indigenous * ind. poverty: edu	-19.519	1.589	-12.280	0.000	-22.663	-16.375
White * ind. poverty: innate/cult	-2.156	1.439	-1.500	0.136	-5.001	0.690
Indigenous * ind. poverty: innate/cult	17.740	1.255	14.140	0.000	15.258	20.223
White * ind. treated worse	1.401	1.151	1.220	0.226	-0.876	3.679
Indigenous * ind. treated worse	-14.775	1.674	-8.820	0.000	-18.087	-11.462
White * ind. pol. influence	-2.354	1.515	-1.550	0.123	-5.352	0.644
Indigenous * ind. pol. Influence	18.234	2.007	9.080	0.000	14.263	22.205
White * discrimination	-17.366	1.666	-10.430	0.000	-20.661	-14.071
Indigenous * discrimination	-12.520	1.881	-6.660	0.000	-16.241	-8.800

N = 1018. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2009 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales), with two-interactions between self-identified group and the non-ethnic /ethnic attitude voter characteristics indicated. The interactions between ethnicity * political preferences (included in 2005 analysis) were dropped to improve degrees of freedom. The interactions of ethnicity with 'Mix of races 'good'' and 'Approves of inter-racial marriage' were also dropped from the analysis because their inclusion produced a highly singular variance matrix, precluding the estimation of standard errors. Parameter estimates for these two sets of interactions are from a second model, which included all the above variables as main effects but only the interactions between ethnicity and 'Mix of races 'good'' and 'Approves of inter-racial marriage'. The coefficients for most other variables do not show substantial changes between the two models.
Source: LAPOP 2010.

Table A27: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009: Cultural Identification Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
MORALES						
REYES VILLA						
Quechua (none)	-1.367	1.499	-0.910	0.363	-4.332	1.598
Aymara (none)	-10.964	3.646	-3.010	0.003	-18.177	-3.752
Other Indigenous (none)	4.366	1.809	2.410	0.017	0.788	7.943
Speaks indigenous language	-1.485	0.646	-2.300	0.023	-2.762	-0.207
Income	0.109	0.086	1.270	0.205	-0.060	0.279
Female	-0.312	0.271	-1.150	0.251	-0.848	0.223
Age	-0.016	0.010	-1.620	0.108	-0.035	0.004
Trust in parties	-0.053	0.078	-0.680	0.500	-0.207	0.101
Participation in protests	1.351	0.299	4.510	0.000	0.758	1.943
National economy has improved	-1.180	0.512	-2.310	0.023	-2.193	-0.168
Personal finances have improved	-0.519	0.379	-1.370	0.173	-1.268	0.230
Resides in media luna	1.121	0.298	3.760	0.000	0.531	1.711
Resides in rural area	-0.104	0.159	-0.660	0.513	-0.418	0.210
Rightist ideology	0.376	0.071	5.270	0.000	0.235	0.518
Wealth redistribution	-0.039	0.125	-0.320	0.752	-0.286	0.207
Social security	0.021	0.158	0.130	0.896	-0.292	0.333
Nationalisations	-0.197	0.072	-2.740	0.007	-0.339	-0.055
Free trade	0.199	0.112	1.790	0.076	-0.021	0.420
Limit opposition voice	-0.311	0.078	-3.960	0.000	-0.466	-0.156
Direct democracy	-0.182	0.078	-2.340	0.021	-0.335	-0.028
Minorities to follow majority	0.028	0.115	0.250	0.806	-0.199	0.256
Mix of races 'good'	0.030	0.136	0.220	0.829	-0.240	0.299
Approves of inter-racial marriage	-0.344	0.149	-2.300	0.023	-0.639	-0.048
Indigenous poverty: low education	-0.160	0.556	-0.290	0.774	-1.260	0.940
Indigenous poverty: innate/cultural	1.023	0.645	1.590	0.115	-0.253	2.298
Indigenous treated worse	0.226	0.490	0.460	0.645	-0.744	1.196
Indigenous political influence	-0.117	0.466	-0.250	0.802	-1.040	0.805
Experience of discrimination	0.403	0.279	1.450	0.151	-0.148	0.953
INTERACTIONS:						
Quechua * mix of races	0.032	0.221	0.140	0.885	-0.406	0.470
Aymara * mix of races	-2.122	0.395	-5.380	0.000	-2.902	-1.341
Other Indigenous * mix of races	-0.533	0.208	-2.560	0.011	-0.945	-0.122
Quechua * inter-racial marriage	0.166	0.191	0.870	0.387	-0.212	0.543
Aymara * inter-racial marriage	1.223	0.644	1.900	0.060	-0.051	2.497
Other Indigenous * inter-racial marriage	0.068	0.148	0.460	0.645	-0.225	0.362
Quechua * ind. poverty: edu	0.947	0.867	1.090	0.277	-0.768	2.662
Aymara * ind. poverty: edu	0.493	0.959	0.510	0.608	-1.404	2.391
Other Indigenous * ind. poverty: edu	11.256	1.281	8.780	0.000	8.721	13.791
Quechua * ind. poverty: innate/cult	16.173	1.398	11.570	0.000	13.409	18.938
Aymara * ind. poverty: innate/cult	-0.939	0.883	-1.060	0.289	-2.685	0.807
Other Indigenous * ind. poverty: innate/cult	-1.328	1.268	-1.050	0.297	-3.835	1.180
Quechua * ind. treated worse	-0.476	0.679	-0.700	0.484	-1.820	0.867
Aymara * ind. treated worse	-0.216	0.930	-0.230	0.817	-2.056	1.624
Other Indigenous * ind/ treated worse	0.413	0.766	0.540	0.591	-1.102	1.928
Quechua * ind. pol. influence	-0.242	0.688	-0.350	0.726	-1.602	1.119
Aymara * ind. pol. influence	-3.277	1.199	-2.730	0.007	-5.648	-0.905
Other Indigenous * ind. pol. Influence	-0.425	1.151	-0.370	0.713	-2.702	1.853

Table A27: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Bolivia 2009: Cultural Identification Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P > [t]	95% confidence intervals	
Quechua * discrimination	-0.329	0.474	-0.690	0.490	-1.266	0.609
Aymara * discrimination	-8.414	1.204	-6.990	0.000	-10.796	-6.032
Other Indigenous * discrimination	-0.404	0.538	-0.750	0.454	-1.468	0.660
Constant	-0.096	1.408	-0.070	0.946	-2.881	2.689
DORIA						
Quechua (none)	-1.463	3.181	-0.460	0.646	-7.755	4.830
Aymara (none)	-29.201	3.460	-8.440	0.000	-36.045	-22.357
Other Indigenous (none)	-11.360	2.485	-4.570	0.000	-16.275	-6.444
Speaks indigenous language	-1.050	0.593	-1.770	0.079	-2.223	0.122
Income	0.297	0.127	2.350	0.020	0.047	0.548
Female	-0.201	0.398	-0.510	0.614	-0.989	0.586
Age	-0.013	0.016	-0.800	0.423	-0.045	0.019
Trust in parties	-0.128	0.140	-0.910	0.363	-0.404	0.149
Participation in protests	0.880	0.574	1.530	0.128	-0.255	2.015
National economy has improved	-0.591	0.554	-1.070	0.288	-1.687	0.505
Personal finances have improved	0.776	0.385	2.020	0.046	0.015	1.537
Resides in media luna	0.655	0.497	1.320	0.190	-0.328	1.638
Resides in rural area	-0.069	0.141	-0.490	0.624	-0.349	0.210
Rightist ideology	0.236	0.103	2.290	0.024	0.032	0.440
Wealth redistribution	0.175	0.221	0.790	0.429	-0.262	0.613
Social security	-0.581	0.236	-2.470	0.015	-1.048	-0.115
Nationalisations	-0.302	0.095	-3.190	0.002	-0.489	-0.115
Free trade	0.019	0.152	0.130	0.900	-0.281	0.320
Limit opposition voice	-0.188	0.155	-1.220	0.226	-0.495	0.118
Direct democracy	-0.141	0.126	-1.130	0.262	-0.390	0.107
Minorities to follow majority	-0.056	0.128	-0.430	0.665	-0.310	0.198
Mix of races 'good'	0.041	0.244	0.170	0.866	-0.441	0.524
Approves of inter-racial marriage	0.100	0.305	0.330	0.743	-0.504	0.704
Indigenous poverty: low education	1.811	1.317	1.380	0.171	-0.794	4.415
Indigenous poverty: innate/cultural	1.526	1.353	1.130	0.261	-1.149	4.202
Indigenous treated worse	-0.095	0.738	-0.130	0.897	-1.556	1.365
Indigenous political influence	-0.138	0.915	-0.150	0.880	-1.947	1.671
Experience of discrimination	0.613	0.446	1.370	0.172	-0.269	1.495
INTERACTIONS:						
Quechua * mix of races	0.622	0.423	1.470	0.144	-0.215	1.458
Aymara * mix of races	-0.108	0.436	-0.250	0.805	-0.970	0.754
Other Indigenous * mix of races	-1.016	0.447	-2.270	0.025	-1.900	-0.132
Quechua * inter-racial marriage	-0.079	0.419	-0.190	0.850	-0.908	0.749
Aymara * inter-racial marriage	-0.244	0.401	-0.610	0.543	-1.038	0.549
Other Indigenous * inter-racial marriage	0.759	0.550	1.380	0.170	-0.329	1.848
Quechua * ind. poverty: edu	-2.236	1.524	-1.470	0.145	-5.250	0.779
Aymara * ind. poverty: edu	-0.827	1.538	-0.540	0.592	-3.869	2.215
Other Indigenous * ind. poverty: edu	15.175	1.485	10.220	0.000	12.237	18.113
Quechua * ind. poverty: innate/cult	15.471	1.710	9.050	0.000	12.089	18.853
Aymara * ind. poverty: innate/cult	14.586	1.909	7.640	0.000	10.810	18.361
Other Indigenous * ind. poverty: innate/cult	16.408	1.756	9.340	0.000	12.934	19.881
Quechua * ind. treated worse	0.784	1.280	0.610	0.541	-1.748	3.317
Aymara * ind. treated worse	0.744	1.138	0.650	0.514	-1.506	2.995
Other Indigenous * ind/ treated worse	-18.955	2.797	-6.780	0.000	-24.488	-13.421
Quechua * ind. pol. influence	-0.587	1.268	-0.460	0.644	-3.096	1.921
Aymara * ind. pol. influence	16.570	1.403	11.810	0.000	13.794	19.345
Other Indigenous * ind. pol. Influence	-1.950	1.831	-1.060	0.289	-5.572	1.672
Quechua * discrimination	-0.624	0.665	-0.940	0.350	-1.939	0.692
Aymara * discrimination	-0.960	0.571	-1.680	0.095	-2.089	0.169
Other Indigenous * discrimination	-17.257	1.632	-10.570	0.000	-20.487	-14.028
Constant	-2.470	2.411	-1.020	0.308	-7.240	2.300

N = 1020. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2009 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Morales), with two-interactions between linguistic group and the non-ethnic /ethnic attitude voter characteristics indicated.
Source: LAPOP 2010.

Table A28: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Personal Linguistic Background on Voting for Morales over Reyes Villa, Bolivia 2009

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	.006	.001	.006	-.001	.022	(P)
				-.001	.025	(BC)
Trust in parties	-.001	.000	.004	-.009	.008	(P)
				-.010	.006	(BC)
Rightist ideology	-.002	.002	.024	-.047	.044	(P)
				-.053	.037	(BC)
Wealth redistribution	-.002	.001	.004	-.011	.005	(P)
				-.017	.002	(BC)
Social security	.000	.000	.003	-.008	.007	(P)
				-.007	.009	(BC)
Nationalizations	.000	.000	.004	-.010	.008	(P)
				-.009	.010	(BC)
Free trade	-.002	.000	.004	-.010	.005	(P)
				-.017	.002	(BC)
Limit voice of opposition	.020^*	.000	.012	.002	.049	(P)
				.004	.053	(BC)
Direct democracy	.007	.000	.006	-.003	.021	(P)
				-.002	.028	(BC)
Minorities are a threat	.000	.000	.004	-.008	.009	(P)
				-.012	.006	(BC)
Mix of races "good"	.000	.001	.003	-.003	.007	(P)
				-.004	.007	(BC)
Approves of inter-racial marriage	.001	.000	.004	-.005	.010	(P)
				-.004	.013	(BC)
Innate/cultural cause of indigenous poverty	-.013	.001	.010	-.037	.003	(P)
				-.046	.000	(BC)

Table A28: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Personal Linguistic Background on Voting for Morales over Reyes Villa, Bolivia 2009

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Indigenous treated worse than whites	.002	-.001	.004	-.008	.010	(P)
				-.002	.016	(BC)
Indigenous have influenced lawmaking	-.001	.000	.004	-.012	.007	(P)
				-.013	.005	(BC)
Experience of discrimination	-.002	.001	.009	-.021	.017	(P)
				-.028	.012	(BC)
Total indirect effects	**.014**	.005	.037	-.054	.094	(P)
				-.060	.085	(BC)
Direct effect	**.195^***	-.015	.075	.031	.329	(P)
				.059	.357	(BC)
Total effects	**.209^***	-.010	.076	.050	.345	(P)
				.072	.359	(BC)
Proportion of total effect mediated	**.066**					

N = 847. Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of personal linguistic background (knowledge of an indigenous language) on vote choice (Morales over Reyes Villa) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: ethnic self-identification, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender nd); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (951 repetitions, from 134 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2010.

Table A29: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as White (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Morales over Reyes Villa, Bolivia 2009

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	-.004	.000	.004	-.014	.003	(P)
				-.018	.001	(BC)
Trust in parties	.000	.000	.002	-.006	.004	(P)
				-.006	.004	(BC)
Rightist ideology	-.045^*	-.001	.020	-.086	-.006	(P)
				-.082	-.005	(BC)
Wealth redistribution	.000	.000	.002	-.006	.004	(P)
				-.006	.004	(BC)
Social security	.000	.000	.003	-.008	.006	(P)
				-.011	.004	(BC)
Nationalizations	-.010*	.000	.006	-.025	.000	(P)
				-.028	-.001	(BC)
Free trade	-.001	.001	.004	-.007	.011	(P)
				-.017	.005	(BC)
Limit voice of opposition	-.013	.001	.010	-.038	.005	(P)
				-.042	.003	(BC)
Direct democracy	-.006	.000	.005	-.017	.002	(P)
				-.020	.001	(BC)
Minorities are a threat	.004	-.001	.009	-.012	.024	(P)
				-.009	.026	(BC)
Mix of races "good"	-.002	.000	.006	-.015	.010	(P)
				-.014	.011	(BC)
Approves of inter-racial marriage	-.018	.001	.012	-.044	.002	(P)
				-.049	.001	(BC)
Innate/cultural cause of indigenous poverty	-.008	.000	.006	-.021	.001	(P)
				-.022	.000	(BC)
Indigenous treated worse than whites	.005	-.001	.005	-.006	.016	(P)
				-.002	.021	(BC)
Indigenous have influenced lawmaking	-.001	.000	.004	-.011	.007	(P)
				-.015	.004	(BC)
Experience of discrimination	.002	.000	.004	-.004	.011	(P)
				-.003	.013	(BC)
Total indirect effects	**-.098^***	.000	.030	-.156	-.036	(P)
				-.151	-.030	(BC)
Direct effect	**-.121^***	-.006	.042	-.213	-.048	(P)
				-.201	-.039	(BC)
Total effects	**-.219^***	-.006	.042	-.310	-.145	(P)
				-.300	-.131	(BC)
Proportion of total effect mediated	**.448**					

N = 704. Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as white (compared with mestizo) on vote choice (Morales over Reyes Villa) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: personal linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender nd); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (1000 repetitions, from 132 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2010.

Table A30: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Indigenous (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Morales over Reyes Villa, Bolivia 2009

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	.007*	-.001	.005	-.001	.018	(P)
				.001	.022	(BC)
Trust in parties	-.002	.001	.007	-.016	.014	(P)
				-.020	.011	(BC)
Rightist ideology	.031	.002	.022	-.006	.078	(P)
				-.007	.078	(BC)
Wealth redistribution	-.001	.000	.003	-.007	.005	(P)
				-.011	.003	(BC)
Social security	.000	.000	.003	-.007	.008	(P)
				-.007	.008	(BC)
Nationalizations	.007*	.000	.006	-.001	.023	(P)
				.000	.026	(BC)
Free trade	-.002	.000	.004	-.011	.005	(P)
				-.017	.001	(BC)
Limit voice of opposition	.031^*	-.001	.012	.011	.057	(P)

Table A30: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Indigenous (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Morales over Reyes Villa, Bolivia 2009

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
				.013	.062	(BC)
Direct democracy	.021^*	.000	.011	.004	.047	(P)
				.005	.050	(BC)
Minorities are a threat	-.003	.001	.005	-.014	.007	(P)
				-.021	.002	(BC)
Mix of races "good"	.000	.000	.003	-.006	.007	(P)
				-.006	.008	(BC)
Approves of inter-racial marriage	.009*	.000	.007	-.001	.026	(P)
				.000	.029	(BC)
Innate/cultural cause of indigenous poverty	.005	.000	.006	-.006	.020	(P)
				-.002	.027	(BC)
Indigenous treated worse than whites	.002	.000	.004	-.005	.013	(P)
				-.002	.019	(BC)
Indigenous have influenced lawmaking	.000	.000	.004	-.007	.011	(P)
				-.006	.011	(BC)
Experience of discrimination	-.003	.004	.012	-.021	.029	(P)
				-.027	.019	(BC)
Total indirect effects	**.104^***	.008	.029	.059	.172	(P)
				.047	.156	(BC)
Direct effect	**.196^***	-.008	.089	.028	.370	(P)
				.052	.401	(BC)
Total effects	**.300^***	.000	.084	.155	.474	(P)
				.157	.479	(BC)
Proportion of total effect mediated	**.346**					

N = 799. Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as indigenous (compared with mestizo) on vote choice (Morales over Reyes Villa) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: personal linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender nd); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (944 repetitions, from 133 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2010.

Table A31: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Indigenous (compared with White) on Voting for Morales over Reyes Villa, Bolivia 2009

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	-.016	.014	.027	-.061	.052	(P)
				-.142	.006	(BC)
Trust in parties	.021	-.003	.034	-.051	.095	(P)
				-.025	.120	(BC)
Rightist ideology	.090^*	.003	.053	.007	.209	(P)
				.012	.214	(BC)
Wealth redistribution	-.018*	.013	.020	-.046	.041	(P)
				-.076	-.001	(BC)
Social security	.002	-.002	.018	-.041	.037	(P)
				-.020	.068	(BC)
Nationalizations	.006	.018	.051	-.078	.125	(P)
				-.158	.081	(BC)
Free trade	.005	.001	.019	-.024	.056	(P)
				-.009	.092	(BC)
Limit voice of opposition	.048	.004	.050	-.020	.180	(P)
				-.013	.200	(BC)
Direct democracy	-.003	-.006	.053	-.114	.090	(P)
				-.101	.108	(BC)
Minorities are a threat	.045*	-.065	.049	-.109	.083	(P)
				.010	.127	(BC)
Mix of races "good"	-.023	.005	.070	-.139	.146	(P)
				-.134	.167	(BC)
Approves of inter-racial marriage	.137	-.134	.118	-.231	.242	(P)
				.048	.415	(BC)
Innate/cultural cause of indigenous poverty	.015	.020	.062	-.077	.175	(P)
				-.137	.128	(BC)
Indigenous treated worse than whites	-.005	.002	.019	-.047	.032	(P)
				-.090	.008	(BC)
Indigenous have influenced lawmaking	-.029	.027	.040	-.077	.084	(P)
				-.149	.006	(BC)
Experience of discrimination	.081	-.021	.059	-.055	.195	(P)
				-.007	.240	(BC)
Total indirect effects	**.357***	-.123	.123	-.019	.483	(P)
				.246	.599	(BC)
Direct effect	**.281^**	.107	.144	.085	.658	(P)
				-.034	.457	(BC)
Total effects	**.638^***	-.016	.102	.425	.818	(P)
				.440	.829	(BC)
Proportion of total effect mediated	**.560**					

N = 191. Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as indigenous (compared with white) on vote choice (Morales over Reyes Villa) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: personal linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender nd); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (414 repetitions, from 0 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2010.

Table A32: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Identification with Aymara culture (compared with no indigenous culture) on Voting for Morales over Reyes Villa, Bolivia 2009

Mediator Variables	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	.047*	-.006	.026	-.005	.096	(P)
				.009	.116	(BC)

Table A32: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Identification with Aymara culture (compared with no indigenous culture) on Voting for Morales over Reyes Villa, Bolivia 2009

Mediator Variables	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Trust in parties	-.002	.002	.007	-.017	.014	(P)
				-.028	.003	(BC)
Rightist ideology	.084^*	.006	.032	.027	.157	(P)
				.019	.145	(BC)
Wealth redistribution	.004	.001	.009	-.012	.028	(P)
				-.008	.030	(BC)
Social secruity	.000	.001	.008	-.014	.020	(P)
				-.020	.013	(BC)
Nationalisations	.053^*	-.003	.023	.012	.103	(P)
				.021	.114	(BC)
Free trade	.001	.000	.007	-.011	.017	(P)
				-.006	.024	(BC)
Limit opposition voice	.024*	-.003	.015	-.004	.054	(P)
				.002	.071	(BC)
Direct democracy	.017	-.002	.017	-.011	.054	(P)
				-.003	.079	(BC)
Minorities are a threat	.003	.000	.006	-.008	.019	(P)
				-.004	.024	(BC)
Mix of races "good"	-.016	.005	.017	-.047	.021	(P)
				-.063	.009	(BC)
Approves of inter-racial marriage	.034	-.007	.027	-.023	.085	(P)
				-.006	.103	(BC)
Innate/cultural cause of ind. poverty	.014*	-.001	.011	-.003	.038	(P)
				.000	.049	(BC)
Ind. treated worse than whites	.001	.002	.008	-.010	.023	(P)
				-.011	.021	(BC)
Indigenous political influence	-.004	.000	.016	-.039	.025	(P)
				-.045	.023	(BC)
Experience of discrimination	.037	.023	.044	-.006	.163	(P)
				-.029	.106	(BC)
Total indirect effects	**.295^***	.017	.076	.161	.466	(P)
				.135	.436	(BC)
Direct effects	**.161**	-.008	.131	-.085	.423	(P)
				-.063	.447	(BC)
Total effect	**.456^***	.009	.088	.308	.652	(P)
				.291	.632	(BC)
Proportion of total effect mediated	**.647**					

N = 409. Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of identification with Aymara culture (compared with no indigenous culture) on vote choice (Morales over Reyes Villa) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: personal linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender, undated); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (659 repetitions, from 101 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2010.

Table A33: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Identification with Quechua culture (compared with no indigenous culture) on Voting for Morales over Reyes Villa, Bolivia 2009

Mediator Variables	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	.004	.003	.009	-.004	.030	(P)
				-.004	.030	(BC)
Trust in parties	.000	.001	.005	-.008	.014	(P)
				-.012	.007	(BC)
Rightist ideology	.053	.008	.034	-.006	.125	(P)
				-.022	.110	(BC)
Wealth redistribution	.001	-.001	.009	-.021	.018	(P)
				-.010	.028	(BC)
Social secruity	-.003	-.001	.010	-.028	.015	(P)
				-.035	.011	(BC)
Nationalisations	.021	.002	.018	-.004	.063	(P)
				-.004	.063	(BC)
Free trade	-.004	-.001	.009	-.029	.009	(P)
				-.032	.006	(BC)
Limit opposition voice	.024^*	-.002	.014	-.002	.051	(P)
				.003	.066	(BC)
Direct democracy	.007	-.003	.012	-.021	.026	(P)
				-.011	.037	(BC)
Minorities are a threat	.005	.000	.009	-.008	.028	(P)
				-.005	.039	(BC)
Mix of races "good"	-.004	.001	.012	-.029	.020	(P)
				-.035	.014	(BC)
Approves of inter-racial marriage	.025*	.000	.017	-.005	.063	(P)
				.000	.071	(BC)
Innante/cultural cause of ind. poverty	.000	.002	.010	-.017	.026	(P)
				-.024	.019	(BC)
Ind. treated worse than whites	.006	-.001	.008	-.008	.025	(P)
				-.004	.038	(BC)
Indigenous political influence	.002	.000	.012	-.023	.026	(P)
				-.022	.028	(BC)
Experience of discrimination	-.010	.003	.014	-.034	.020	(P)
				-.047	.011	(BC)
Total indirect effects	**.127^***	.011	.056	.032	.252	(P)
				.024	.239	(BC)
Direct effects	**.060**	.003	.077	-.101	.203	(P)
				-.124	.190	(BC)
Total effect	**.187^***	.014	.069	.059	.334	(P)
				.005	.301	(BC)
Proportion of total effect mediated	**.680**					

Table A33: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Identification with Quechua culture (compared with no indigenous culture) on Voting for Morales over Reyes Villa, Bolivia 2009

Mediator Variables	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type

N = 557. Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of identification with Quechua culture (compared with no indigenous culture) on vote choice (Morales over Reyes Villa) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: personal linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender, undated); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (997 repetitions, from 114 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2010.

Table A34: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Identification with a Lowland Indigenous culture (compared with no indigenous culture) on Voting for Morales over Reyes Villa, Bolivia 2009

Mediator Variables	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	.006	.002	.011	-.010	.033	(P)
				-.009	.036	(BC)
Trust in parties	-.002	.002	.010	-.022	.021	(P)
				-.040	.011	(BC)
Rightist ideology	.002	.008	.027	-.044	.063	(P)
				-.064	.049	(BC)
Wealth redistribution	-.002	-.001	.007	-.019	.011	(P)
				-.022	.010	(BC)
Social secruity	-.002	.001	.007	-.018	.013	(P)
				-.029	.007	(BC)
Nationalisations	.026	-.005	.019	-.015	.058	(P)
				-.004	.069	(BC)
Free trade	-.004	-.001	.018	-.047	.025	(P)
				-.051	.021	(BC)
Limit opposition voice	.038*	-.007	.022	-.008	.074	(P)
				.003	.090	(BC)
Direct democracy	.016	-.002	.015	-.011	.048	(P)
				-.002	.085	(BC)
Minorities are a threat	-.016	.005	.016	-.052	.015	(P)
				-.079	.002	(BC)
Mix of races "good"	-.012	.005	.013	-.033	.019	(P)
				-.045	.005	(BC)
Approves of inter-racial marriage	.024*	-.003	.014	-.002	.050	(P)
				.003	.064	(BC)
Innante/cultural cause of ind. poverty	.007	.001	.011	-.007	.037	(P)
				-.006	.042	(BC)
Ind. treated worse than whites	-.002	.000	.009	-.026	.013	(P)
				-.033	.009	(BC)
Indigenous political influence	.013	.003	.026	-.032	.067	(P)
				-.040	.061	(BC)
Experience of discrimination	.000	.000	.006	-.012	.014	(P)
				-.010	.017	(BC)
Total indirect effects	**.091^**	.007	.050	.004	.201	(P)
				-.005	.191	(BC)
Direct effects	**-.141**	.022	.083	-.252	.093	(P)
				-.285	.024	(BC)
Total effect	**-.050**	.029	.080	-.159	.156	(P)
				-.186	.104	(BC)
Proportion of total effect mediated	**-1.830**					

N = 325. Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of identification with a lowland indigenous culture (compared with no indigenous culture) on vote choice (Morales over Reyes Villa) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: personal linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender, undated); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (858 repetitions, from 87 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2010.

Table A35: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Identification with Aymara culture (compared with Quechua culture) on Voting for Morales over Reyes Villa, Bolivia 2009

Mediator Variables	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	.008	-.001	.020	-.034	.047	(P)
				-.032	.051	(BC)
Trust in parties	.006*	-.003	.007	-.009	.017	(P)
				.000	.035	(BC)
Rightist ideology	-.010	.008	.026	-.044	.056	(P)
				-.054	.044	(BC)
Wealth redistribution	-.001	.001	.009	-.024	.017	(P)
				-.048	.008	(BC)
Social secruity	-.002	.000	.010	-.023	.018	(P)
				-.030	.015	(BC)
Nationalisations	.000	-.001	.012	-.029	.021	(P)
				-.028	.023	(BC)
Free trade	.000	.002	.010	-.017	.025	(P)
				-.023	.018	(BC)
Limit opposition voice	.014	.000	.016	-.015	.050	(P)
				-.011	.055	(BC)
Direct democracy	.038^*	-.007	.018	.002	.071	(P)
				.014	.103	(BC)
Minorities are a threat	-.010	.003	.010	-.029	.009	(P)
				-.062	.000	(BC)
Mix of races "good"	.011	.003	.013	-.007	.044	(P)
				-.009	.039	(BC)
Approves of inter-racial marriage	.004	.000	.015	-.024	.036	(P)
				-.022	.037	(BC)

Table A35: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Identification with Aymara culture (compared with Quechua culture) on Voting for Morales over Reyes Villa, Bolivia 2009

Mediator Variables	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Innante/cultural cause of ind. poverty	.018^	.031	.028	.011	.125	(P)
				-.004	.028	(BC)
Ind. treated worse than whites	-.003	.004	.009	-.017	.023	(P)
				-.035	.003	(BC)
Indigenous political influence	.004	.005	.014	-.009	.046	(P)
				-.014	.037	(BC)
Experience of discrimination	-.003	.004	.017	-.030	.044	(P)
				-.039	.029	(BC)
Total indirect effects	**.074^**	.049	.059	.022	.251	(P)
				-.051	.130	(BC)
Direct effects	**.361^***	-.025	.107	.133	.540	(P)
				.189	.612	(BC)
Total effect	**.435^***	.024	.104	.273	.665	(P)
				.235	.629	(BC)
Proportion of total effect mediated	**.170**					

N = 355. Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of identification with Aymara culture (compared Quechua culture) on vote choice (Morales over Reyes Villa) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: personal linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender, undated); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (859 repetitions, from 88 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2010.

Table A36: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Identification with Aymara culture (compared with a lowland indigenous culture) on Voting for Morales over Reyes Villa, Bolivia 2009

Mediator Variables	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	.028	.003	.024	-.015	.089	(P)
				-.018	.085	(BC)
Trust in parties	-.006	.002	.020	-.043	.047	(P)
				-.051	.028	(BC)
Rightist ideology	.112^*	.002	.056	.005	.240	(P)
				.006	.240	(BC)
Wealth redistribution	.015*	-.010	.012	-.019	.029	(P)
				.002	.075	(BC)
Social secruity	-.006	.002	.017	-.038	.035	(P)
				-.051	.018	(BC)
Nationalisations	-.012	-.004	.019	-.061	.022	(P)
				-.054	.027	(BC)
Free trade	.021	-.006	.028	-.031	.082	(P)
				-.005	.155	(BC)
Limit opposition voice	-.041	.012	.057	-.150	.096	(P)
				-.187	.048	(BC)
Direct democracy	-.009	.002	.028	-.059	.056	(P)
				-.074	.037	(BC)
Minorities are a threat	.055	-.008	.043	-.039	.135	(P)
				-.005	.154	(BC)
Mix of races "good"	.006	.004	.017	-.016	.056	(P)
				-.017	.053	(BC)
Approves of inter-racial marriage	.021	-.002	.031	-.050	.082	(P)
				-.030	.099	(BC)
Innate/cultural cause of ind. poverty	.007	.000	.027	-.045	.064	(P)
				-.027	.073	(BC)
Ind. treated worse than whites	-.026	-.001	.033	-.105	.020	(P)
				-.132	.010	(BC)
Indigenous political influence	.028*	-.011	.021	-.021	.066	(P)
				.006	.114	(BC)
Experience of discrimination	-.012	-.025	.036	-.114	.022	(P)
				-.061	.060	(BC)
Total indirect effects	**.181***	-.037	.103	-.053	.348	(P)
				.024	.598	(BC)
Direct effects	**.364^***	.005	.164	.019	.633	(P)
				.019	.630	(BC)
Total effect	**.545^***	-.032	.159	.178	.789	(P)
				.244	.804	(BC)
Proportion of total effect mediated	**.332**					

N = 292. Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of identification with Aymara culture (compared a lowland indigenous culture) on vote choice (Morales over Reyes Villa) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: personal linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender, undated); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (590 repetitions, from 72 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2010.

Table A37: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Identification with Quechua culture (compared with a lowland indigenous culture) on Voting for Morales over Reyes Villa, Bolivia 2009

Mediator Variables	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	-.002	-.001	.006	-.018	.007	(P)
				-.023	.004	(BC)
Trust in parties	-.012	.004	.011	-.031	.014	(P)
				-.039	.001	(BC)
Rightist ideology	.036^	.008	.026	.000	.101	(P)
				-.005	.091	(BC)
Wealth redistribution	.003	.002	.011	-.009	.035	(P)
				-.006	.043	(BC)
Social secruity	-.006	.000	.013	-.041	.017	(P)
				-.048	.010	(BC)

Table A37: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Identification with Quechua culture (compared with a lowland indigenous culture) on Voting for Morales over Reyes Villa, Bolivia 2009

Mediator Variables	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Nationalisations	.000	.000	.011	-.021	.024	(P)
				-.026	.021	(BC)
Free trade	.016*	-.004	.012	-.011	.038	(P)
				.001	.052	(BC)
Limit opposition voice	-.011	.003	.024	-.052	.046	(P)
				-.058	.037	(BC)
Direct democracy	-.015	.001	.014	-.044	.010	(P)
				-.049	.006	(BC)
Minorities are a threat	.002	.000	.007	-.011	.018	(P)
				-.005	.032	(BC)
Mix of races "good"	.003	.001	.010	-.013	.028	(P)
				-.013	.027	(BC)
Approves of inter-racial marriage	.017*	-.001	.014	-.005	.051	(P)
				.000	.065	(BC)
Innante/cultural cause of ind. poverty	-.003	.000	.011	-.030	.013	(P)
				-.040	.010	(BC)
Ind. treated worse than whites	.006	.002	.013	-.017	.038	(P)
				-.018	.036	(BC)
Indigenous political influence	-.002	-.002	.010	-.029	.010	(P)
				-.032	.009	(BC)
Experience of discrimination	-.011	.001	.014	-.039	.014	(P)
				-.045	.010	(BC)
Total indirect effects	**.021**	.013	.071	-.081	.187	(P)
				-.087	.178	(BC)
Direct effects	**.226^***	-.009	.081	.036	.352	(P)
				.026	.351	(BC)
Total effect	**.247^***	.004	.101	.033	.443	(P)
				.019	.431	(BC)
Proportion of total effect mediated	**.085**					

N = 440. Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of identification with Quechua culture (compared a lowland indigenous culture) on vote choice (Morales over Reyes Villa) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: personal linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender, undated); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (984 repetitions, from 93 clusters, across 9 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.

Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2010.

Appendix B: Ecuador (Chapter Four)

Table B1: Descriptive Statistics: Model Sample, Ecuador 2002

Table B2: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Ecuador 2002

Table B3: Descriptive Statistics: Model Sample, Ecuador 2006

Table B4: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Ecuador 2006

Table B5: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as White (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Correa over Noboa, Ecuador 2006

Table B6: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Indigenous (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Correa over Noboa, Ecuador 2006

Table B7: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Indigenous (compared with White) on Voting for Correa over Noboa, Ecuador 2006

Table B8: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Black or Mulatta (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Correa over Noboa, Ecuador 2006

Table B9: Descriptive Statistics: Model Sample, Ecuador 2009

Table B10: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Ecuador 2009

Table B11: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Family Linguistic Background on Voting for Correa over Noboa, Ecuador 2009

Table B12: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as White (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Correa over Noboa, Ecuador 2009

Table B13: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Indigenous (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Correa over Noboa, Ecuador 2009

Table B14: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Indigenous (compared with White) on Voting for Correa over Noboa, Ecuador 2009

Table B15: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Black or Mulatta (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Correa over Noboa, Ecuador 2009

Table B1: Descriptive Statistics: Model Sample, Ecuador 2002

Vote Choice	White	Mestizo	Indigenous	Black	Total
Gutiérrez	45	275	4	28	352
Noboa	11	66	3	4	84
Roldós	10	92	2	0	104
Borja	57	426	16	39	538
Other/Null	53	476	38	19	586
Total	176	1,335	63	90	1,664

Cells show unweighted counts of respondents in the model sample, by vote choice and ethnic group.
Source: Author's elaboration of data from LAPOP 2004

Table B2: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Ecuador 2002

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
GUTIÉRREZ	base outcome					
NOBOA						
White (Mestizo)	0.389	0.268	1.450	0.148	-0.138	0.915
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-0.781	0.620	-1.260	0.208	-1.997	0.436
Black (Mestizo)	0.351	0.349	1.010	0.315	-0.333	1.035
Income	-0.005	0.040	-0.120	0.906	-0.083	0.073
Female	-0.163	0.173	-0.950	0.345	-0.503	0.176
Age	-0.019	0.006	-3.240	0.001	-0.030	-0.007
Trust in parties	-0.060	0.058	-1.030	0.304	-0.174	0.054
National economy has improved	-0.168	0.292	-0.580	0.564	-0.741	0.405
Personal finances have improved	0.049	0.246	0.200	0.842	-0.434	0.532
Resides in highlands (coast)	-1.204	0.196	-6.130	0.000	-1.589	-0.819
Resides in Amazon (coast)	-1.460	0.241	-6.060	0.000	-1.932	-0.987
Resides in rural area	-0.556	0.203	-2.740	0.006	-0.954	-0.158
Rightist ideology	0.096	0.040	2.370	0.018	0.017	0.175
Strongman populist leader	-0.012	0.190	-0.070	0.947	-0.384	0.359
President can bypass Congress	0.005	0.173	0.030	0.978	-0.334	0.344
Constant	0.977	0.702	1.390	0.164	-0.401	2.355
ROLDÓS						
White (Mestizo)	0.278	0.418	0.670	0.505	-0.541	1.098
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-0.409	0.722	-0.570	0.571	-1.826	1.007
Black (Mestizo)	0.092	0.615	0.150	0.881	-1.114	1.299
Income	0.200	0.062	3.240	0.001	0.079	0.321
Female	0.140	0.275	0.510	0.610	-0.399	0.679
Age	-0.011	0.008	-1.390	0.165	-0.028	0.005
Trust in parties	-0.004	0.087	-0.040	0.966	-0.174	0.166
National economy has improved	-0.389	0.535	-0.730	0.467	-1.439	0.660
Personal finances have improved	-0.164	0.418	-0.390	0.694	-0.984	0.655
Resides in highlands (coast)	-0.330	0.290	-1.140	0.255	-0.898	0.238
Resides in Amazon (coast)	-1.137	0.460	-2.470	0.014	-2.039	-0.235
Resides in rural area	-0.983	0.399	-2.460	0.014	-1.765	-0.201
Rightist ideology	-0.070	0.065	-1.080	0.282	-0.198	0.058
Strongman populist leader	-0.006	0.307	-0.020	0.984	-0.607	0.595
President can bypass Congress	-0.256	0.281	-0.910	0.363	-0.808	0.296
Constant	-1.443	1.116	-1.290	0.196	-3.632	0.747
BORJA						
White (Mestizo)	-0.116	0.433	-0.270	0.788	-0.966	0.733
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-0.749	0.768	-0.980	0.329	-2.256	0.757
Black (Mestizo)	-13.595	0.420	-32.350	0.000	-14.420	-12.771
Income	0.238	0.063	3.770	0.000	0.114	0.361
Female	0.057	0.265	0.210	0.830	-0.462	0.576
Age	-0.005	0.008	-0.680	0.496	-0.021	0.010
Trust in parties	0.155	0.075	2.060	0.039	0.008	0.302
National economy has improved	-0.144	0.425	-0.340	0.734	-0.978	0.689
Personal finances have improved	0.197	0.362	0.550	0.586	-0.513	0.907
Resides in highlands (coast)	1.562	0.402	3.890	0.000	0.774	2.351
Resides in Amazon (coast)	0.000	0.571	0.000	0.999	-1.120	1.121
Resides in rural area	-0.254	0.341	-0.740	0.457	-0.923	0.415
Rightist ideology	-0.168	0.065	-2.590	0.010	-0.295	-0.041
Strongman populist leader	0.445	0.301	1.480	0.139	-0.145	1.035
President can bypass Congress	0.213	0.260	0.820	0.413	-0.297	0.722
Constant	-4.599	1.179	-3.900	0.000	-6.912	-2.286

N = 1664. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2002 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Gutiérrez). Effects of region are compared to base category 'Coast'.
Source: Author's calculations based on LAPOP 2004.

Table B3: Descriptive Statistics: Model Sample, Ecuador 2006

Vote Choice	White	Mestiza	Indigenous	Black	Total
Álvaro Noboa	17	107	6	8	138
Rafael Correa	79	900	36	38	1,053
Gilmar Gutiérrez	2	65	12	3	82
León Roldós	3	59	1	1	64
Other/Null	13	87	4	8	112
Total	**114**	**1,218**	**59**	**58**	**1,449**

Cells show unweighted counts of respondents in the model sample, by vote choice and ethnic group.
Source: Author's elaboration of data from LAPOP 2006

Table B4: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Ecuador 2006

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
NOBOA	base outcome					
CORREA						
White (Mestizo)	-0.107	0.346	-0.310	0.758	-0.791	0.577
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-0.250	0.561	-0.450	0.656	-1.361	0.861
Black (Mestizo)	-0.057	0.414	-0.140	0.892	-0.876	0.762

Table B4: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Ecuador 2006

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
Income	-0.105	0.067	-1.570	0.119	-0.238	0.027
Female	-0.001	0.245	-0.010	0.996	-0.486	0.483
Age	0.003	0.008	0.390	0.699	-0.013	0.020
Trust in parties	0.108	0.068	1.580	0.117	-0.027	0.243
Resides in highlands (coast)	0.936	0.215	4.350	0.000	0.510	1.362
Resides in Amazon (coast)	1.164	0.342	3.400	0.001	0.487	1.840
Resides in rural area	0.613	0.225	2.730	0.007	0.168	1.057
Rightist ideology	-0.201	0.049	-4.060	0.000	-0.299	-0.103
Wealth redistribution	0.089	0.064	1.410	0.162	-0.036	0.215
Nationalisations	0.037	0.061	0.610	0.544	-0.084	0.158
Free trade	0.002	0.067	0.030	0.979	-0.131	0.135
Limit opposition voice	0.070	0.058	1.200	0.231	-0.045	0.186
Direct democracy	0.113	0.057	1.960	0.052	-0.001	0.226
Minorities to follow majority	0.120	0.050	2.410	0.017	0.021	0.218
Constant	0.140	0.777	0.180	0.857	-1.397	1.676
G. GUTIÉRREZ						
White (Mestizo)	-0.452	1.046	-0.430	0.666	-2.521	1.616
Indigenous (Mestizo)	1.093	0.745	1.470	0.145	-0.380	2.567
Black (Mestizo)	1.388	0.886	1.570	0.120	-0.366	3.141
Income	-0.327	0.121	-2.690	0.008	-0.566	-0.087
Female	-0.872	0.426	-2.040	0.043	-1.715	-0.028
Age	-0.001	0.015	-0.040	0.971	-0.031	0.030
Trust in parties	0.208	0.119	1.750	0.082	-0.027	0.443
Resides in highlands (coast)	2.133	0.497	4.290	0.000	1.150	3.116
Resides in Amazon (coast)	3.804	0.577	6.590	0.000	2.662	4.946
Resides in rural area	0.078	0.415	0.190	0.851	-0.744	0.900
Rightist ideology	-0.190	0.092	-2.070	0.041	-0.372	-0.008
Wealth redistribution	-0.094	0.124	-0.750	0.452	-0.339	0.152
Nationalisations	0.031	0.136	0.230	0.820	-0.238	0.299
Free trade	-0.118	0.133	-0.880	0.379	-0.382	0.146
Limit opposition voice	-0.077	0.124	-0.620	0.537	-0.321	0.168
Direct democracy	0.091	0.106	0.860	0.392	-0.119	0.300
Minorities to follow majority	0.189	0.125	1.520	0.131	-0.057	0.436
Constant	-0.528	1.640	-0.320	0.748	-3.773	2.718
ROLDÓS						
White (Mestizo)	-0.513	0.651	-0.790	0.432	-1.801	0.774
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-2.953	1.159	-2.550	0.012	-5.247	-0.660
Black (Mestizo)	-0.542	0.985	-0.550	0.583	-2.490	1.406
Income	0.142	0.099	1.440	0.152	-0.053	0.338
Female	-0.611	0.406	-1.500	0.135	-1.415	0.193
Age	0.026	0.014	1.860	0.065	-0.002	0.054
Trust in parties	-0.091	0.132	-0.690	0.491	-0.352	0.170
Resides in highlands (coast)	2.012	0.384	5.240	0.000	1.253	2.771
Resides in Amazon (coast)	1.072	0.673	1.590	0.113	-0.259	2.404
Resides in rural area	0.326	0.426	0.770	0.445	-0.516	1.168
Rightist ideology	-0.052	0.078	-0.660	0.509	-0.207	0.103
Wealth redistribution	0.080	0.101	0.790	0.433	-0.121	0.280
Nationalisations	-0.129	0.113	-1.140	0.257	-0.353	0.095
Free trade	0.040	0.130	0.310	0.756	-0.216	0.297
Limit opposition voice	0.072	0.091	0.780	0.434	-0.109	0.252
Direct democracy	0.097	0.109	0.890	0.374	-0.118	0.313
Minorities to follow majority	-0.094	0.090	-1.040	0.298	-0.272	0.084
Constant	-3.432	1.134	-3.030	0.003	-5.675	-1.189

N = 1449. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2006 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Noboa). Effects of region are compared to base category 'Coast'.
Source: Author's calculations based on LAPOP 2008.

Table B5: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as White (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Correa over Noboa, Ecuador 2006

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	-.003	.000	.004	-.012	.005	(P)
				-.014	.003	(BC)
Trust in parties	.001	.000	.003	-.004	.008	(P)
				-.003	.012	(BC)
Rightist ideology	.005	.001	.010	-.012	.027	(P)
				-.011	.027	(BC)
Wealth redistribution	.000	.000	.002	-.005	.005	(P)
				-.004	.006	(BC)
Nationalizations	.002	.000	.004	-.004	.012	(P)
				-.002	.016	(BC)
Free trade	.002	.000	.003	-.004	.009	(P)
				-.002	.015	(BC)
Limit voice of opposition	.000	.000	.003	-.008	.007	(P)
				-.008	.006	(BC)
Direct democracy	.000	.000	.002	-.005	.006	(P)
				-.005	.006	(BC)
Minorities are a threat	.002	.001	.004	-.003	.013	(P)
				-.002	.014	(BC)
Total indirect effects	**.008**	.001	.014	-.015	.039	(P)
				-.015	.038	(BC)
Direct effect	**-.058**	.002	.053	-.152	.050	(P)
				-.149	.052	(BC)
Total effects	**-.049**	.003	.053	-.144	.063	(P)
				-.145	.062	(BC)
Proportion of total effect mediated	**-.166**					

N=1044. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively.
Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as white (compared with mestizo) on vote choice (Correa over Noboa) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender nd); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap

Table B5: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as White (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Correa over Noboa, Ecuador 2006

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals	Type

(1000 repetitions, from 131 clusters, across 6 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2008.

Table B6: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Indigenous (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Correa over Noboa, Ecuador 2006

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	.001	.000	.002	-.004	.007	(P)
				-.002	.009	(BC)
Trust in parties	.001	.000	.003	-.004	.009	(P)
				-.004	.010	(BC)
Rightist ideology	.016*	-.001	.009	-.001	.034	(P)
				.001	.039	(BC)
Wealth redistribution	.000	.000	.002	-.005	.006	(P)
				-.005	.005	(BC)
Nationalizations	.005	.000	.005	-.002	.018	(P)
				-.002	.020	(BC)
Free trade	.005	.000	.006	-.008	.017	(P)
				-.007	.018	(BC)
Limit voice of opposition	-.005	.000	.005	-.017	.002	(P)
				-.019	.002	(BC)
Direct democracy	.001	.000	.003	-.005	.009	(P)
				-.003	.011	(BC)
Minorities are a threat	.000	.000	.002	-.006	.004	(P)
				-.008	.003	(BC)
Total indirect effects	**.022**	-.001	.016	-.011	.054	(P)
				-.011	.055	(BC)
Direct effect	**-.084**	.010	.056	-.168	.051	(P)
				-.180	.039	(BC)
Total effects	**-.062**	.009	.057	-.150	.075	(P)
				-.158	.060	(BC)
Proportion of total effect mediated	**-.348**					

N=988. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively.
Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as indigenous (compared with mestizo) on vote choice (Correa over Noboa) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender nd); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (994 repetitions, from 131 clusters, across 6 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2008.

Table B7: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Indigenous (compared with White) on Voting for Correa over Noboa, Ecuador 2006

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	-.009	-.001	.027	-.069	.040	(P)
				-.106	.022	(BC)
Trust in parties	.005	-.010	.040	-.101	.068	(P)
				-.059	.103	(BC)
Rightist ideology	.003	-.002	.021	-.042	.048	(P)
				-.026	.071	(BC)
Wealth redistribution	.013	-.027	.035	-.092	.060	(P)
				-.007	.120	(BC)
Nationalizations	-.016	.015	.049	-.105	.104	(P)
				-.147	.053	(BC)
Free trade	-.005	.006	.057	-.129	.115	(P)
				-.234	.060	(BC)
Limit voice of opposition	.005	.002	.030	-.058	.073	(P)
				-.062	.072	(BC)
Direct democracy	.011	.000	.026	-.035	.072	(P)
				-.031	.081	(BC)
Minorities are a threat	-.020	-.020	.052	-.182	.034	(P)
				-.131	.075	(BC)
Total indirect effects	**-.013**	-.036	.096	-.245	.137	(P)
				-.162	.196	(BC)
Direct effect	**.089**	.027	.226	-.291	.612	(P)
				-.310	.563	(BC)
Total effects	**.076**	-.009	.213	-.314	.526	(P)
				-.283	.623	(BC)
Proportion of total effect mediated	**-.168**					

N=121. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively.
Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as indigenous (compared with white) on vote choice (Correa over Noboa) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender nd); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (626 repetitions, from 60 clusters, across 6 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2008.

Table B8: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Black or Mulatta (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Correa over Noboa, Ecuador 2006

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	.001	.000	.002	-.003	.006	(P)
				-.002	.009	(BC)
Trust in parties	.000	.000	.003	-.006	.005	(P)
				-.004	.007	(BC)
Rightist ideology	-.018^*	.000	.010	-.040	-.002	(P)
				-.042	-.003	(BC)
Wealth redistribution	.000	.000	.002	-.004	.004	(P)

				-.003	.006	(BC)
Nationalizations	-.006	.000	.005	-.018	.004	(P)
				-.019	.002	(BC)
Free trade	-.002	.000	.004	-.014	.003	(P)
				-.016	.001	(BC)
Limit voice of opposition	.001	.000	.003	-.007	.008	(P)
				-.003	.013	(BC)
Direct democracy	.000	.000	.004	-.008	.008	(P)
				-.010	.007	(BC)
Minorities are a threat	-.004	.000	.005	-.016	.003	(P)
				-.018	.002	(BC)
Total indirect effects	**-.028^***	-.001	.015	-.061	-.002	(P)
				-.060	-.001	(BC)
Direct effect	**.021**	.006	.048	-.060	.130	(P)
				-.063	.117	(BC)
Total effects	**-.007**	.005	.048	-.084	.099	(P)
				-.088	.095	(BC)
Proportion of total effect mediated	**3.969**					

N=995. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively.
Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as black or mulatta (compared with mestiza) on vote choice (Correa over Noboa) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender nd); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (1000 repetitions, from 131 clusters, across 6 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2008.

Table B9: Descriptive Statistics: Model Sample, Ecuador 2009

Linguistic background and vote choice		White	Mestiza	Indigenous	Black	Total
Parents only speak Spanish						
	Rafael Correa	96	762	6	35	899
	Lucio Gutierrez	20	123	0	2	145
	Alvaro Noboa	10	95	0	6	111
	Other/None	13	168	1	8	190
Parents speak indigenous language						
	Rafael Correa	0	16	25	0	41
	Lucio Gutierrez	0	8	4	0	12
	Alvaro Noboa	0		2	0	2
	Other/None	0	2	8	0	10
Total		**139**	**1,174**	**46**	**51**	**1,410**

Cells show unweighted counts of respondents in the model sample, by vote choice, linguistic, and self-identified ethnic group.
Source: Author's elaboration of data from LAPOP 2010

Table B10: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Ecuador 2009

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
CORREA	base outcome					
L. GUTIÉRREZ						
White (Mestizo)	0.337	0.233	1.450	0.150	-0.124	0.799
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-2.157	0.854	-2.520	0.013	-3.849	-0.465
Black (Mestizo)	-1.169	1.014	-1.150	0.251	-3.176	0.839
Parents speak indigenous language	1.103	0.570	1.940	0.055	-0.026	2.232
Income	0.010	0.064	0.150	0.878	-0.117	0.137
Female	0.009	0.225	0.040	0.967	-0.436	0.454
Age	-0.005	0.008	-0.580	0.564	-0.021	0.012
Trust in parties	-0.010	0.085	-0.120	0.908	-0.179	0.159
Participation in protests	0.301	0.289	1.040	0.301	-0.273	0.874
National economy has improved	-0.546	0.271	-2.010	0.046	-1.083	-0.009
Personal finances have improved	-0.084	0.300	-0.280	0.780	-0.678	0.510
Resides in highlands (coast)	0.093	0.243	0.380	0.701	-0.388	0.575
Resides in Amazon (coast)	0.754	0.313	2.410	0.018	0.134	1.373
Resides in rural area	0.336	0.314	1.070	0.286	-0.286	0.958
Rightist ideology	0.114	0.042	2.710	0.008	0.031	0.198
Wealth redistribution	-0.212	0.071	-2.990	0.003	-0.353	-0.072
Social security	0.172	0.113	1.530	0.129	-0.051	0.395
Nationalisations	-0.137	0.052	-2.640	0.009	-0.239	-0.034
Free trade	-0.075	0.067	-1.120	0.264	-0.208	0.058
Limit opposition voice	-0.219	0.060	-3.630	0.000	-0.338	-0.099
Direct democracy	0.140	0.061	2.290	0.024	0.019	0.261
Minorities to follow majority	-0.037	0.060	-0.610	0.542	-0.156	0.082
Constant	-1.405	0.910	-1.540	0.125	-3.208	0.398
NOBOA						
White (Mestizo)	-0.487	0.470	-1.040	0.303	-1.419	0.445
Indigenous (Mestizo)	0.933	0.549	1.700	0.092	-0.155	2.020
Black (Mestizo)	0.095	0.528	0.180	0.857	-0.950	1.141
Parents speak indigenous language	-0.967	0.619	-1.560	0.121	-2.194	0.259
Income	-0.196	0.089	-2.190	0.030	-0.373	-0.019
Female	-0.052	0.193	-0.270	0.789	-0.435	0.331
Age	-0.006	0.008	-0.720	0.473	-0.021	0.010
Trust in parties	-0.056	0.087	-0.640	0.523	-0.227	0.116
Participation in protests	0.731	0.237	3.080	0.003	0.260	1.201
National economy has improved	-0.603	0.357	-1.690	0.094	-1.311	0.104
Personal finances have improved	-0.417	0.330	-1.260	0.209	-1.071	0.237
Resides in highlands (coast)	-1.284	0.246	-5.220	0.000	-1.771	-0.797
Resides in Amazon (coast)	-0.310	0.344	-0.900	0.369	-0.991	0.371
Resides in rural area	-0.791	0.392	-2.020	0.046	-1.567	-0.015
Rightist ideology	0.081	0.051	1.590	0.115	-0.020	0.181
Wealth redistribution	-0.046	0.089	-0.510	0.608	-0.222	0.131
Social security	-0.024	0.105	-0.230	0.820	-0.232	0.184
Nationalisations	-0.150	0.090	-1.670	0.097	-0.329	0.028
Free trade	0.166	0.064	2.600	0.011	0.039	0.292
Limit opposition voice	-0.153	0.062	-2.490	0.014	-0.276	-0.031
Direct democracy	0.082	0.071	1.160	0.249	-0.058	0.222

Table B10: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Ecuador 2009

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P > [t]	95% confidence intervals	
Minorities to follow majority	-0.084	0.055	-1.510	0.133	-0.194	0.026
Constant	1.121	1.051	1.070	0.288	-0.961	3.204

N = 1410. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2009 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Correa). Effects of region are compared to base category 'Coast'.
Source: Author's calculations based on LAPOP 2010.

Table B11: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Family Linguistic Background on Voting for Correa over Noboa, Ecuador 2009

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	.000	.000	.008	-.016	.018	(P)
				-.015	.018	(BC)
Trust in parties	.003	.000	.006	-.009	.017	(P)
				-.004	.026	(BC)
Rightist ideology	-.003	.001	.005	-.013	.008	(P)
				-.018	.003	(BC)
Wealth redistribution	.001	.000	.005	-.010	.013	(P)
				-.006	.016	(BC)
Social security	.000	.000	.003	-.006	.008	(P)
				-.006	.008	(BC)
Nationalizations	-.001	.000	.006	-.015	.013	(P)
				-.020	.010	(BC)
Free trade	.006	.001	.009	-.009	.028	(P)
				-.008	.029	(BC)
Limit voice of opposition	-.001	-.001	.009	-.019	.017	(P)
				-.018	.019	(BC)
Direct democracy	.001	.000	.005	-.011	.012	(P)
				-.004	.022	(BC)
Minorities are a threat	.001	.000	.005	-.012	.013	(P)
				-.009	.015	(BC)
Mix of races "good"	.001	.000	.004	-.009	.011	(P)
				-.005	.014	(BC)
Approves of inter-racial marriage (black)	.005	.000	.007	-.007	.022	(P)
				-.006	.023	(BC)
Innate/cultural cause of black poverty	-.005	-.001	.009	-.027	.005	(P)
				-.030	.004	(BC)
Black treated worse than whites	.000	.001	.006	-.010	.017	(P)
				-.009	.018	(BC)
Indigenous have influenced lawmaking	-.004	.000	.007	-.022	.005	(P)
				-.032	.002	(BC)
Experience of discrimination	.001	.000	.005	-.007	.012	(P)
				-.005	.017	(BC)
Total indirect effects	**.004**	.001	.021	-.036	.046	(P)
				-.038	.043	(BC)
Direct effect	**.108**	.007	.079	-.005	.240	(P)
				-.010	.228	(BC)
Total effects	**.112**	.008	.077	.011	.248	(P)
				.005	.233	(BC)
Proportion of total effect mediated	**.032**					

N=937. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively.
Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of personal linguistic background (knowledge of an indigenous language) on vote choice (Correa over Noboa) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: ethnic self-identification, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender nd); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (836 repetitions, from 119 clusters, across 6 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2010.

Table B12: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as White (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Correa over Noboa, Ecuador 2009

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	-.004	-.001	.006	-.018	.005	(P)
				-.021	.003	(BC)
Trust in parties	.003	.000	.005	-.006	.014	(P)
				-.003	.019	(BC)
Rightist ideology	-.005	.000	.005	-.018	.002	(P)
				-.022	.001	(BC)
Wealth redistribution	.000	.000	.003	-.008	.007	(P)
				-.006	.008	(BC)
Social security	.000	.000	.003	-.007	.005	(P)
				-.010	.003	(BC)
Nationalizations	.009	.001	.008	-.002	.029	(P)
				-.001	.034	(BC)
Free trade	-.006	.000	.005	-.017	.002	(P)
				-.020	.001	(BC)
Limit voice of opposition	.002	.000	.006	-.009	.015	(P)
				-.007	.018	(BC)
Direct democracy	-.001	.000	.003	-.008	.006	(P)
				-.012	.002	(BC)
Minorities are a threat	.003	.000	.003	-.002	.011	(P)
				-.001	.014	(BC)
Mix of races "good"	.000	.000	.003	-.007	.005	(P)
				-.007	.004	(BC)
Approves of inter-racial marriage (black)	-.012	.000	.009	-.032	.002	(P)
				-.036	.001	(BC)
Innate/cultural cause of black poverty	.000	.000	.004	-.009	.009	(P)
				-.010	.008	(BC)
Black treated worse than whites	-.007	.000	.008	-.023	.007	(P)
				-.026	.006	(BC)
Indigenous have influenced lawmaking	-.002	.000	.004	-.012	.006	(P)
				-.017	.003	(BC)

Table B12: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as White (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Correa over Noboa, Ecuador 2009

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Experience of discrimination	.000	.000	.002	-.005	.003	(P)
				-.004	.004	(BC)
Total indirect effects	-.021	.000	.020	-.059	.022	(P)
				-.059	.022	(BC)
Direct effect	.091	.008	.078	-.051	.252	(P)
				-.057	.247	(BC)
Total effects	.071	.009	.077	-.067	.227	(P)
				-.073	.222	(BC)
Proportion of total effect mediated	-.292					

N=855. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively.
Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as white (compared with mestizo) on vote choice (Correa over Noboa) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: family linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender nd); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (1000 repetitions, from 119 clusters, across 6 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2010.

Table B13: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Indigenous (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Correa over Noboa, Ecuador 2009

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	-.014	.000	.012	-.042	.002	(P)
				-.052	.000	(BC)
Trust in parties	-.001	.000	.007	-.015	.014	(P)
				-.017	.014	(BC)
Rightist ideology	.006	.000	.007	-.008	.020	(P)
				-.004	.024	(BC)
Wealth redistribution	.000	.000	.006	-.013	.013	(P)
				-.011	.015	(BC)
Social security	.001	.000	.005	-.008	.013	(P)
				-.005	.017	(BC)
Nationalizations	.001	-.001	.007	-.016	.016	(P)
				-.011	.019	(BC)
Free trade	.005	.000	.008	-.008	.025	(P)
				-.006	.031	(BC)
Limit voice of opposition	-.001	.001	.009	-.018	.018	(P)
				-.022	.016	(BC)
Direct democracy	-.003	.000	.007	-.020	.008	(P)
				-.027	.005	(BC)
Minorities are a threat	-.002	.000	.006	-.016	.009	(P)
				-.022	.006	(BC)
Mix of races "good"	.001	.001	.005	-.008	.015	(P)
				-.006	.019	(BC)
Approves of inter-racial marriage (black)	-.013	-.001	.012	-.041	.004	(P)
				-.044	.002	(BC)
Innate/cultural cause of black poverty	.005	.002	.012	-.016	.032	(P)
				-.017	.029	(BC)
Black treated worse than whites	-.008	.000	.010	-.032	.011	(P)
				-.035	.008	(BC)
Indigenous have influenced lawmaking	.002	.001	.006	-.008	.017	(P)
				-.006	.023	(BC)
Experience of discrimination	.002	.002	.007	-.006	.020	(P)
				-.006	.020	(BC)
Total indirect effects	**-.020**	.004	.027	-.067	.035	(P)
				-.079	.026	(BC)
Direct effect	**-.071**	-.018	.068	-.208	.014	(P)
				-.178	.033	(BC)
Total effects	**-.091**	-.013	.066	-.216	-.004	(P)
				-.201	.009	(BC)
Proportion of total effect mediated	**.218**					

N=803. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively.
Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as indigenous (compared with mestizo) on vote choice (Correa over Noboa) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: family linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender nd); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (882 repetitions, from 117 clusters, across 6 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2010.

Table B14: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Indigenous (compared with White) on Voting for Correa over Noboa, Ecuador 2009

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	-.006	.003	.033	-.085	.066	(P)
				-.155	.027	(BC)
Trust in parties	.010	.011	.100	-.244	.266	(P)
				-.256	.210	(BC)
Rightist ideology	.031	-.001	.087	-.141	.242	(P)
				-.082	.297	(BC)
Wealth redistribution	.000	-.001	.061	-.135	.135	(P)
				-.149	.134	(BC)
Social security	.035	.022	.117	-.224	.277	(P)
				-.310	.178	(BC)
Nationalizations	-.063	-.016	.114	-.321	.142	(P)
				-.279	.171	(BC)
Free trade	.001	-.008	.110	-.305	.234	(P)
				-.305	.234	(BC)
Limit voice of opposition	-.002	.016	.066	-.115	.189	(P)
				-.172	.118	(BC)
Direct democracy	-.006	-.024	.093	-.317	.124	(P)

Table B14: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Indigenous (compared with White) on Voting for Correa over Noboa, Ecuador 2009

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
				-.193	.168	(BC)
Minorities are a threat	.014	-.010	.065	-.137	.169	(P)
				-.052	.248	(BC)
Mix of races "good"	.006	-.020	.064	-.172	.087	(P)
				-.050	.342	(BC)
Approves of inter-racial marriage (black)	-.035	.004	.089	-.260	.135	(P)
				-.354	.041	(BC)
Innate/cultural cause of black poverty	.041	-.014	.141	-.419	.308	(P)
				-.217	.317	(BC)
Black treated worse than whites	.014	-.025	.084	-.268	.181	(P)
				-.029	.255	(BC)
Indigenous have influenced lawmaking	.130	-.037	.177	-.301	.432	(P)
				-.003	.594	(BC)
Experience of discrimination	-.007	.006	.109	-.206	.252	(P)
				-.233	.196	(BC)
Total indirect effects	**.164**	-.094	.378	-.660	.751	(P)
				-.480	.931	(BC)
Direct effect	**.628***	-.733	.393	-.718	.609	(P)
				.637	.730	(BC)
Total effects	**.792***	-.827	.341	-.704	.655	(P)
				.825	.825	(BC)
Proportion of total effect mediated	**.208**					

N=114. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively.
Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as indigenous (compared with white) on vote choice (Correa over Noboa) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: family linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender nd); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (145 repetitions, from 52 clusters, across 4 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2010.

Table B15: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Black or Mulatta (compared with Mestiza) on Voting for Correa over Noboa, Ecuador 2009

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	-.016^*	.001	.008	-.032	.001	(P)
				-.037	-.002	(BC)
Trust in parties	.002	.000	.003	-.003	.010	(P)
				-.002	.012	(BC)
Rightist ideology	-.002	-.001	.004	-.013	.004	(P)
				-.014	.003	(BC)
Wealth redistribution	-.001	.000	.004	-.010	.006	(P)
				-.015	.003	(BC)
Social security	-.001	.001	.003	-.005	.008	(P)
				-.011	.002	(BC)
Nationalizations	.003	.000	.005	-.005	.017	(P)
				-.003	.022	(BC)
Free trade	.007	.001	.008	-.002	.026	(P)
				-.002	.030	(BC)
Limit voice of opposition	.001	.000	.007	-.014	.016	(P)
				-.012	.019	(BC)
Direct democracy	.000	.001	.003	-.005	.008	(P)
				-.008	.003	(BC)
Minorities are a threat	.001	.000	.004	-.007	.011	(P)
				-.004	.015	(BC)
Mix of races "good"	-.001	.000	.006	-.012	.011	(P)
				-.015	.009	(BC)
Approves of inter-racial marriage (black)	.008	.000	.007	-.003	.025	(P)
				-.001	.027	(BC)
Innate/cultural cause of black poverty	.000	.000	.003	-.007	.007	(P)
				-.007	.008	(BC)
Black treated worse than whites	.000	.000	.004	-.008	.009	(P)
				-.008	.009	(BC)
Indigenous have influenced lawmaking	.002	.000	.004	-.006	.012	(P)
				-.003	.015	(BC)
Experience of discrimination	.001	.000	.005	-.008	.012	(P)
				-.008	.012	(BC)
Total indirect effects	**.005**	.004	.023	-.034	.058	(P)
				-.042	.048	(BC)
Direct effect	**.027**	.007	.062	-.075	.169	(P)
				-.084	.164	(BC)
Total effects	**.032**	.011	.064	-.068	.187	(P)
				-.073	.175	(BC)
Proportion of total effect mediated	**.162**					

N=979. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively.
Notes: (i) Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as black or mulatta (compared with mestiza) on vote choice (Correa over Noboa) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated; (ii) controls are: family linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances; (iii) mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender nd); (iv) standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (961 repetitions, from 117 clusters, across 6 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2010.

Appendix C: Peru (Chapter Five)

Table C1: Descriptive Statistics: Model Sample, Peru 2006

Table C2: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2006

Table C3: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2006: Linguistic Interactions

Table C4: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2006: Self-Identification Interactions

Table C5: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Peru 2006

Table C6: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Peru 2006: Linguistic Interactions

Table C7: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Peru 2006: Self-Identification Interactions

Table C8: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Family Linguistic Background on Voting for Humala over Flores, Peru 2006

Table C9: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as White (compared to Mestizo) on Voting for Humala over Flores, Peru 2006

Table C10: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Indigenous (compared to Mestizo) on Voting for Humala over Flores, Peru 2006

Table C11: Descriptive Statistics: Model Sample, Peru 2011

Table C12: Descriptive Statistics: Ethnic Attitudes Model Sample, Peru 2011

Table C13: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2011

Table C14: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2011: Linguistic Interactions

Table C15: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2011: Self-Identification Interactions

Table C16: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Peru 2011

Table C17: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Peru 2011: Self-Identification Interactions

Table C18: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Family Linguistic Background on Voting for Humala over Kuczynski, Peru 2011

Table C19: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as White (compared with Mestizo) on Voting for Humala over Kuczynski, Peru 2011

Table C20: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Indigenous (compared with Mestizo) on Voting for Humala over Kuczynski, Peru 2011

Table C21: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Family Linguistic Background on Voting for Humala over Kuczynski, Peru 2011 (includes racial attitudes)

Table C22: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Family Linguistic Background on Voting for Humala over Fujimori, Peru 2011

Table C1: Descriptive Statistics: Model Sample, Peru 2006

		White	Mestiza	Indigenous	Black	Total
Parents speak Spanish only						
	Ollanta Humala	11	95	3	2	111
	Alan Garcia	25	87	2	2	116
	Lourdes Flores	23	91	0	0	114
	Martha Chavez	0	17	0	0	17
	Other/Null	11	54	2	2	69
Parents speak an indigenous language						
	Ollanta Humala	9	81	17	2	109
	Alan Garcia	1	38	7	1	47
	Lourdes Flores	3	28	2	1	34
	Martha Chavez	0	2	2	0	4
	Other/Null	1	28	4	1	34
Total		84	521	39	11	655

Cells show unweighted counts of respondents in the model sample, by vote choice and ethnic group
Source: Author's elaboration from LAPOP 2006.

Table C2: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2006

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
HUMALA	base outcome					
GARCÍA						
White (Mestizo)	0.549	0.342	1.600	0.112	-0.132	1.230
Indigenous (Mestizo)	0.300	0.526	0.570	0.570	-0.747	1.347
Parents speak indigenous language	-0.609	0.248	-2.450	0.016	-1.103	-0.115
Income	0.054	0.061	0.880	0.380	-0.068	0.176
Female	0.361	0.217	1.670	0.100	-0.070	0.792
Age	0.008	0.007	1.120	0.265	-0.006	0.022
Trust in parties	0.166	0.091	1.840	0.070	-0.014	0.347
Participation in protests	-0.415	0.366	-1.140	0.259	-1.142	0.312
National economy has improved	-0.050	0.366	-0.140	0.892	-0.778	0.679
Personal finances have improved	0.185	0.312	0.590	0.555	-0.436	0.806
Resides in north	0.262	0.349	0.750	0.454	-0.432	0.956
Resides in Amazon	-1.103	0.456	-2.420	0.018	-2.010	-0.196
Resides in highlands	0.267	0.450	0.590	0.554	-0.627	1.162
Resides in rural area	-0.202	0.372	-0.540	0.588	-0.943	0.539
Grew up in rural area	-0.594	0.313	-1.900	0.061	-1.215	0.028
Rightist ideology	0.255	0.058	4.390	0.000	0.139	0.371
Supports FTA with USA	1.288	0.211	6.110	0.000	0.868	1.707
Limit opposition voice	0.232	0.218	1.060	0.291	-0.202	0.666
Strongman populist leader	-0.196	0.221	-0.890	0.378	-0.636	0.244
Constant	-2.996	0.607	-4.940	0.000	-4.204	-1.789
FLORES						
White (Mestizo)	0.547	0.360	1.520	0.133	-0.169	1.262
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-0.803	0.911	-0.880	0.381	-2.614	1.009
Parents speak indigenous language	-0.950	0.259	-3.670	0.000	-1.465	-0.435
Income	0.236	0.062	3.800	0.000	0.113	0.359
Female	1.185	0.196	6.040	0.000	0.795	1.575
Age	-0.007	0.007	-1.060	0.293	-0.021	0.006
Trust in parties	0.133	0.082	1.630	0.107	-0.029	0.296
Participation in protests	-0.730	0.398	-1.830	0.070	-1.521	0.061
National economy has improved	0.562	0.468	1.200	0.233	-0.368	1.492
Personal finances have improved	0.023	0.456	0.050	0.960	-0.885	0.931
Resides in north	-0.429	0.336	-1.270	0.206	-1.097	0.240
Resides in Amazon	-0.937	0.479	-1.960	0.054	-1.890	0.016
Resides in highlands	-0.017	0.427	-0.040	0.969	-0.865	0.832
Resides in rural area	0.105	0.428	0.250	0.807	-0.747	0.956
Grew up in rural area	-0.653	0.332	-1.970	0.053	-1.314	0.007
Rightist ideology	0.288	0.056	5.150	0.000	0.177	0.399
Supports FTA with USA	1.360	0.278	4.890	0.000	0.807	1.913
Limit opposition voice	-0.057	0.227	-0.250	0.803	-0.509	0.395
Strongman populist leader	-0.398	0.240	-1.660	0.101	-0.875	0.079
Constant	-3.653	0.704	-5.190	0.000	-5.053	-2.253
CHÁVEZ						
White (Mestizo)	-13.542	0.375	-36.120	0.000	-14.288	-12.796
Indigenous (Mestizo)	1.465	0.860	1.700	0.092	-0.245	3.175
Parents speak indigenous language	-1.043	0.450	-2.320	0.023	-1.938	-0.149
Income	0.083	0.093	0.890	0.376	-0.102	0.268
Female	0.011	0.397	0.030	0.979	-0.779	0.801
Age	-0.001	0.021	-0.040	0.966	-0.043	0.041
Trust in parties	0.190	0.167	1.140	0.260	-0.143	0.523
Participation in protests	-1.088	0.758	-1.440	0.155	-2.595	0.419
National economy has improved	0.268	0.578	0.460	0.644	-0.882	1.418
Personal finances have improved	-1.493	0.994	-1.500	0.137	-3.471	0.485
Resides in north	0.249	0.525	0.470	0.636	-0.795	1.293
Resides in Amazon	0.287	0.673	0.430	0.671	-1.052	1.625
Resides in highlands	-1.364	1.248	-1.090	0.278	-3.845	1.118
Resides in rural area	-0.511	0.649	-0.790	0.433	-1.802	0.779
Grew up in rural area	0.042	0.532	0.080	0.938	-1.016	1.100
Rightist ideology	0.215	0.093	2.320	0.023	0.030	0.399
Supports FTA with USA	0.291	0.399	0.730	0.468	-0.502	1.084
Limit opposition voice	1.303	0.380	3.430	0.001	0.547	2.059
Strongman populist leader	-0.399	0.529	-0.750	0.453	-1.451	0.653
Constant	-4.138	1.527	-2.710	0.008	-7.176	-1.099

N = 655. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2006 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Humala). Effects of region are compared to base category 'Lima'.
Source: LAPOP 2006.

Table C3: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2006: Linguistic Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
HUMALA	base outcome					
GARCÍA						
White (Mestizo)	0.594	0.344	1.730	0.087	-0.089	1.278
Indigenous (Mestizo)	0.383	0.584	0.660	0.514	-0.779	1.544
Parents speak indigenous language	-1.316	1.240	-1.060	0.291	-3.782	1.150
Income	0.008	0.080	0.090	0.925	-0.152	0.167
Female	0.302	0.230	1.310	0.192	-0.155	0.759
Age	0.007	0.007	1.040	0.301	-0.007	0.021
Trust in parties	0.167	0.091	1.830	0.071	-0.015	0.349
Participation in protests	-0.374	0.376	-0.990	0.323	-1.122	0.374
National economy has improved	-0.028	0.378	-0.070	0.941	-0.781	0.725
Personal finances have improved	0.224	0.310	0.720	0.471	-0.392	0.841
Resides in north	0.256	0.347	0.740	0.462	-0.434	0.947
Resides in Amazon	-1.126	0.444	-2.530	0.013	-2.010	-0.242
Resides in highlands	0.203	0.464	0.440	0.662	-0.721	1.127
Resides in rural area	-0.180	0.377	-0.480	0.634	-0.930	0.570
Grew up in rural area	-0.608	0.337	-1.800	0.075	-1.278	0.062
Rightist ideology	0.250	0.072	3.470	0.001	0.106	0.393
Supports FTA with USA	1.451	0.258	5.630	0.000	0.939	1.963
Limit opposition voice	-0.081	0.283	-0.290	0.774	-0.644	0.481
Strongman populist leader	0.003	0.251	0.010	0.991	-0.496	0.502
INTERACTIONS with ind. language:						
Rightist ideology	0.050	0.136	0.370	0.711	-0.219	0.320
Supports FTA with USA	-0.365	0.455	-0.800	0.425	-1.271	0.541
Limit opposition voice	0.912	0.472	1.930	0.057	-0.027	1.852
Strongman populist leader	-0.513	0.515	-1.000	0.321	-1.537	0.510
Income	0.092	0.164	0.560	0.577	-0.234	0.417
Constant	-2.730	0.662	-4.130	0.000	-4.046	-1.413
FLORES						
White (Mestizo)	0.580	0.370	1.570	0.121	-0.156	1.316
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-0.772	0.937	-0.820	0.412	-2.636	1.091
Parents speak indigenous language	-1.519	0.817	-1.860	0.066	-3.144	0.105
Income	0.179	0.064	2.800	0.006	0.052	0.306
Female	1.175	0.208	5.650	0.000	0.761	1.589
Age	-0.008	0.007	-1.160	0.248	-0.022	0.006
Trust in parties	0.130	0.082	1.590	0.116	-0.033	0.294
Participation in protests	-0.728	0.388	-1.880	0.064	-1.500	0.043
National economy has improved	0.591	0.466	1.270	0.208	-0.337	1.519
Personal finances have improved	0.023	0.452	0.050	0.960	-0.876	0.921
Resides in north	-0.460	0.342	-1.340	0.183	-1.140	0.221
Resides in Amazon	-0.968	0.479	-2.020	0.046	-1.920	-0.016
Resides in highlands	-0.020	0.456	-0.040	0.965	-0.927	0.886
Resides in rural area	0.131	0.435	0.300	0.764	-0.734	0.995
Grew up in rural area	-0.696	0.331	-2.100	0.038	-1.353	-0.038
Rightist ideology	0.278	0.067	4.150	0.000	0.145	0.411
Supports FTA with USA	1.584	0.343	4.610	0.000	0.901	2.266
Limit opposition voice	-0.090	0.279	-0.320	0.748	-0.645	0.465
Strongman populist leader	-0.329	0.271	-1.210	0.229	-0.868	0.211
INTERACTIONS with ind. language:						
Rightist ideology	0.038	0.105	0.360	0.721	-0.171	0.246
Supports FTA with USA	-0.712	0.579	-1.230	0.223	-1.864	0.441
Limit opposition voice	-0.030	0.524	-0.060	0.954	-1.073	1.013
Strongman populist leader	-0.116	0.430	-0.270	0.788	-0.972	0.740
Income	0.164	0.113	1.450	0.152	-0.062	0.389
Constant	-3.380	0.706	-4.790	0.000	-4.784	-1.976
CHÁVEZ						
White (Mestizo)	-13.259	0.374	-35.460	0.000	-14.003	-12.515
Indigenous (Mestizo)	1.363	0.806	1.690	0.095	-0.241	2.967
Parents speak indigenous language	-2.295	1.967	-1.170	0.247	-6.207	1.618
Income	-0.038	0.117	-0.320	0.747	-0.271	0.195
Female	0.066	0.402	0.160	0.870	-0.733	0.865
Age	-0.004	0.019	-0.180	0.856	-0.042	0.035
Trust in parties	0.196	0.162	1.210	0.230	-0.127	0.519
Participation in protests	-1.086	0.693	-1.570	0.121	-2.463	0.292
National economy has improved	0.315	0.525	0.600	0.550	-0.730	1.360
Personal finances have improved	-1.487	0.995	-1.500	0.139	-3.466	0.491
Resides in north	0.214	0.516	0.410	0.680	-0.813	1.240
Resides in Amazon	0.347	0.687	0.510	0.615	-1.019	1.713
Resides in highlands	-0.899	1.223	-0.730	0.465	-3.331	1.534
Resides in rural area	-0.599	0.726	-0.820	0.412	-2.044	0.846
Grew up in rural area	0.010	0.548	0.020	0.985	-1.079	1.100
Rightist ideology	0.199	0.109	1.820	0.072	-0.018	0.417
Supports FTA with USA	0.329	0.521	0.630	0.530	-0.708	1.366
Limit opposition voice	1.569	0.510	3.080	0.003	0.555	2.584
Strongman populist leader	-0.267	0.586	-0.460	0.650	-1.433	0.899
INTERACTIONS with ind. language:						
Rightist ideology	-0.163	0.350	-0.460	0.643	-0.860	0.534
Supports FTA with USA	0.141	0.796	0.180	0.860	-1.442	1.723
Limit opposition voice	-1.534	1.238	-1.240	0.219	-3.997	0.929
Strongman populist leader	-0.527	0.842	-0.630	0.533	-2.203	1.148
Income	0.530	0.154	3.430	0.001	0.223	0.837
Constant	-3.674	1.829	-2.010	0.048	-7.313	-0.035

N = 655. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2006 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Humala), with two-way interactions between linguistic group and the indicated non-ethnic voter characteristics. Effects of region are compared to base category 'Lima'.
Source: LAPOP 2006.

Table C4: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2006: Self-Identification Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
HUMALA	base outcome					
GARCÍA						
White (Mestizo)	-1.823	1.515	-1.200	0.232	-4.838	1.191
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-36.386	3.574	-10.180	0.000	-43.496	-29.277
Parents speak indigenous language	-0.536	0.238	-2.250	0.027	-1.011	-0.062
Income	0.046	0.060	0.780	0.440	-0.072	0.165
Female	0.338	0.217	1.560	0.123	-0.094	0.770
Age	0.010	0.007	1.420	0.160	-0.004	0.025
Trust in parties	0.197	0.084	2.350	0.021	0.031	0.364
Participation in protests	-0.311	0.388	-0.800	0.426	-1.083	0.461
National economy has improved	-0.126	0.312	-0.400	0.688	-0.747	0.495
Personal finances have improved	0.291	0.306	0.950	0.345	-0.318	0.900
Resides in north	0.253	0.357	0.710	0.480	-0.457	0.964
Resides in Amazon	-1.100	0.465	-2.360	0.020	-2.025	-0.175
Resides in highlands	0.239	0.489	0.490	0.627	-0.735	1.212
Resides in rural area	-0.196	0.392	-0.500	0.619	-0.975	0.583
Grew up in rural area	-0.571	0.297	-1.920	0.058	-1.162	0.020
Rightist ideology	0.229	0.075	3.060	0.003	0.080	0.377
Supports FTA with USA	1.191	0.251	4.750	0.000	0.693	1.690
Limit opposition voice	0.061	0.223	0.280	0.783	-0.382	0.505
Strongman populist leader	-0.113	0.229	-0.490	0.624	-0.569	0.344
INTERACTIONS:						
White * Rightist ideology	0.390	0.259	1.510	0.136	-0.125	0.905
Indigenous * Rightist ideology	-0.631	0.455	-1.390	0.170	-1.537	0.275
White * Supports FTA with USA	1.063	0.674	1.580	0.119	-0.278	2.405
Indigenous * Supports FTA with USA	35.488	3.115	11.390	0.000	29.290	41.685
White * Limit opp. voice	0.688	0.689	1.000	0.321	-0.683	2.059
Indigenous * Limit opp. voice	37.778	2.898	13.040	0.000	32.013	43.543
White * Strongman pop. Leader	0.472	0.599	0.790	0.433	-0.719	1.664
Indigenous * Strongman pop. Leader	-2.641	1.969	-1.340	0.184	-6.559	1.277
White * Income	-0.118	0.169	-0.700	0.485	-0.454	0.217
Indigenous * Income	1.059	0.514	2.060	0.042	0.037	2.081
Constant	-2.972	0.574	-5.180	0.000	-4.114	-1.831
FLORES						
White (Mestizo)	-0.142	2.703	-0.050	0.958	-5.519	5.234
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-52.798	4.308	-12.260	0.000	-61.368	-44.229
Parents speak indigenous language	-0.948	0.250	-3.800	0.000	-1.445	-0.452
Income	0.250	0.054	4.660	0.000	0.143	0.356
Female	1.206	0.202	5.980	0.000	0.805	1.608
Age	-0.005	0.007	-0.760	0.447	-0.019	0.009
Trust in parties	0.144	0.082	1.760	0.083	-0.019	0.307
Participation in protests	-0.673	0.399	-1.690	0.095	-1.466	0.120
National economy has improved	0.512	0.414	1.240	0.220	-0.312	1.336
Personal finances have improved	0.059	0.458	0.130	0.898	-0.852	0.970
Resides in north	-0.434	0.318	-1.360	0.176	-1.068	0.199
Resides in Amazon	-0.894	0.485	-1.840	0.069	-1.859	0.072
Resides in highlands	-0.074	0.449	-0.170	0.869	-0.968	0.819
Resides in rural area	0.076	0.428	0.180	0.859	-0.775	0.928
Grew up in rural area	-0.709	0.365	-1.940	0.056	-1.435	0.017
Rightist ideology	0.296	0.051	5.840	0.000	0.195	0.397
Supports FTA with USA	1.278	0.280	4.560	0.000	0.721	1.835
Limit opposition voice	-0.313	0.259	-1.210	0.230	-0.828	0.202
Strongman populist leader	-0.246	0.243	-1.010	0.316	-0.730	0.239
INTERACTIONS:						
White * Rightist ideology	0.171	0.280	0.610	0.542	-0.385	0.728
Indigenous * Rightist ideology	-0.240	0.637	-0.380	0.708	-1.508	1.028
White * Supports FTA with USA	0.540	0.522	1.040	0.304	-0.498	1.578
Indigenous * Supports FTA with USA	53.647	4.297	12.480	0.000	45.098	62.195
White * Limit opp. voice	1.325	0.806	1.640	0.104	-0.277	2.928
Indigenous * Limit opp. voice	36.987	4.578	8.080	0.000	27.879	46.094
White * Strongman pop. Leader	-0.024	0.673	-0.040	0.971	-1.364	1.315
Indigenous * Strongman pop. Leader	-2.280	2.895	-0.790	0.433	-8.039	3.479
White * Income	-0.143	0.303	-0.470	0.638	-0.746	0.460
Indigenous * Income	0.223	0.685	0.330	0.746	-1.140	1.587
Constant	-3.837	0.579	-6.630	0.000	-4.989	-2.686
CHÁVEZ						
White (Mestizo)	-20.342	2.369	-8.590	0.000	-25.055	-15.629
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-334.102	16.336	-20.450	0.000	-366.600	-301.604
Parents speak indigenous language	-1.644	0.691	-2.380	0.020	-3.020	-0.269
Income	0.012	0.112	0.100	0.917	-0.211	0.234
Female	0.203	0.454	0.450	0.656	-0.701	1.106
Age	-0.007	0.022	-0.310	0.757	-0.050	0.036
Trust in parties	0.295	0.165	1.790	0.077	-0.033	0.623
Participation in protests	-1.514	0.910	-1.660	0.100	-3.324	0.296
National economy has improved	-0.086	0.632	-0.140	0.892	-1.344	1.171
Personal finances have improved	-1.269	1.036	-1.230	0.224	-3.330	0.791
Resides in north	0.062	0.513	0.120	0.904	-0.958	1.082
Resides in Amazon	0.347	0.659	0.530	0.599	-0.963	1.658
Resides in highlands	-0.584	1.159	-0.500	0.616	-2.890	1.722
Resides in rural area	-0.572	0.746	-0.770	0.446	-2.056	0.913
Grew up in rural area	0.190	0.645	0.290	0.769	-1.094	1.473
Rightist ideology	0.162	0.121	1.340	0.184	-0.079	0.403
Supports FTA with USA	-0.155	0.495	-0.310	0.756	-1.140	0.831
Limit opposition voice	1.422	0.450	3.160	0.002	0.528	2.317
Strongman populist leader	-0.459	0.491	-0.930	0.353	-1.437	0.518
INTERACTIONS:						
White * Rightist ideology	0.021	0.266	0.080	0.938	-0.509	0.550
Indigenous * Rightist ideology	-29.248	1.491	-19.620	0.000	-32.213	-26.283
White * Supports FTA with USA	1.579	0.638	2.480	0.015	0.311	2.847
Indigenous * Supports FTA with USA	120.022	4.752	25.250	0.000	110.568	129.476
White * Limit opp. voice	-0.559	0.760	-0.730	0.465	-2.071	0.953
Indigenous * Limit opp. voice	34.636	3.067	11.290	0.000	28.534	40.738

Table C4: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2006: Self-Identification Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
White * Strongman pop. Leader	0.399	0.876	0.460	0.650	-1.343	2.142
Indigenous * Strongman pop. Leader	-89.402	4.272	-20.930	0.000	-97.900	-80.903
White* Income	-0.027	0.219	-0.120	0.902	-0.462	0.408
Indigenous * Income	58.762	2.748	21.390	0.000	53.296	64.228
Constant	-3.507	1.830	-1.920	0.059	-7.148	0.134

N = 655. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2006 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Humala), with two-way interactions between self-identified group and the indicated non-ethnic voter characteristics. Effects of region are compared to base category 'Lima'.
Source: LAPOP 2006..

Table C5: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Peru 2006

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
HUMALA						
GARCÍA						
White (Mestizo)	0.341	0.332	1.030	0.308	-0.321	1.002
Indigenous (Mestizo)	0.231	0.591	0.390	0.697	-0.945	1.406
Parents speak indigenous language	-0.620	0.265	-2.340	0.022	-1.148	-0.092
Income	0.035	0.063	0.550	0.585	-0.091	0.161
Female	0.424	0.231	1.840	0.070	-0.035	0.883
Age	0.004	0.007	0.490	0.623	-0.011	0.018
Trust in parties	0.144	0.088	1.650	0.103	-0.030	0.319
Participation in protests	-0.536	0.403	-1.330	0.187	-1.338	0.266
National economy has improved	0.120	0.374	0.320	0.748	-0.623	0.863
Personal finances have improved	0.008	0.313	0.020	0.980	-0.614	0.630
Resides in north	0.365	0.346	1.050	0.296	-0.325	1.054
Resides in Amazon	-1.213	0.517	-2.340	0.021	-2.242	-0.184
Resides in highlands	0.339	0.478	0.710	0.481	-0.612	1.290
Resides in rural area	-0.104	0.377	-0.280	0.784	-0.853	0.646
Grew up in rural area	-0.690	0.342	-2.020	0.047	-1.370	-0.009
Rightist ideology	0.278	0.065	4.260	0.000	0.148	0.407
Supports FTA with USA	1.389	0.203	6.850	0.000	0.986	1.793
Limit opposition voice	0.141	0.229	0.620	0.540	-0.315	0.597
Strongman populist leader	-0.188	0.230	-0.820	0.416	-0.646	0.269
Trust in indigenous movement	-0.040	0.086	-0.470	0.640	-0.212	0.131
Experience of discrimination	0.011	0.115	0.090	0.927	-0.219	0.240
Constant	-2.621	0.757	-3.460	0.001	-4.126	-1.116
FLORES						
White (Mestizo)	0.489	0.402	1.220	0.227	-0.310	1.288
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-0.746	0.881	-0.850	0.399	-2.499	1.006
Parents speak indigenous language	-0.915	0.267	-3.430	0.001	-1.446	-0.385
Income	0.208	0.061	3.420	0.001	0.087	0.328
Female	1.312	0.206	6.360	0.000	0.902	1.722
Age	-0.011	0.007	-1.550	0.126	-0.025	0.003
Trust in parties	0.130	0.092	1.420	0.159	-0.052	0.312
Participation in protests	-0.683	0.376	-1.820	0.073	-1.432	0.065
National economy has improved	0.711	0.497	1.430	0.156	-0.278	1.699
Personal finances have improved	0.005	0.422	0.010	0.991	-0.834	0.844
Resides in north	-0.426	0.389	-1.090	0.277	-1.200	0.348
Resides in Amazon	-0.952	0.513	-1.860	0.067	-1.974	0.069
Resides in highlands	0.016	0.454	0.040	0.972	-0.888	0.920
Resides in rural area	0.050	0.468	0.110	0.916	-0.882	0.981
Grew up in rural area	-0.602	0.347	-1.730	0.087	-1.293	0.090
Rightist ideology	0.316	0.067	4.700	0.000	0.182	0.449
Supports FTA with USA	1.366	0.265	5.150	0.000	0.837	1.894
Limit opposition voice	-0.163	0.237	-0.690	0.492	-0.634	0.308
Strongman populist leader	-0.421	0.247	-1.700	0.092	-0.912	0.070
Trust in indigenous movement	-0.043	0.096	-0.450	0.655	-0.235	0.148
Experience of discrimination	0.047	0.133	0.350	0.724	-0.217	0.311
Constant	-3.310	0.656	-5.050	0.000	-4.614	-2.005
CHÁVEZ						
White (Mestizo)	-13.569	0.386	-35.160	0.000	-14.337	-12.801
Indigenous (Mestizo)	1.858	1.114	1.670	0.099	-0.358	4.074
Parents speak indigenous language	-1.777	0.629	-2.830	0.006	-3.028	-0.526
Income	0.054	0.102	0.530	0.595	-0.148	0.257
Female	-0.138	0.517	-0.270	0.790	-1.166	0.890
Age	-0.016	0.024	-0.660	0.510	-0.063	0.031
Trust in parties	0.249	0.178	1.400	0.166	-0.106	0.603
Participation in protests	-0.934	0.897	-1.040	0.301	-2.718	0.851
National economy has improved	0.557	0.634	0.880	0.382	-0.704	1.818
Personal finances have improved	-1.521	1.050	-1.450	0.152	-3.611	0.569
Resides in north	0.321	0.594	0.540	0.590	-0.860	1.502
Resides in Amazon	0.345	0.749	0.460	0.646	-1.145	1.836
Resides in highlands	-0.920	1.424	-0.650	0.520	-3.753	1.912
Resides in rural area	-0.250	0.701	-0.360	0.722	-1.644	1.144
Grew up in rural area	-0.668	0.777	-0.860	0.393	-2.215	0.879
Rightist ideology	0.268	0.101	2.650	0.010	0.067	0.470
Supports FTA with USA	0.583	0.407	1.430	0.155	-0.226	1.393
Limit opposition voice	1.192	0.491	2.430	0.017	0.216	2.168
Strongman populist leader	-0.258	0.638	-0.400	0.687	-1.526	1.011
Trust in indigenous movement	-0.132	0.193	-0.690	0.495	-0.516	0.252
Experience of discrimination	-0.097	0.184	-0.530	0.600	-0.463	0.269
Constant	-3.387	1.960	-1.730	0.088	-7.287	0.513

N = 607. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2006 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Humala). Effects of region are compared to base category 'Lima'.
Source: LAPOP 2006.

Table C6: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Peru 2006: Linguistic Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
HUMALA	base outcome					
GARCÍA						
White (Mestizo)	0.345	0.324	1.070	0.290	-0.299	0.989
Indigenous (Mestizo)	0.487	0.660	0.740	0.462	-0.826	1.801
Parents speak indigenous language	0.314	1.716	0.180	0.855	-3.101	3.729
Income	0.031	0.080	0.390	0.701	-0.129	0.191
Female	0.384	0.243	1.580	0.119	-0.101	0.868
Age	0.002	0.007	0.340	0.736	-0.012	0.017
Trust in parties	0.145	0.091	1.590	0.115	-0.036	0.325
Participation in protests	-0.512	0.429	-1.190	0.237	-1.366	0.343
National economy has improved	0.136	0.417	0.330	0.744	-0.694	0.967
Personal finances have improved	-0.045	0.311	-0.140	0.885	-0.664	0.574
Resides in north	0.374	0.367	1.020	0.311	-0.355	1.104
Resides in Amazon	-1.284	0.512	-2.510	0.014	-2.302	-0.265
Resides in highlands	0.101	0.461	0.220	0.827	-0.816	1.018
Resides in rural area	-0.052	0.387	-0.130	0.894	-0.821	0.718
Grew up in rural area	-0.706	0.372	-1.900	0.061	-1.447	0.034
Rightist ideology	0.265	0.075	3.560	0.001	0.117	0.414
Supports FTA with USA	1.527	0.272	5.630	0.000	0.987	2.068
Limit opposition voice	-0.054	0.311	-0.170	0.863	-0.673	0.565
Strongman populist leader	-0.069	0.263	-0.260	0.792	-0.593	0.454
Trust in indigenous movement	0.093	0.126	0.740	0.460	-0.157	0.344
Experience of discrimination	0.151	0.175	0.870	0.389	-0.196	0.499
INTERACTIONS with ind. language:						
Rightist ideology	0.112	0.166	0.670	0.504	-0.219	0.442
Supports FTA with USA	-0.124	0.457	-0.270	0.787	-1.034	0.786
Limit opposition voice	0.699	0.476	1.470	0.146	-0.248	1.646
Strongman populist leader	-0.381	0.542	-0.700	0.484	-1.458	0.697
Income	-0.012	0.164	-0.070	0.942	-0.339	0.315
Trust in indigenous movement	-0.331	0.265	-1.250	0.216	-0.859	0.197
Experience of discrimination	-0.255	0.250	-1.020	0.310	-0.753	0.242
Constant	-3.119	0.914	-3.410	0.001	-4.939	-1.300
FLORES						
White (Mestizo)	0.479	0.408	1.170	0.244	-0.333	1.290
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-0.588	0.937	-0.630	0.532	-2.452	1.276
Parents speak indigenous language	-0.168	1.250	-0.130	0.893	-2.656	2.319
Income	0.182	0.070	2.590	0.011	0.042	0.322
Female	1.328	0.213	6.230	0.000	0.904	1.751
Age	-0.013	0.008	-1.660	0.100	-0.028	0.002
Trust in parties	0.120	0.090	1.340	0.184	-0.058	0.299
Participation in protests	-0.681	0.366	-1.860	0.066	-1.409	0.047
National economy has improved	0.715	0.495	1.450	0.152	-0.269	1.699
Personal finances have improved	-0.058	0.411	-0.140	0.887	-0.875	0.759
Resides in north	-0.451	0.402	-1.120	0.266	-1.251	0.349
Resides in Amazon	-1.023	0.496	-2.060	0.042	-2.009	-0.036
Resides in highlands	-0.106	0.464	-0.230	0.821	-1.030	0.818
Resides in rural area	0.092	0.464	0.200	0.843	-0.832	1.016
Grew up in rural area	-0.665	0.354	-1.880	0.064	-1.369	0.039
Rightist ideology	0.303	0.080	3.810	0.000	0.145	0.461
Supports FTA with USA	1.557	0.341	4.570	0.000	0.879	2.235
Limit opposition voice	-0.048	0.296	-0.160	0.871	-0.638	0.541
Strongman populist leader	-0.454	0.283	-1.600	0.113	-1.017	0.109
Trust in indigenous movement	0.077	0.094	0.820	0.415	-0.110	0.264
Experience of discrimination	0.102	0.221	0.460	0.645	-0.337	0.542
INTERACTIONS with ind. language:						
Rightist ideology	0.079	0.138	0.570	0.570	-0.197	0.354
Supports FTA with USA	-0.425	0.617	-0.690	0.493	-1.653	0.803
Limit opposition voice	-0.279	0.511	-0.550	0.586	-1.295	0.737
Strongman populist leader	0.057	0.505	0.110	0.910	-0.948	1.062
Income	0.070	0.126	0.560	0.578	-0.180	0.321
Trust in indigenous movement	-0.278	0.152	-1.830	0.071	-0.580	0.024
Experience of discrimination	-0.046	0.283	-0.160	0.871	-0.610	0.518
Constant	-3.643	0.755	-4.830	0.000	-5.145	-2.141
CHÁVEZ						
White (Mestizo)	-16.899	0.424	-39.820	0.000	-17.743	-16.054
Indigenous (Mestizo)	0.896	1.166	0.770	0.445	-1.424	3.215
Parents speak indigenous language	-17.388	4.499	-3.870	0.000	-26.339	-8.437
Income	-0.049	0.115	-0.420	0.673	-0.278	0.180
Female	-0.067	0.513	-0.130	0.896	-1.087	0.953
Age	-0.020	0.022	-0.900	0.370	-0.064	0.024
Trust in parties	0.343	0.180	1.900	0.060	-0.015	0.702
Participation in protests	-1.834	1.214	-1.510	0.135	-4.249	0.581
National economy has improved	0.338	0.664	0.510	0.612	-0.982	1.659
Personal finances have improved	-1.837	1.500	-1.220	0.224	-4.821	1.148
Resides in north	0.521	0.608	0.860	0.394	-0.689	1.731
Resides in Amazon	0.536	0.785	0.680	0.497	-1.026	2.098
Resides in highlands	0.373	1.111	0.340	0.738	-1.838	2.584
Resides in rural area	-0.401	0.854	-0.470	0.640	-2.100	1.298
Grew up in rural area	-0.723	0.870	-0.830	0.409	-2.455	1.009
Rightist ideology	0.213	0.131	1.620	0.108	-0.048	0.474
Supports FTA with USA	0.368	0.533	0.690	0.491	-0.691	1.428
Limit opposition voice	1.593	0.527	3.020	0.003	0.544	2.641
Strongman populist leader	-0.575	0.581	-0.990	0.326	-1.731	0.581
Trust in indigenous movement	0.045	0.166	0.270	0.786	-0.284	0.375
Experience of discrimination	-0.095	0.258	-0.370	0.715	-0.608	0.418
INTERACTIONS with ind. language:						
Rightist ideology	0.534	0.558	0.960	0.341	-0.576	1.644
Supports FTA with USA	17.305	2.012	8.600	0.000	13.302	21.308
Limit opposition voice	-23.125	3.566	-6.490	0.000	-30.220	-16.030
Strongman populist leader	-3.208	2.646	-1.210	0.229	-8.473	2.056
Income	2.586	0.983	2.630	0.010	0.630	4.542
Trust in indigenous movement	-6.661	2.822	-2.360	0.021	-12.276	-1.047

Table C6: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Peru 2006: Linguistic Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
Experience of discrimination	-1.044	1.158	-0.900	0.370	-3.349	1.261
Constant	-3.515	2.346	-1.500	0.138	-8.182	1.153

N = 607. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2006 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Humala), with two-way interactions between linguistic group and the indicated non-ethnic voter characteristics and ethnic attitudes. Effects of region are compared to base category 'Lima'.
Source: LAPOP 2006.

Table C7: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Peru 2006: Self-Identification Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
HUMALA	base outcome					
GARCÍA						
White (Mestizo)	-2.342	1.952	-1.200	0.234	-6.226	1.543
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-167.746	10.438	-16.070	0.000	-188.514	-146.977
Parents speak indigenous language	-0.624	0.281	-2.220	0.029	-1.183	-0.065
Income	0.026	0.064	0.400	0.689	-0.102	0.154
Female	0.396	0.230	1.720	0.088	-0.061	0.853
Age	0.003	0.008	0.430	0.670	-0.012	0.019
Trust in parties	0.182	0.084	2.170	0.033	0.015	0.349
Participation in protests	-0.573	0.459	-1.250	0.215	-1.486	0.340
National economy has improved	0.035	0.357	0.100	0.921	-0.674	0.745
Personal finances have improved	0.077	0.321	0.240	0.812	-0.561	0.714
Resides in north	0.396	0.358	1.110	0.271	-0.316	1.108
Resides in Amazon	-1.265	0.558	-2.270	0.026	-2.376	-0.155
Resides in highlands	0.274	0.535	0.510	0.609	-0.790	1.339
Resides in rural area	-0.097	0.424	-0.230	0.819	-0.940	0.746
Grew up in rural area	-0.831	0.374	-2.220	0.029	-1.574	-0.087
Rightist ideology	0.269	0.082	3.300	0.001	0.107	0.431
Supports FTA with USA	1.298	0.252	5.140	0.000	0.796	1.800
Limit opposition voice	-0.060	0.252	-0.240	0.813	-0.561	0.441
Strongman populist leader	-0.074	0.237	-0.310	0.755	-0.546	0.397
Trust in indigenous movement	-0.107	0.091	-1.170	0.244	-0.288	0.075
Experience of discrimination	0.107	0.133	0.800	0.424	-0.158	0.371
INTERACTIONS:						
White * Rightist ideology	0.274	0.273	1.000	0.318	-0.269	0.816
Indigenous * Rightist ideology	8.738	1.137	7.680	0.000	6.475	11.001
White * Supports FTA with USA	0.784	0.676	1.160	0.250	-0.562	2.129
Indigenous * Supports FTA with USA	111.213	3.544	31.380	0.000	104.161	118.265
White * Limit opp. voice	0.809	0.767	1.060	0.294	-0.716	2.335
Indigenous * Limit opp. voice	140.849	4.965	28.370	0.000	130.971	150.727
White * Strongman pop. Leader	0.514	0.580	0.890	0.378	-0.640	1.669
Indigenous * Strongman pop. Leader	-77.464	2.804	-27.630	0.000	-83.043	-71.886
White * Income	-0.087	0.187	-0.460	0.643	-0.460	0.286
Indigenous * Income	-8.160	0.682	-11.960	0.000	-9.518	-6.803
White * Trust in indigenous movt.	0.207	0.244	0.850	0.399	-0.279	0.693
Indigenous * Trust in indigenous movt.	26.742	1.509	17.720	0.000	23.740	29.744
White * discrimination	-0.136	0.529	-0.260	0.798	-1.188	0.916
Indigenous * discrimination	-21.279	0.918	-23.180	0.000	-23.105	-19.452
Constant	-2.309	0.753	-3.060	0.003	-3.808	-0.810
FLORES						
White (Mestizo)	1.417	2.100	0.670	0.502	-2.762	5.595
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-597.330	19.430	-30.740	0.000	-635.989	-558.670
Parents speak indigenous language	-0.987	0.283	-3.490	0.001	-1.550	-0.424
Income	0.223	0.063	3.560	0.001	0.099	0.348
Female	1.331	0.217	6.130	0.000	0.899	1.763
Age	-0.013	0.007	-1.950	0.055	-0.026	0.000
Trust in parties	0.132	0.100	1.320	0.190	-0.066	0.330
Participation in protests	-0.755	0.391	-1.930	0.057	-1.533	0.022
National economy has improved	0.694	0.467	1.490	0.141	-0.235	1.622
Personal finances have improved	-0.006	0.458	-0.010	0.989	-0.918	0.906
Resides in north	-0.423	0.390	-1.090	0.281	-1.199	0.352
Resides in Amazon	-0.879	0.538	-1.630	0.106	-1.949	0.192
Resides in highlands	-0.129	0.481	-0.270	0.789	-1.085	0.827
Resides in rural area	-0.022	0.486	-0.050	0.964	-0.989	0.945
Grew up in rural area	-0.661	0.373	-1.770	0.080	-1.403	0.081
Rightist ideology	0.332	0.058	5.750	0.000	0.217	0.446
Supports FTA with USA	1.284	0.280	4.580	0.000	0.727	1.842
Limit opposition voice	-0.403	0.273	-1.480	0.144	-0.947	0.140
Strongman populist leader	-0.267	0.269	-0.990	0.325	-0.802	0.269
Trust in indigenous movement	-0.020	0.091	-0.220	0.825	-0.202	0.161
Experience of discrimination	0.141	0.137	1.030	0.305	-0.131	0.414
INTERACTIONS:						
White * Rightist ideology	0.078	0.279	0.280	0.781	-0.478	0.634
Indigenous * Rightist ideology	51.502	1.801	28.600	0.000	47.919	55.085
White * Supports FTA with USA	0.413	0.604	0.680	0.496	-0.789	1.616
Indigenous * Supports FTA with USA	196.607	6.356	30.930	0.000	183.962	209.253
White * Limit opp. voice	1.239	0.926	1.340	0.185	-0.605	3.082
Indigenous * Limit opp. voice	155.697	7.161	21.740	0.000	141.448	169.945
White * Strongman pop. Leader	-0.046	0.693	-0.070	0.948	-1.425	1.334
Indigenous * Strongman pop. Leader	4.860	2.913	1.670	0.099	-0.936	10.656
White * Income	-0.173	0.241	-0.720	0.475	-0.652	0.306
Indigenous * Income	6.326	0.545	11.620	0.000	5.242	7.410
White * Trust in indigenous movt.	-0.213	0.295	-0.720	0.471	-0.800	0.373
Indigenous * Trust in indigenous movt.	36.600	1.236	29.610	0.000	34.141	39.059
White * discrimination	-0.033	0.784	-0.040	0.966	-1.592	1.526
Indigenous * discrimination	-63.986	1.863	-34.350	0.000	-67.692	-60.279
Constant	-3.479	0.730	-4.760	0.000	-4.933	-2.026
CHÁVEZ						
White (Mestizo)	-15.516	2.768	-5.610	0.000	-21.023	-10.009
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-22.154	3.312	-6.690	0.000	-28.745	-15.563
Parents speak indigenous language	-17.712	0.603	-29.360	0.000	-18.912	-16.511
Income	-0.030	0.114	-0.260	0.793	-0.257	0.197

Table C7: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Peru 2006: Self-Identification Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P > [t]	95% confidence intervals	
Female	0.038	0.509	0.070	0.941	-0.974	1.051
Age	-0.026	0.024	-1.110	0.270	-0.074	0.021
Trust in parties	0.400	0.179	2.240	0.028	0.045	0.756
Participation in protests	-1.341	1.045	-1.280	0.203	-3.420	0.738
National economy has improved	0.088	0.727	0.120	0.904	-1.357	1.534
Personal finances have improved	-1.292	1.160	-1.110	0.269	-3.600	1.016
Resides in north	0.330	0.594	0.560	0.580	-0.852	1.512
Resides in Amazon	0.436	0.797	0.550	0.586	-1.151	2.022
Resides in highlands	0.392	1.117	0.350	0.726	-1.830	2.614
Resides in rural area	-0.153	0.820	-0.190	0.853	-1.785	1.479
Grew up in rural area	-0.897	0.907	-0.990	0.326	-2.703	0.908
Rightist ideology	0.206	0.131	1.570	0.120	-0.055	0.467
Supports FTA with USA	0.133	0.507	0.260	0.793	-0.875	1.142
Limit opposition voice	1.437	0.530	2.710	0.008	0.382	2.491
Strongman populist leader	-0.396	0.569	-0.700	0.489	-1.529	0.737
Trust in indigenous movement	-0.116	0.190	-0.610	0.543	-0.495	0.262
Experience of discrimination	-0.098	0.246	-0.400	0.693	-0.588	0.393
INTERACTIONS:						
White * Rightist ideology	-0.233	0.282	-0.830	0.410	-0.794	0.327
Indigenous * Rightist ideology	-14.472	0.748	-19.340	0.000	-15.960	-12.983
White * Supports FTA with USA	1.537	0.648	2.370	0.020	0.248	2.826
Indigenous * Supports FTA with USA	69.839	3.274	21.330	0.000	63.324	76.354
White * Limit opp. voice	-0.932	0.824	-1.130	0.261	-2.573	0.708
Indigenous * Limit opp. voice	4.152	2.469	1.680	0.097	-0.761	9.065
White * Strongman pop. Leader	0.296	0.904	0.330	0.744	-1.502	2.094
Indigenous * Strongman pop. Leader	17.167	1.775	9.670	0.000	13.635	20.699
White * Income	-0.091	0.185	-0.490	0.624	-0.460	0.277
Indigenous * Income	11.046	0.594	18.590	0.000	9.864	12.229
White * Trust in indigenous movt.	-0.261	0.329	-0.790	0.431	-0.915	0.394
Indigenous * Trust in indigenous movt.	-6.635	0.577	-11.490	0.000	-7.784	-5.486
White * discrimination	0.085	0.507	0.170	0.867	-0.924	1.094
Indigenous * discrimination	-5.952	0.632	-9.410	0.000	-7.210	-4.693
Constant	-2.720	2.379	-1.140	0.256	-7.453	2.013

N = 607. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2006 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Humala), with two-way interactions between self-identified group and the indicated non-ethnic voter characteristics and ethnic attitudes. Effects of region are compared to base category 'Lima'.
Source: LAPOP 2006.

Table C8: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Family Linguistic Background on Voting for Humala over Flores, Peru 2006

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	.037^*	.002	.019	.010	.088	(P)
				.012	.096	(BC)
Trust in parties	.009	.000	.009	-.004	.028	(P)
				-.003	.029	(BC)
Rightist ideology	.037^*	.001	.017	.010	.077	(P)
				.013	.082	(BC)
FTA with USA	-.001	-.001	.024	-.043	.048	(P)
				-.038	.059	(BC)
Strong, populist leader	.001	.001	.009	-.011	.024	(P)
				-.009	.032	(BC)
Direct democracy (pop5)	.008	.002	.015	-.008	.053	(P)
				-.005	.070	(BC)
Trust in indigenous movement	.000	.003	.010	-.013	.032	(P)
				-.023	.021	(BC)
Experience of discrimination	-.008	.000	.014	-.043	.015	(P)
				-.063	.009	(BC)
Total indirect effects	.084^*	.008	.048	.012	.200	(P)
				.011	.197	(BC)
Direct effect	.114*	-.007	.065	-.031	.241	(P)
				.000	.262	(BC)
Total effects	.198^*	.001	.071	.078	.368	(P)
				.094	.417	(BC)
Proportion of total effect mediated	.424					

N = 42. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively. Notes: Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of family linguistic background (parent(s) knowledge of an indigenous language) on vote choice (Humala over Flores) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated. Controls are: ethnic self-identification, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances. Mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender nd). Standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (869 repetitions, from 77 clusters, across 7 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2006.

Table C9: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as White (compared to Mestizo) on Voting for Humala over Flores, Peru 2006

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	-.006	.003	.016	-.029	.039	(P)
				-.032	.034	(BC)
Trust in parties	.001	-.001	.008	-.013	.019	(P)
				-.009	.033	(BC)
Rightist ideology	-.004	.002	.017	-.030	.041	(P)
				-.030	.041	(BC)
FTA with USA	-.009	.005	.031	-.049	.078	(P)
				-.049	.080	(BC)
Strong, populist leader	.001	.000	.007	-.013	.017	(P)
				-.009	.024	(BC)
Direct democracy (pop5)	.003	.001	.013	-.013	.039	(P)
				-.009	.062	(BC)
Trust in indigenous movement	.000	-.001	.006	-.013	.010	(P)
				-.013	.010	(BC)
Experience of discrimination	.002	-.002	.009	-.026	.010	(P)

Table C9: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as White (compared to Mestizo) on Voting for Humala over Flores, Peru 2006

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
				-.016	.013	(BC)
Total indirect effects	**-.013**	.007	.060	-.091	.141	(P)
				-.085	.155	(BC)
Direct effect	**-.146***	.005	.068	-.265	.000	(P)
				-.271	-.012	(BC)
Total effects	**-.159**	.012	.088	-.291	.058	(P)
				-.292	.056	(BC)
Proportion of total effect mediated	**.081**					

N = 322. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively. Notes: Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as white (compared with mestizo) on vote choice (Humala over Flores) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated. Controls are: family linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances. Mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender nd). Standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (1000 repetitions, from 76 clusters, across 7 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2006.

Table C10: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Indigenous (compared to Mestizo) on Voting for Humala over Flores, Peru 2006

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	.027^*	-.001	.015	.003	.061	(P)
				.006	.069	(BC)
Trust in parties	-.006	.001	.009	-.027	.009	(P)
				-.038	.003	(BC)
Rightist ideology	.019	.000	.018	-.018	.055	(P)
				-.016	.057	(BC)
FTA with USA	.011	-.002	.025	-.035	.062	(P)
				-.028	.073	(BC)
Strong, populist leader	-.003	-.001	.010	-.027	.011	(P)
				-.050	.005	(BC)
Direct democracy (pop5)	.021^*	.007	.026	.000	.099	(P)
				.000	.099	(BC)
Trust in indigenous movement	.000	.000	.007	-.015	.013	(P)
				-.030	.007	(BC)
Experience of discrimination	-.006	.001	.012	-.031	.021	(P)
				-.044	.009	(BC)
Total indirect effects	**.064**	.005	.047	-.016	.178	(P)
				-.016	.178	(BC)
Direct effect	**.050**	-.011	.085	-.148	.182	(P)
				-.117	.188	(BC)
Total effects	**.114**	-.006	.105	-.104	.297	(P)
				-.086	.308	(BC)
Proportion of total effect mediated	**.562**					

N=298. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively. Notes: Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as indigenous (compared with mestizo) on vote choice (Humala over Flores) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated. Controls are: family linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances. Mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender nd). Standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (886 repetitions, from 70 clusters, across 7 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2006.

able C11: Descriptive Statistics: Model Sample, Peru 2011

Family Linguistic Background	Ethnic Self-Identification			
Vote Choice	White	Mestiza	Indigenous	Total
Parents speak Spanish only				
Ollanta Humala	23	207	6	236
Keiko Fujimori	14	139	10	163
Pedro Pablo Kuczynski	8	61	0	69
Alejandro Toledo	3	32	0	35
Other/Null	6	53	1	60
Parents speak an indigenous language				
Ollanta Humala	7	124	31	162
Keiko Fujimori	5	35	6	46
Pedro Pablo Kuczynski	2	6	1	9
Alejandro Toledo	1	13	4	18
Other/Null	0	21	3	24
Total	69	691	62	822

Cells show unweighted counts of respondents in the model sample, by vote choice and ethnic group.
Source: Author's elaboration from LAPOP 2012

Table C12: Descriptive Statistics: Ethnic Attitudes Model Sample, Peru 2011

	Ethnic Self-Identification			
Family Linguistic Background	White	Mestiza	Indigenous	Total
Parents speak Spanish only				
Ollanta Humala	12	92	2	106
Keiko Fujimori	7	72	5	84
Pedro Pablo Kuczynski	1	19	0	20
Alejandro Toledo	2	13	0	15
Other/Null	2	22	0	24
Parents speak an indigenous language				0
Ollanta Humala	3	50	13	66
Keiko Fujimori	3	16	3	22
Pedro Pablo Kuczynski	1	2	0	3
Alejandro Toledo	1	4	1	6
Other/Null	0	11	3	14
Total	32	301	27	360

Cells show unweighted counts of respondents in the model sample, by vote choice and ethnic group.
Source: Author's elaboration from LAPOP 2012

Table C13: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2011

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
HUMALA	base outcome					
FUJIMORI						
White (Mestizo)	0.190	0.347	0.550	0.585	-0.500	0.880
Indigenous (Mestizo)	0.402	0.409	0.980	0.328	-0.410	1.215
Parents speak indigenous language	-0.746	0.312	-2.390	0.019	-1.366	-0.126
Income	-0.022	0.032	-0.670	0.506	-0.086	0.043
Female	0.923	0.186	4.950	0.000	0.553	1.294
Age	-0.014	0.007	-2.160	0.034	-0.027	-0.001
Trust in parties	-0.018	0.062	-0.290	0.772	-0.142	0.106
Participation in protests	-0.810	0.283	-2.860	0.005	-1.372	-0.247
National economy has improved	0.293	0.216	1.360	0.179	-0.136	0.722
Personal finances have improved	-0.286	0.257	-1.110	0.268	-0.797	0.224
Resides in north	-0.370	0.303	-1.220	0.225	-0.972	0.232
Resides in Amazon	-0.091	0.375	-0.240	0.808	-0.836	0.654
Resides in highlands	-0.362	0.394	-0.920	0.361	-1.145	0.421
Resides in rural area	-0.044	0.273	-0.160	0.873	-0.585	0.498
Rightist ideology	0.056	0.047	1.190	0.238	-0.037	0.149
Wealth redistribution	-0.084	0.094	-0.890	0.374	-0.271	0.103
Public health service	0.024	0.093	0.260	0.795	-0.161	0.209
Nationalisations	-0.110	0.051	-2.150	0.035	-0.212	-0.008
Free trade	0.103	0.084	1.220	0.226	-0.065	0.271
Limit opposition voice	-0.068	0.074	-0.910	0.365	-0.216	0.080
Direct democracy	-0.072	0.073	-0.990	0.327	-0.217	0.073
Minorities to follow majority	0.093	0.079	1.170	0.245	-0.065	0.250
Constant	0.434	0.915	0.470	0.636	-1.384	2.253
KUCZYNSKI						
White (Mestizo)	0.341	0.459	0.740	0.460	-0.572	1.254
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-1.336	1.249	-1.070	0.288	-3.819	1.147
Parents speak indigenous language	-1.413	0.340	-4.160	0.000	-2.088	-0.738
Income	0.119	0.048	2.480	0.015	0.024	0.215
Female	0.668	0.299	2.240	0.028	0.074	1.262
Age	-0.034	0.008	-4.200	0.000	-0.050	-0.018
Trust in parties	0.017	0.090	0.190	0.852	-0.162	0.196
Participation in protests	-0.839	0.528	-1.590	0.116	-1.889	0.210
National economy has improved	0.059	0.515	0.120	0.909	-0.965	1.083
Personal finances have improved	-0.496	0.369	-1.340	0.183	-1.229	0.238
Resides in north	-0.664	0.440	-1.510	0.134	-1.538	0.210
Resides in Amazon	-0.330	0.365	-0.910	0.368	-1.055	0.395
Resides in highlands	0.230	0.463	0.500	0.621	-0.690	1.150
Resides in rural area	-0.831	0.472	-1.760	0.082	-1.770	0.108
Rightist ideology	0.068	0.082	0.830	0.407	-0.094	0.231
Wealth redistribution	-0.234	0.134	-1.750	0.084	-0.500	0.032
Public health service	0.083	0.150	0.550	0.582	-0.215	0.381
Nationalisations	-0.223	0.073	-3.050	0.003	-0.368	-0.078
Free trade	-0.041	0.109	-0.380	0.705	-0.258	0.175
Limit opposition voice	-0.012	0.094	-0.130	0.897	-0.199	0.175
Direct democracy	-0.079	0.093	-0.850	0.396	-0.263	0.105
Minorities to follow majority	0.110	0.092	1.200	0.234	-0.073	0.293
Constant	0.697	1.244	0.560	0.577	-1.775	3.168
TOLEDO						
White (Mestizo)	-0.054	0.536	-0.100	0.920	-1.118	1.010
Indigenous (Mestizo)	0.024	0.759	0.030	0.974	-1.485	1.534
Parents speak indigenous language	0.075	0.384	0.190	0.846	-0.688	0.838
Income	0.132	0.054	2.440	0.017	0.025	0.240
Female	0.745	0.333	2.240	0.028	0.084	1.407
Age	0.004	0.009	0.390	0.698	-0.015	0.022
Trust in parties	0.032	0.107	0.300	0.768	-0.181	0.245
Participation in protests	-0.378	0.421	-0.900	0.372	-1.214	0.459
National economy has improved	-0.450	0.426	-1.060	0.293	-1.296	0.395
Personal finances have improved	0.172	0.341	0.500	0.616	-0.507	0.850
Resides in north	0.132	0.429	0.310	0.760	-0.721	0.984
Resides in Amazon	0.314	0.506	0.620	0.536	-0.691	1.319
Resides in highlands	-0.076	0.548	-0.140	0.890	-1.165	1.013
Resides in rural area	0.250	0.421	0.590	0.555	-0.588	1.087
Rightist ideology	-0.033	0.069	-0.480	0.635	-0.169	0.104
Wealth redistribution	-0.191	0.128	-1.500	0.138	-0.445	0.063
Public health service	0.233	0.158	1.480	0.143	-0.080	0.547
Nationalisations	-0.191	0.080	-2.380	0.019	-0.351	-0.032
Free trade	0.004	0.108	0.040	0.970	-0.210	0.218
Limit opposition voice	-0.026	0.100	-0.260	0.795	-0.225	0.173
Direct democracy	0.023	0.103	0.230	0.821	-0.182	0.229
Minorities to follow majority	0.021	0.105	0.200	0.842	-0.188	0.230
Constant	-3.113	1.742	-1.790	0.077	-6.576	0.349

N = 807. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2011 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Humala). Effects of region are compared to base category 'Lima'.
Source: Author's calculations based on LAPOP 2012.

Table C14: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2011: Linguistic Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
HUMALA	base outcome					
FUJIMORI						
White (Mestizo)	0.193	0.363	0.530	0.597	-0.529	0.915
Indigenous (Mestizo)	0.474	0.388	1.220	0.225	-0.297	1.244
Parents speak indigenous language	-0.522	1.514	-0.340	0.731	-3.530	2.486
Income	-0.051	0.034	-1.510	0.134	-0.119	0.016
Female	0.943	0.187	5.050	0.000	0.572	1.314
Age	-0.015	0.007	-2.280	0.025	-0.029	-0.002
Trust in parties	-0.013	0.064	-0.210	0.836	-0.140	0.114
Participation in protests	-0.864	0.281	-3.070	0.003	-1.423	-0.305
National economy has improved	0.285	0.221	1.290	0.200	-0.154	0.724

Table C14: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2011: Linguistic Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P > [t]	95% confidence intervals	
Personal finances have improved	-0.297	0.265	-1.120	0.264	-0.824	0.229
Resides in north	-0.417	0.311	-1.340	0.183	-1.034	0.201
Resides in Amazon	-0.164	0.383	-0.430	0.669	-0.925	0.596
Resides in highlands	-0.341	0.392	-0.870	0.387	-1.119	0.438
Resides in rural area	-0.006	0.283	-0.020	0.982	-0.568	0.555
Rightist ideology	0.079	0.051	1.560	0.124	-0.022	0.180
Wealth redistribution	-0.093	0.113	-0.830	0.410	-0.317	0.131
Public health service	0.053	0.127	0.420	0.677	-0.199	0.305
Nationalisations	-0.103	0.066	-1.560	0.121	-0.233	0.028
Free trade	0.082	0.100	0.820	0.412	-0.116	0.281
Limit opposition voice	-0.117	0.082	-1.420	0.158	-0.279	0.046
Direct democracy	-0.079	0.079	-1.000	0.320	-0.236	0.078
Minorities to follow majority	0.148	0.081	1.830	0.070	-0.013	0.308
INTERACTIONS with Ind. language:						
Rightist ideology	-0.166	0.137	-1.210	0.230	-0.438	0.107
Wealth redistribution	-0.018	0.220	-0.080	0.935	-0.456	0.420
Public health service	-0.074	0.213	-0.350	0.731	-0.497	0.350
Nationalisations	-0.035	0.135	-0.260	0.798	-0.303	0.233
Free trade	0.110	0.170	0.650	0.519	-0.228	0.448
Limit opposition voice	0.157	0.182	0.860	0.391	-0.205	0.519
Direct democracy	0.068	0.182	0.370	0.709	-0.294	0.430
Minorities to follow majority	-0.212	0.159	-1.330	0.186	-0.527	0.104
Income	0.105	0.071	1.490	0.141	-0.035	0.246
Constant	0.541	0.970	0.560	0.578	-1.386	2.468
KUCZYNSKI						
White (Mestizo)	0.401	0.467	0.860	0.393	-0.527	1.329
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-2.010	1.055	-1.900	0.060	-4.107	0.088
Parents speak indigenous language	-5.329	2.317	-2.300	0.024	-9.933	-0.725
Income	0.074	0.052	1.430	0.157	-0.029	0.177
Female	0.667	0.313	2.130	0.036	0.046	1.289
Age	-0.032	0.009	-3.780	0.000	-0.049	-0.015
Trust in parties	0.026	0.090	0.290	0.773	-0.153	0.205
Participation in protests	-1.059	0.540	-1.960	0.053	-2.132	0.015
National economy has improved	0.217	0.508	0.430	0.671	-0.793	1.227
Personal finances have improved	-0.587	0.395	-1.490	0.141	-1.372	0.197
Resides in north	-0.726	0.431	-1.690	0.095	-1.582	0.130
Resides in Amazon	-0.428	0.367	-1.170	0.246	-1.158	0.301
Resides in highlands	0.284	0.477	0.590	0.553	-0.664	1.231
Resides in rural area	-0.666	0.463	-1.440	0.154	-1.587	0.255
Rightist ideology	0.035	0.086	0.410	0.683	-0.136	0.206
Wealth redistribution	-0.192	0.133	-1.440	0.153	-0.457	0.073
Public health service	0.095	0.160	0.600	0.553	-0.223	0.414
Nationalisations	-0.191	0.079	-2.420	0.018	-0.348	-0.034
Free trade	-0.069	0.126	-0.550	0.585	-0.319	0.181
Limit opposition voice	-0.023	0.103	-0.220	0.827	-0.227	0.182
Direct democracy	-0.060	0.102	-0.580	0.562	-0.263	0.144
Minorities to follow majority	0.076	0.110	0.690	0.490	-0.142	0.295
INTERACTIONS with Ind. language:						
Rightist ideology	0.298	0.136	2.190	0.031	0.027	0.569
Wealth redistribution	-0.798	0.527	-1.520	0.133	-1.845	0.248
Public health service	0.513	0.345	1.490	0.140	-0.172	1.199
Nationalisations	-0.208	0.191	-1.090	0.281	-0.588	0.173
Free trade	0.123	0.235	0.520	0.602	-0.344	0.590
Limit opposition voice	-0.206	0.241	-0.860	0.395	-0.684	0.272
Direct democracy	-0.295	0.176	-1.680	0.097	-0.646	0.055
Minorities to follow majority	0.523	0.221	2.370	0.020	0.084	0.961
Income	0.378	0.167	2.260	0.026	0.046	0.709
Constant	1.016	1.268	0.800	0.425	-1.504	3.535
TOLEDO						
White (Mestizo)	-0.109	0.544	-0.200	0.841	-1.190	0.972
Indigenous (Mestizo)	0.243	0.788	0.310	0.758	-1.323	1.810
Parents speak indigenous language	-3.548	2.669	-1.330	0.187	-8.852	1.757
Income	0.129	0.067	1.920	0.058	-0.004	0.262
Female	0.830	0.333	2.490	0.015	0.168	1.492
Age	0.005	0.009	0.520	0.601	-0.013	0.023
Trust in parties	0.026	0.110	0.230	0.816	-0.192	0.243
Participation in protests	-0.379	0.425	-0.890	0.376	-1.224	0.466
National economy has improved	-0.524	0.476	-1.100	0.275	-1.470	0.423
Personal finances have improved	0.142	0.349	0.410	0.685	-0.551	0.836
Resides in north	0.115	0.450	0.260	0.799	-0.779	1.009
Resides in Amazon	0.253	0.525	0.480	0.631	-0.790	1.295
Resides in highlands	0.046	0.523	0.090	0.930	-0.994	1.086
Resides in rural area	0.266	0.425	0.630	0.533	-0.578	1.110
Rightist ideology	-0.037	0.084	-0.440	0.664	-0.204	0.130
Wealth redistribution	-0.234	0.169	-1.380	0.170	-0.570	0.102
Public health service	0.169	0.187	0.910	0.368	-0.202	0.540
Nationalisations	-0.148	0.114	-1.290	0.199	-0.375	0.079
Free trade	-0.109	0.120	-0.910	0.366	-0.347	0.129
Limit opposition voice	-0.103	0.137	-0.750	0.452	-0.376	0.169
Direct democracy	-0.056	0.139	-0.410	0.686	-0.332	0.219
Minorities to follow majority	0.079	0.145	0.540	0.588	-0.209	0.366
INTERACTIONS with Ind. language:						
Rightist ideology	-0.065	0.156	-0.420	0.678	-0.374	0.244
Wealth redistribution	0.189	0.292	0.650	0.519	-0.392	0.771
Public health service	0.079	0.355	0.220	0.825	-0.627	0.785
Nationalisations	-0.130	0.180	-0.720	0.473	-0.487	0.228
Free trade	0.404	0.222	1.820	0.073	-0.038	0.846
Limit opposition voice	0.213	0.235	0.910	0.366	-0.253	0.679
Direct democracy	0.206	0.226	0.910	0.364	-0.243	0.656
Minorities to follow majority	-0.164	0.191	-0.860	0.391	-0.543	0.214
Income	0.027	0.110	0.250	0.807	-0.192	0.246
Constant	-1.830	2.126	-0.860	0.392	-6.054	2.395

Table C14: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2011: Linguistic Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	

N = 807. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2011 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Humala), with two-way interactions between linguistic group and the indicated non-ethnic voter characteristic. Effects of region are compared to base category 'Lima'.
Source: Author's calculations based on LAPOP 2012.

Table C15: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2011: Self-Identification Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
HUMALA						
FUJIMORI						
White (Mestizo)	2.848	2.466	1.150	0.251	-2.053	7.750
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-2.795	4.380	-0.640	0.525	-11.499	5.909
Speaks an indigenous language	-0.756	0.315	-2.400	0.018	-1.381	-0.130
Income	-0.032	0.034	-0.920	0.358	-0.100	0.036
Female	1.001	0.198	5.060	0.000	0.607	1.394
Age	-0.015	0.007	-2.150	0.034	-0.030	-0.001
Trust in parties	-0.011	0.061	-0.180	0.858	-0.131	0.110
Participation in protests	-0.988	0.325	-3.040	0.003	-1.634	-0.343
National economy has improved	0.281	0.220	1.280	0.204	-0.155	0.718
Personal finances have improved	-0.292	0.275	-1.060	0.291	-0.839	0.255
Resides in north	-0.470	0.314	-1.500	0.138	-1.093	0.154
Resides in Amazon	-0.277	0.380	-0.730	0.467	-1.032	0.477
Resides in highlands	-0.275	0.401	-0.690	0.495	-1.071	0.522
Resides in rural area	-0.006	0.288	-0.020	0.984	-0.577	0.566
Rightist ideology	0.108	0.051	2.130	0.036	0.007	0.210
Wealth redistribution	-0.058	0.100	-0.580	0.565	-0.256	0.140
Public health service	0.008	0.105	0.080	0.939	-0.200	0.216
Nationalisations	-0.112	0.057	-1.970	0.052	-0.225	0.001
Free trade	0.046	0.084	0.540	0.589	-0.122	0.213
Limit opposition voice	-0.039	0.069	-0.570	0.571	-0.177	0.098
Direct democracy	-0.054	0.073	-0.740	0.460	-0.199	0.091
Minorities to follow majority	0.003	0.084	0.030	0.973	-0.164	0.170
INTERACTIONS						
White * Rightist ideology	-0.235	0.130	-1.810	0.073	-0.493	0.022
Indigenous * Rightist ideology	-0.617	0.488	-1.270	0.209	-1.587	0.352
White * Wealth redist.	-0.043	0.480	-0.090	0.929	-0.997	0.911
Indigenous * Wealth redist.	-1.734	0.560	-3.100	0.003	-2.847	-0.621
White * Public health service	0.024	0.553	0.040	0.965	-1.075	1.124
Indigenous * Public health service	1.137	0.299	3.800	0.000	0.543	1.730
White * Nationalisations	-0.190	0.179	-1.060	0.293	-0.545	0.166
Indigenous * Nationalisations	-0.450	0.278	-1.620	0.108	-1.002	0.102
White * Free trade	-0.080	0.343	-0.230	0.815	-0.761	0.601
Indigenous * Free trade	2.156	1.060	2.030	0.045	0.050	4.263
White * Limit opp. voice	-0.433	0.267	-1.620	0.108	-0.964	0.097
Indigenous * Limit opp. voice	-0.253	0.485	-0.520	0.603	-1.218	0.711
White * Direct democracy	-0.110	0.257	-0.430	0.669	-0.621	0.400
Indigenous * Direct democracy	-0.237	0.264	-0.900	0.371	-0.762	0.287
White * Minorities follow maj.	0.714	0.337	2.120	0.037	0.044	1.385
Indigenous * Minorities follow maj.	0.527	0.345	1.530	0.130	-0.158	1.213
White * Income	-0.055	0.115	-0.480	0.634	-0.284	0.174
Indigenous * Income	0.252	0.135	1.860	0.066	-0.017	0.521
KUCZYNSKI						
White (Mestizo)	-1.564	3.763	-0.420	0.679	-9.041	5.913
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-48.167	2.880	-16.730	0.000	-53.889	-42.444
Speaks an indigenous language	-1.610	0.344	-4.670	0.000	-2.295	-0.926
Income	0.121	0.052	2.330	0.022	0.018	0.224
Female	0.736	0.295	2.490	0.015	0.149	1.323
Age	-0.034	0.008	-4.070	0.000	-0.051	-0.018
Trust in parties	0.019	0.088	0.210	0.833	-0.155	0.192
Participation in protests	-0.830	0.522	-1.590	0.116	-1.868	0.209
National economy has improved	0.191	0.483	0.400	0.693	-0.768	1.151
Personal finances have improved	-0.522	0.367	-1.420	0.158	-1.252	0.207
Resides in north	-0.600	0.481	-1.250	0.215	-1.555	0.355
Resides in Amazon	-0.414	0.382	-1.080	0.281	-1.174	0.345
Resides in highlands	0.371	0.493	0.750	0.454	-0.609	1.351
Resides in rural area	-0.808	0.483	-1.670	0.098	-1.767	0.152
Rightist ideology	0.075	0.088	0.850	0.399	-0.100	0.250
Wealth redistribution	-0.216	0.138	-1.570	0.121	-0.491	0.058
Public health service	0.064	0.152	0.420	0.676	-0.238	0.366
Nationalisations	-0.307	0.084	-3.650	0.000	-0.475	-0.140
Free trade	-0.102	0.113	-0.900	0.368	-0.326	0.122
Limit opposition voice	0.078	0.110	0.710	0.480	-0.141	0.297
Direct democracy	-0.094	0.091	-1.030	0.306	-0.276	0.087
Minorities to follow majority	0.050	0.115	0.430	0.666	-0.179	0.279
INTERACTIONS						
White * Rightist ideology	-0.114	0.231	-0.490	0.622	-0.574	0.345
Indigenous * Rightist ideology	0.113	0.211	0.540	0.592	-0.306	0.532
White * Wealth redist.	0.655	0.782	0.840	0.404	-0.898	2.208
Indigenous * Wealth redist.	-7.421	0.546	-13.600	0.000	-8.506	-6.337
White * Public health service	-0.457	0.589	-0.780	0.439	-1.628	0.713
Indigenous * Public health service	1.652	0.538	3.070	0.003	0.583	2.721
White * Nationalisations	0.348	0.335	1.040	0.302	-0.318	1.014
Indigenous * Nationalisations	5.188	0.513	10.120	0.000	4.169	6.207
White * Free trade	0.540	0.411	1.320	0.192	-0.276	1.356
Indigenous * Free trade	0.571	0.408	1.400	0.165	-0.239	1.381
White * Limit opp. voice	-0.498	0.298	-1.670	0.099	-1.090	0.095
Indigenous * Limit opp. voice	-4.911	0.686	-7.160	0.000	-6.274	-3.548
White * Direct democracy	-0.097	0.249	-0.390	0.697	-0.592	0.398
Indigenous * Direct democracy	3.361	0.537	6.260	0.000	2.294	4.429
White * Minorities follow maj.	0.438	0.335	1.310	0.194	-0.227	1.104
Indigenous * Minorities follow maj.	6.349	0.439	14.460	0.000	5.476	7.221
White * Income	-0.212	0.151	-1.400	0.164	-0.511	0.088

Table C15: Voter Characteristics and Vote Choice, Peru 2011: Self-Identification Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
Indigenous * Income	0.650	0.119	5.460	0.000	0.413	0.886
TOLEDO						
White (Mestizo)	-285.284	17.246	-16.540	0.000	-319.557	-251.011
Indigenous (Mestizo)	6.778	4.498	1.510	0.135	-2.161	15.717
Speaks an indigenous language	0.006	0.413	0.010	0.988	-0.814	0.826
Income	0.110	0.057	1.930	0.057	-0.003	0.223
Female	0.592	0.335	1.770	0.081	-0.074	1.258
Age	-0.002	0.010	-0.190	0.848	-0.022	0.018
Trust in parties	0.067	0.109	0.620	0.538	-0.149	0.283
Participation in protests	-0.466	0.391	-1.190	0.236	-1.242	0.310
National economy has improved	-0.332	0.452	-0.730	0.465	-1.231	0.567
Personal finances have improved	0.269	0.367	0.730	0.466	-0.461	0.998
Resides in north	0.214	0.422	0.510	0.613	-0.625	1.052
Resides in Amazon	0.288	0.504	0.570	0.569	-0.714	1.291
Resides in highlands	0.061	0.568	0.110	0.915	-1.068	1.189
Resides in rural area	0.093	0.424	0.220	0.828	-0.750	0.935
Rightist ideology	-0.012	0.074	-0.160	0.870	-0.159	0.135
Wealth redistribution	-0.111	0.140	-0.790	0.431	-0.388	0.167
Public health service	0.212	0.159	1.340	0.184	-0.103	0.528
Nationalisations	-0.238	0.094	-2.520	0.014	-0.426	-0.050
Free trade	-0.057	0.113	-0.500	0.615	-0.281	0.167
Limit opposition voice	0.038	0.105	0.370	0.714	-0.169	0.246
Direct democracy	0.006	0.126	0.050	0.961	-0.245	0.258
Minorities to follow majority	0.013	0.113	0.120	0.906	-0.212	0.239
INTERACTIONS						
White * Rightist ideology	-6.553	0.392	-16.730	0.000	-7.331	-5.775
Indigenous * Rightist ideology	-0.374	0.213	-1.760	0.082	-0.797	0.049
White * Wealth redist.	-60.726	2.383	-25.480	0.000	-65.462	-55.991
Indigenous * Wealth redist.	-0.021	0.325	-0.070	0.948	-0.667	0.624
White * Public health service	71.930	3.422	21.020	0.000	65.131	78.730
Indigenous * Public health service	-1.111	0.613	-1.810	0.073	-2.329	0.108
White * Nationalisations	8.076	0.605	13.340	0.000	6.873	9.280
Indigenous * Nationalisations	-0.274	0.448	-0.610	0.542	-1.164	0.615
White * Free trade	-33.672	1.499	-22.460	0.000	-36.652	-30.693
Indigenous * Free trade	1.458	0.605	2.410	0.018	0.255	2.661
White * Limit opp. voice	-9.147	0.571	-16.010	0.000	-10.283	-8.012
Indigenous * Limit opp. voice	0.114	0.446	0.260	0.799	-0.772	0.999
White * Direct democracy	3.657	0.715	5.110	0.000	2.236	5.079
Indigenous * Direct democracy	0.365	0.494	0.740	0.462	-0.617	1.347
White * Minorities follow maj.	9.425	0.804	11.720	0.000	7.827	11.022
Indigenous * Minorities follow maj.	-1.349	0.418	-3.230	0.002	-2.180	-0.518
White * Income	24.933	0.904	27.590	0.000	23.137	26.730
Indigenous * Income	-0.168	0.234	-0.720	0.475	-0.633	0.298
Constant	-2.848	2.031	-1.400	0.165	-6.885	1.190

N = 807. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2011 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Humala), with two-way interactions between self-identified group and the indicated non-ethnic voter characteristic. Effects of region are compared to base category 'Lima'.
Source: Author's calculations based on LAPOP 2012.

Table C16: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Peru 2011

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
HUMALA						
FUJIMORI						
White (Mestizo)	0.243	0.523	0.460	0.644	-0.797	1.283
Indigenous (Mestizo)	0.295	0.582	0.510	0.614	-0.864	1.454
Speaks an indigenous language	-0.784	0.431	-1.820	0.073	-1.641	0.074
Income	-0.016	0.042	-0.380	0.708	-0.100	0.068
Female	0.701	0.274	2.550	0.013	0.154	1.247
Age	-0.014	0.010	-1.440	0.153	-0.033	0.005
Trust in parties	-0.042	0.089	-0.470	0.636	-0.220	0.135
Participation in protests	-0.705	0.440	-1.600	0.113	-1.581	0.170
National economy has improved	0.245	0.322	0.760	0.449	-0.396	0.886
Personal finances have improved	-0.014	0.381	-0.040	0.970	-0.773	0.744
Resides in north	-0.981	0.457	-2.150	0.035	-1.890	-0.073
Resides in Amazon	-0.788	0.560	-1.410	0.163	-1.902	0.325
Resides in highlands	-0.745	0.596	-1.250	0.215	-1.932	0.441
Resides in rural area	0.081	0.374	0.220	0.829	-0.664	0.826
Rightist ideology	0.084	0.065	1.290	0.201	-0.046	0.215
Wealth redistribution	-0.090	0.141	-0.640	0.524	-0.370	0.190
Public health service	-0.071	0.141	-0.500	0.615	-0.350	0.209
Nationalisations	0.013	0.069	0.180	0.854	-0.125	0.150
Free trade	0.139	0.116	1.200	0.235	-0.092	0.369
Limit opposition voice	-0.068	0.092	-0.740	0.462	-0.250	0.115
Direct democracy	-0.169	0.107	-1.580	0.118	-0.382	0.044
Minorities to follow majority	0.152	0.089	1.710	0.090	-0.025	0.329
Dark-skinned people make bad leaders	-1.115	0.714	-1.560	0.122	-2.536	0.306
Supports racial quotas for university	0.040	0.065	0.620	0.539	-0.089	0.168
Indigenous poverty: cultural cause	0.031	0.324	0.090	0.925	-0.615	0.676
Constant	0.694	1.138	0.610	0.543	-1.569	2.958
KUCZYNSKI						
White (Mestizo)	-0.494	0.801	-0.620	0.539	-2.088	1.101
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-13.058	0.641	-20.390	0.000	-14.332	-11.783
Speaks an indigenous language	-0.947	0.491	-1.930	0.058	-1.924	0.031
Income	0.046	0.087	0.530	0.601	-0.127	0.218
Female	0.064	0.458	0.140	0.890	-0.847	0.975
Age	-0.027	0.014	-1.980	0.051	-0.054	0.000
Trust in parties	0.192	0.154	1.250	0.216	-0.114	0.498
Participation in protests	-1.740	0.819	-2.120	0.037	-3.370	-0.110
National economy has improved	-0.131	0.909	-0.140	0.886	-1.939	1.677
Personal finances have improved	-0.119	0.697	-0.170	0.865	-1.505	1.267
Resides in north	-0.542	0.575	-0.940	0.348	-1.686	0.602

Table C16: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Peru 2011

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
Resides in Amazon	-0.888	0.904	-0.980	0.329	-2.688	0.911
Resides in highlands	0.525	0.959	0.550	0.585	-1.382	2.433
Resides in rural area	-1.890	1.392	-1.360	0.178	-4.660	0.880
Rightist ideology	0.019	0.096	0.190	0.847	-0.172	0.209
Wealth redistribution	-0.033	0.222	-0.150	0.883	-0.475	0.409
Public health service	-0.356	0.195	-1.820	0.072	-0.745	0.033
Nationalisations	-0.336	0.149	-2.250	0.027	-0.633	-0.039
Free trade	0.401	0.188	2.130	0.036	0.027	0.776
Limit opposition voice	0.151	0.193	0.780	0.437	-0.234	0.536
Direct democracy	-0.038	0.161	-0.240	0.812	-0.359	0.282
Minorities to follow majority	-0.032	0.150	-0.220	0.830	-0.332	0.267
Dark-skinned people make bad leaders	-0.600	1.065	-0.560	0.575	-2.718	1.519
Supports racial quotas for university	-0.136	0.132	-1.030	0.306	-0.400	0.127
Indigenous poverty: cultural cause	0.231	0.600	0.390	0.701	-0.962	1.424
Constant	0.776	2.197	0.350	0.725	-3.594	5.147
TOLEDO						
White (Mestizo)	0.593	0.802	0.740	0.462	-1.003	2.189
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-0.534	1.528	-0.350	0.728	-3.575	2.506
Speaks an indigenous language	0.300	0.780	0.390	0.701	-1.251	1.852
Income	0.224	0.096	2.330	0.022	0.033	0.414
Female	0.167	0.494	0.340	0.736	-0.815	1.149
Age	0.012	0.018	0.680	0.501	-0.023	0.047
Trust in parties	-0.067	0.146	-0.460	0.650	-0.358	0.225
Participation in protests	-0.625	0.729	-0.860	0.394	-2.076	0.826
National economy has improved	0.276	0.676	0.410	0.684	-1.068	1.621
Personal finances have improved	0.034	0.634	0.050	0.957	-1.228	1.297
Resides in north	0.665	0.741	0.900	0.372	-0.809	2.138
Resides in Amazon	0.482	1.123	0.430	0.669	-1.752	2.715
Resides in highlands	0.173	0.830	0.210	0.835	-1.479	1.826
Resides in rural area	0.790	0.731	1.080	0.283	-0.663	2.244
Rightist ideology	-0.148	0.100	-1.480	0.143	-0.347	0.051
Wealth redistribution	0.345	0.251	1.370	0.174	-0.155	0.845
Public health service	0.215	0.355	0.610	0.545	-0.490	0.921
Nationalisations	-0.238	0.130	-1.830	0.071	-0.496	0.021
Free trade	0.027	0.144	0.190	0.852	-0.260	0.314
Limit opposition voice	-0.054	0.172	-0.320	0.753	-0.397	0.288
Direct democracy	0.001	0.137	0.000	0.996	-0.272	0.273
Minorities to follow majority	0.071	0.162	0.440	0.665	-0.252	0.394
Dark-skinned people make bad leaders	-13.986	0.603	-23.200	0.000	-15.185	-12.787
Supports racial quotas for university	-0.096	0.129	-0.750	0.458	-0.353	0.161
Indigenous poverty: cultural cause	0.750	0.553	1.360	0.179	-0.350	1.851
Constant	-6.609	3.473	-1.900	0.061	-13.520	0.302

N = 352. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2011 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Humala). Effects of region are compared to base category 'Lima'.
Source: Author's calculations based on LAPOP 2012.

Table C17: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Peru 2011: Self-Identification Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% confidence intervals	
HUMALA	base outcome					
FUJIMORI						
White (Mestizo)	0.261	0.522	0.500	0.618	-0.776	1.299
Indigenous (Mestizo)	0.283	0.575	0.490	0.624	-0.861	1.427
Speaks an indigenous language	-0.775	0.662	-1.170	0.245	-2.092	0.542
Income	-0.014	0.043	-0.320	0.746	-0.100	0.072
Female	0.682	0.273	2.490	0.015	0.138	1.225
Age	-0.013	0.010	-1.360	0.176	-0.032	0.006
Trust in parties	-0.049	0.089	-0.550	0.582	-0.226	0.128
Participation in protests	-0.695	0.444	-1.570	0.121	-1.579	0.188
National economy has improved	0.245	0.324	0.750	0.453	-0.400	0.889
Personal finances have improved	-0.004	0.376	-0.010	0.992	-0.751	0.743
Resides in north	-0.982	0.460	-2.140	0.036	-1.898	-0.067
Resides in Amazon	-0.755	0.571	-1.320	0.190	-1.891	0.380
Resides in highlands	-0.798	0.603	-1.320	0.189	-1.999	0.402
Resides in rural area	0.062	0.378	0.160	0.871	-0.691	0.814
Rightist ideology	0.085	0.065	1.300	0.197	-0.045	0.214
Wealth redistribution	-0.082	0.140	-0.590	0.560	-0.361	0.197
Public health service	-0.079	0.138	-0.570	0.567	-0.355	0.196
Nationalisations	0.013	0.071	0.180	0.856	-0.128	0.153
Free trade	0.139	0.117	1.190	0.239	-0.094	0.372
Limit opposition voice	-0.068	0.093	-0.730	0.465	-0.252	0.116
Direct democracy	-0.172	0.109	-1.580	0.118	-0.388	0.044
Minorities to follow majority	0.161	0.089	1.800	0.075	-0.016	0.339
Dark-skinned people make bad leaders	-1.277	0.906	-1.410	0.163	-3.080	0.526
Supports racial quotas for university	0.030	0.073	0.410	0.686	-0.115	0.174
Indigenous poverty: cultural cause	-0.058	0.422	-0.140	0.891	-0.898	0.782
INTERACTIONS with Ind. language:						
Dark-skinned people make bad leaders	0.617	1.634	0.380	0.706	-2.634	3.868
Supports racial quotas for university	-0.021	0.187	-0.110	0.912	-0.393	0.352
Indigenous poverty: cultural cause	0.310	0.752	0.410	0.681	-1.186	1.806
Constant	0.719	1.142	0.630	0.530	-1.552	2.991
KUCZYNSKI						
White (Mestizo)	-0.462	0.834	-0.550	0.581	-2.120	1.197
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-13.374	0.841	-15.900	0.000	-15.048	-11.701
Speaks an indigenous language	0.324	0.897	0.360	0.719	-1.461	2.109
Income	0.043	0.086	0.500	0.620	-0.128	0.214
Female	0.074	0.450	0.170	0.869	-0.821	0.969
Age	-0.027	0.014	-1.920	0.058	-0.054	0.001
Trust in parties	0.173	0.157	1.100	0.274	-0.140	0.487
Participation in protests	-1.654	0.845	-1.960	0.054	-3.335	0.027
National economy has improved	-0.041	0.925	-0.040	0.965	-1.882	1.799

Table C17: Ethnic Attitudes and Vote Choice, Peru 2011: Self-Identification Interactions

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P > [t]	95% confidence intervals	
Personal finances have improved	-0.221	0.715	-0.310	0.758	-1.644	1.202
Resides in north	-0.518	0.586	-0.890	0.379	-1.684	0.647
Resides in Amazon	-0.948	0.965	-0.980	0.329	-2.867	0.972
Resides in highlands	0.740	0.996	0.740	0.460	-1.242	2.721
Resides in rural area	-1.762	1.362	-1.290	0.199	-4.473	0.948
Rightist ideology	0.012	0.094	0.130	0.898	-0.175	0.199
Wealth redistribution	-0.027	0.213	-0.130	0.900	-0.450	0.396
Public health service	-0.346	0.192	-1.800	0.075	-0.729	0.036
Nationalisations	-0.330	0.135	-2.450	0.016	-0.597	-0.062
Free trade	0.393	0.191	2.060	0.043	0.014	0.772
Limit opposition voice	0.151	0.188	0.800	0.425	-0.224	0.525
Direct democracy	-0.042	0.157	-0.270	0.789	-0.356	0.271
Minorities to follow majority	-0.051	0.151	-0.340	0.736	-0.351	0.249
Dark-skinned people make bad leaders	-0.411	1.173	-0.350	0.727	-2.745	1.923
Supports racial quotas for university	-0.117	0.148	-0.790	0.434	-0.412	0.178
Indigenous poverty: cultural cause	0.227	0.707	0.320	0.749	-1.180	1.634
INTERACTIONS with Ind. language:						
Dark-skinned people make bad leaders	-12.336	1.571	-7.850	0.000	-15.462	-9.211
Supports racial quotas for university	-0.462	0.252	-1.830	0.071	-0.963	0.040
Indigenous poverty: cultural cause	-0.245	1.363	-0.180	0.858	-2.957	2.467
Constant	0.802	2.143	0.370	0.709	-3.462	5.066
TOLEDO						
White (Mestizo)	0.555	0.827	0.670	0.504	-1.090	2.200
Indigenous (Mestizo)	-0.810	1.705	-0.470	0.636	-4.202	2.582
Speaks an indigenous language	-3.688	1.770	-2.080	0.040	-7.210	-0.166
Income	0.209	0.102	2.040	0.044	0.006	0.412
Female	0.072	0.499	0.140	0.885	-0.920	1.064
Age	0.014	0.018	0.770	0.444	-0.022	0.050
Trust in parties	-0.002	0.167	-0.010	0.992	-0.333	0.330
Participation in protests	-0.842	0.752	-1.120	0.266	-2.338	0.655
National economy has improved	0.369	0.667	0.550	0.582	-0.959	1.697
Personal finances have improved	-0.076	0.689	-0.110	0.913	-1.446	1.295
Resides in north	0.903	0.714	1.260	0.210	-0.517	2.323
Resides in Amazon	0.769	1.158	0.660	0.508	-1.534	3.072
Resides in highlands	0.756	1.078	0.700	0.485	-1.389	2.900
Resides in rural area	0.477	0.817	0.580	0.561	-1.149	2.103
Rightist ideology	-0.134	0.094	-1.420	0.159	-0.321	0.053
Wealth redistribution	0.314	0.273	1.150	0.253	-0.229	0.858
Public health service	0.206	0.361	0.570	0.570	-0.512	0.924
Nationalisations	-0.226	0.127	-1.770	0.080	-0.480	0.027
Free trade	0.022	0.148	0.150	0.884	-0.274	0.317
Limit opposition voice	-0.048	0.175	-0.270	0.785	-0.395	0.300
Direct democracy	-0.016	0.131	-0.120	0.903	-0.277	0.245
Minorities to follow majority	0.046	0.155	0.290	0.769	-0.263	0.354
Dark-skinned people make bad leaders	-14.174	0.795	-17.820	0.000	-15.757	-12.592
Supports racial quotas for university	-0.301	0.152	-1.980	0.051	-0.603	0.002
Indigenous poverty: cultural cause	0.807	0.687	1.170	0.244	-0.560	2.175
INTERACTIONS with Ind. language:						
Dark-skinned people make bad leaders	0.408	1.231	0.330	0.741	-2.042	2.857
Supports racial quotas for university	0.912	0.282	3.230	0.002	0.351	1.473
Indigenous poverty: cultural cause	-0.670	1.344	-0.500	0.619	-3.345	2.004
Constant	-5.803	3.310	-1.750	0.083	-12.390	0.783

N = 352. Table show results from a multinomial logistic regression with 2011 vote choice as the dependent variable (base category is Humala), with two-way interactions between self-identified group and the indicated ethnic attitudes. Effects of region are compared to base category 'Lima'.
Source: Author's calculations based on LAPOP 2012.

Table C18: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Family Linguistic Background on Voting for Humala over Kuczynski, Peru 2011

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	.043^*	.004	.020	.014	.089	(P)
				.012	.085	(BC)
Trust in parties	-.002	.000	.007	-.016	.011	(P)
				-.021	.007	(BC)
Rightist ideology	.004	.001	.008	-.010	.024	(P)
				-.006	.027	(BC)
Wealth redistribution	.006	.001	.009	-.008	.029	(P)
				-.007	.030	(BC)
Public health service	.000	.000	.006	-.011	.011	(P)
				-.017	.008	(BC)
Nationalizations	.036^*	-.002	.017	.005	.072	(P)
				.012	.081	(BC)
Free trade	-.003	.001	.009	-.021	.016	(P)
				-.032	.006	(BC)
Limit opposition voice	.001	.000	.008	-.016	.019	(P)
				-.013	.023	(BC)
Direct democracy	.011	-.001	.012	-.011	.040	(P)
				-.004	.053	(BC)
Minorities are a threat	-.005	.000	.010	-.029	.011	(P)
				-.036	.007	(BC)
Total indirect effects	**.091^***	.004	.032	.038	.158	(P)
				.034	.156	(BC)
Direct effect	**.340^***	.010	.085	.181	.510	(P)
				.162	.498	(BC)
Total effects	**.431^***	.014	.077	.279	.590	(P)
				.261	.567	(BC)
Proportion of total effect mediated	**.211**					

N=476. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively.
Notes: Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of family linguistic background (parent(s) knowledge of an indigenous language) on vote choice (Humala over Kuczynksi) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated. Controls are: ethnic self-identification, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances. Mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender nd). Standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (666 repetitions across 19 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2012.

Table C19: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as White (compared with Mestizo) on Voting for Humala over Kuczynski, Peru 2011

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	-.004	.000	.009	-.025	.014	(P)
				-.026	.011	(BC)
Trust in parties	-.001	.000	.006	-.014	.011	(P)
				-.018	.008	(BC)
Rightist ideology	-.001	.000	.005	-.013	.009	(P)
				-.016	.006	(BC)
Wealth redistribution	.004	.000	.008	-.012	.022	(P)
				-.006	.033	(BC)
Public health service	.000	.000	.005	-.011	.012	(P)
				-.016	.009	(BC)
Nationalizations	.012	.000	.014	-.013	.045	(P)
				-.012	.047	(BC)
Free trade	-.001	.000	.005	-.013	.006	(P)
				-.019	.004	(BC)
Limit opposition voice	.002	.000	.012	-.022	.026	(P)
				-.020	.033	(BC)
Direct democracy	.000	.000	.008	-.016	.019	(P)
				-.017	.018	(BC)
Minorities are a threat	.005	.000	.008	-.008	.026	(P)
				-.004	.033	(BC)
Total indirect effects	**.015**	.000	.026	-.037	.069	(P)
				-.038	.062	(BC)
Direct effect	**-.024**	.003	.073	-.155	.142	(P)
				-.155	.136	(BC)
Total effects	**-.009**	.003	.069	-.130	.145	(P)
				-.128	.145	(BC)
Proportion of total effect mediated	**-1.746**					

N = 438. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively.
Notes: Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as white (compared with mestizo) on vote choice (Humala over Kuczynksi) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated. Controls are: family linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances. Mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender nd). Standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (995 repetitions across 19 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2012.

Table C20: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Self-Identification as Indigenous (compared with Mestizo) on Voting for Humala over Kuczynski, Peru 2011

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	.000	-.001	.014	-.031	.027	(P)
				-.029	.028	(BC)
Trust in parties	-.001	.000	.005	-.013	.008	(P)
				-.020	.006	(BC)
Rightist ideology	-.007	-.001	.010	-.031	.007	(P)
				-.034	.007	(BC)
Wealth redistribution	.000	-.003	.011	-.028	.019	(P)
				-.023	.027	(BC)
Public health service	.001	.001	.006	-.009	.017	(P)
				-.006	.022	(BC)
Nationalizations	.002	.001	.013	-.023	.030	(P)
				-.023	.031	(BC)
Free trade	-.007	.001	.012	-.030	.015	(P)
				-.042	.012	(BC)
Limit opposition voice	-.001	-.001	.006	-.018	.009	(P)
				-.023	.005	(BC)
Direct democracy	-.001	.001	.007	-.014	.016	(P)
				-.017	.009	(BC)
Minorities are a threat	.002	.000	.007	-.012	.017	(P)
				-.005	.030	(BC)
Total indirect effects	**-.012**	-.002	.029	-.073	.043	(P)
				-.066	.048	(BC)
Direct effect	**.172***	-.057	.088	-.068	.267	(P)
				.051	.332	(BC)
Total effects	**.159***	-.060	.088	-.076	.251	(P)
				.039	.318	(BC)
Proportion of total effect mediated	**-.078**					

N=436. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively.
Notes: Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of self-identification as indigenous (compared with mestizo) on vote choice (Humala over Kuczynksi) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated. Controls are: family linguistic background, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances. Mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender nd). Standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (647 repetitions across 19 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2012.

Table C21: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Family Linguistic Background on Voting for Humala over Kuczynski, Peru 2011 (includes racial attitudes)

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	.017	-.006	.027	-.039	.073	(P)
				-.013	.106	(BC)
Trust in parties	-.004	-.001	.014	-.039	.018	(P)
				-.053	.012	(BC)
Rightist ideology	.004	-.003	.013	-.034	.026	(P)
				-.012	.043	(BC)
Wealth redistribution	.000	.000	.013	-.025	.031	(P)
				-.025	.031	(BC)
Public health service	-.002	-.001	.033	-.074	.060	(P)
				-.062	.061	(BC)
Nationalizations	.058*	-.013	.031	-.009	.106	(P)

Table C21: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Family Linguistic Background on Voting for Humala over Kuczynski, Peru 2011 (includes racial attitudes)

Mediation variable	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
				.020	.145	(BC)
Free trade	.041^	.009	.031	.001	.128	(P)
				-.005	.103	(BC)
Limit opposition voice	-.005	-.003	.022	-.054	.033	(P)
				-.058	.030	(BC)
Direct democracy	-.016	-.007	.033	-.099	.028	(P)
				-.093	.031	(BC)
Minorities are a threat	.003	.003	.019	-.040	.046	(P)
				-.040	.046	(BC)
Dark-skinned are bad leaders	.005	-.004	.040	-.108	.079	(P)
				-.067	.106	(BC)
Supports racial quotas in universities	-.015	-.002	.028	-.079	.040	(P)
				-.079	.040	(BC)
Cultural cause of dark-skinned poverty	-.006	.001	.022	-.056	.036	(P)
				-.107	.010	(BC)
Total indirect effects	**.081**	-.026	.093	-.128	.261	(P)
				-.048	.315	(BC)
Direct effect	**.383^***	.031	.179	.076	.902	(P)
				.006	.787	(BC)
Total effects	**.464^***	.005	.170	.112	.898	(P)
				.099	.858	(BC)
Proportion of total effect mediated	**.175**					

N=180. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively.
Notes: Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of family linguistic background (parent(s) knowledge of an indigenous language) on vote choice (Humala over Kuczynksi) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated. Controls are: ethnic self-identification, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances. Mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender nd). Standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (181 repetitions across 18 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2012.

Table C22: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Family Linguistic Background on Voting for Humala over Fujimori, Peru 2011

Mediation Variables	Coefficient	Bias	SE	95% confidence intervals		Type
Income	-.008	-.001	.010	-.029	.010	(P)
				-.029	.010	(BC)
Trust in parties	-.002	.000	.005	-.015	.007	(P)
				-.018	.004	(BC)
Rightist ideology	.004	.000	.007	-.008	.020	(P)
				-.006	.024	(BC)
Wealth redistribution	.001	.000	.004	-.007	.012	(P)
				-.005	.016	(BC)
Public health services	.000	.000	.004	-.008	.009	(P)
				-.008	.007	(BC)
Nationalisations	.014*	.001	.009	-.001	.035	(P)
				.000	.036	(BC)
Free trade	.007	.000	.007	-.004	.024	(P)
				-.003	.027	(BC)
Limit opposition voice	.003	.000	.005	-.006	.017	(P)
				-.003	.020	(BC)
Direct democracy	.006	.000	.007	-.004	.024	(P)
				-.002	.030	(BC)
Minorities are a threat	.001	.000	.005	-.008	.011	(P)
				-.004	.017	(BC)
Total indirect effects	**.025**	.000	.019	-.011	.062	(P)
				-.011	.062	(BC)
Direct effects	**.185^***	.002	.066	.051	.320	(P)
				.047	.316	(BC)
Total effect	**.210^***	.002	.065	.080	.342	(P)
				.078	.340	(BC)
Proportion of total effect mediated	**.118**					

N=607. ^ and * = significant based on 95 percent confidence intervals calculated with the percentile (P) and/or bias-correction (BC) method respectively.
Notes: Coefficients (except totals in bold) indicate the effect of family linguistic background (parent(s) knowledge of an indigenous language) on vote choice (Humala over Fujimori) as mediated through the mediation variable indicated. Controls are: ethnic self-identification, age, sex, region of residence, rural residence, participation in protests, and assessment of the national economy and personal finances. Mediation effects are computed with the user-written Stata command "binary_mediation" (Ender nd). Standard errors (SE) and confidence intervals are calculated with bootstrap (1000 repetitions across 19 strata), using the percentile (P) and bias-correction (BC) methods.
Source: Author's calculation based on LAPOP 2012.

Appendix D: The Peruvian Voting Experiment (Chapter Six)

Table D1: Peruvian Voting Experiment: Profile of Sample
Table D2: Voter Characteristics and Phase 1 Feeling Thermometer Ratings (with linguistic background)
Table D3: Voter Characteristics and Phase 1 Feeling Thermometer Ratings (with white self-identification)
Table D4: Voter Characteristics and Phase 1 Feeling Thermometer Ratings (with indigenous or cholo self-identification)
Table D5: Voter Characteristics and Phase 3 Feeling Thermometer Ratings (with linguistic background)
Table D6: Voter Characteristics and Phase 3 Feeling Thermometer Ratings (with white self-identification)
Table D7: Voter Characteristics and Phase 3 Feeling Thermometer Ratings (with indigenous or cholo self-identification)
Table D8: Voter Characteristics and Final Vote Choice
Note to Figure 6.11: Possible explanation for unexplained pattern in the control group
Figure D1: The Effect of Ascribed Personal Characteristics on Final Vote Choice

Table D1: Peruvian Voting Experiment: Profile of Sample

Age	**18-25**	**26-35**	**36-45**	**46-55**	**56-65**	**Over 65**
	91	49	39	23	13	2
Gender	**Male**	**Female**				
	108	109				
Residence	**Lima Met.**	**Lima Prov.**	**North Coast**	**North Highlands**	**South Coast**	**South Highlands**
	116	20	19	28	27	10
	Central highlands	**Amazon**				
	18	0				
Education	**Primary**	**Secondary**	**Superior**			
	7	49	161			
Parents' linguistic background	**Spanish only**	**Indigenous language**				
	179	37				
Ethnic self-identification	**Indigenous**	**Cholo**	**Mestizo**	**White**	**Black**	**Other**
	4	41	124	31	5	12
Occupation	**Unemployed**	**Salaried work**	**Informal work**	**Student**	**Retired**	**Other**
	28	88	32	54	3	12
Total						217

Notes: The table shows the key demographic indicators of the experimental sample. Lima Met. = Metropolitan Lima; Lima prov. = Province of Lima.
Source: Peruvian voting experiment

Table D2: Voter Characteristics and Phase 1 Feeling Thermometer Ratings (with linguistic background)

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95% conf intervals	
P1 thermometer feelings, Olarte over Romero						
Perceived position on nationalisations P1	0.143	0.062	2.31	0.023	0.020	0.266
Perceived position on presidential powers P1	0.013	0.080	0.16	0.871	-0.146	0.172
Perceived position on social spending P1	0.044	0.074	0.59	0.557	-0.103	0.191
Perceived leftist ideology P1	0.005	0.057	0.08	0.936	-0.108	0.118
Age	0.104	1.418	0.07	0.942	-2.700	2.907
Female	-5.427	3.513	-1.55	0.125	-12.374	1.520
Education	13.301	3.948	3.37	0.001	5.493	21.109
Income	-2.092	0.976	-2.14	0.034	-4.023	-0.161
Parents speak indigenous language	1.813	4.499	0.40	0.688	-7.085	10.711
Political knowledge	-8.160	2.720	-3.00	0.003	-13.540	-2.779
Support for labour flexibilisation	0.048	0.070	0.68	0.499	-0.091	0.187
Support for social investment	0.052	0.075	0.69	0.494	-0.097	0.201
Support for neoliberalism	-0.105	0.084	-1.25	0.215	-0.271	0.061
Support for indigenous rights	0.154	0.076	2.01	0.046	0.003	0.305
Support for increased presidential powers	0.062	0.080	0.77	0.441	-0.097	0.221
Support for restrictions on foreign companies	-0.033	0.071	-0.47	0.637	-0.173	0.106
Leftist ideology	-0.319	0.110	-2.89	0.004	-0.537	-0.101
Constant	-6.695	20.174	-0.33	0.741	-46.596	33.207
P1 thermometer feelings, Sánchez over Rodriguez						
Perceived position on nationalisations P1	0.131	0.101	1.30	0.202	-0.073	0.336
Perceived position on presidential powers P1	-0.024	0.123	-0.20	0.844	-0.272	0.223
Perceived position on social spending P1	0.130	0.116	1.12	0.270	-0.105	0.364
Perceived leftist ideology P1	-0.100	0.099	-1.01	0.320	-0.300	0.101
Age	2.013	2.140	0.94	0.352	-2.305	6.332
Female	4.933	5.778	0.85	0.398	-6.728	16.594
Education	0.146	5.920	0.02	0.980	-11.801	12.093
Income	-2.161	1.871	-1.16	0.255	-5.936	1.614
Parents speak indigenous language	1.528	9.951	0.15	0.879	-18.554	21.609
Political knowledge	-3.930	3.807	-1.03	0.308	-11.614	3.753
Support for labour flexibilisation	-0.252	0.128	-1.97	0.056	-0.510	0.006
Support for social investment	-0.089	0.118	-0.76	0.453	-0.328	0.149
Support for neoliberalism	0.065	0.117	0.55	0.584	-0.172	0.302
Support for indigenous rights	0.032	0.130	0.25	0.806	-0.231	0.295
Support for increased presidential powers	-0.163	0.125	-1.31	0.198	-0.415	0.089
Support for restrictions on foreign companies	-0.163	0.121	-1.34	0.186	-0.408	0.082
Leftist ideology	0.172	0.199	0.87	0.392	-0.229	0.574
Constant	22.990	31.553	0.73	0.470	-40.686	86.666

N = 154 (T1/T2); *N* = 60 (C).
Coefficients are linear regression coefficients from separate OLS regression models (one for each candidate pair) with the difference between each candidate's P1 'feeling thermometer' rating as the dependent variable (0-100 scale, from negative to positive views). 'Perceived position…' variables are the differences between the voter's placement of the two candidates on the relevant issue-scales after P1. All other independent variables refer to the voter's self-reported characteristics.
Source: Peruvian voting experiment

Table D3: Voter Characteristics and Phase 1 Feeling Thermometer Ratings (with white self-identification)

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95 % Conf. intervals	
P1 thermometer feelings, Olarte over Romero						
Perceived position on nationalisations P1	0.147	0.060	2.440	0.016	0.028	0.266
Perceived position on presidential powers P1	0.016	0.081	0.200	0.838	-0.143	0.176
Perceived position on social spending P1	0.046	0.074	0.620	0.537	-0.101	0.193
Perceived leftist ideology P1	-0.001	0.057	-0.020	0.981	-0.113	0.110
Age	0.129	1.413	0.090	0.928	-2.665	2.923
Female	-5.734	3.553	-1.610	0.109	-12.762	1.294
Education	13.014	3.942	3.300	0.001	5.218	20.810
Income	-1.991	0.986	-2.020	0.045	-3.940	-0.041
Self-identifies as white	-3.331	5.538	-0.600	0.549	-14.284	7.622
Political knowledge	-8.158	2.711	-3.010	0.003	-13.520	-2.796
Support for labour flexibilisation	0.050	0.070	0.710	0.477	-0.088	0.188
Support for social investment	0.053	0.075	0.700	0.484	-0.096	0.201
Support for neoliberalism	-0.115	0.084	-1.370	0.174	-0.281	0.051
Support for indigenous rights	0.152	0.076	2.000	0.048	0.002	0.303
Support for increased presidential powers	0.062	0.080	0.780	0.439	-0.096	0.221

Table D3: Voter Characteristics and Phase 1 Feeling Thermometer Ratings (with white self-identification)

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95 % Conf. intervals	
Support for restrictions on foreign companies	-0.035	0.071	-0.500	0.617	-0.175	0.105
Leftist ideology	-0.319	0.110	-2.910	0.004	-0.536	-0.102
Constant	-4.296	20.195	-0.210	0.832	-44.239	35.647
P1 thermometer feelings, Sánchez over Rodriguez						
Perceived position on nationalisations P1	0.132	0.102	1.290	0.203	-0.074	0.338
Perceived position on presidential powers P1	-0.021	0.121	-0.180	0.862	-0.265	0.223
Perceived position on social spending P1	0.127	0.115	1.110	0.275	-0.105	0.359
Perceived leftist ideology P1	-0.096	0.095	-1.010	0.316	-0.288	0.095
Age	2.017	2.110	0.960	0.345	-2.239	6.273
Female	4.799	5.684	0.840	0.403	-6.663	16.261
Education	0.072	5.841	0.010	0.990	-11.707	11.852
Income	-2.219	1.754	-1.270	0.213	-5.756	1.317
Self-identifies as white	-0.369	7.499	-0.050	0.961	-15.491	14.754
Political knowledge	-3.988	3.784	-1.050	0.298	-11.619	3.643
Support for labour flexibilisation	-0.251	0.126	-1.990	0.053	-0.506	0.003
Support for social investment	-0.092	0.116	-0.790	0.434	-0.326	0.143
Support for neoliberalism	0.066	0.118	0.560	0.580	-0.173	0.304
Support for indigenous rights	0.033	0.128	0.260	0.798	-0.226	0.292
Support for increased presidential powers	-0.162	0.122	-1.330	0.192	-0.408	0.084
Support for restrictions on foreign companies	-0.165	0.122	-1.350	0.184	-0.411	0.081
Leftist ideology	0.174	0.197	0.890	0.380	-0.222	0.571
Constant	24.068	31.323	0.770	0.446	-39.102	87.237

N = 154 (T1/T2); *N* = 61 (C).
Coefficients are linear regression coefficients from separate OLS regression models (one for each candidate pair) with the difference between each candidate's P1 'feeling thermometer' rating as the dependent variable (0-100 scale, from negative to positive views). 'Perceived position…' variables are the differences between the voter's placement of the two candidates on the relevant issue-scales after P1. All other independent variables refer to the voter's self-reported characteristics.
Source: Peruvian voting experiment

Table D4: Voter Characteristics and Phase 1 Feeling Thermometer Ratings (with indigenous or cholo self-identification)

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95 % Conf. intervals	
P1 thermometer feelings, Olarte over Romero						
Perceived position on nationalisations P1	0.156	0.061	2.57	0.011	0.036	0.275
Perceived position on presidential powers P1	0.022	0.081	0.27	0.786	-0.138	0.182
Perceived position on social spending P1	0.050	0.074	0.67	0.502	-0.097	0.197
Perceived leftist ideology P1	0.008	0.057	0.14	0.886	-0.104	0.121
Age	0.370	1.430	0.26	0.797	-2.459	3.198
Female	-5.139	3.514	-1.46	0.146	-12.089	1.810
Education	12.866	3.940	3.27	0.001	5.074	20.658
Income	-2.100	0.973	-2.16	0.033	-4.025	-0.175
Self-identifies as indigenous or *cholo*	4.128	4.469	0.92	0.357	-4.710	12.967
Political knowledge	-7.946	2.722	-2.92	0.004	-13.33	-2.561
Support for labour flexibilisation	0.051	0.070	0.73	0.466	-0.087	0.189
Support for social investment	0.061	0.075	0.81	0.418	-0.088	0.210
Support for neoliberalism	-0.118	0.084	-1.41	0.161	-0.284	0.048
Support for indigenous rights	0.151	0.076	1.98	0.049	0.000	0.301
Support for increased presidential powers	0.065	0.080	0.81	0.418	-0.093	0.223
Support for restrictions on foreign companies	-0.044	0.072	-0.62	0.537	-0.186	0.097
Leftist ideology	-0.324	0.109	-2.96	0.004	-0.540	-0.107
Constant	-5.780	20.002	-0.29	0.773	-45.341	33.781
P1 thermometer feelings, Sánchez over Rodriguez						
Perceived position on nationalisations P1	0.115	0.100	1.15	0.257	-0.086	0.316
Perceived position on presidential powers P1	0.007	0.123	0.05	0.957	-0.241	0.255
Perceived position on social spending P1	0.123	0.113	1.09	0.283	-0.105	0.352
Perceived leftist ideology P1	-0.085	0.095	-0.90	0.374	-0.276	0.106
Age	2.021	2.076	0.97	0.336	-2.165	6.208
Female	5.599	5.679	0.99	0.330	-5.854	17.052
Education	-0.398	5.795	-0.07	0.946	-12.086	11.289
Income	-1.937	1.744	-1.11	0.273	-5.454	1.580
Self-identifies as indigenous or *cholo*	8.304	8.730	0.95	0.347	-9.301	25.909
Political knowledge	-4.236	3.657	-1.16	0.253	-11.611	3.140
Support for labour flexibilisation	-0.271	0.127	-2.14	0.038	-0.527	-0.016
Support for social investment	-0.104	0.116	-0.90	0.372	-0.338	0.129
Support for neoliberalism	0.082	0.115	0.71	0.481	-0.150	0.314
Support for indigenous rights	0.030	0.127	0.24	0.815	-0.226	0.285
Support for increased presidential powers	-0.177	0.122	-1.45	0.154	-0.422	0.069
Support for restrictions on foreign companies	-0.196	0.123	-1.59	0.118	-0.443	0.052
Leftist ideology	0.161	0.195	0.83	0.412	-0.232	0.554
Constant	26.035	30.285	0.86	0.395	-35.041	87.111

N = 154 (T1/T2); *N* = 61 (C).
Coefficients are linear regression coefficients from separate OLS regression models (one for each candidate pair) with the difference between each candidate's P1 'feeling thermometer' rating as the dependent variable (0-100 scale, from negative to positive views). 'Perceived position…' variables are the differences between the voter's placement of the two candidates on the relevant issue-scales after P1. All other independent variables refer to the voter's self-reported characteristics.
Source: Peruvian voting experiment

Table D5: Voter Characteristics and Phase 3 Feeling Thermometer Ratings (with linguistic background)

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95 % Conf. intervals	
P3 thermometer feelings, Olarte over Romero, T1						
Perceived position on nationalisations P3	0.094	0.112	0.840	0.407	-0.131	0.319
Perceived position on presidential powers P3	0.023	0.119	0.190	0.849	-0.217	0.262
Perceived position on social spending P3	-0.103	0.115	-0.900	0.372	-0.334	0.127
Perceived leftist ideology P3	-0.090	0.098	-0.920	0.363	-0.286	0.106
Age	0.569	3.221	0.180	0.860	-5.885	7.023
Female	-1.602	6.387	-0.250	0.803	-14.402	11.198
Education	-6.971	8.506	-0.820	0.416	-24.017	10.075
Income	-2.670	1.716	-1.560	0.125	-6.108	0.768

Table D5: Voter Characteristics and Phase 3 Feeling Thermometer Ratings (with linguistic background)

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95 % Conf. intervals	
Parents speak indigenous language	7.126	8.601	0.830	0.411	-10.111	24.363
Political knowledge	-0.283	4.941	-0.060	0.954	-10.186	9.619
Support for labour flexibilisation	0.326	0.137	2.390	0.020	0.052	0.599
Support for social investment	-0.181	0.152	-1.200	0.237	-0.485	0.123
Support for neoliberalism	0.220	0.149	1.480	0.145	-0.078	0.519
Support for indigenous rights	0.465	0.154	3.030	0.004	0.157	0.773
Support for increased presidential powers	0.308	0.142	2.180	0.034	0.025	0.592
Support for restrictions on foreign companies	-0.050	0.150	-0.340	0.738	-0.350	0.250
Leftist ideology	0.404	0.193	2.100	0.041	0.018	0.791
Constant	-36.720	37.552	-0.980	0.332	-111.975	38.535
P3 thermometer feelings, Olarte over Romero, T2						
Perceived position on nationalisations P3	0.022	0.150	0.150	0.883	-0.279	0.323
Perceived position on presidential powers P3	0.134	0.139	0.960	0.341	-0.145	0.412
Perceived position on social spending P3	0.022	0.155	0.140	0.890	-0.288	0.331
Perceived leftist ideology P3	-0.015	0.132	-0.110	0.911	-0.279	0.249
Age	-0.165	3.609	-0.050	0.964	-7.389	7.059
Female	-11.630	10.456	-1.110	0.271	-32.559	9.299
Education	-4.451	9.807	-0.450	0.652	-24.083	15.180
Income	-1.740	2.590	-0.670	0.504	-6.924	3.444
Parents speak indigenous language	-5.405	11.656	-0.460	0.645	-28.736	17.927
Political knowledge	-3.124	7.170	-0.440	0.665	-17.476	11.229
Support for labour flexibilisation	-0.172	0.195	-0.880	0.381	-0.561	0.218
Support for social investment	-0.135	0.213	-0.630	0.529	-0.560	0.291
Support for neoliberalism	-0.074	0.245	-0.300	0.763	-0.565	0.416
Support for indigenous rights	-0.094	0.218	-0.430	0.667	-0.531	0.342
Support for increased presidential powers	0.046	0.217	0.210	0.833	-0.389	0.481
Support for restrictions on foreign companies	-0.318	0.173	-1.840	0.071	-0.664	0.028
Leftist ideology	-0.017	0.312	-0.060	0.956	-0.642	0.607
Constant	98.105	51.891	1.890	0.064	-5.767	201.977
P3 thermometer feelings, Sánchez over Rodriguez, C						
Perceived position on nationalisations	0.055	0.165	0.330	0.739	-0.277	0.388
Perceived position on presidential powers	-0.102	0.160	-0.640	0.526	-0.424	0.220
Perceived position on social spending	0.134	0.125	1.070	0.290	-0.118	0.385
Perceived leftist ideology	-0.102	0.116	-0.870	0.387	-0.336	0.133
Age	-0.985	3.233	-0.300	0.762	-7.501	5.531
Female	0.970	8.173	0.120	0.906	-15.501	17.441
Education	4.571	8.811	0.520	0.606	-13.186	22.328
Income	-0.027	2.680	-0.010	0.992	-5.428	5.373
Parents speak indigenous language	15.427	15.189	1.020	0.315	-15.185	46.039
Political knowledge	-6.976	5.833	-1.200	0.238	-18.732	4.780
Support for labour flexibilisation	-0.347	0.177	-1.960	0.056	-0.703	0.010
Support for social investment	-0.180	0.171	-1.050	0.300	-0.525	0.166
Support for neoliberalism	-0.239	0.167	-1.430	0.159	-0.576	0.098
Support for indigenous rights	-0.248	0.192	-1.300	0.202	-0.635	0.138
Support for increased presidential powers	-0.387	0.173	-2.240	0.030	-0.735	-0.039
Support for restrictions on foreign companies	-0.446	0.158	-2.820	0.007	-0.765	-0.127
Leftist ideology	-0.365	0.288	-1.270	0.211	-0.945	0.214
Constant	105.608	39.571	2.670	0.011	25.857	185.359

N =73 (T1), 76 (T2), 62 (C).
Coefficients are linear regression coefficients from separate OLS regression models (one for each candidate pair/group) with the difference between each candidate's P3 'feeling thermometer' rating as the dependent variable (0-100 scale, from negative to positive views). 'Perceived position…' variables are the differences between the voter's placement of the two candidates on the relevant issue-scales after P3. All other independent variables refer to the voter's self-reported characteristics.
Source: Peruvian voting experiment

Table D6: Voter Characteristics and Phase 3 Feeling Thermometer Ratings (with indigenous/cholo self-identification)

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95 % Conf. intervals	
P3 thermometer feelings, Olarte over Romero, T1						
Perceived position on nationalisations P3	0.105	0.112	0.930	0.355	-0.120	0.330
Perceived position on presidential powers P3	0.028	0.121	0.230	0.819	-0.215	0.270
Perceived position on social spending P3	-0.108	0.117	-0.920	0.360	-0.341	0.126
Perceived leftist ideology P3	-0.096	0.099	-0.960	0.341	-0.295	0.104
Age	1.060	3.193	0.330	0.741	-5.339	7.459
Female	-1.154	6.408	-0.180	0.858	-13.996	11.688
Education	-7.688	8.517	-0.900	0.371	-24.756	9.380
Income	-2.558	1.752	-1.460	0.150	-6.069	0.954
Self-identifies as indigenous or cholo	-0.729	8.286	-0.090	0.930	-17.336	15.877
Political knowledge	-1.006	4.997	-0.200	0.841	-11.021	9.008
Support for labour flexibilisation	0.352	0.134	2.630	0.011	0.083	0.621
Support for social investment	-0.168	0.152	-1.100	0.274	-0.472	0.137
Support for neoliberalism	0.196	0.149	1.320	0.194	-0.103	0.496
Support for indigenous rights	0.468	0.156	3.000	0.004	0.155	0.781
Support for increased presidential powers	0.293	0.142	2.070	0.044	0.009	0.577
Support for restrictions on foreign companies	-0.015	0.151	-0.100	0.922	-0.317	0.288
Leftist ideology	0.403	0.195	2.070	0.044	0.012	0.794
Constant	-36.253	38.217	-0.950	0.347	-112.842	40.336
P3 thermometer feelings, Olarte over Romero, T2						
Perceived position on nationalisations P3	-0.007	0.156	-0.040	0.965	-0.320	0.306
Perceived position on presidential powers P3	0.161	0.144	1.120	0.269	-0.127	0.449
Perceived position on social spending P3	0.050	0.154	0.320	0.749	-0.259	0.358
Perceived leftist ideology P3	-0.010	0.127	-0.080	0.940	-0.265	0.246
Age	0.284	3.674	0.080	0.939	-7.070	7.639
Female	-10.931	10.351	-1.060	0.295	-31.650	9.788
Education	-6.131	10.080	-0.610	0.545	-26.307	14.046
Income	-1.349	2.617	-0.520	0.608	-6.587	3.889
Self-identifies as indigenous or cholo	9.640	12.749	0.760	0.453	-15.880	35.160
Political knowledge	-0.954	7.453	-0.130	0.899	-15.873	13.964
Support for labour flexibilisation	-0.150	0.196	-0.770	0.445	-0.542	0.241

Table D6: Voter Characteristics and Phase 3 Feeling Thermometer Ratings (with indigenous/cholo self-identification)

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95 % Conf. intervals	
Support for social investment	-0.103	0.218	-0.470	0.639	-0.540	0.334
Support for neoliberalism	-0.081	0.244	-0.330	0.743	-0.570	0.409
Support for indigenous rights	-0.097	0.217	-0.440	0.659	-0.532	0.339
Support for increased presidential powers	0.040	0.216	0.180	0.855	-0.394	0.473
Support for restrictions on foreign companies	-0.344	0.177	-1.950	0.056	-0.697	0.010
Leftist ideology	-0.032	0.308	-0.100	0.918	-0.648	0.584
Constant	94.326	51.615	1.830	0.073	-8.992	197.644
P3 thermometer feelings, Sánchez over Rodriguez, C						
Perceived position on nationalisations P3	0.106	0.164	0.650	0.519	-0.223	0.436
Perceived position on presidential powers P3	-0.186	0.162	-1.150	0.257	-0.512	0.140
Perceived position on social spending P3	0.182	0.116	1.570	0.124	-0.052	0.416
Perceived leftist ideology P3	-0.123	0.116	-1.060	0.296	-0.356	0.111
Age	-0.518	3.161	-0.160	0.870	-6.886	5.849
Female	1.103	7.968	0.140	0.891	-14.946	17.152
Education	2.943	8.613	0.340	0.734	-14.405	20.290
Income	0.454	2.498	0.180	0.856	-4.576	5.485
Self-identifies as indigenous or cholo	18.113	12.869	1.410	0.166	-7.807	44.032
Political knowledge	-8.753	5.546	-1.580	0.122	-19.923	2.417
Support for labour flexibilisation	-0.369	0.175	-2.110	0.040	-0.722	-0.017
Support for social investment	-0.198	0.167	-1.190	0.241	-0.534	0.138
Support for neoliberalism	-0.221	0.164	-1.350	0.183	-0.550	0.108
Support for indigenous rights	-0.275	0.190	-1.450	0.155	-0.657	0.108
Support for increased presidential powers	-0.425	0.170	-2.500	0.016	-0.768	-0.083
Support for restrictions on foreign companies	-0.484	0.156	-3.100	0.003	-0.798	-0.170
Leftist ideology	-0.377	0.281	-1.340	0.187	-0.943	0.189
Constant	115.207	37.282	3.090	0.003	40.118	190.297

N =73 (T1), 76 (T2), 63 (C).

Coefficients are linear regression coefficients from separate OLS regression models (one for each candidate pair/group) with the difference between each candidate's P3 'feeling thermometer' rating as the dependent variable (0-100 scale, from negative to positive views). 'Perceived position…' variables are the differences between the voter's placement of the two candidates on the relevant issue-scales after P3. All other independent variables refer to the voter's self-reported characteristics.

Source: Peruvian voting experiment

Table D7: Voter Characteristics and Phase 3 Feeling Thermometer Ratings (with white self-identification)

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95 % Conf. intervals	
P3 thermometer feelings, Olarte over Romero, T1						
Perceived position on nationalisations P3	0.108	0.123	0.880	0.383	-0.138	0.354
Perceived position on presidential powers P3	0.026	0.120	0.220	0.829	-0.215	0.268
Perceived position on social spending P3	-0.108	0.118	-0.910	0.367	-0.345	0.129
Perceived leftist ideology P3	-0.094	0.098	-0.960	0.342	-0.291	0.103
Age	1.097	3.184	0.340	0.732	-5.284	7.479
Female	-1.031	6.637	-0.160	0.877	-14.331	12.270
Education	-7.748	8.529	-0.910	0.368	-24.840	9.344
Income	-2.598	1.737	-1.500	0.140	-6.078	0.883
Parents speak indigenous language	0.702	12.949	0.050	0.957	-25.248	26.651
Political knowledge	-0.922	4.911	-0.190	0.852	-10.763	8.920
Support for labour flexibilisation	0.349	0.141	2.480	0.016	0.067	0.631
Support for social investment	-0.167	0.154	-1.090	0.282	-0.475	0.141
Support for neoliberalism	0.197	0.160	1.230	0.223	-0.124	0.518
Support for indigenous rights	0.466	0.155	3.020	0.004	0.156	0.776
Support for increased presidential powers	0.292	0.143	2.040	0.046	0.005	0.579
Support for restrictions on foreign companies	-0.019	0.146	-0.130	0.898	-0.311	0.273
Leftist ideology	0.402	0.194	2.070	0.043	0.012	0.791
Constant	-35.929	37.931	-0.950	0.348	-111.943	40.086
P3 thermometer feelings, Olarte over Romero, T2						
Perceived position on nationalisations P3	0.061	0.149	0.410	0.684	-0.238	0.360
Perceived position on presidential powers P3	0.112	0.138	0.810	0.420	-0.164	0.388
Perceived position on social spending P3	0.003	0.152	0.020	0.986	-0.302	0.307
Perceived leftist ideology P3	-0.003	0.125	-0.020	0.983	-0.253	0.248
Age	-0.116	3.533	-0.030	0.974	-7.187	6.956
Female	-8.701	10.356	-0.840	0.404	-29.431	12.029
Education	-0.420	10.018	-0.040	0.967	-20.473	19.632
Income	-2.518	2.614	-0.960	0.339	-7.751	2.715
Parents speak indigenous language	21.442	15.074	1.420	0.160	-8.732	51.616
Political knowledge	-5.864	7.348	-0.800	0.428	-20.573	8.845
Support for labour flexibilisation	-0.147	0.192	-0.760	0.449	-0.531	0.238
Support for social investment	-0.187	0.209	-0.900	0.374	-0.606	0.231
Support for neoliberalism	-0.101	0.242	-0.420	0.678	-0.585	0.384
Support for indigenous rights	-0.083	0.215	-0.390	0.699	-0.514	0.347
Support for increased presidential powers	0.056	0.214	0.260	0.796	-0.373	0.484
Support for restrictions on foreign companies	-0.255	0.175	-1.460	0.149	-0.605	0.094
Leftist ideology	0.036	0.308	0.120	0.907	-0.581	0.653
Constant	78.140	52.479	1.490	0.142	-26.909	183.189
P3 thermometer feelings, Sánchez over Rodriguez, C						
Perceived position on nationalisations P3	0.060	0.163	0.370	0.714	-0.268	0.388
Perceived position on presidential powers P3	-0.125	0.157	-0.790	0.432	-0.441	0.192
Perceived position on social spending P3	0.156	0.118	1.320	0.193	-0.082	0.393
Perceived leftist ideology P3	-0.086	0.115	-0.750	0.460	-0.318	0.146
Age	-0.585	3.207	-0.180	0.856	-7.044	5.874
Female	0.201	8.027	0.030	0.980	-15.965	16.368
Education	4.525	8.764	0.520	0.608	-13.126	22.176
Income	-0.500	2.537	-0.200	0.845	-5.609	4.610
Parents speak indigenous language	-8.980	9.806	-0.920	0.365	-28.731	10.770
Political knowledge	-8.395	5.606	-1.500	0.141	-19.687	2.896
Support for labour flexibilisation	-0.320	0.176	-1.820	0.075	-0.675	0.034
Support for social investment	-0.191	0.169	-1.130	0.264	-0.533	0.150
Support for neoliberalism	-0.252	0.166	-1.510	0.138	-0.587	0.084
Support for indigenous rights	-0.227	0.190	-1.190	0.239	-0.609	0.156
Support for increased presidential powers	-0.396	0.170	-2.330	0.024	-0.739	-0.053
Support for restrictions on foreign companies	-0.475	0.158	-3.000	0.004	-0.794	-0.156

Table D7: Voter Characteristics and Phase 3 Feeling Thermometer Ratings (with white self-identification)

Voter characteristic	Coeff.	SE	t	P < [t]	95 % Conf.	intervals
Leftist ideology	-0.421	0.285	-1.480	0.147	-0.995	0.153
Constant	117.771	37.869	3.110	0.003	41.498	194.044

N =73 (T1), 76 (T2), 63 (C).
Coefficients are linear regression coefficients from separate OLS regression models (one for each candidate pair/group) with the difference between each candidate's P3 'feeling thermometer' rating as the dependent variable (0-100 scale, from negative to positive views). 'Perceived position…' variables are the differences between the voter's placement of the two candidates on the relevant issue-scales after P3. All other independent variables refer to the voter's self-reported characteristics.
Source: Peruvian voting experiment

Table D8: Voter Characteristics and Final Vote Choice

Voter characteristic	Group and corresponding left-nationalist candidate	Coefficient	Standard Error
Income	T1 Olarte	- .0594**	.0226
	T2 Romero	.0691*	.0268
	C Rodriguez	.0563^	.0298
Indigenous language background	T1 Olarte	- .2033	.1170
	T2 Romero	-.0172	.1309
	C Rodriguez	- .4779**	.1031
Opposed to labour flexibilisation	T1 Olarte	.0038**	.0012
	T2 Romero	.0051**	.0014
	C Rodriguez	.0038**	.0012
Supports increased investment in social programs	T1 Olarte	- .0010	.0021
	T2 Romero	.0027	.0022
	C Rodriguez	- .0023	.0021
Opposed to neoliberalism	T1 Olarte	.0061**	.0022
	T2 Romero	.0027	.0026
	C Rodriguez	- .0018	.0020
Supports expanded indigenous rights	T1 Olarte	.0046*	.0022
	T2 Romero	.0013	.0023
	C Rodriguez	.0021	.0022
Supports increased presidential powers	T1 Olarte	.0053**	.0020
	T2 Romero	.0028	.0024
	C Rodriguez	.0038^	.0021
Supports restrictions on foreign companies	T1 Olarte	- .0013	.0021
	T2 Romero	.0009	.0020
	C Rodriguez	.0058**	.0017
Identifies with Leftist ideology	T1 Olarte	.0050^	.0027
	T2 Romero	.0013	.0033
	C Rodriguez	-.0015	.0033
Total significant measures (of which policy preferences)	**T1**	**7 (6)**	
	T2	**2 (1)**	
	C	**5 (3)**	

N=209; ^ = p<.10; * = p<.05; ** = p<.01
Coefficients are average marginal effects on the predicted probability of voting for the left-nationalist candidate, by each group. Results are based on a single logistic regression model, with two-way interactions between group and each voter characteristic.
Source: Peruvian voting experiment

Note to Figure 6.11: Possible explanation for unexpected vote pattern in the control group:

It is quite conceivable that a voter first correctly identifies candidate placements (e.g. according to Figure 6.8), then votes for the candidate who was closest to their own profile (so 'correctly' according to the voter-candidate affinity measure; 6.12), but appears to vote *incorrectly* according to the voter issue stand variable (Figure 6.11). For example, a voter may correctly identify the difference between their two candidates, placing the left-nationalist candidate (Rodriguez) at an average position of '35' and the neoliberal candidate (Sánchez) at '20'. The voter's own average issue stand is '30'. According to the voter issue stand measure, the 'correct' choice would be Sánchez (the voter's average stand is below '50', thus closer to the neoliberal 'pole' than the left-nationalist 'pole'), but according to the voter-candidate affinity measure, the 'correct' choice would be Rodriguez (5 points difference instead of 10). Although we might argue that the voter in question has not really identified the two candidates' stands 'correctly', placing Rodriguez too low, it is clear that she/he has correctly perceived the candidates' relative positions as well as their own position relative to both candidates. Overall, the voter-candidate affinity measure is probably a better guide to voters' motivations, although it does not consider misidentification of candidate stands in the first place.

FIGURE D1: The Effect of Ascribed Personal Characteristics on Final Vote Choice

N = 214.

The graphs show the predicted probability with 95 percent confidence intervals of voting for the Left-nationalist candidate (column one) and the Neoliberal candidate (column two) after Phase Three, by group, and according to whether a personal trait has been ascribed (green) or not ascribed (black 'X') to the candidate in question. Thus, a 'green' predicted probability above 0.5 suggests the ascription of the given trait is positively associated with a vote for the candidate, while a 'green' predicted probability below 0.5 suggests the ascription of the trait is negatively associated with a vote for the candidate. It is noteworthy that two of the more positive traits – 'hardworking, honest', and 'sophisticated' – tend to be positively associated with a vote for each candidate. It is similarly noteworthy that the ascription of the populist label tends to be negatively associated with a vote for each candidate. However, see Chapter Six for discussion on the unequal distribution of ascribed traits, as well as differences in the effect on vote choice of trait ascription, according to candidates' ethnic profile.

Appendix E: LAPOP Survey Questions and New Variable Coding

Table E1: LAPOP Bolivia Survey 2006
Table E2: LAPOP Bolivia Survey 2010
Table E3: LAPOP Ecuador Survey 2004
Table E4: LAPOP Ecuador Survey 2008
Table E5: LAPOP Ecuador Survey 2010
Table E6: LAPOP Peru Survey 2006
Table E7: LAPOP Peru Survey 2012

Table E1: LAPOP BOLIVIA SURVEY 2006
(used for Bolivia's 2005 election)

Variable[191]	LAPOP question(s) and response codes[192]	New variable coding[193]
Vote choice	BOLVB3 [VBPTY05] Por cuál partido o candidato votó para presidente? (No lea las alternativas) FREPAB (Eliceo Rodriguez)[1] MAS (Evo Morales) [2] MIP (Felipe Quispe "Mallku") [3] MNR (Michiaki Nagatani) [4] NFR (Gildo Angulo) [5] Podemos (Jorge Quiroga) [6] UN (Samuel Doria Medina) [7] USTB (Nestor Garcia) [8] Nulo, blanco[98]	Coded so that: [1] Evo Morales (2) [2] Jorge Quiroga (6) [3] Samuel Doria (7) [4] Michiaki Nagatani (4) [5] Other/Null (all other non-missing responses)
Speaks an indigenous language	LENG1. Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que ha hablado de pequeño en su casa? (acepte una alternativa) Castellano [1] Quechua [2] Aymara [3] Otro (nativo) [4] _____ Otro extranjero [5]_____	Coded so that: [1] = Indigenous (2, 3, 4) [0] = Non-indigenous (1, 5).
White, Mestizo, Indigenous	ETID. Ud. se considera una persona de raza blanca, chola, mestiza, indígena, negra u originario? Blanca [1] Mestiza [3] Indígena [4] Negra [5] Originaria [6] Otra _____ [7]	Coded so that: [1] = White (1) [2] = Mestizo (2, 5, 7) [3] = Indigenous (3, 6)
Aymara, Quechua, Other Indigenous, None	ETID2. [Census] ¿Se considera perteneciente a alguno de los siguientes pueblos originarios o indígenas? (leer todas las opciones) Quechua [1] Aymara[2] Guaraní[3] Chiquitano[4] Mojeño[5] Otro nativo[6] ninguno [7] otros _____ (especificar)	Coded so that: [1] = None (7) [2] = Aymara (2) [3] = Quechua (1) [4] = Other Indigenous (3, 4, 5, 6, espicificar)
Income	Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de esta casa, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan? [Mostrar tabla de ingresos] Nada [0] Menos de 250 Bs. [1] De 251 a 500 Bs. [2] De 501 a 1000 Bs. [3] De 1001 a 2000 Bs. [4] De 2001 a 5000 Bs. [5] De 5001 a 10.000 Bs. [6] De 10.001 a 20.000 Bs. [7] más de 20.000 [8]	Original coding.
Female	Q1. Sexo (*no pregunte*): Hombre [1] Mujer [2]	Original coding.
Age	Q2. Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años	Original coding.
Trust in parties	B21 [B30]. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los partidos políticos? Scale: [1] Nada; to [7] Mucho	Original coding.
Participation in protests	PROT1. ¿Ha participado Ud. en una manifestación o protesta pública? Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca? Algunas veces [1] casi nunca [2] nunca [3]	Coded so that: [0] = No (3) [1] = Yes (1, 2)
National economy has improved	SOCT2. ¿Considera Ud. que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que	Coded so that:

[191] Variable used in vote analysis.
[192] Original question wording in the LAPOP surveys, with original response coding in parentheses (in addition, most questions included 'do not know' and 'no answer' responses).
[193] Coding of the new variables used in the analysis. Square brackets show response categories of the new variables (i.e., those constructed by the author). Parentheses show the original response categories that were recoded into each new variable response category.

	hace doce meses? Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3]	[0] Not improved (2, 3) [1] Improved (1)
Personal finances have improved	IDIO2. ¿Considera Ud. que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3]	Coded so that: [0] Not improved (2, 3) [1] Improved (1)
Resides in *media luna*	DPT. Departamento: La Paz [1] Santa Cruz [2] Cochabamba [3] Oruro [4]Chuquisaca [5] Potosí [6]Pando [7] Tarija [8] Beni [9]	Coded so that: [0] Western highlands (1, 3, 4, 5, 6) [1] Media luna (2, 7, 8, 9)
Resides in rural area	UR. (1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país]	Coded so that: [0] Urban (1) [1] Rural (2)
Rightist ideology	L1. Mostrar tabla #1: Ahora para cambiar de tema.... En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de izquierdistas y derechistas, o sea, de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría Ud. en esta escala? Scale: 1 [Izquierda]; to 10 [Derecha]	Original coding.
Support for gas nationalisation	BOLREFM32 [REFM32]. ¿Con qué firmeza aprobaría o desaprobaría que el gobierno nacionalice las empresas petroleras para que YPFB se haga cargo de todas sus actividades? Scale: 1 [Desaprueba]; to 10 [Aprueba]	Original coding.
'Strongman' populist leader	AUT10. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está usted más de acuerdo? Lo que Bolivia más necesita es un Presidente fuerte y decidido que ponga orden con mano dura, [1] o Lo que el país necesita más es un Presidente que sepa dialogar y concertar con todos los sectores de la poblacíon? [2]	Coded so that: [0] = No (2) [1] Yes (1)
Direct democracy	JC20. Agunas personas dicen que estaríamos mejor sin partidos políticos. Otros dicen que necesitamos los partidos para representar los intereses de la gente. ¿Con cuál esta más de acuerdo? Sin partidos [1] Con partidos [2]	Coded so that: [0] = No (2) [1] = Yes (1)
Minorities to follow majority	AD2. De las siguientes frases ¿Cuál es la que mejor refleja su manera de pensar? En una democracia la minoría debe acatar y hacer lo que la mayoría diga. [1] En una democracia la mayoría manda pero se respetan los derechos de las minorías. [2]	Coded so that: [0] = No (2) [1] = Yes (1)
Prefer leader of same ethnicity	REP1. ¿Usted se sentiría mejor representado en el gobierno y el parlamento por líderes de su misma procedencia étnica o no importa la procedencia del líder sino su capacidad solamente? Líderes de la misma procedencia [1] No importa la procedencia [2]	Coded so that: [0] = No (2) [1] = Yes (1)
Prefer one national culture	NEWTOL8. Sería mejor para el país que exista una sola cultura nacional para todos o... 2) Los pueblos indígenas deberían mantener sus valores, cultura y lenguaje. Una sola cultura nacional [1] Mantener sus valores [2]	Coded so that: [0] = No (2) [1] = Yes (1)
Experience of discrimination	¿Alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o tratado de manera injusta por su apariencia física o su forma de hablar en los siguientes lugares: DIS1 En la escuela, colegio o universidad Sí [1] No [2] DIS2 En las oficinas del gobierno (juzgados, ministerios, alcaldías) Sí [1] No [2] DIS3 Cuando buscaba trabajo en alguna empresa o negocio Sí [1] No [2]	Coded as an additive index, with +1 for each affirmative response.

	DIS4 En reuniones o eventos sociales Sí [1] No [2] DIS5 En lugares públicos (como en la calle, la plaza o el mercado) Sí [1] No [2]	
Negative views of Aymara	BOLIT1A [IT1A] Ahora, hablando de distintos grupos de personas, ¿diría Ud. que en general los aymaras son gente ..? (lea alternativas) Muy confiable [1] Algo confiable [2] Poco confiable [3] Nada confiable [4]	Coded so that: [0] = No (1, 2) [1] = Yes (3, 4)
Negative views of Quechua	BOLIT1B [IT1B] Ahora, hablando de distintos grupos de personas, ¿diría Ud. que en general los quechuas son gente ..? (lea alternativas) Muy confiable [1] Algo confiable [2] Poco confiable [3] Nada confiable [4]	Coded so that: [0] = No (1, 2) [1] = Yes (3, 4)
Negative views of Camba	BOLIT1C [IT1C] Ahora, hablando de distintos grupos de personas, ¿diría Ud. que en general los cambas son gente ..? (lea alternativas) Muy confiable [1] Algo confiable [2] Poco confiable [3] Nada confiable [4]	Coded so that: [0] = No (1, 2) [1] = Yes (3, 4)
Negative views of whites	BOLIT1D [IT1D] Ahora, hablando de distintos grupos de personas, ¿diría Ud. que en general los blancos en Bolivia son gente ..? (lea alternativas) Muy confiable [1] Algo confiable [2] Poco confiable [3] Nada confiable [4]	Coded so that: [0] = No (1, 2) [1] = Yes (3, 4)

Table E2: LAPOP BOLIVIA SURVEY 2010
(used for Bolivia's 2009 election)

Variable	LAPOP question(s) and response codes	Measure construction
Vote choice	VB3. ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2009? [NO LEER LISTA] (00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la boleta en blanco, arruinó o anuló su voto) (1001) Gente (Román Loayza) (1002) MAS (Evo Morales) (1003) PP (Manfred Reyes Villa) (1004) AS (René Joaquino) (1005) BSD (Rime Choquehuanca) (1006) Pulso (Alejo Veliz) (1007) UN (Samuel Doria Medina) (1008) MUSPA (Ana María Flores) (77) Otro	Coded so that: [1] Evo Morales (1002) [2] Manfred Reyes Villa (1003) [3] Samuel Doria (1007) [4] Other/Null (all other non-missing responses)
Speaks an indigenous language	LENG1. ¿Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que habló de pequeño en su casa? [acepte una alternativa, no más] [No leer alternativas] (1001) Castellano (1002) Quechua (1003) Aymara (1006) Guaraní (1004) Otro (nativo) (1005) Otro extranjero	Coded so that: [1] = Indigenous (1002, 1003, 1006, 1004) [0] = Non-indigenous (1001, 1005).
White, Mestizo, Indigenous	ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena u originaria, negra o Afro-boliviana, mulata u otra? (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena/originaria (4) Negra o Afro-boliviana (5) Mulata (7) Otra	Coded so that: [1] = White (1) [2] = Mestizo (2, 4, 5, 7) [3] = Indigenous (3)
Aymara, Quechua, Other Indigenous, None	BOLETID2. [Census] ¿Se considera perteneciente a alguno de los siguientes pueblos originarios o indígenas? [Leer todas las opciones] (1) Quechua (2) Aymara (3) Guaraní (4) Chiquitano (5) Mojeño (6) Otro nativo (7) Ninguno (8) Otros _____ (especificar)	Coded so that: [1] = None (7) [2] = Aymara (2) [3] = Quechua (1) [4] = Other Indigenous (3, 4, 5, 6)
Income	Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan? [Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa al mes?] (00) Ningún ingreso (01) Menos de 250 Bs. (02) De 251 a 500 Bs. (03) De 500 a 800 Bs. (04) de 801 a 1,200 Bs. (05) De 1.201 a 2.000 Bs. (06) De 2.001 a 3.000 Bs. (07) de 3.001 a 5.000 Bs. (08) De 5.001 a 10.000 Bs. (09) De 10.000 a 20.000 Bs. (10) Más de 20.000 Bs.	Original coding.
Female	Q1. [Anotar, no preguntar] Género: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	Original coding.
Age	Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años	Original coding.
Trust in parties	B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los partidos políticos? Scale: [1] Nada; to [7] Mucho	Original coding.
Participation in protests	PROT3. ¿En los últimos 12 meses ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? (1) Sí ha participado (2) No ha participado (88) NS (98) NR	Coded so that: [0] = No (2) [1] = Yes (1)
National economy has improved	SOCT2. ¿Considera Ud. que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3] NS/NR [8]	Coded so that: [0] Not improved (2, 3) [1] Improved (1)
Personal finances have improved	IDIO2. ¿Considera Ud. que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace	Coded so that: [0] Not improved (2, 3)

	doce meses? Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3] NS/NR [8]	[1] Improved (1)
Resides in *media luna*	PROV. Departamento: La Paz [01] Santa Cruz [02] Cochabamba [03] Oruro [04] Chuquisaca [05] Potosí [06] Pando [07] Tarija [08] Beni [09]]	Coded so that: [0] Western highlands (01, 03, 04, 05, 06) [1] Media luna (02, 07, 08, 09)
Resides in rural area	UR. (1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país]	Coded so that: [0] Urban (1) [1] Rural (2)
Rightist ideology	L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la cual el número 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala? Scale: 1 [Izquierda]; to 10 [Derecha]	Original coding.
Wealth resdistribution	ROS4. El Estado boliviano debe implementar políticas firmes para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres . ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo]	Original coding.
Social security	ROS5. El Estado boliviano, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de proveer las pensiones de jubilación ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo] ROS6. El Estado boliviano, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de proveer los servicios de salud. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo]	Coded as the average (mean) of ROS5 and ROS5.
Nationalisations	ROS1. El Estado boliviano, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo]	Original coding.
Free trade	B48. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudan a mejorar la economía? Scale: 1 [Nada]; to 7 [Mucho]	Original coding.
Limit opposition voice	POP101. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo]	Original coding.
Direct democracy	POP107. El pueblo debe gobernar directamente y no a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo]	Original coding.
Minorities are a threat	POP113. Aquellos que no están de acuerdo con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo]	Original coding.
Mix of races 'good'	RAC3A. La mezcla de razas es buena para Bolivia. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación? Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo]	Original coding.
Approves of inter-racial marriage	RAC3B. Estaría de acuerdo que una hija o hijo suyo se casara con una persona indígena. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación? [Si el	Original coding.

	entrevistado no tiene hijos, pídale que suponga que los tiene] Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo]	
Indigenous poverty: innate/cultural cause	RAC1C. Según los datos del Censo de Población las personas indígenas u originarias son más pobres, en general, que el resto de la población. ¿Cuál cree usted que es la principal razón de esto? [Leer opciones] [Permitir sólo una respuesta] (1) Porque las personas indígenas no trabajan lo suficiente (2) Porque las personas indígenas son menos inteligentes (3) Porque las personas indígenas son tratadas de manera injusta (4) Porque las personas indígenas tienen bajo nivel educativo (5) Porque las personas indígenas no quieren cambiar su cultura	Coded so that: [0] = Disagree (3, 4) [1] = Agree (1, 2, 5)
Indigenous treated worse	RAC4. ¿Ud. cree que las personas indígenas son tratadas mucho mejor, mejor, igual, peor o mucho peor que las personas blancas? (1) Mucho mejor (2) Mejor (3) Igual (4) Peor (5) Mucho peor	Coded so that: [0] = No (1, 2, 3) [1] = Yes (4, 5)
Indigenous political influence	IND2. ¿Cuánta influencia cree usted que los grupos indígenas han tenido en la promulgación o aprobación de nuevas leyes en este país? [Leer Alternativas] (1) Mucha (2) Algo (3) Poca (4) Ninguna	Coded so that: [0] = None/little (3, 4) [1] = Some/a lot (1, 2)
Experience of discrimination	Pensando en los últimos cinco años, ¿alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o ha sido tratado mal o de manera injusta: [Repetir después de cada pregunta: muchas veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, o nunca] DIS11. Por su color de piel? ¿Usted diría que eso ha sucedido muchas veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, o nunca? (1) Muchas veces (2) Algunas veces (3) Pocas veces (4) Nunca DIS17. Se ha sentido discriminado por su forma de hablar o acento? (1) Muchas veces (2) Algunas veces (3) Pocas veces (4) Nunca DIS13. Por su condición económica (1) Muchas veces (2) Algunas veces (3) Pocas veces (4) Nunca	Each variable was recoded so that: [1] Never (4) [2] Rarely (3) [3] Sometimes (2) [4] Many times (1) Then an additive index was constructed from all three recoded variables.

Table E3: LAPOP ECUADOR SURVEY 2004
(used for Ecuador's 2002 election)

Variable	LAPOP question(s) and response codes	Measure construction
Vote choice	VB3. ¿Por cuál candidato votó para Presidente en la primera vuelta de las eleccions pasadas de 2002? (1) Lucio Edwin Gutiérrez Borbua (2) Alvaro Noboa Pontón (3) León Roldós Agulera (4) Rodrigo Borja Cevallos (5) Antonio Xavier Neira Menendez (6) Jacobo Bucaram Ortiz (7) Jacinto Velasquez Herrera (8) Ivonne Leyla Juez Abuchakra (9) Cesar Augutso Alarcon Costa (10) Osvaldo Hurtado Larrea (11) Carlos Antonio Vargas Guatatuca (12) Voto nulo/voto en blanco Otro _____	Coded so that: [1] Lucio Gutiérrez (1) [2] Alvaro Noboa (2) [3] León Roldós (3) [4] Rodrigo Borja (4) [5] Other/Null (all other non-missing responses)
White, Mestizo, Indigenous, Black	ETID. ¿Cómo se considera: indígena, negro (afro-ecuatoriano), mestizo, mulato, blanco u otro? Blanco [1] Mestizo [3] Indígena [4] Negro o Afro-Ecuatoriano [5] Mulato [6] Otra _____ [7]	Coded so that: [1] = White (1) [2] = Mestizo (2, 5, 7) [3] = Indigenous (3) [4] = Black (4, 6)
Income	Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales? [Mostrar lista de rangos Tarjeta E] (00) Ningún ingreso (01) Menos de $25 (02) Entre $26-$50 (03) $51-$100 (04) $101-$150 (05) $151-$200 (06) $201-$300 (07) $301-$400 (08) $401-$500 (09) $501-$750 (10) $751-$1000 (11) $1001-$1500 (12) $1501-$2000 (13) $2000 y más	Original coding.
Female	Q1. ANOTE: Sexo: Hombre [1] Mujer [2]	Original coding.
Age	Q2. Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años	Original coding.
Trust in parties	B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza UD. en los partidos políticos? Scale: [1] Nada; to [7] Mucho	Original coding.
National economy has improved	SOCT2. ¿Considera Ud. que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3]	Coded so that: [0] Not improved (2, 3) [1] Improved (1)
Personal finances have improved	IDIO2. ¿Considera Ud. que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3]	Coded so that: [0] Not improved (2, 3) [1] Improved (1)
Resides in coast, highlands, amazon	Estrato (1) Costa urbana (2) Costa rural (3) Sierra urbana (4) Sierra rural (5) Oriente norte (6) Oriente sur (8) Frontera norte (9) Frontera sur	Coded so that: [1] Coast (1, 2) [2] Highlands (3, 4) [3] Amazon (5, 6)
Resides in rural area	Area (1) Urbano (2) Rural	Coded so that: [0] Urban (1) [1] Rural (2)
Rightist ideology	L1. Ahora para cambiar de tema…. En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de	Original coding.

	izquierda a derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de izquierdistas y derechistas, o sea, de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría Ud. en esta escala? Scale: 1 [Izquierda]; to 10 [Derecha]	
'Strongman' populist leader	DEM11 ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos? (1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos	Coded so that: [0] = No (2) [1] = Yes (1)
President can bypass Congress	D43. ¿Qué tipo de President de República prefiere usted más? Uno que trate de solucionar los problemas a través de leyes aprobadas por el Congreso, aunque esto tarde mucho tiempo, o… Uno que trate de solucionar los problemas rápidamente, evidtando el Congreso si fuera necesario. (1) Leyes aprobadas por el Congreso (2) Rápidamente, evitando el Congreso	Coded so that: [0] = No (1) [1] = Yes (2)

Table E4: LAPOP ECUADOR SURVEY 2008
(used for Ecuador's 2006 election)

Variable	LAPOP question(s) and response codes	Measure construction
Vote choice	VB3. ¿Por quien votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2006? [NO LEER LISTA] (00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó boleta en blanco, o anuló su voto) [Pasar a ECUVB20] (901) Rafael Correa, Movimiento Alianza País - PAIS (902) Gilmar Gutiérrez, Partido Sociedad Patriótica - PSP (903) Jaime Damerval, Concertación de Fuerzas Populares - CFP (904) Cynthia Viteri, Partido Social Cristiano – PSC (905) Álvaro Noboa, Partido Renovador Institucional Acción Nacional - PRIAN (906) Luís Macas, Movimiento Pachakutik (907) León Roldós, Alianza RED-ID (908) Fernando Rosero, Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano – PRE (909) Luís Villacís, Movimiento Popular Democrático MPD (910) Marco Proaño Maya, Movimiento Reivindicación Democrática (911) Carlos Sagñay, Integración Nacional Alfarista (912) Lenín Torres, Movimiento Revolucionario Participación Popular - MPP (913) Marcelo Larrea, Alianza ALBA – Tercera República (77) Otro	Coded so that: [1] Alvaro Noboa (905) [2] Rafael Correa (901) [3] Gilmar Gutiérrez (902) [4] León Roldós (907) [5] Other/Null (all other non-missing responses)
White, Mestizo, Indigenous, Black	ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra o Afro-ecuatoriana, mulata, u otra? (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra o Afro-ecuatoriana (5) Mulata (7) Otra	Coded so that: [1] = White (1) [2] = Mestizo (2, 7) [3] = Indigenous (3) [4] = Black (4, 5)
Income	Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan? [Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa por mes?] [10 déciles basados en la moneda y distribución del país] (00) Ningún ingreso (01) Menos de $60 (02) Entre $61- $100 (03) $101-$200 (04) $201-$300 (05) $301-$500 (06) $501-$750 (07) $751-$1000 (08) $1001-1500 (09) $1501-$2000 (10) $2001 y más	Original coding.
Female	Q1. [Anotar, no preguntar] Género: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	Original coding.
Age	Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años	Original coding.
Trust in parties	B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los partidos políticos? Scale: [1] Nada; to [7] Mucho	Original coding.
Participation in protests	PROT3. ¿En los últimos 12 meses ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? (1) Sí ha participado (2) No ha participado (88) NS (98) NR	Coded so that: [0] = No (2) [1] = Yes (1)
National economy has improved	SOCT2. ¿Considera Ud. que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3] NS/NR [8]	Coded so that: [0] Not improved (2, 3) [1] Improved (1)
Personal finances have improved	IDIO2. ¿Considera Ud. que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3] NS/NR [8]	Coded so that: [0] Not improved (2, 3) [1] Improved (1)
Resides in coast, highlands, amazon	ESTRATOPRI: (901) Costa Urbana (902) Costa Rural (903) Sierra Urbana (904) Sierra Rural	Coded so that: [1] Coast (901, 902)

	(905) Oriente Norte (906) Oriente Sur	[2] Highlands (903, 904) [3] Amazon (905, 906)
Resides in rural area	UR. (1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país]	Coded so that: [0] Urban (1) [1] Rural (2)
Rightist ideology	L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la cual el número 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala? Scale: 1 [Izquierda]; to 10 [Derecha]	Original coding.
Wealth resdistribution	ROS4. El Estado ecuatoriano debe implementar políticas firmes para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres . ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo]	Original coding.
Nationalisations	ROS1. El Estado ecuatoriano, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo]	Original coding.
Free trade	B48. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudan a mejorar la economía? Scale: 1 [Nada]; to 7 [Mucho]	Original coding.
Limit opposition voice	POP101. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo]	Original coding.
Direct democracy	POP107. El pueblo debe gobernar directamente y no a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo]	Original coding.
Minorities are a threat	POP113. Aquellos que no están de acuerdo con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo]	Original coding.

Table E5: LAPOP ECUADOR SURVEY 2010
(used for Ecuador's 2009 election)

Variable	LAPOP question(s) and response codes	Measure construction
Vote choice	VB3. ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2009? [NO LEER LISTA] (00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la boleta en blanco, arruinó o anuló su voto) (901) Rafael Correa, Movimiento Alianza País - PAIS (902) Lucio Gutiérrez, Partido Sociedad Patriótica - PSP (903) Martha Roldos Bucaram, Alianza Izquierda Unida- RED/MIPD (904) Carlos Sagnay De La Bastida, Movimiento Triunfo Mil- MTM (905) Álvaro Noboa, Partido Renovador Institucional Acción Nacional - PRIAN (906) Melba Jacome, Movimiento Tierra Fertil- MTF (907) Diego Delgado Jara, Movimiento de Integracion y Transformacion Social- MITS (908) Carlos Gonzales Albornoz, Movimiento Independiente Justo y Solidario- MIJS (77) Otro	Coded so that: [1] Rafael Correa (901) [2] Lucio Gutiérrez (902) [3] Alvaro Noboa (905) [4] Other/Null (all other non-missing responses)
Parents speak an indigenous language	LENG4. Hablando del idioma que sus padres conocían, ¿sus padres hablan o hablaban [Leer alternativas]: (Encuestador: si uno de los padres hablaba sólo un idioma y el otro más de uno, anotar 2.) (1) Sólo castellano (2) Castellano e idioma nativo (3) Sólo idioma native (4) Castellano e idioma extranjero	Coded so that: [0] = None (1, 4) [1] = Indigenous language (2, 3)
White, Mestizo, Indigenous, Black	ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra, mulata, u otra? (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra (5) Mulata (7) Otra	Coded so that: [1] = White (1) [2] = Mestizo (2, 7) [3] = Indigenous (3) [4] = Black (4, 5)
Income	Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan? [Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa al mes?] (00) Ningún ingreso (01) Menos de $60 (02) Entre $61- $100 (03) $101-$200 (04) $201-$300 (05) $301-$500 (06) $501-$750 (07) $751-$1000 (08) $1001-1500 (09) $1501-$2000 (10) $2001 y más	Original coding.
Female	Q1. [Anotar, no preguntar] Género: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	Original coding.
Age	Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años	Original coding.
Trust in parties	B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los partidos políticos? Scale: [1] Nada; to [7] Mucho	Original coding.
Participation in protests	PROT3. ¿En los últimos 12 meses ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? (1) Sí ha participado (2) No ha participado (88) NS (98) NR	Coded so that: [0] = No (2) [1] = Yes (1)
National economy has improved	SOCT2. ¿Considera Ud. que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3] NS/NR [8]	Coded so that: [0] Not improved (2, 3) [1] Improved (1)
Personal finances have improved	IDIO2. ¿Considera Ud. que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3] NS/NR [8]	Coded so that: [0] Not improved (2, 3) [1] Improved (1)
Resides in coast, highlands, amazon	ESTRATOPRI: (901) Costa Urbana (902) Costa Rural (903) Sierra Urbana (904) Sierra Rural	Coded so that: [1] Coast (901, 902)

	(905) Oriente Norte (906) Oriente Sur	[2] Highlands (903, 904) [3] Amazon (905, 906)
Resides in rural area	UR. (1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país]	Coded so that: [0] Urban (1) [1] Rural (2)
Rightist ideology	L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la cual el número 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala? Scale: 1 [Izquierda]; to 10 [Derecha]	Original coding.
Wealth resdistribution	ROS4. El Estado ecuatoriano debe implementar políticas firmes para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres . ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo]	Original coding.
Social security	ROS5. El Estado ecuatoriano, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de proveer las pensiones de jubilación ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? ROS6. El Estado ecuatoriano, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de proveer los servicios de salud. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo]	Coded as the average (mean) of ROS5 and ROS5.
Nationalisations	ROS1. El Estado ecuatoriano, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo]	Original coding.
Free trade	B48. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudan a mejorar la economía? Scale: 1 [Nada]; to 7 [Mucho]	Original coding.
Limit opposition voice	POP101. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo]	Original coding.
Direct democracy	POP107. El pueblo debe gobernar directamente y no a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo]	Original coding.
Minorities are a threat	POP113. Aquellos que no están de acuerdo con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo]	Original coding.

Table E6: LAPOP PERU SURVEY 2006
(used for Peru's 2006 election)

Variable	LAPOP question(s) and response codes	Measure construction
Vote choice	PERVB3 ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en la primera vuelta? [NO LEER LISTA] 0. Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejo la cédula en blanco, o anuló su voto) 01. Ollanta Humala (Unión por el Perú (UPP) 02. Alan García (Partido Aprista Peruano - APRA) 03. Lourdes Flores (Unidad Nacional) 04. Martha Chávez (Alianza por el Futuro) 05. Valentín Paniagua (Frente de Centro) 06. Humberto Lay (Restauración Nacional) 77. Otro	Coded so that: [1] Ollanta Humala (01) [2] Alan García (02) [3] Lourdes Flores (03) [4] Martha Chávez (04) [5] Other/null (all other non-missing responses)
Parents speak indigenous language	PERLENG4. Hablando del idioma que sus padres conocían, ¿sus padres hablan o hablaban [Leer alternativas] (Encuestador: si uno de los padres hablaba sólo un idioma y el otro más de uno, anotar 2.) Sólo castellano [1] Castellano e idioma nativo [2] Sólo idioma nativo [3] Castellano e idioma extranjero [4]	Coded so that: [1] = Indigenous (2, 3) [0] = Non-indigenous (1, 4).
White, Mestizo, Indigenous	PERETIDA. Considera que su madre es o era una persona: blanca, mestiza, indígena, oriental, negra o mulata? (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra (5) Mulata (6) Oriental (7) Otra	Coded so that: [1] = White (1) [2] = Mestizo (2, 5, 6, 7) [3] = Indigenous (3)
Income	Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan? (00) Ningún ingreso (01 100 soles o menos (02) De 101 soles a 200 (03) De 201 a 400 soles (04) De 401 a 600 soles (05) De 601 a 800 soles (06) De 801 a 1,200 soles (07) De 1,201 a 1,600 soles (08) 1,601 a 2,000 soles (09) 2,001 a 3,000 soles (10) Más de 3,000 soles	Original coding.
Female	Q1. Sexo (*no pregunte*): Hombre [1] Mujer [2]	Original coding.
Age	Q2. Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años	Original coding.
Trust in parties	B21 ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los partidos políticos? Scale: [1] Nada; to [7] Mucho	Original coding.
Participation in protests	PROT2. ¿Ha participado Ud. en una manifestación o protesta pública? Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca? Algunas veces [1] casi nunca [2] nunca [3]	Coded so that: [0] = No (3) [1] = Yes (1, 2)
National economy has improved	SOCT2. ¿Considera Ud. que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3]	Coded so that: [0] Not improved (2, 3) [1] Improved (1)
Personal finances have improved	IDIO2. ¿Considera Ud. que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3]	Coded so that: [0] Not improved (2, 3) [1] Improved (1)
Resides in Lima, north, Amazon, highlands	Estratopri: (1) Costa Norte (2) Costa Sur (3) Lima (4) Selva (5) Sierra Centro (6) Sierra Norte (7) Sierra Sur (11) Ayacucho (12) Cusco (13) Huánuco (14) Junín (15) Pasco (16) San Martín (17) Ucayalí	Coded so that: [1] = Lima (2, 3) [2] = North (1) [3] = Amazon (4, 17)

		[4] = Highlands (5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16)
Resides in rural area	UR. (1) Urbano (2) Rural	Coded so that: [0] Urban (1) [1] Rural (2)
Grew up in rural area	MIG1. Durante su niñez, ¿dónde vivió Ud principalmente? en el campo? en un pueblo? O en una ciudad?: 1. En el campo 2. En un pueblo 3. En una ciudad	Coded so that: [0] = Urban (2, 3) [1] = Rural (1)
Rightist ideology	L1. Ahora para cambiar de tema.... En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de izquierdistas y derechistas, o sea, de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría Ud. en esta escala? Scale: 1 [Izquierda]; to 10 [Derecha]	Original coding.
Supports FTA with USA	PERGI7 ¿Usted cree que su situación económica mejorará si el Perú aprueba el TLC? (1) Sí (2) No	Coded so that: [0] = No (2) [1] = Yes (1)
Limit opposition voice	POP1. [Leer alternativas] 1. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición, [o al contrario], 2. Aunque atrase el progreso del país, nuestros presidentes no deben limitar la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición.	Coded so that: [0] = No (2) [1] = Yes (1)
'Strongman' populist leader	POP5. [Leer alternativas] 1. Nuestros presidentes deben hacer lo que el pueblo quiere aunque las leyes se lo impidan, [o al contrario], 2. Nuestros presidentes deben obedecer las leyes aunque al pueblo no le guste.	Coded so that: [0] = No (2) [1] = Yes (1)

Table E7: LAPOP PERU SURVEY 2012
(used for Peru's 2011 election)

Variable	LAPOP question(s) and response codes	Measure construction
Vote choice	VB3. ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2011, en la primera vuelta? [NO LEER LISTA] (00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la cédula en blanco, arruinó o anuló su voto) (1101) Ollanta Humala (Gana Perú) (1102) Keiko Fujimori (Fuerza 2011) (1103) Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (Alianza por el Gran Cambio) (1104) Alejandro Toledo (Perú Posible) (1105) Luis Castañeda Lossio (Solidaridad Nacional) (77) Otro	Coded so that: [1] Ollanta Humala (1101) [2] Keiko Fujimori (1102) [3] Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (1103) [4] Alejandro Toledo (1104) [5] Other/null (all other non-missing responses)
Parents speak indigenous language	LENG4. Hablando del idioma que sus padres conocían, ¿sus padres hablan o hablaban [Leer alternativas]: (Encuestador: si uno de los padres hablaba sólo un idioma y el otro más de uno, anotar 2.) (1) Sólo castellano/español (2) Castellano/español e idioma native (3) Sólo idioma nativo (4) Castellano/español e idioma extranjero	Coded so that: [1] = Indigenous (2, 3) [0] = Non-indigenous (1, 4).
White, Mestizo, Indigenous	ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra, mulata, u otra? [Si la persona entrevistada dice Afro-peruana, codificar como (4) Negra] (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra (5) Mulata (6) Oriental (7) Otra	Coded so that: [1] = White (1) [2] = Mestizo (2, 4, 5, 6, 7) [3] = Indigenous (3)
Income	Q10NEW. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiars mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan? [Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa al mes?] (00) Ningún ingreso (01) Menos de 110 soles (02) De 110 a 230 soles (03) De 231 a 340 soles (04) De 341 a 450 soles (05) De 451 a 560 soles (06) De 561 a 680 soles (07) De 681 a 790 soles (08) De 791 a 900 soles (09) De 901 a 1010 soles (10) De 1011 a 1180 soles (11) De 1181 a 1350 soles (12) De 1351 a 2030 soles (13) De 2031 a 2700 soles (14) De 2701 a 3380 soles (15) De 3381 a 4050 soles (16) Más de 4050 soles	Original coding.
Female	Q1. [Anotar, no preguntar] Género: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	Original coding.
Age	Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años	Original coding.
Trust in parties	B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los partidos políticos? Scale: [1] Nada; to [7] Mucho	Original coding.
Participation in protests	PROT3. ¿En los últimos 12 meses ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? (1) Sí ha participado (2) No ha participado	Coded so that: [0] = No (2) [1] = Yes (1)
National economy has improved	SOCT2. ¿Considera Ud. que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3]	Coded so that: [0] Not improved (2, 3) [1] Improved (1)
Personal finances have improved	IDIO2. ¿Considera Ud. que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? Mejor [1] Igual [2] Peor [3]	Coded so that: [0] Not improved (2, 3) [1] Improved (1)
Resides in Lima, north,	ESTRATOPRI.	Coded so that:

Amazon, highlands	(1101) Costa Norte (1102) Costa Sur (1103) Lima Metropolitana (1104) Selva (1105) Sierra Centro (1106) Sierra norte (1107) Sierra Sur	[1] Lima (1102, 1103) [2] North (1101) [3] Amazon (1104) [4] Highlands (1105, 1106, 1107)
Resides in rural area	UR. (1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país]	Coded so that: [0] Urban (1) [1] Rural (2)
Rightist ideology	L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la cual el número 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala? Scale: 1 [Izquierda]; to 10 [Derecha]	Original coding.
Wealth resdistribution	ROS4. El Estado peruano debe implementar políticas firmes para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres . ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo]	Original coding.
Public health service	ROS6. El Estado peruano, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de proveer los servicios de salud. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo]	Original coding.
Nationalisations	ROS1. El Estado peruano, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo]	Original coding.
Free trade	B48. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudan a mejorar la economía? Scale: 1 [Nada]; to 7 [Mucho]	Original coding.
Limit opposition voice	POP101. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo]	Original coding.
Direct democracy	POP107. El pueblo debe gobernar directamente y no a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo]	Original coding.
Minorities are a threat	POP113. Aquellos que no están de acuerdo con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? Scale: 1 [Muy en desacuerdo]; to 7 [Muy de acuerdo]	Original coding.